# ·1f CHANAN SINGH & ANOTHER v. JAi KAUR

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 803
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-08-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 774 of 1966
- **Bench:** J.C. Shah, Acting C.J, V. R.Amaswami, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1f-chanan-singh-another-v-jai-kaur-4697
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Pun;ab Pre-emp1ion Act, 1913, s. 15(2)(b)-Scope of-Amendment
by Amendment Act of 1964--JJ has retrosvective operation.
S, the owner of sdme land in a village in Punjab, died leaving a widow
and the respondent, his daughter by another wi'fe. The widow sold a pa'ft
of the land in February 1958 to the appell'!Ilts, whereupon the re.pondent
filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land sold. The trial eourt
decreed the suit and a first appeal was dismissed. A single bench of the
High Court allowed the second appeal on the view that the respondent
not being the widow's daughter, had no right of pre-emption under
s. 15(2) of the Punjab Pre..,mption Act, 1913, as amended by the Punjab
Pre-emption
Amendment Act, 1960. However, a division bench in a
Letters Patent appeal, relying on an amendment made by the Punjab Preemption Amendment Act, 1964 in s. 15(2) (b), reversed the judgment of
the single bench and decreed the suit.
'
It was eontended. in appeal to this Court that there is no indication in
the Amendment Act of 1964 that it is to have, retrospective operation and
the amendment made by it should be deemed to be only prospective.
HELD : The Amendment Act of 1964 was merely of a clarificatory or
declaratory nature. , Even in th~ absence of words which were inserted
by the: Amendment.Act of 1964 under s. 15(2)(b) the only possible inteqxetation and m@ning of the words "in the son or daughter of ouch
female" could have. :reference to and cover the son or daughter of the
husband of the •fem~le. The entire scheme of s. 15(2) is that the right
of pre-emption has _been confined to the issues of the last male holder
from whom the prdj>erty which has been •old came by inherit•nce. [805
HJ
Under s. !5(2)(b) the right of pre-emption would vest firstly in the
son or daughter of the husband of the female meaning thereby either her
own off-springs from the husband whom she had succeeded or the oon or
daughter of that,husl>and even from another wife. [806 G]
In the pre!ient..:Cllse the respondent was entitled to exercise hec right
of pre..,mption under paragraph First of clause (b) of s. 15(2) even before the Amendme!lt of 1964. Whatever doubts extsted they were removed by that Act which must be given retrospective operation. [807 E-F]
Ram Sarup v. Munshi & Ors., [1%3] 3 S.C.R. 858 and Mota Si~gh v.
Prem Parkash Kaur & Ors., I.LR. [1961] Punj. 614, 627; referred to.

## Text

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·1f
CHANAN SINGH & ANOTHER
v.
JAi KAUR
August 11, 1969
[J.C. SHAH, ACTING C.J., V. R.AMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J
Pun;ab Pre-emp1ion Act, 1913, s. 15(2)(b)-Scope of-Amendment
by Amendment Act of 1964--JJ has retrosvective operation.
S, the owner of sdme land in a village in Punjab, died leaving a widow
and the respondent, his daughter by another wi'fe. The widow sold a pa'ft
of the land in February 1958 to the appell'!Ilts, whereupon the re.pondent
filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land sold. The trial eourt
decreed the suit and a first appeal was dismissed. A single bench of the
High Court allowed the second appeal on the view that the respondent
not being the widow's daughter, had no right of pre-emption under
s. 15(2) of the Punjab Pre..,mption Act, 1913, as amended by the Punjab
Pre-emption
Amendment Act, 1960. However, a division bench in a
Letters Patent appeal, relying on an amendment made by the Punjab Preemption Amendment Act, 1964 in s. 15(2) (b), reversed the judgment of
the single bench and decreed the suit.
'
It was eontended. in appeal to this Court that there is no indication in
the Amendment Act of 1964 that it is to have, retrospective operation and
the amendment made by it should be deemed to be only prospective.
HELD : The Amendment Act of 1964 was merely of a clarificatory or
declaratory nature. , Even in th~ absence of words which were inserted
by the: Amendment.Act of 1964 under s. 15(2)(b) the only possible inteqxetation and m@ning of the words "in the son or daughter of ouch
female" could have. :reference to and cover the son or daughter of the
husband of the •fem~le. The entire scheme of s. 15(2) is that the right
of pre-emption has _been confined to the issues of the last male holder
from whom the prdj>erty which has been •old came by inherit•nce. [805
HJ
Under s. !5(2)(b) the right of pre-emption would vest firstly in the
son or daughter of the husband of the female meaning thereby either her
own off-springs from the husband whom she had succeeded or the oon or
daughter of that,husl>and even from another wife. [806 G]
In the pre!ient..:Cllse the respondent was entitled to exercise hec right
of pre..,mption under paragraph First of clause (b) of s. 15(2) even before the Amendme!lt of 1964. Whatever doubts extsted they were removed by that Act which must be given retrospective operation. [807 E-F]
Ram Sarup v. Munshi & Ors., [1%3] 3 S.C.R. 858 and Mota Si~gh v.
Prem Parkash Kaur & Ors., I.LR. [1961] Punj. 614, 627; referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 774 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
August 31, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 91 of 1961.
Harbans Singh, for the appellant.
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 1 S.CR.
Bishan Narain and S. K. Mthta, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J.
This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of a division bench of the Punjab High Court decreeiaig tlie
suit filed by the respondent for possession of certain land by preemption.
The facts may be shortly stated : Santa Singh was the owner
of some land in village Samadh Bhai, tehsil Moga.
He died
leaving a widow Smt. Sobhi.
He also left a daughter Smt. Jai
Kaur from his other wife.
On February 3, 1958 Smt. Sobhi
sold 73 ka.nals 14 marlas of land to the appe!lanL1, the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed being Rs. 8,000/-.
Smt. Jai
Kaur filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land which
had been sold by SmL Sobhi.
According to her a eonsideraJon
of Rs. 4,000/- only had been paid by the vendee.
The t::al
court decreed the suit in May 1959 granting a decree for possession on payment of Rs. 6,500/- together with costs.
The second
Additional Judge to whom an appeal was taken dismissed it.
In
the High Cou;l the ]earned Single Judge took the view that Smt.
Jai Kaur not being the daughter of the vendor Smt. Sobhi had
no right of pre-emption tmder s. 15 (2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 as amended by the Punjab Pre-e111ption Amendment Act, 1960. The suit was dismissed. Smt. Jai Kaur filed an
appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court.
Relying on an amendment made by the
P~njab Pre-emption
Amendment Act
1964 in the first paragraph of clause (b) of
sub-s. (2) of s. 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, hereinafter
called the Act, the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the
Single Judge and decreed the plaintiff's suit.
The relevant provisions oi the statute may now be noticed
together with the amendments made in 1960 and 1964. Section
15 of the Act was substituted bys. 4 of the Amendment Act, 1960.
According to the substituted section the right of pre-emption in
respect of agricultural land and village immoveable property shall
vest thus:-
(1)
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection ( 1 ) ,-
(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her
father or brother or the sale in respect of such
land or property is by the son or daughter of
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CHANAN ~INGH V. JAI KAUR (Grover, J.)
so 5
such female, after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest,-
(i) ii the sale is by such female, in her brother or
brothers son;
(ii) if \]le sale is by the son or daughter of such
fem!lle, in the mother's brother or the mother's
brothetfs sons of the vendor or vendors;"
By the Amendm~nt Act 1964 in the first paragraph of s. 15 ( 2 )( b)
between the words "such" and "female" the words "husba,nd of
the" were insetjed:
The result was that after the amendment
the portion of clause (b) relevant for our purpose was to read
as follows :
,
"FIRST, ln the son or daughter of such husband of
the femal~i" ,
Now if the Amendment Act of 1964 could be regarded as having
retrospective opera(ion so as to affect pending proceedings there
c:i,n be no disp"(ltti that the judgment of the division bench was
right and must! be affirmed.
The contention which has
been
raised on behalf of the appellants is that there is no indication
in the Amendmenf;IAct of 1964 that it was to have retrospective
operation and therefore the amendment made by it should be
deemed to be ~
prospective.
It may be mentioned that by
s. 6 of the Ame)'ldd'lent Act of 1960 a new section 31 was inserted
in. the Act. That section provided, "no court shall pass a decree
in a suit for p~e-einption whether instituted before or after the
commencement of :the Punjab Pre-emption Amendment Act of
1960 which is 1nc!;jnsistent with the provisions of the said Act."
In Ram Sarup >.r. Munshi & Ors.( 1) this Court held that the language used in s. ·Sl was comprehensive enough so as to require
an appellate court to give effect tC' the substantive provisions of
the Amending ,<\ct::whether the appeal before it was one against
a decree granting p~e-emptioo or one refusing that relief. Althou~h
s. 31 was inserted jn the Act for all times the phraseology employed therein d00$; not show that its language was meant to
cover those arn~dments which would be made subsequent to the
Amendment Act of 1960.
The word "said" can have reference
in the context only to the enactment of 1960 and to nc other.
It would not be. legitimate for the courts to give an extended
effect to a provision used and words employed warranted such a
course being followed.
That does not appear to be the case here.
Tt appears to 4s that the Amendment Act of 1964 was merely
of a clarificatory or declaratory nature. Even in the absence of
the words which '-Vere inserted by the Amendme.nt Act of 1964
in s. 15(2)(b} i])e only possible interpretation and meaning of
ilJ [1963J 3 S.9.R. 858.
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1970] I S.CR.
the words "in the son or daughter of such female"
could have
reference to and cover the son. or daughter of the husband of the
female.
The entire scheme of sub-s. (2) of s. 15 is that the right
or pre-emption has been confined to the issues of the last male
holder from whom the property which has been sold came by
inheritance.
Looking at clause (a) of sub-s. (2) where the propcny which has been sold has come to the female from her father
or brother by succession the right of pre-emption has been given
to her brother or brother's son.
As has been observed in More
Singh v. Prem Parkash Kaur & Ors.('), the predominant idea
seems to be that the property must not go outside the line of the
last male holder and the right has been given to his male lineal
descendants.
Where the sale is by the son or the daughter
of such female the right is given to the mother's brother or
their sons.
The principle which has been kept in view is that
the person on whom the right of pre-emption is conferred
must be a male lineal descendant of the last male holder of the
property sold.
This is so with regard to clause (a) of sub-s. (2).
Coming to clause ( b) where the sale is by a female of land or
property to which she has succeeded through her husband or
through her son in case the son has inherited the same from his
father the right of pre-emption is to vest firstly in
:be son or
daughter of such female and secondly in the husband's brother or
husband's brother's son of such female.
Now ii the son or
daughter of the female who has sold the property could rekr to
her sun or daughter from a hu.sband other than the one from
whom the property devolved on her, it would be contrary to the
scheme and purpose of sub-s. (2) which essentially is to vest the
right of pre-emption in the lineal descendants of the la : male
holder.
Similarly it is unthinkable that a husband's b11Jther or
husband's brother's son should have rC>f'erence to a
hus!Jand
to
whom
the property never belonged.
Jn other words it could
never be intended that if a female has had a previous husband who
has either died or with whom the marriage has been dissolved and
the female has remarried and succeeded to the proper!)
of her
second husband the brother or the brother's son of her previous
husband should be able to claim the right of pre-emption when
they had .nothing whatsoever to do with the property sought to be
pre-empted.
It would follow that under clause (b) the right of
pre-emption would vest firstly in the son or daughter of the husband
of the female me·ming thereby either her own off-spring from the
hush.and whom she has succeeded or the son or daughter of that
husband even from another wife.
If the above discussion is kept in view there is no difficulty i,n
attributing a retroactive intention to the
legislature when . the
Amendment Act of 1964 was enacted. It is well settled that 1f a
(I) f.L.R. 11961) Punj 61·1. 627.
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CHANAN SINGH v. JAI KAUR (Grover, J.)
8 07
statute is curative or merely declares the previous law retroactive
operation would be more rightly ascribed to it than the legislation
which may prejudicially affect past rights and transacti~. We
are in entire agreement with the following view expressed in a
recent full bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Moti Ram
v. Bakhwant Singh& Ors.(') in which a similar point came up !or
consideration :
"A close a!lalysis of paragraphs (First) and (Secondly) of Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15
before the qmendment introduced by Punjab Act 13 of
1964 would demonstrate that a son of the husband of a
female vendor. though not born from her womb would
be entitled to pre-empt, particularly when the husband's
brother and even the son of the husband's brother of
that female are accorded the right of pre-emption. To
reiterate, the right of pre-emption is accorded manifestly
on the principle of consanguinity, the property of the
female vendor being 'that of her husband, and there is no
reas(\n why the step-son should be excluded and the
nephew of the husband included.
From this alone it
must be inferred that the Legislature had intended to
include a step•SOn and consequently retrospective operation had to be given to .the amending Act as such a
constructi(\h ·appears to be in consonance and harmony
with the purpose o.f the Act".
The result, therefore, is that the respondent was entitled to exercise
her right of pre-emption under paragraph First of cl. (b) of sub-s.
(2) of s. 15 even, before the amendment made in 1964.
At any
rate whatever doubt~ existed they were removed by the Amendment Act of 1964. which must be given retrospective operation .
.
The appeal consequently fails and it is dismissed with costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) LL.R.[1968] I Punjab 104, 120.