# 2 S.C.R. 203 GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. & ANR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS

- **Citation:** [2014] 2 S.C.R. 203
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-01-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1102 of 2014
- **Bench:** R.M. Lodha, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2-s-c-r-203-godrej-boyce-mfg-co-ltd-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-29843
- **Pages:** 60

## Headnote

FOREST ACT, 1927:
s.35(3) - Mere issuance of a notice uls.35(3) is not
sufficient for any/and being .,declared a "private forest" within
the meaning of that expression as defined in s.2(f)(iii) of the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 - s.35(3)
A
B
c
is not intended to end the process with the mere issuance of 0
a notice but it also requires service of a notice on the owner
of the forest - The need for ensuring service is also to prevent
damage to or destruction of a forest - In the absence of any
fime period having been specified for deciding a show cause
notice issued u/s.35, it must be presumed that it must be
·decided within a reasonable time - In the instant case, notice
E
issued u/s.35(3) after its publication in the Gazette was not
acted upon either under the provisions of the Forest Act as
amended from time to time or under the Private Forests Act
- Admittedly, no attempt was made by the State to take over
possession of the disputed land at any point of time - On the
F
contrary, permissions were granted from time to time for
construction of buildings on the disputed land - Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said that any of these disputed
lands were 'forest' within the primary meaning of that word, or
even within the extended meaning given in s.2(c-i) of the
G
Private Forests Act - Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition
Act, 1975 - s.2(c-i), 2(f)(iii).
s.35(3) - Service of notice - Notice was issued to the
203
H
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 2 S.y.R.
A appellant in 1957 but no decision was taken thereon ti/11975,
that is, for about 18 years - This is an unusually long period
and undoubtedly much more than a reasonable time had
elapsed for enabling the State to take a decision on the notice
- Therefore, the said notice must, for all intents and purposes
B be treated as having become a dead letter - The said notice
cannot be described as a 'pipeline notice' since it cannot be
reasonably said that the pipeline extends from 1956-57 up
to 1975 - No citizen can reasonably be told after almost half
a century that he/she was issued a show cause notice (which
c was not serv,ed also) and based on the said notice his land
was declared a private forest about three decades ago and
that it vests in the State - State cannot be allowed to demolish
the massive constructions made thereon over the last half a
century - Basic principles of good governance must be
0 followed by every member of the Executive branch of the
State at all times keeping the interests of all citizens in mind
as also the larger public interest.
MAHARASHTRA PRIVATE FORESTS ACQUISITION.
ACT, 1975: s.2(f)(iii) - Service of notice - Word "issued" in
E s.2(f)(iii) of the Act, 1975 rlw s.35 of the Forest Act, 1927 -
Interpretation of - Held: It must be given a broad meaning in
the surrounding context in which it is used - The scheme of
s.35 of the Forest Act needs to be kept in mind while
considering ''issued" in s.2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act -
F A notice uls.35(3) ofthe Forest Act is intended to give an
opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter
alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in
respect of that forest - Such a notice pre-supposes the
existence of a forest - The owner of the forest is expected to
G file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the
notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in
support of the objections - After these basic requirements are
met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the
objections - This entire procedure obviously cannot be
H followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
205
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
owner is served with the notice - s. 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests
A
Act is not intended to apply to notices that had passed their
shelf-life and that only 'pipeline notices' issued in reasonably
close proximity to the coming into force of the Private Forests
Act are 'live' an

## Text

_Characters 0–39,647 of 115,253. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39647 for what follows._

(2014] 2 S.C.R. 203
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. & ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1102 of 2014)
JANUARY 30, 2014
[R.M. LODHA, MADAN B. LOKUR AND
KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]
FOREST ACT, 1927:
s.35(3) - Mere issuance of a notice uls.35(3) is not
sufficient for any/and being .,declared a "private forest" within
the meaning of that expression as defined in s.2(f)(iii) of the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 - s.35(3)
A
B
c
is not intended to end the process with the mere issuance of 0
a notice but it also requires service of a notice on the owner
of the forest - The need for ensuring service is also to prevent
damage to or destruction of a forest - In the absence of any
fime period having been specified for deciding a show cause
notice issued u/s.35, it must be presumed that it must be
·decided within a reasonable time - In the instant case, notice
E
issued u/s.35(3) after its publication in the Gazette was not
acted upon either under the provisions of the Forest Act as
amended from time to time or under the Private Forests Act
- Admittedly, no attempt was made by the State to take over
possession of the disputed land at any point of time - On the
F
contrary, permissions were granted from time to time for
construction of buildings on the disputed land - Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said that any of these disputed
lands were 'forest' within the primary meaning of that word, or
even within the extended meaning given in s.2(c-i) of the
G
Private Forests Act - Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition
Act, 1975 - s.2(c-i), 2(f)(iii).
s.35(3) - Service of notice - Notice was issued to the
203
H
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 2 S.y.R.
A appellant in 1957 but no decision was taken thereon ti/11975,
that is, for about 18 years - This is an unusually long period
and undoubtedly much more than a reasonable time had
elapsed for enabling the State to take a decision on the notice
- Therefore, the said notice must, for all intents and purposes
B be treated as having become a dead letter - The said notice
cannot be described as a 'pipeline notice' since it cannot be
reasonably said that the pipeline extends from 1956-57 up
to 1975 - No citizen can reasonably be told after almost half
a century that he/she was issued a show cause notice (which
c was not serv,ed also) and based on the said notice his land
was declared a private forest about three decades ago and
that it vests in the State - State cannot be allowed to demolish
the massive constructions made thereon over the last half a
century - Basic principles of good governance must be
0 followed by every member of the Executive branch of the
State at all times keeping the interests of all citizens in mind
as also the larger public interest.
MAHARASHTRA PRIVATE FORESTS ACQUISITION.
ACT, 1975: s.2(f)(iii) - Service of notice - Word "issued" in
E s.2(f)(iii) of the Act, 1975 rlw s.35 of the Forest Act, 1927 -
Interpretation of - Held: It must be given a broad meaning in
the surrounding context in which it is used - The scheme of
s.35 of the Forest Act needs to be kept in mind while
considering ''issued" in s.2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act -
F A notice uls.35(3) ofthe Forest Act is intended to give an
opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter
alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in
respect of that forest - Such a notice pre-supposes the
existence of a forest - The owner of the forest is expected to
G file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the
notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in
support of the objections - After these basic requirements are
met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the
objections - This entire procedure obviously cannot be
H followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
205
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
owner is served with the notice - s. 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests
A
Act is not intended to apply to notices that had passed their
shelf-life and that only 'pipeline notices' issued in reasonably
close proximity to the coming into force of the Private Forests
Act are 'live' and could be acted upon.
INTERPRETATION
OF
STATUTES:
Literal
interpretation or contextual interpretation - Held: Words in a
statute must be interpreted literally - But at the same time if
B
the context in which a word is used and the provisions of a·
statute inexorably suggest a subtext other than literal, then the
C
context becomes important - It is true that ordinary rule of
. construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily
carries - But the subject of legislation and the context in which
a word or expression is employed may require a departure
from the rule of literal construction.
The disputed land was given on perpetual lease in
1835 to FCB. In 1948, Godrej (Petitioner-G) acquired the
said land from NP successor in interest of FCB. The land
was described in the perpetual lease as "waste land". On
D
-27.8.1951, Salsette Estates (land Revenue Exemption
E
Abolition) Act, 1951 was passed which provided that
waste land not appropriated for cultivation vested in the
State. The State claimed that disputed land was not
brought under cultivation before 14.8.1951 and, therefore,
vested in it. Aggrieved, Petitioner-G filed suit. A consent
F
decree was passed on 8.1.1962 to the effect that disputed
land was appropriated and brought under cultivation
before 14.8.1951 and was property of Petitioner-G. This
confirmed that the disputed land was waste land and not
forest.
G
In development plans of 1967 and 1971, the disputed
land was shown as residential and was built upon after
municipal sanctions. In 1976, Petitioner-G obtained
sanction under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 for housing and then built multistoried houses. In
H
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A 1948, the Government amended Forest Act, 1927 taking
out waste land from definition and made inclusive
definition of forest. More amendments were made in 1955
and 1961.
8
In 2006, Petitioner-G received six stop work notices
on the ground that the disputed land was "affected" by
the reservation of a private forest and therefore no
construction could be carried out therein without the
permission of the Government under the Forest
C (Conservation) Act, 1980. Petitioner-G learnt that as per
mutation records, the disputed land vested in the State
and there was a notice no.WT/53 published in the Gazette
on 6.9.1956. Petitioner-G filed writ petitions. The High
Court dismissed the writ petitions.
D
The questions which arose for consideration in the
instant appeals were whether the disputed land was at
all a forest within the meaning of section 2(c-i) of the
Private Forests Act; whether mere issuance of a notice
under the provisions of Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest
E Act, 1927 was sufficient for any land being declared a
"private forest" within the meaning of that expression as
defined in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private
Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975; whether the word
"issued" in Section 2(f) (iii) of the Maharashtra Private
F Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 read with Section 35 of the
Indian Forest Act, 1927 must be given a literal
interpretation or a broad meaning; and even assuming
the disputed lands were forest lands, can the State be
allowed to demolish the massive constructions made
G thereon over the last half a century.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The narrative of the events disclosed that
Notice No. WT/53 after its publication in the Gazette was
H not acted upon either under the provisions llf the Forest
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
207
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
Act as amended from time to time or under the Private
A
Forests Act. Admittedly, no attempt was made by the
State to take over possession of the disputed land at any
point of time. On the contrary, permissions were granted
to Petitioner-G from time to time for construction of
buildings on the disputed land, which permissions were
B
availed of by Petitioner-G for the benefit of thousands of
its employees. [para 23] (234-E-F; 235-A]
2. The constitutional validity of the Private Forests
Act (including Section 3 thereof) was challenged in the
C
High Court by *Waghmare on the ground of legislative
competence of the State Legislature. The High Court held
that a land owner who had been issued a notice under
Section 35(3) of the Forest Act (but was not heard) has
an opportunity to contend that his or her land is not a
'forest' within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private
D
Forests Act and that the land does not vest automatically
in the State by virtue of Section 3 of the Private Forests
Act. This position was not contested and became final.
The view of the High Court was accepted by the State of
Maharashtra and was not challenged and attained finality.
E
. [Paras 24, 25, 27] (235-B, E-F; 237-C]
3. The right to file objections to a notice under
Section 35(3) of the Forest Act came up for consideration
F
in **Chintamani in which it was noticed that where a final
notification is issued under Section 35(1) of the Forest
Act (obviously after hearing the objections of the land
owner in compliance with the requirements of Section
35(3) thereof), the entire land of the land owner would
automatically vest in the State on the appointed date, that G
is, 30th August 1975 when the Private Forests Act came
into force. In such a case, the land owner would, ex
hypothesi have an opportunity of showing in the
objections to the notice under Section 35(3) that the land
is not a 'forest' as defined under Section 34A of the Forest
H
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A Act. If the land owner succeeded in so showing, then
clearly a final notification under Section 35(1) of the
Forest Act could not be issued. But if the land owner did
not succeed in so showing, only then could a final
notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act be
B issued. The words "or land" under Section 35(3) of the
Forest Act had been deleted by the Indian Forest
(Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 and, additionally
therefore, such an objection could validly have been
raised. Consequently, the situation that presented itself
C in **Chintamani was that though a notice was issued to
the land owner under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act
before 30th August 1975, it could not be decided before
that date when the Private Forests Act came into force.
(Such a notice was referred to as a 'pipeline notice').
0 Clearly, the recipient of a pipeline notice would be entitled ·
to the benefit of *Waghmare but apparently have been
overlooked by this Court in **Chintamani. However, to
mitigate the hardship to a pipeline noticee who is not
given the benefit of *Waghmare this Court read Section
2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act and observed (perhaps ·
E as a sop to the land owner) that the "Maharashtra
Legislature thought that the entire property covered by
the notice in the State need not vest but it excluded 2
hectares out of the forest land held by the landholder.
That was the consideration for not allowing the benefit
F of an inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not allowing the
notification to be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927
Act". In this background, this Court narrowly construed
the words "a notice has been issued under sub-section
(3) of section 35 of the Forest Act" occurring in Section
G 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act as not requiring "service
of such notice before 30-8-1975, nor for an inquiry nor for
a notification under Section 35(1 )." In a sense, therefore,
not only is there a difference of views between
*Waghmare and **Chintamani but **Chintamani has gone
H much further in taking away the right of a landholder. It
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
209
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
is quite clear from a reading of *Waghmare that the
A
"means and includes" definition of forest in Section
2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act does not detract or take
away from the primary meaning of the word 'forest'.
[Paras 30-33, 47] [238-B-H; 239-A-D; 246-H; 247-A]
B
**Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of Maharashtra
(2000) 3 sec 143 - Partly overruled .
. Banarsi Debi v. /TO (1964) 7 SCR 539; CWT v. Kundan
Lal Behari Lal (1975) 4 SCC 844: 1976 AIR 1150; *Janu
Chandra Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978
C
Bombay 119 - referred to.
4. In the case of Petitioner-G, the admitted position, as
per the consent decree dated 8th January 1962 was that the
disputed land was not a waste land nor was it a forest. In so o
far as the other appeals were concerned, the disputed lands
were built upon, from time to time, either for industrial
purposes or for commercial purposes or for residential
purposes. Under the circumstances, by no stretch of
imagination can it be said that any of these disputed lands
E
are 'forest' within the primary meaning of that word, or even
within the extended meaning given in Section 2(c-i) of the
Private Forests Act. [para 51] [248-B-0]
5. The notice said to have been issued to PetitionerG being Notice No. WT/53 cannot be described as a
F
'pipeline notice'. It cannot be reasonably said that the
pipeline extends from 1956-57 up to 1975. Assuming that
a notice issued in 1956-57 is a pipeline notice even in
1975, the question would, nevertheless, relate to the
meaning and impact of "issued" of Section 2(f)(iii) of the
G
Private Forests Act read with Section 35 of the Forest Act.
Undoubtedly, the first rule of interpretation is that the·
words in a statute must be interpreted literally. But at the
same time if the context in which a word is used and the
provisions of a statute inexorably suggest a subtext other
H
210
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A than literal, then the context becomes important. It is true
that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a
meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the subject of
legislation and the context in which a word or expression
is employed may require a departure from the rule of
B literal construction. The scheme of Section 35 of the
Forest Act needs to be kept in mind while considering
"issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act. A
notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended
to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show
c cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory
measure be not made in respect of that forest. Such a
notice pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner
of the forest is expected to file objections within a
reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also
0 given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the
objections. After these basic requirements are met, the
owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the
objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be
followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless
the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of
E a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is
inherent in the very language used in the provision and
the very purpose of the provision. [paras 52-56] [248-DH; 249-E-F; 250-A-D]
F
6. Additionally, Section 35(4) of the Forest Act
provides that a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest
Act may provide that for a period not exceeding six
months (extended to one year in 1961) the owner of the
forest can be obliged to adhere to one or more of the
G regulatory or prohibitory measures mentioned in Section
35(1) of the Forest Act. On the failure of the owner of the
forest to abide by the said measures, he/she is liable to
imprisonment for a term upto six months and/or a fine
under Section 35(7) of the Forest Act. Surely, given the
H penal consequence of non-adherence to a Section 35(4)
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
211
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
·direction in a Section 35(3) notice, service of such a
A
notice must be interpreted to be mandatory. On the facts
.of the case in Petitioner-G, such a direction was in fact
;'.given and Petitioner-G was directed, for a period of six
:months, to refrain from the cutting and removal of trees
;and timber and the firing and clearing of vegetation.
B
'.Strictly speaking, therefore, despite not being served with
Notice No. WT/53 and despite having no knowledge of it,
.Petitioner-G was liable to be punished under Section
, 35(7) of the Forest Act if it cut or removed any tree or
: timber or fired or cleared any vegetation. [para 57] [250C
D-H; 251-A]
Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 2 SCC 942: 1976.
(2) SCR 809; Black Diamond Beverages v. Commercial Tax
Officer (1998) 1 SCC 458 1997 ( 4) Suppl. SCR 133; R.L
Arora v. State of U.P. (1964) 6 SCR 784; Tata Engg. & D
Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 346 2000
(3) SCR 219; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5
SCC 397 2002 (3) SCR 1078 - relied on.
Robinson v. Barton-Eccles Local Board (1883) 8 AC 798
E
- referred to.
7. This interplay may be looked at from another point
of view, namely, the need to issue a direction under
Section 35(4) of the Forest Act, which can be only to
prevent damage to or destruction of a forest. If the notice
under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not served on the
owner of the forest, he/she may continue to damage the
forest defeating the very purpose of the Forest Act. Such
F
an interpretation cannot be given to Section 35 of the
Forest Act nor can a limited interpretation be given to the
G
word "issued" used in the context of Section 35 of the
Forest Act in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.
Finally, Section 35(5) of the Forest Act mandates not only
service of a notice issued under that provision "in the
manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for
H
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A the service of summons" but also its publication "in the
manner prescribed by rules". This double pronged
receipt and confirmation of knowledge of the show
cause notice by the owner of a forest makes it clear that
Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not intended to end the
8 process with the mere issuance of a notice but it also
requires service of a notice on the owner of the forest.
The need for ensuring service is clearly to protect the
interests of the owner of the forest who may have valid
reasons not only to object to the issuance of regulatory
C or prohibitory directions, but to also enable him/her to
raise a jurisdictional issue that the land in question is
actually not a forest. The need for ensuring service is
also to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest.
Unfortunately, Chintamani missed these finer details
because it was perhaps not brought to the notice of this
D Court that Section 35 of the Forest Act as applicable to
the State of Maharashtra had sub-sections beyond subsection (3). [paras 58, 59, 60] (251-A-G]
8. It is true that a word has to be construed in the
E context in which it is used in a statute. By making a
reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act to
'issue' in Section 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that the
word is dressed in borrowed robes. Once that is
appreciated (and it was unfortunately overlooked in
F Chintamani) then it is quite clear that 'issued' in Section
2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must include service of
the show cause notice as postulated in Section 35 of the
Forest Act. Under these circumstances, to this extent,
Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is overruled to
G this extent. Assuming that the word 'issued' as occurring
in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must be
literally and strictly construed, the question would arise
whether it also has reference to a show cause notice
issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act at any given
H time (say in 1927 or in 1957) or would it be more
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
213
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
reasonable to hold that it has reference to a show cause
A
notice issued in somewhat closer proximity to the
coming into force of the Private Forests Act, or a 'pipeline
notice'. In the absence of any time period having been
specified for deciding a show cause notice issued under
Section 35 of the Forest Act, it must be presumed that it
B
must be decided within a reasonable time. According to
the State, a show cause notice was issued to PetitionerG in 1957 (and assuming it was served) but no decision
was taken thereon till 1975 that is for about 18 years. This
is an unusually long period and undoubtedly much more
C
than a reasonable time had elapsed for enabling the State
to take a decision on the show cause notice. Therefore,
the show cause notice must, for all intents and purposes
be treated as having become a dead letter and the seed
planted by the State yielded nothing. [paras 61, 65, 67] o
[252-B-G; 253-A-C; 254-A-C]
Ram/ila Maidan Incident, In re (2012) 5 SCC 1 2012 (4)
SCR 971; Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125 1984
(1) SCR 139 - relied on.
E
9. The entire problem may also be looked at from the
perspective of the citizen rather than only from the
perspective of the State. No citizen can reasonably be told
after almost half a century that he/she was issued a show
cause notice (which was probably not served) and based
F
on the show cause notice his/her land was declared a
private forest about three decades ago and that it vests
in the State. Basic principles of good governance must
be followed by every member of the Executive branch of
the State at all times keeping the interests of all citizens
in mind as also the larger public interest. The failure of G
the State to take any decision on the show cause notice
for several decades (assuming it was served on
Petitioner-G) is indicative of its desire to not act on it. This
opinion was fortified by a series of events that took place
between 1957 and 2006, beginning with the consent
H
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A decree of 8th January 1962 in Suit whereby the disputed
land was recognized as not being forest land; permission
to construct a large number of buildings (both residential
and otherwise) as per the Development Plans of 1967 and
then of 1991; exemptions granted by the Competent
8 Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 leading to petitioner-G making unhindered but
permissible constructions; and finally, the absence of any
attempt by the State to take possession of the 'forest
land' under Section 5 of the Private Forests Act for a
couple of decades. The subsequent event of the State
C moving an application in Godavarman virtually denying
the existence of a private forest on the disputed land also
indicated that the State had come to terms with reality and
was grudgingly prepared to accept that, even if the law
permitted, it was now too late to remedy the situation.
D This view was emphatically reiterated by the Central
Empowered Committee in its report dated 13th July 2009.
[Paras 67, 68] [254-C-H; 255-A-C]
10. The Bombay Environment Action Group has
E alleged collusion between petitioner-G and other
appellants and the State of Maharashtra to defeat the
purpose of the Private Forests Act. It is difficult at this
distant point of time to conclude, one way or the other,
whether there was or was not any collusion (as alleged)
or whether it was simply a case of poor governance by
F the State. The fact would remain that possession of the
disputed land was not taken over or attempted to be
taken over for decades and the issue was never raised
when it should have been. To raise it now after a lapse
of so many decades is unfair to Petitioner-G, the other
G appellants, the institutions, the State and the residents of
the tenements that have been constructed in the
meanwhile. [Paras 69, 70] [255-C-D, G-H; 256-A-B]
11. Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Aft is not
intended to apply to notices that had passed their shelf-life
H and that only 'pipeline notices' issued in reasonably close
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
215
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
proximity to the coming into force of the Private Forests
A
Act were 'live' and could be acted upon. The fact that the
Private Forests Act repealed some sections of the Forest
Act, particularly Sections 34A and 35 thereof is also
significant. Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act is in a
sense a saving clause for pipeline notices issued under
B
Section 35(3) of the Forest Act but which could not, for want
of adequate time be either withdrawn or culminate in the
issuance of a regulatory or prohibitory final notification
under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, depending on the
objections raised by the land owner. Looked at from any c
point of view, it does seem clear that Section 2(f)(iii) of the
Private Forests Act was intended to apply to 'live' and not
stale notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act.
[Paras 71, 73] [256-C, F-G; 257-A-B]
12. The next question is whether at all the unstated
D
decision of the State to take over the so-called forest land
can be successfully implemented. What the decision
implies is the demolition, amongst others, of a large
number of residential buildings, industrial buildings,
commercial buildings, Bhabha Atomic Energy Complex
E
and the Employees State Insurance Scheme Hospital and
compulsorily rendering homeless thousands of families,
some of whom may have invested considerable savings
in the disputed lands. What it also implies is demolition
of the municipal and other public infrastructure works
F
already undertaken and in use, clearing away the rubble
and then planting trees and shrubs to 'restore' the 'forest'
to an acceptable condition. No party should be allowed
to take the benefit or advantage of their own wrong and
a patent illegality cannot be cured. An unauthorized G
construction, unless compoundable in law, must be
razed. In question are the circumstances leading to the
application of the principle and the practical application
of the principle. More often than not, the municipal
authorities and builders conspiratorially join hands in
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[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A violating the law but the victim is an innocent purchaser
or investor who pays for the maladministration. In such
a case, how is the victim to be compensated or is he or
she expected to be the only loser? If the victim is to be
compensated, who will do so? These issues have not
B been discussed in the decisions cited by the Bombay
Environment Action Group. The application of the
principle laid down by this Court, therefore, depends on
the independent facts found in a case. The remedy of
demolition cannot be applied per se with a broad brush
c to all cases. The State also seems to have realized this
and that is perhaps the reason why it moved the
application that it did in Godavarman. [paras 74, 75, 80)
[257-C-H; 258-A-B; 259-C-D)
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
D Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627; State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad
Sharma (1966) 3 SCR 557; Khub Chand v. State of
Rajasthan (1967) 1 SCR 120 - relied on.
K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officer (1974) 2 SCC 506;
E M.I. Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu (1996) 6 SCC 464;
Pleasant Stay Hotel v. Palani Hills Conservation_ Council
(1995) 6 SCC 127; Pratibha Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra (1991) 3 SCC 341; Santoshkumar
Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale (2009) 9
F SCC 352 2009 AIR 2471; CIT v. Bababhai Pitamberdas
(HUF) 1993 Supp (3) SCC 530 - referred to.
13. Looking at the issue from point of view of the
citizen and not only from the point of view of the State
or a well meaning pressure group, it does appear that
G even though the basic principle is that the buyer should
beware and therefore if the appellants and purchasers of
tenements or commercial establishments from the
appellants ought to bear the consequences of
unauthorized construction, the well-settled principle of·
H
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
217
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
caveat emptor would be applicable in normal A
circumstances and not in extraordinary circumstances as
these appeals present, when a citizen is effectively led up
the garden path for several decades by the State itself.
The instant appeals do not relate to a stray or a few
instances of unauthorized constructions and, therefore,
fall in a class of their own. In a case such as the present,
B
if a citizen cannot trust the State which has given
statutory permissions and provided municipal facilities,
whom should he or she trust? Assuming the disputed
land was a private forest, the State remained completely c
inactive when construction was going on over acres and
acres of land and .of a very large number of buildings
thereon and for a few decades. The State permitted the
construction through the development plans and by
granting exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and
0
Regulation) Act, 1976 and providing necessary
infrastructure such as roads and sanitation on the
disputed land and the surrounding area. When such a
large scale activity involving the State is being carried on
over vast stretches of land exceeding a hundred acres,
it is natural for a reasonable citizen to assume that
E
whatever actions are being taken are in accordance with
law otherwise the State would certainly step in to prevent
such a massive and prolonged breach of the law. The
silence of the State in all the appeals led the appellants
and a large number of citizens to believe that there was
no patent illegality in the constructions on the disputed
land nor was there any legal risk in investing on the
disputed land. Under these circumstances, for the State
F
or the Bombay Environment Action Group to contend
that only the citizen must bear the consequences of the
G
unauthorized construction may not be appropriate. It is
the complete inaction of the State, rather its active
consent that has resulted in several citizens being placed
in a precarious position where they are now told that their
investment is actually in unauthorized constructions
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[2014] 2 S.C.R.
A which are liable to be demolished any time even after
several decades. There is no reason why these citizens
should be the only victims of such a fate and the State
be held not responsible for this state of affairs; nor is
there any reason why under such circumstances this
B Court should not come to the aid of victims of the
culpable failure of the State to implement and enforce the
law for several decades. In none of these cases is there
an allegation that the State has acted arbitrarily or
irrationally so as to voluntarily benefit any of the
c appellants. On the contrary, the facts show that the
appellants followed the due legal process in making the
constructions that they did and all that can be said of the
State is that its Rip Van Winkleism enabled the appellants
to obtain valid permissions from various authorities, from
0 time to time, to make constructions over a long duration.
The appellants and individual citizens cannot be faulted
or punished for that. These appeals raised larger issues
of good administration and governance and the State
has, regrettably, come out in poor light in this regard.
E [paras 81 to 84) [259-E-H; 260-A-H; 261-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1978 Bombay 119
Referred to
Para 24
(2000) 3 sec 143
Partly overruled
Para 29
F
1976 (2) SCR 809
Referred to
Para 48
1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 133 Referred to
Para 49
(1883) 8 AC 798
Referred to
Para 50
G
(1964) 6 SCR 784
Relied on
Para 54
2000 (3) SCR 219
Relied on
Para 54
2002 (3) SCR 1078
Relied on
Para 54
H
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
219
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
1993 supp (3) sec 530
Referred to
Para 61
A
(1964) 7 SCR 539
Referred to
Para 61
1976 AIR 1150
Referred to
Para 61
2012 (4) SCR 971
Relied on
Para 64
B
1984 (1) SCR 139
Relied on
Para 65
2009 AIR 2471
Referred to
Para 65
(2005) 1 sec 627
Relied on
Para 72
c
(1966) 3 SCR 557
Relied on
Para 72
(1967) f SCR 120
Relied on
Para 72
(1974) 2 sec 506
Referred to
Para 74
(1996) 6 sec 464
Referred to
Para 74
D
(1995) 6 sec 121
Referred to
Para 74
(1991) 3 sec 341
Referred to
Para 74
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
E
1102 of 2014.
From the Judgment and order dated 24.03.2008 of the
High Gout of Bombay in WP No. 2196 of 2006.
.
WITH
F
Civil Appeal No. 1103 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1104 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1105 of 2014.
G
Civil Appeal No. 1106 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1107 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1108 of 2014.
H
A
B
c
D
E
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[2014] 2 S.C.R.
Civil Appeal No. 1109 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1110 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1111 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1112 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1113 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1114 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1115 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1116 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1117 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1118 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1119 of 2014.
Civil Appeal No. 1120 of 2014.
SLP (C) No. 34691/2011.
Paras Kuhad, ASG, F.S. Nariman, R.F. Nariman, Dr.
Rajeev Dhawan, Meenakshi Arora, Dr. AM. Singhvi, Pravin
Samdani, Ashok K. Gupta, C.U. Singh, Upmanyu Hazarika,
F Shekhar Naphade, Atul Y. Chitale, J.P. Cama, Basava P. Patil,
Madhvi Diwan. Ajay Bhargava, Vanita Bhargava, Karun Mehta,
Priyambada Mishra (for Khaitan & Co.). Shailesh C.
Mahimtura, Jatin Zaveri, Amit Mehta, Neel Kamal Mishra,
Joseph Pookkatt, Girija Balakrishnan, Prashant Kr., Manjula
Srinivasan (for AP&J Chambers), Saurabh Sinha, Joseph
G Pookkatt (for AP & J Chambers), P.K. Manohar, Pallavi Gupta,
Amit Bhandari, Kalyanai Shukla, Satyendra Kumar, Sunil
Fernandes, Shishir Deshpande, Amit Yadav, Devansh A.
Mohta, Sujata Kurdukar, Gaurav Goel, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi
Agrawala, E.C. Agrawala, Hetu Arora Sethi, Darpan K.M.,
H
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
221
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
Manish Kumar, Amit Kumar, Rakesh K. Sharma, Amol
A
Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Arun R. Padneker, Sanjay V.
Kharde, A.P. Mayee, Shubhangi Tuli (for Asha G. Nair), Mohan
Prasad Gupta, S.K. Bajwa, Jitin Chaturvedi, S.N. Terdal,
Sanyukta Mukherjee, Jayati Chitale, Suchitra A. Chitale, Vijay
K. Verma, Tarun Verma, M.N.S. Rao, Bhardwaj S. Iyengar,
B
Shailesh Madiyal, Shishir Deshpande, Amit Yadav (for Sujata
Kurdukar), D. Bharat Kumar, Sanooja M., Abhijit Sengupta,
Vinay Navare, Satyajeet Kumar, Abha R. Sharma, Shilpa Singh,
A. Venayagam Balan, Vikas Mehta, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Mahesh
Aggarwal (for E.G. Agrawala), Sharmila Upadhyay, D.N. c
Goburdhan, Prashant Kumar, Anurag Sharma (for AP & J
Chambers) for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The principal question for consideration is whether the
mere issuance of a notice under the provisions of Section 35(3)
of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 is sufficient for any land being
D
· declared a "private forest" within the meaning of that expression
E
as defined in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests
(Acquisition) Act, 1975. In our opinion, the question must be
answered in the negative. Connected therewith is the question
whether the word "issued" in Section 2(f) (iii) of the Maharashtra
Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 read with Section 35 of
the Indian Forest Act, 1927 must be given a literal interpretation
F
or a broad meaning. In our opinion the word must be given a
broad meaning in the surrounding context in which it is used.
3. A tertiary question that arises is, assuming the disputed
lands are forest lands, can the State be allowed to demolish
G
the massive constructions made thereon over the last half a
century. Given the facts and circumstances of these appeals,
our answer to this question is also in the negative.
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A
4. This is a batch of 20 appeals and they were argued on
the basis of the facts as in the appeal of Godrej. In each appeal,
the minute details would, of course, be different but the legal
issues are the same and all the appeals were argued by
learned counsel on the basis that the legal issues and questions
B of law are the same. For convenience, we have taken into
consideration the facts in the appeal of Godrej.
Facts
5. Godrej acquired land in Vikhroli in Salsette taluka in
C Maharashtra by a registered deed of conveyance dated 30th
July 1948 from Nowroji Pirojsha, successor in interest of
Framjee Cawasjee Banaji who, in turn, had been given a
perpetual lease/kowl for the land. by the Government of Bombay
D
on 7th July 1835.
6. The land was described in the perpetual lease/kowl as
"waste land" and one of the purposes of the lease was to
cultivate the waste land. We are concerned in this appeal with
an area of 133 acres and 38 gunthas of land bearing Old
E Survey Nos.117,118 and 120 (New Survey Nos. 36 (Part), 37
and 38). For convenience this land is hereafter referred as the
"disputed land".
Consent decree in the Bombay High Court
F
7. On 27th August 1951 the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Bombay passed the Salsette Estates (Land Revenue
Exemption Abolition) Act, 1951. This statute was brought into
force on 1st March 1952. Section 4 of the Salsette Estates Act
provided that waste lands granted under a perpetual lease/kowl
G not appropriated or brought under cultivation before 14th
August 1951 shall vest in and be the property of the State.1
H
1.
Section 4 - Waste lands, etc .. to vest in Government
(a) All waste lands in any estate which under the terms of the kowl are not
the property of the estate-holder,
GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF
223
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
8. According to the State, the disputed land was not
appropriated or brought under cultivation before 14th August
1951 and, therefore, it vested in or was the property of the State
by virtue of Section 4 of the Salsette Estates Act.
9. This factual position was disputed by Godrej and to
resolve the dispute, Suit No. 413 of 1953 was filed by Godrej
in the Bombay High Court praying, inter alia, for a declaration
that it was the owner of the disputed land in village Vikhroli as
the successor in title of Framjee Cawasjee Banaji; that the
provisions of the Salsette Estates Act had no application to the
disputed land and, that the disputed land had been appropriated
by Godrej before 14th August 1951 for its industrial
undertaking.
10. The suit was contested by the State by filing a written
statement but eventually the Bombay High Court passed a
consent decree on 8th January 1962 to the effect that except
for an area of 31 gunthas, all other lands were appropriated
and brought under cultivation by Godrej before 14th August
-1951- and are the property of Godrej. The consent decree reads,
inter alia, as follows:-
"AND THIS COURT by and with such consent DOTH
FUTHER DECLARE that it is agreed by and between the
parties of the following lands namely
(b) all waste lands in any estate which under the terms of the kowl are the
property of the estate-holder but have not been appropriated or brought
under cultivation before the 14th August 1951, and
(c) all other kinds of property referred to in Section 37 of the Code situate
A
B
c
D
E
F
in an estate which is not the property of any individual or an aggregate of
persons legally capable of holding property other than the estate-holder
G
and except in so far as any rights of persons may be established in or
over the same and except as may be otherwise provided by any law for
the time being in force, together with all rights in or over the same or
appertaining thereto,
and are hereby declared to be the property of the State and it shall be lawful
to dispose of and sell the same by the authority in the manner and for the
purposes prescribed in Section 37 or 38 of the Code, as the case may be.
H
A
B
c
D
224
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(2014] 2 S.C.R.
S.