# 2 S.C.R. 447 OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2010] 2 S.C.R. 447
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-02-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1514 of 2010
- **Bench:** V.S. Slrpurkar, Deepak Verma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2-s-c-r-447-om-parkash-v-union-of-india-and-ors-26616
- **Pages:** 49

## Headnote

A
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: s. 6, First proviso,
Explanation I - Limitation for issuance of s. 6 declaration ,...
Computation of - Issuance of s.4 Notification - Order of stay
C
in favour of land owners who preferred writ petitions before
High Court - On vacation of interim stay by virtue of dismissal
of writ petitions, authorities proceeded further and issued
notification under s. 6 - In case of some land owners, s. 6
declaration quashed - Appellants had not challenged the s. 4 o
notification -
They filed writ petitions challenging s. 6
declaration which were dismissed - On appeal, held: Where
any order of stay is granted in favour of land owners, actual
period covered by order of stay should be excluded while
computing period of limitation for issuance of s. 6 notification
E
- Thereafter, if declaration is quashed by any Court, it would
only enure to the benefit of those who had approached the
Court - The benefit would certainly not extend to them who
had not approached the Court - Thus the appellants cannot
be rewarded on account of their own lapse - After a long lapse
of time, it would not only be harsh but inequitable also to
quash the notifications so as to grant liberty to the appellants
to challenge same in accordance with law - Delay and /aches
- Equity.
F
On 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, notifications were G
issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
acquisition of more than 50,000 bighas of land situated
in 1.3 different villages. Aggrieved land owners filed writ
447
H
448
.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A petitions· before High Court challenging the same. Interim
ord~.f of. stay was granted. High court ultimately
dismJ~sed the writ petitions. The dismissal of writ petition
was not challenged and-it attained finality. Pursuant to the
S~ction 4:Notification, Sectibn 6 Notification was issued.
8 The appellants had not challenged the Section 4
Notification and so there was no order of stay passed by
any court in their favour i.e. there was no order of restraint
from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
In case of spme of the land-owners, writ petitions
C challenging the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court were allowed on 14.8.1988.
Appellants filed writ petitions before High Court
challenging the Section 6 declaration/notifications on the
ground that the Section 6 declaration was not issued
D within the period of three years from the date of issuance·
of Section 4 notifications which rendered the acquisition
illegal and void qua appellants' lands; that the stay order
granted in favour of other land owners, who had
challenged either the Section 4 notifications or the
E Section 6 declaration would not be applicable or
operative to the appellants' lands~ and that appellant
claimed parity with those land-owners who successfully
challenged the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by
F different orders passed by High Court. Hence these
appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of
G Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 makes it
crystal clear that where any order of stay has been
granted in favour of land owner, while computing the
period of limitation of three years for issuance of Section
6 notification, the actual period covered by such order of
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
449
stay should be excluded. On account of omission of the
A
appellants, they cannot be granted dividend for .their own
defaults. The appellants ought to have been more careful,
cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along with
those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the
High Court. Not having done so, they have to suffer the
B
consequence of issuance of notifications under Section
4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably
amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation
can

## Text

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[20_10] 2 S.C.R. 447
OM PARKASH
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1514 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 8, 2010
[V.S. SLRPURKAR AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]
A
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: s. 6, First proviso,
Explanation I - Limitation for issuance of s. 6 declaration ,...
Computation of - Issuance of s.4 Notification - Order of stay
C
in favour of land owners who preferred writ petitions before
High Court - On vacation of interim stay by virtue of dismissal
of writ petitions, authorities proceeded further and issued
notification under s. 6 - In case of some land owners, s. 6
declaration quashed - Appellants had not challenged the s. 4 o
notification -
They filed writ petitions challenging s. 6
declaration which were dismissed - On appeal, held: Where
any order of stay is granted in favour of land owners, actual
period covered by order of stay should be excluded while
computing period of limitation for issuance of s. 6 notification
E
- Thereafter, if declaration is quashed by any Court, it would
only enure to the benefit of those who had approached the
Court - The benefit would certainly not extend to them who
had not approached the Court - Thus the appellants cannot
be rewarded on account of their own lapse - After a long lapse
of time, it would not only be harsh but inequitable also to
quash the notifications so as to grant liberty to the appellants
to challenge same in accordance with law - Delay and /aches
- Equity.
F
On 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, notifications were G
issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
acquisition of more than 50,000 bighas of land situated
in 1.3 different villages. Aggrieved land owners filed writ
447
H
448
.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A petitions· before High Court challenging the same. Interim
ord~.f of. stay was granted. High court ultimately
dismJ~sed the writ petitions. The dismissal of writ petition
was not challenged and-it attained finality. Pursuant to the
S~ction 4:Notification, Sectibn 6 Notification was issued.
8 The appellants had not challenged the Section 4
Notification and so there was no order of stay passed by
any court in their favour i.e. there was no order of restraint
from issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
In case of spme of the land-owners, writ petitions
C challenging the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court were allowed on 14.8.1988.
Appellants filed writ petitions before High Court
challenging the Section 6 declaration/notifications on the
ground that the Section 6 declaration was not issued
D within the period of three years from the date of issuance·
of Section 4 notifications which rendered the acquisition
illegal and void qua appellants' lands; that the stay order
granted in favour of other land owners, who had
challenged either the Section 4 notifications or the
E Section 6 declaration would not be applicable or
operative to the appellants' lands~ and that appellant
claimed parity with those land-owners who successfully
challenged the Section 6 declaration/notification before
the High Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by
F different orders passed by High Court. Hence these
appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of
G Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 makes it
crystal clear that where any order of stay has been
granted in favour of land owner, while computing the
period of limitation of three years for issuance of Section
6 notification, the actual period covered by such order of
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
449
stay should be excluded. On account of omission of the
A
appellants, they cannot be granted dividend for .their own
defaults. The appellants ought to have been more careful,
cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along with
those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the
High Court. Not having done so, they have to suffer the
B
consequence of issuance of notifications under Section
4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
use of the word "any" in the explanation considerably
amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation
can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding c
is stayed. It may be complete stay of the operation of the
entire notification or may even be a partial stay - partial
in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of
whom it will operate. [Paras 76, 77, 86, 87] [479-D; 485-GH; 486-A-B]
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1987 Delhi 239,
approved.
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India & Others 37 (1989)
D
DLT 150, referred to.
E
2. Each of the notifications issued under Section 4
F
of the Act was composite in nature. The interim order of
stay was granted in many petitions. Thus, in the teeth of
such interim orders of stay during the period of stay,
respondents could not proceed further to issue
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act. The
language employed in the interim orders of stay was also
such that it had completely restrained the respondents
from proceeding further in the matter by issuing
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act. As
G
soon as the interim stay came to be vacated by virtue of
the main order having been passed in the writ petition,
respondents, taking advantage of the period of stay
during which they were restrained from issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, proceeded further
H
450
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A and issued notification under Section 6 of the Act. [Paras
88 and 89) [486-E-H; 487-A-B]
3.1. It is true that language of Section 6 of the Act
implies that declarations can be issued piecemeal and it
8 is not necessary to issue one single declaration for whole
of the area which is covered under notification issued
under Section 4 of the Act. Parliament was aware of such
type of situation and that is whY\ such a right has been
carved out in favour of respondent-State. In many cases,
urgency clause may be invoked, therefore, the right of
C filing objections under Section 5A of the Act would not
arise. In some cases, even though objections might be
preferred under Section 5A of the Act, but, may not be
pressed in spite of knowledge of acquisition of land.
Some of the land owners may not prefer to file any
D objections at aH. In order to meet such type of exigencies
as may arise in the case, power has been given by the
Parliament to the Executive to issue declarations in
piecemeal under Section 6 of the Act, wherever it may be
feasible to implement the scheme. [Paras 90) [487-C-E]
E
3.2. In the case in hand, as many as four declarations
under Section 6 of the Act were issued from time to time.
Finally when declaration is quashed by any Court, it
would only enure to the benefit of those who had
. F approached the Court. It would certainly not extend the
benefit to t~ose who had not approached the Court or
who might have gone into slumber. At this long distance
of time, it would neither be proper nor legally justified to
grant that benefit to the appellants. If it is granted to even
G those who had not approached the court, then it would
frustrate the very purpose and scope of the Act. Final
quashment of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
by any Court, in some other matter, cannot be extended
to the benefit of the present.appellants. In any ·case, there
is no ground to rise to the occasion to do so, much less
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
451
to the benefits of the appellants. It is not a fit case to grant
A
such inequitable reliefs to the appellants, after such a
. long delay. [Paras 91 and 93] [487-F-G; 488-B-C]
Munni Lal & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & . Ors. ILR
(1984) I Delhi 469, referred to.
B
3.3. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on
account of their own lapse as they should have been
vigilant enough to get their matters also listed along with
those in whose favour ultimately judgment wa~
pronounced. Looki"@ to the scheme of the Act, it is C
obvious that the appellants would certainly suffer the
consequence of the interim order passed in some other
matters preferred by other land owners challenging the
notifications but finally benefit thereof cannot be accrued
to the appellants as the same would obviously be o
confined to those petitioners only in whose favour orders
were passed. [Paras 94 and 95] (488-D-F]
4. First proviso appended to section 6 clearly
indicates that all actions which have taken place between
E
the period, after commencement of Land Acquisition
(Amendment & Validation) Ordinance 1967 but before the
commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act
1984, would be saved. There is no dispute in these
matters that notifications under Section 4 of the Act were
issued on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, the period which is
covered by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act. The
excl.usion envisaged is available in respect of
notifications issued between the period commencing
from 29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984. [Paras 96 and 98] [488-GF
H; 489-A-B; 490-G]
Chatro Devi v. Union of India & Ors. 137 (2007) DLT 14,
referred to.
5. Impugned orders passed by High Court from time
G
H
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A to time would reveal that some have been dismissed
primarily on the ground of delay and laches. If the
appellants were under some bonafide mistake and had
not challenged the issuance of notifications or
declaration under Section 6 of the. Act within a
B reasonable time then on the ground that there was an
eclipse period during which they were not supposed to
take any legal action, would be of no help to them. Some
of the petitions have been filed either in the year 2000 or
subsequent thereto. Thus, the High Court was justified
C in not entertaining such petitions on the ground of delay
and laches .. Even though, they have tried to attempt to
explain the delay but such a long delay cannot be
condoned more so, when proceeding of acquisition was
initiated in the year 1980. Almost 30 years have already
passed by, but, no ·steps could be taken to formally
D complete the scheme so far. Thus, after such a long lapse
of time, it will not only be harsh but inequitable also to
quash the notifications so as to grant liberty to the
appellants to challenge same in accordance with law.
[Paras 109 and 110) [494-G-H]
E
6. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act being·
composite one it would not be proper and legally
justifiable to quash the same more so when most of the
appellants had not filed any objections under Section SA
F of the Act. Thus, the declarations issued under Section
6 of the Act cannot be quashed. [Para 112] [495-D]
7. Unless the declarations issued by respondents on
as many as four dates, in the year 1985, are quashed in
toto, it cannot be said that respondents could not have
G proceeded further with regard to acquisition of those
lands for which the same has not been quashed earlier.
In other words, it has been held that for all remaining
lands for which neither the notifications under Section 4
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
453
nor declarations under Section 6 have been quashed,
A
acquisition proceedings; notification/declaration issued
for remaining lands would continue to hold good and
respondents can proceed further. [Paras 113 and 114]
[495-E-G]
Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 - relied on.
B
Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
(1990) 7 SCC 44; Oxford English School v. Government of C
Tamil Nadu and Others (1995) 5 SCC 206; Chatro Devi v.
Union of India & Ors. 137 (2007) DLT 14; Vishwas Nagar
Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association v. Under Secretary,
Delhi Administration (1990) 2 SCC 268; Star Wire (India) Ltd.
v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698; Swaika Properties
(P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695; Meera Sahni D
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177; Delhi
Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC
296; Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council and Others
1956 AC 376; F. Hoffmann- LA Roche and Co. A.G. and
Others v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1975 AC
E
29·5, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
ILR (1984) I Delhi 469 referred to
AIR 1987 Delhi 239
(1997) 5 sec 421
(1990) 1 sec 44
(1995) s sec 20s
approved
relied on
referred to
referred to
Paras 5,54, 56,
88
Paras 20,
Paras 20,
30, 32, 43, 61, 81,
F
83, 84, 105, 107,
G
108, 111, 112
Paras 21, 30, 36
Para 30
H
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A
37 (1989) DLT 150
referred to
Para 34
(1999) 1 sec 44
referred to
Para 36
137 (2007) DLT 14
referred to
Paras 42, 102
B
(1990) 2 sec 268
referred to
Para 64
(1996) 11 sec 698
referred to
Para 64
(2008) 4 sec 695
referred to
Para 64
(2008) 9 sec 111
referred to
Para 65
c
(2000) 1 sec · 296
referred to
Para 68
1956 AC 376
referred to
Para 69
1975 AC 295
referred to
Para 69
D
137 (2007) DLT 14
referred to
Para 101
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1514 of 2010
E
From the Judgment & Order dated25.11.2004 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition No. 346 of 1987.
WITH
C. A. ~~s. 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1522,
F
1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1531, 1532,
1533, 1534, 1535, 1536-38, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542, 1543,
1544, 1545, 1546, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 1552, 1553,
1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563,
1564, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1573,
G 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 1581, 1582, 1583,
1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1593,
1594, 1595, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1603,
1604, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613,
1614, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1619, 1620 and 1621 of 2010.
H
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
455
P.P. Rao, Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, T. R. Andhyarjuna, P. S.
A
Patwalia, M. R. Calla, P. N. Lekhi, Ravinder Sethi, Mukul
Rohtagi, S.S. Upadhya, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Dr. K.S. Sidhu, K.
N. Bhat, Mariarputham, Hiren Rawal, ASG.Ms. India Jaising,
ASG; M.K. Garg, Sumit Bansal, P.Tripathi, Ms. J. Mishra,
Jagdeep Kishore, Ms. Pallavi Mohan (for Ms. Manjula Gupta),
B
Ms.- Meenakshi Lekhi, Lokesh Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Rohit Bhat,
Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra, Pradeep Misra, Ms. Daleep Kr.
Dhyani, Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, Anish K.V., Dhruv Mehta,
Yashraj Singh Deora, Mohit Abraham (for M/s. K.L. Mehta &
Co.), Ms. S. Janani, Deepak Goel, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Vinay c
Bhasin, N.S. Vashisht,. Anurag Chawla, Arun k Sinha, Rakesh
Singh, Sumit Sinha, Dhruv Mehta, Om Prakash, T.S. Sabarish,
·Ms. Tanushree Mukherjee (for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co.), M.K.
Garg, Siddhartha Choudhary, Rahul Gupta, Ms. Reema
Sharma, Bhargava V. Desai,· M. Vashisht, Sameer Vashisht,
0
M.R. Shamshed, Amit Sibal, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Parmanand
Gaur, Mukesh Verma, Vivek Vishnoi, Arunabh Choudhary,
Anupam Lal Das, Kashi Vishveshwar, Raktim Gogoi, Arun K.
Sinha, Anandeshwar Gautum, AK.Sinha, Mukul Kumar, P.O.
Sharma, Mukul Gupta, M. A Chinnasamy, Jai Prakash, ~.S.
E
Mann, Preetam Shah, Harbir Singh, K. Krishna Kumar,
Amarjeet Singh Bedi, Maldeep Sidhu, Samar Bansal, Ms.
Aparna Rohatgi Baldev Atreya, Ms . .Meenakshi Lekhi, AV.
Rangam, Buddy A Rangadhan, Puneet Sharma, S.S. Sharma,
Oharmeridra Kumar Sinha, N.S. Vashisht, Vishal Singh, Arun
K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh, Sumit Sinha, Ms. Kanchan Kaur
F
Dhodi, Anandeshwar Gautram, Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh,
Sumit Sinha, Vishal Singh, R.R. Jamwal, Balaji Srinivasa, Dr.
K.P.S. Dalal, Anil Karanwal, Krishna Pal Singh, Ms. S.adhna
Sandhu, Ms.Gargi Khanna, Ms. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Gunwant Dara,
Y.P. Mahajan, T.V. Ratnam, R.N. Keshwami, Ram Lal Roy, Rajiv _ G
Garg, Ashish Garg, Annam-0.N .. Rao, Abhay Kumar, Rajesh
Anand, Saurabh Mehra, Ms. Maldeep Sidhu, Sanjay Poddar,
Ms. Rekha Pandey, N.S. Benipal, Sushma Suri, D.N.
Goburdhan, Ms. Asha G. Nair, Prabal -Bagchi, Ms. Rekha
P~~ey, Ms. Gargi Khanna, Mrs. Klran Bhardwaj, Ms. Gurmeet H
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201 O] 2 S.C.R.
A
Bawa, D.S. Mahra, Sanjeev Sahay, Balendu Shekhar, V.B.
B
c
Saharya (for M/s Saharya & Co.), V.K. Verma, Ms. Rachana
Srivastava, ·Sanjiv Sen, Praveen Swarup, Raj iv Kr. Pathak for
the appearing parties.
.
The following judgment of the Court was delivered:
DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. Permission to file Special Leave
Petitions is granted.
2. Delay condoned. Substitution allowed.
3. Leave granted.
4. For planned development of Delhi, Lt. Governor issued
notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 05.11.1980 and
D 25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land situated
in 13 different villages falling within Delhi.
5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of
the said notifications under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ
E petitions in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same on
variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on 15.11.1983
in the case of Munni Lal & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners -
F
Munni Lal & Ors., the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
came to the conclusion that the writ petitions challenging the
validity of the notifications dated 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980
issued under Section 4 of the Act, deserve to be dismissed
and accordingly were dismissed. We have been given to
G understand that against this judgment and order, no appeal was
filed and this judgment thus attained finality.
H
6. These appeals arise out of Judgment and Order passed
by Delhi High Court in Writ Petitions preferred by appellant and
other similarly situated appellants under Article 226 of the
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
457
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
Constitution of India, wherein challenge was primarily and
A
basically to the declaration/notifications issued by Delhi
Administration under Section 6 of the Act.
7. The said petitions having been dismissed by different
Orders passed by Division Benches of Delhi High Court, these
8
appellants are before us challenging the same on variety of
grounds.
8. The cases have a long and chequered history. For the
sake of convenience, we are taking the facts of the civil appeal
arising out of SLF (C) No. 9389 of 2005, Om Prakash V.s.
C
·
Union of India and Others as issue involved in these cases is
almost identical and common.
9. ·Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the case
are mentioned hereinbelow.
D
10. Notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued
on two different dates, viz., 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980.
11. Pursuant thereto, further declarations/notifications as
contemplated under Section 6 of the Act were issued on
20.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986.
12. Admittedly, appellant and several such other appellants
are in possession as owners of different parcels of land situated
in 13 villages, within Delhi.
13. Notifications issued under Section 4 for planned
development of Delhi had a caveat that three types of land were
exempted from the purview of these notifications i.e government
land, land already notified under Section 4 or 6 of the Act or
E
F
land in respect of which lay-out plans/building plans were
G ·
sanctioned by Municipal Corporation of Delhi before
05. 11.1980.
14. It is not in dispute that initially appellants had not
challenged the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act,
H
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 2 S.C.R.
A by filing writ petitions or resorting to any other remedy in
accordance with law.
'
15. Obviously, there could not have been any order of stay
passed by any court in their favour. In other words, there was
B no order of restraint from issuance of declaration under Section
6 of the Act.
16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the
said declaration should have been issued within a period of
three years from the date of issuance of notifications under
C Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before
24.11. 1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or
before 24.11.1983, i.e., within the statutory period of three
years, it is contended that acquisition is illegaVand void qua
appellants' lands. In the aforesaid appeal, last declaration under
D Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on 07.06.1985, which
according to the appellant, was clearly beyond statutory period .
of three years. Thus, whole proceedings of acquisition. should
be rendered illegal and void ab initio. Howe..ver, the last.
declaration was still issued on 26.2.1986.
·'
E
1.7. It has also been appellants' case that the stay order
granted in favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged
either the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act or the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act, would not be applicable · · .
F or operative to the appellanls' land as obviously it would be· I
confined only to those who had approached the Court and were :
granted stay.
18. Like appellant, there were many such land-owners who
haa challenged the said declaration/notification issued under
G Section 6 of the Act before the High Court of Delhi and their
petitions having been allowed on 14.8.1988, appellant claimed
parity on the ground that due to some bona-fide mistake, the
appellant's petition which was filed in the year 1987 could .not
be listed along with batch matters but subsequently, appellant's
H petition came to be dismissed. Thus, for this reason he should
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
not be put to an irreparable loss of losing his land.
45.9
19. Appellant's petition came up for hearing before
Division Bench of High Court of Delhi on 25.11.2004 and on
the said date following order of dismissal came to be passed:
A
· "We find .that the issue raised in the petition with
B
regard to validity of the Declaration issued un~er Section
6 of the said Act, stands concluded against the petitioner
by the decision of the Apex Court in Abhey Ram.and Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 (whiQ.h
approved the full Bench decision of this court in B.R.
C
Gupta's case. AIR 1987 Delhi 239 on the issue that the
declaration under Section 6 was not beyond time) and
Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
(1990) 7 SCC 44, wherein their Lordships were pleased
to observe that those who had not filed objections under
D
Section 5(A) of the said Act could not be allowed to
contend either that Section 5_enquiry was bad, or that
Section 6 Declaration must be struck down and that the
Section 4 notification would lapse. Admittedly, in the
present case, no objections have been filed by the E
petitioner under Section 5 (A) of the Act.
Consequently, the writ petition and application for interim
relief are dismissed and interim order dated 9.2.1987
stands vacated."
20. Perusal of the aforesaid order would make it abundantly
clear that while considering the appellant's petition, High Court
was of the opinion that in the light of the opinion expressed by
Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union oflndia reported
F
in AIR 1987 Delhi 239 (refered to as B.R.Gupta-1), affirmed by
G
this Court in Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors. Vs. Union
of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 decided on 22.04.1997,
holding therein that declaration issued under Section 6 was not
beyond time.
,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A
21. Impugned order further shows that it placed reliance
on another judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 sec
44, Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.
wherein it has been held that all those land-owners who had
not preferred objections under Section SA of the Act, could not
s be allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section SA of
the Act was bad or the declaration issued under Section 6 must
be struck down on the ground of limitation or consequently,
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act would stand
lapsed. Thus, the appellant's petition was not entertained and
c. ultimate!y came to be dismissed.
22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High .
Court that some of the appellants herein and many similarly
situated land-owners had not preferred objections under Section
SA of the Act. There are other appeals, in which .objections
D were preferred but have been decided against them or even
though objections were preferred but were not pressed, on
account of subsequent developments that have taken place.
We would deal with those type of matters little later.
E
23. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for appellant
contended that in this batch of appeals, broadly three
categories can be formulated :
Category No. 1 - where land-owners had admittedly not
filed objections under Section SA of the Act, but essentially, the
F challenge was only to declaration issued under Section 6 of the
Act, being time-barred.
Category No. 2- even though land-owners had preferred
objections under Section SA of the Act, wherein an enquiry was
G held, but the same were rejected.
Category No. 3 - during the pendency of the objections
under Section SA of the Act, some of the land-owners had sold
their lands. Pursuant to the execution of said sale-deeds in
H favour of the vendees, they continued to press objections
'OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
461
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
preferred by their vendors but the same were also rejected.
24. It has been fairly conceded by learned senior counsel
for appellant that he had neither challenged the notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act nor had preferred any
objection under Section 5A of the Act independently. Thus,
obviously there could not have been any stay order granted in
his favour by any court. Therefore, ordinarily, the period of
limitation would be three years as contemplated under Section
6 of the Act (first proviso read with Explanation 1 appended
thereto).
25. To appreciate the aforesaid arguments, it is necessary
to und~rstand the true and correct import of Section 6 of the
Act, reproduced hereinbelow :
A
B
c
"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.-
D
(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when
the appropriate Government is satisfied, after con$idering
the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-sectio~ (2),
that any particular land is needed for public purpose or for
a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect
E
under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or
of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and
different declarations may be made from time to time in
respect of different parcels of any land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (1 ),
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required) under Section
5A, sub-section (2):
F
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section
G
(1 ),-
(i) published after the commencement of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance,
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
1967 but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after
the expiry ofthree year~ from the date of the publication
of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after
the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of
the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be
made unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly
out of public revenues or some fund control!~ or managed
by a local authority.
[Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods
referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in_ pursuance of the
notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is
stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
[Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be
awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds
of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such
compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid
out of public revenues.]
(2) Every declaration shaH be published in the Official
Gazette. [and in two daily newspapers circulaUng in the
locality in which the land is situated of which at least one
shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such declaration :
to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such
public, notice being hereinafter referred to as the date of
publication of the declaration), and such declaration shat!
· · · state] the district or other territorial-division in which the
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
463
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.J
land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its
A
approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been
made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that
8
the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company,
as the case may be; and, after making such declaration
the appropriate Government may acquire the land in
manner hereinafter appearing."
26. It has strenuously been contended by learned senior
C
counsel Shri P.P. Rao that even if appellant had not preferred
any objection under Section 5A of the Act, his right to challenge
issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act after the
stipulated period of limitation, cannot be taken away, especially
in the light of the provisions contained in Article 300A of the
D
Constitution of India. It was also submitted by him that both
rights are independent and accordingly can be invoked
separately. He also submitted that language of Articles 21 and
· 300A of the Constitution is almost identical, thus, no person .
should be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
E
27. We were also taken through Article 17 of Universal
Declaration of Humclm Rights, which safeguards the interest of
I
persons in properties. He, therefore, submitted that if the
property of the appellant is sought to be acquired in this fashion
then it would tantamount to violation of human rights as
guaranteed under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration.
F
28. A further point has also been tried to be hammered
before us that Land Acquisition Act being expropriatory in
nature, its provisions deserve to be construed strictly and each
G
and every step required to be taken by the respondents must
be strictly adhered to.
29. Lastly, it was submitted by him that in any case,
Government is not likely to suffer any loss, much less an
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464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A irreparable loss, even if the land owned, possessed and
occupied by the appellant is exempted from acquisition
whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury as
with long passage of time he has constructed his house, is
residing therein for long number of years and acquisition thereof
s would lead to serious consequences and would be disastrous
to him and other similarly situated land owners. In other words,
it has been contended that equitable justice is required to be
meted out to the appellant and this Court shall ensure that no
injustice is rendered to this appellant and other such hundreds
c of appellants.
D
E
F
G
30. In the light of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior
counsel for the appellant submitted that following questions of·
law would arise in this and the connected appeals:
(i) Whether proposition of law propounded in Delhi
Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra),
(referred .to as No.1) has correctly been understood by the
Division Bench in the impugned order?
(ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Supra) which approved the
Full Bench opinion of Delhi High Court in B.R. Gupta-I,
(Supra) has indirectly been over-ruled in the case of Oxford
English School Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and
Others (1995) 5 SCC 206?
(iii) If, that being the legal position, even though Abhey
Ram's case (supra) rendered by three learned Judges of
this Court, can still be interpreted to grant benefit to the
appellant as otherwise great injustice would be caused to
appellant.
31. Shri P.N. Lekhi, learned senior counsel appearing for
some of the appellants has taken us through the history of the
Act and the various amendments which have been incorporated
H from time to time. He has also advanced the same arguments
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
465
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
as have been put forth by Mr. P.P. Rao, that the effect of stay
A
order granted in other matter should not be logically and legally
made applicable to those who had not even approached the
Court, as it would always be an order of stay in personam and
not an order in rem.
32. It is brought to our notice that he appears for all those
appellants, who are subsequent purchasers, after issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Sale Deeds in favour
B
of these appellants have been executed between the period
from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997, i.e., the period between the date
C
of judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of
B.R. Gupta-I and the date of judgment of this Court in the case
of Abhey Ram (supra). According to him, this was the eclipse
period as in some of the matters, notifications under Section
4 were quashed on account of failure of Delhi Administration
to issue further declarations under Section 6 of the Act, within
D
a period of three years from the date of issuance of notifications
under Section 4 of the Act. Since even thereafter, no steps were
taken by Delhi Administration to issue a fresh notification under
Section 4 of the Act, the subsequent purchasers were fully
justified in purchasing the lands from previous owners. Thus,
E
all purchases by them between the aforesaid period would be
said to have been made during the eclipse period and
therefore, they should be called owners rather than subsequent
purchasers.
33. He has also put forth an argument that prior to coming
F
into force of Amendment Act of 1984, there was no exclusion
clause appended to Section 6, by way of an explanation and
therefore, exactly three years' period has to be computed
between the date of publication of notification under Section 4
G
of the Act and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act
for determining as to whether the same had been issued within
the aforesaid period or not. In other words, he has contended
that irrespective of the fact that there was any stay or there was
no stay, in either case, the period of three years should be
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466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 2 S.C.R.
A calculated from the actual date of publication of notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act till the date of publication of
notification under Section 6 of the Act.
B
34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing·
in some appeals contende.d that primarily petitions of th~se
appellants have been dismissed on the ground of laches. He
has contended that in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India & .
Othets reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to
as 'B.R. Gupta-II], notificatioi:i with regard to acquisition of
lands situated in 11 villages was quashed and in subsequent
C judgment, notification with regard to two more villages was
quashed. Therefore, there was no occasion on the part of these
appellants to have continued to prosecute their objections
preferred under Section SA of the Act.
D
35. According to him, from the year 1989 to 1997, there
was an absolute silence with regard to the acquisition, which
had initially commenced in the year 1980. Therefore, no prudent
man would have taken legal action during the aforesaid period.
He, therefore, contended that appellants were justified in not
E taking any action during the aforesaid period. ·only when fresh
proceedings commenced with regard to acquisition, appellants
were prompt enough to file writ petitions either in the year 2000 · ·
or 2002. Thus, delay having been explained properly, the
Division Bench has grossly erred in dismissing the same on
F the ground of laches.
36. Our attention has been drawn to the letter of Mrs. Gita
Sagar, Joint Secretary, (L & B) dated 31.3.1989 mentioning
therein that in the light of the Division Bench Judgment of Delhi
High Court in B.R. Gupta-II quashing the notifications issued
. G under Section 4 of the Act, nothing more was required to be
done and acquisition proceedings be dropped. This further
stood fortified vide subsequent circular issued by Delhi
Administration on 07.12.1999. According to him, thus the
appellants were entirely justified in not taking any action .. In other
H words, he contended that from the year 1990 to 1997, the·
I
i
OM PARKASH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
467
[DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs Gurdip Singh
A
Uban reported in (1999) 7 SCC 44 held the field whereby
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was quashed and
no further action was taken by Delhi Administration.
37. Thus, any prudent man would be given to understand
that nothing more was required to be done and therefore they
sat quiet over the matters. He,. therefore, contended that
dismissal of appellants' writ petitions on the ground of laches
was wholly unjustified and uncalled for, niore so, when the
reasons for the delay were fully assigned satisfactorily.
B
c
38. Arguments were advanced by him on the Doctrine of
'Legitimate Expectation'. He also contended that the right to
hold property as envisaged under the Constitution being
constitutional right conferred under Article 300A, cannot be
permitted to be taken away without authority of law. Even
D
though, it is not a Fundamental Right nevertheless, it continues
to be a constitutional right, and such right was never taken away
from Article 14 of the Constitution.
39. It is further submitted by him that Sections 5A and 6
E
of the Act cannot be separated as the right envisaged under
Section 5A is a collective right and cannot be equated with
Section 6. It has also been argued on the "Doctrine of Public
Law'' to contend that there was no case for dismissal of the
petitions of these appellants on the ground of l~ches. According . F
to him, it would amount to discrimination to these appellants
vis-a-vis the other land-owners who have been extended the
benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby exempting their
lands from being acquired, therefore, the same cannot be
allowed to stand.
40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for some other appellants contended that he is appearing for
those land-owners, who had actually filed their objections under
Section 5A of the Act and belong to village Shayoorpur. The
G
said petitions were filed in the year 1985.
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468
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[2010] 2 S.C.R.
A
41. However, unfortunately, when the said petitions were
B
heard on 3.3.200S, learned counsel for the appellants was
absent as a result whereof, the petitions came to be dismissed.
Thus, they were constrained to file review petitions but same
also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006.
42. It has further been contended that on account of
difference of opinion between Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter
Kumar (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B.
Lokur on the question of import and interpretation of Section
SA of the Act, the matter was referred to Hon'ble Mr. Justice
C T.S. Thakur (as he then was). Hon'ble Mr.Justice Thakur agreed
with the views expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B.
Lokur. While concurring, he held that hearing as contemplated
under Section SA of the Act would mean an effective hearing
and it is not an empty formality and the provision thereof has
D to be strictly adhered to and principles .of naturaljustice have
to be followed. The said judgment titled Chatro Devi Vs Union
of/ndia & Ors. is reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14.
43. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, strenuously contended before us
E that in B.R.