# ' - ' . 2 S.C.R. SUPRE:rillE COURT REPORTS K. VENKATARAMIAH v. A. SEETHARAMA REDDY & ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 35
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-09-05
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2-s-c-r-supre-rille-court-reports-k-venkataramiah-v-a-seetharama-reddy-ors-2931
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

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2 S.C.R.
SUPRE:rillE COURT REPORTS
K. VENKATARAMIAH
v.
A. SEETHARAMA REDDY & ORS.
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HrnAYATULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
35
Election Petition-Age of Candidate on date of nomination
or election-Admission of additional evidence in High CourtWhen can be allowed-Additional evidence taken with consent of
parties-Effect-Constitution of India, Art. 173 (b)-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), O. 41, R. 27.
The appellant challenged the validity of election of
respondent on the grounds that he was below 30 years on the
relevant date, that his election was vitiated by undue influence
exercised on the voters by S'Jtll.(' Ministers of the State, that the
secrecy of ballot was not maintained and that the election wa!!
void on account of improper deletion of names of voters from
the final list.
All the objections were rejected by the Election ·
Tribunal which dismissed the election petition. On appeal,
the High Court confirmed the findings of the Election Tribunal
and dismissed the appeal. The appellant came to this Court
by special Ir.ave.
The appellant challenged the decision of the High Court
mainly on the ground that in
reaching its conclusion on the
question of age of the respondent on
the date of election, the
High Court took into
consideration evidence w'
1iich ivas not
legally available for comideration and that the additional
evidence was admitted v1ithout complying with the provision~
of law.
Held, that the High Court allowed additional evidence
to be admitted as it required that evidence either to enable it
to pronounce judg1nent or for any
other substantial cause
within the meaningofR.
27 (1) (b)ofO, 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. It could not be said that the High Court
made the order for admission of additional evidence without
applying its mind.
The appellate court has power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evideRoe "to em1ble it to
19~3.
F1bruary, 12,
1'63
K. V cdatarantiah
••
A. Sulh.,..,.a R1ddJ
•
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
pronounce
judgment" but also for "any other substantial
cause." There may be cases where even though the court finds
that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record
as it is and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional
evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment," it still consi·
ders that in the interest of justice something which remains
obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judg·
mcnt in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one
for allowing additional evidence "for any other substantial
cause."
Held, also, that the omission of the High Court to record
the reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate
such admission. The provision is not mandatory although
where a furth"r appeal lies from the decision of the appellate
Court, the recordin~ of the reasons may be necessary and
useful to the Court of further appeal for deciding whether the
discretion had heen judicially exercised by the Court below or
not and the omission to record the reas0ns must be treated as
a serious defect.
When additional evidence was taken with the a'5ent of
both sides or without objection at the time it was taken, it is
not open to a party to complain of it later on. As the appe·
Ii ant did not press his application against the admission of
additional evidence, the objection must be over-ruled.
Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh. [1951] S. C. R. 258,
Sre~manchuruier v. Gopalchunder, (Hl66) 11 M. I. A. 28,
Manmohan Da.• v. Musammat Ramdei (1931) 35 C. W. N. 925
Gopal, Singhv.
Jltakri Rai, (1885) I. L. R. 12Cal. 37,
Parsotim v.
Lal
~!Jfohar,
(1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 254 and
Jagarnath Prasad v. Hanuinan Pers/ur,l, (1909) L. R. 36 I.
A. 221, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDWTION: Civil Appeal
No. 676 of 1962 •
Appeal by spccia I leave from the judgment and
decree dated September 5, 1961, of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Special Appeal
No. 3 of 19

## Text

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2 S.C.R.
SUPRE:rillE COURT REPORTS
K. VENKATARAMIAH
v.
A. SEETHARAMA REDDY & ORS.
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HrnAYATULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
35
Election Petition-Age of Candidate on date of nomination
or election-Admission of additional evidence in High CourtWhen can be allowed-Additional evidence taken with consent of
parties-Effect-Constitution of India, Art. 173 (b)-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), O. 41, R. 27.
The appellant challenged the validity of election of
respondent on the grounds that he was below 30 years on the
relevant date, that his election was vitiated by undue influence
exercised on the voters by S'Jtll.(' Ministers of the State, that the
secrecy of ballot was not maintained and that the election wa!!
void on account of improper deletion of names of voters from
the final list.
All the objections were rejected by the Election ·
Tribunal which dismissed the election petition. On appeal,
the High Court confirmed the findings of the Election Tribunal
and dismissed the appeal. The appellant came to this Court
by special Ir.ave.
The appellant challenged the decision of the High Court
mainly on the ground that in
reaching its conclusion on the
question of age of the respondent on
the date of election, the
High Court took into
consideration evidence w'
1iich ivas not
legally available for comideration and that the additional
evidence was admitted v1ithout complying with the provision~
of law.
Held, that the High Court allowed additional evidence
to be admitted as it required that evidence either to enable it
to pronounce judg1nent or for any
other substantial cause
within the meaningofR.
27 (1) (b)ofO, 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. It could not be said that the High Court
made the order for admission of additional evidence without
applying its mind.
The appellate court has power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evideRoe "to em1ble it to
19~3.
F1bruary, 12,
1'63
K. V cdatarantiah
••
A. Sulh.,..,.a R1ddJ
•
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
pronounce
judgment" but also for "any other substantial
cause." There may be cases where even though the court finds
that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record
as it is and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional
evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment," it still consi·
ders that in the interest of justice something which remains
obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judg·
mcnt in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one
for allowing additional evidence "for any other substantial
cause."
Held, also, that the omission of the High Court to record
the reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate
such admission. The provision is not mandatory although
where a furth"r appeal lies from the decision of the appellate
Court, the recordin~ of the reasons may be necessary and
useful to the Court of further appeal for deciding whether the
discretion had heen judicially exercised by the Court below or
not and the omission to record the reas0ns must be treated as
a serious defect.
When additional evidence was taken with the a'5ent of
both sides or without objection at the time it was taken, it is
not open to a party to complain of it later on. As the appe·
Ii ant did not press his application against the admission of
additional evidence, the objection must be over-ruled.
Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh. [1951] S. C. R. 258,
Sre~manchuruier v. Gopalchunder, (Hl66) 11 M. I. A. 28,
Manmohan Da.• v. Musammat Ramdei (1931) 35 C. W. N. 925
Gopal, Singhv.
Jltakri Rai, (1885) I. L. R. 12Cal. 37,
Parsotim v.
Lal
~!Jfohar,
(1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 254 and
Jagarnath Prasad v. Hanuinan Pers/ur,l, (1909) L. R. 36 I.
A. 221, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDWTION: Civil Appeal
No. 676 of 1962 •
Appeal by spccia I leave from the judgment and
decree dated September 5, 1961, of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Special Appeal
No. 3 of 1961.
K. Bhimsu,nlcarcwi,
A. Ranyu,nad/w,m Clietty,
A. Vadavalli, N. Udayaratlmam and A. V. Rangam,
{or the appellant.
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
A. V. Viswana.tha Sastri and T. Thiagarajan,
for respondent No. 1.
K. R. Ch1mdhri, V. 0. Prashar and Amarsingh
Chaturvedi for respondent No. 2.
1963.
February 12. The judgment of the
Court was delivered by
/
DAS GuPTA. J.-This is an appeal against a
judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh confirmiHg an order of the Election Tribu·
nal, Hyderabad by which the Tribunal dismissed
an election petition filed by the present appellant.
By that petition this appellant sought a declaration
that the election of three persons, the present respondent,
Seetharam Reddy, one Anandam and
M. Ataur Rahman be declared void and that he, the
petitioner, be declared
as duly elected
to the
Legislative Council of the Andhra Pradesh from
Telangana Graduates Constituency. In this appeal
we are no longer concerned with the question of
validity of elections of Mr. Anandam or Mr. M.
Ataur Rahman but only with that of the respondent
Seetharam Reddy.
The appellant challenges the decision of the
High Court mainly on the ground that in reaching
its conclusion on the vital question of the age of
Seetharam Reddy on the da t~ of election the High
Court took into consideration evidence which was
not legally available for such consideration.
Though a large number of objections. were
raised in the petition to contest the validity of
Seetharam Reddy's election, C'lly four of them were
ultimately pressed before the Election Tribunal,
viz., (1)
That Seetharam Reddy was disqualified
to be chosen to fill a seat in the-Legislative Council
under Art. 173 (b) of the Constitution his age !Jeing
J91i3
K. Venklltara"1fah
v.
A. Seathar«mtJ Reddy
Dt1s Gupta, J.
1963
K. Ven.War...W
y,
A, S11th4r11ms RH'y
Llas Gupl4, J.
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,.
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
below 3U years on the relevant date; (2)
That the
election was vitiated by undue influence exercised
on
the voters by some Miniiters of the State of
Andhra Pradesh ; (:J) That the secrecy of the
ballot was not maintained, aml (4)
That the election was void on account of improper deletion of
names of"votcrs in the final list.
All these objections were rejected by the Election Tribunal wluch accordingly dismissed the petition.
On appeal, the High Court confirmed the
findings of the Election Tribunal on all these points
and dismissed the appeal.
Faced with the position that the correctness
of these findings which are all findings of facts is
not open to challenge before this Court in this appeal
by special leave, the appellant has raised the contention that the High Court's decision on the question of age of Seetharam Reddy was vitiated by the
error of law in that additional evidence was admitt·
eel and considered by the High Court without
complying with the provisions of law.
It appears that a considerable amount of oral
and documentary evidence was adduced before the
Tribunal on this question of Seetharam Reddy'-'
age. While the petitioner tried to establish that
Seetharam Reddy was borr.
in October 193l,
::,~~tharam Reddy tried to establisi1 i!lat he was born
:sometime in 1928. The Tribunal rejected as unworthy of credit the oral testimony adduced by either
side.
It also rejected most
of the documentary
evidence, including R-5 and R-6, R-11 and R-12.
R-5 i< a u;rth register; R-6 is an entry therein, R-11
is a certificale purporting to be issued by the Head
!v!astcr of the l\fuslim E'!gh School, Kurnool, in
respect of the age of the respondent Scetharam Reddy
while R-12 is an application said to have been made
at the time of his admission to this school. The
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
Tribunal's finding was that Seetharam Reddy did
not study in the Kurnool Muslim High School. The
Tribunal also rejected the documentary evidence
produced on behalf of the· petitioner seeking to show
that the respondent Seetharam Reddy was born on
October 10, 1931. Ultimately, however, the Tribunal decided the issue as regards the age against the
petitioner on the basis of certain documents in connection with the proceedings before the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council which showed that
the respondent Seetharam Reddy was a major by the
year 1356 Fasli. It appears that in that year an
appeal was pending in the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council which had arisen out ol a suit regarding the adoption of Seetharam
Reddy by one
T ulsamma, and the party who contested the alleged
adoption filed a petition to declare him (Seetharam
Reddy) as a major. Exhibit R-10 is that petition.
After notice was servecl a power ( wakalatnama) was
filed by Seetharam Reddy as a major in the appeal.
In this wakalatnama (Ex. R-3) Seetharam Reddy's
age was given as 19 years. Exhibit R-13 was the
i:iotice issued to Seetharam Reddy in those proceedmgs.
. f~);:.
The Tribunal was of opinion that the gem1i~e:
ncss of these documents, Exhibits R-3, R-10 and
R-13, could not be questioned and it was clear that
the respondent was treated as a major in the proceedings before the Judicial Committee from aud after
1356 Fasli. That showed, according to the Tribunal,
that he was npt less than 30 years of age on the date
of election or nomination.
The High Court also came to the same conclusion on this issue as regards Seetharam Reddy's age.
In coming to this conclusion it has relied not only on
the wakalatnama Ex. R-3 mentioned above but also
on four other documents, viz., Exs. R-5 and R-o,
which the Tribunal rejected as unreliable and
196}
K, Venkut«r«n1id
••
A. St11har.,.. R<il;i
DOJ Gu;t•, J,
1963
/,·. l,.tul;,•ft1ra111ia_l1
v •
. i Stt!h .1r1mr. HtdrJ.1
Oa.t .up:a, J.
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
Exs. R-l!J aud R-20 which were not tendered in e1·idrnce before the Tribunal but came before the High
Court as additional evidence. The appellant contends
that the High Court acted without jurisdiction in
admitting additional evidence.
We ;tre clearly of opinion that even if it was
found that the High Court erred in taking the additional evidence that would uot be a case of lack of
jurisdiction but would be au error in the exercise of
jurisdiction.
As was pointed out however by thi5
Court in Arfin SinJh v. /(w·tar Sin']li (1). "The
discretion to• receive and admit additional evidence
is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in Order XLI,
rule ~i, of the Code of Civil Procedure."
The question whether in the present case the High Court
exercised the discretion judicially has therefore to be
examined by us.
Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure
empowers the appellate court "to take additional
evidence or to require such evidence to be taken,.,
"subject to such conditions and limitations as may
be prescribed.,.
Ruic 27 of Or . .fl of the Code of
Civil--l'rocedure prescribes the conditions and limitations in the matter.
The Rule first lays down that
the
parties to
an appeal shall
not
be entitled
to produce additional evidence, whether oral or
documentary; in the appellate court. It then proceeds to lay dowu two classes of cases where the
appellate court may allow additional evidence to be
produced.
One class is where the Court appealed
from has
rcfu~ed to admit evidence which ought to
have been admitted.
The other class is where the
appellate court requires such additional eviden1 c for
itself-either to enable it to pronounce judgment or
for any other substantial cause.
The second class
of the rule requires that when additional evidence is
allowed to be produced by an appellate court the
Court shall record the reason for its admission.
(t) {1951] S,C.R, 258.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
The additional evidence that was produced in
this case had not been tendered in evidence before
the Election Tribunal and so this case does not fall
within the first class meutioned above.
Obviously,
therefore, the High Court allowed the production of
this evidence on its own requirement .
It is contended before us on behalf of the appellant that the learned Judges made the order mechanically without applying their minds to the requirements of Or. 41 r. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Support for this contention is sought from the fact
that the High Court did not record its reasons for
the admission of the additional evidence as required
by the second clause of the rule. The importance
of this provision for recording of the reasons for
admission of additional evidence has been emphasised
in· several cases (Vide., Sreemanchunder v.
Gopalchunder (1); ;Jlanmohan Das
v.
Musamrnat
Rarndei (2)).
It is very much to be desired that the courts of
appeal should not overlook 'the provisions of cl. (2)
of the Ruic and should record
their reasons for
admitting additional evidence. We arc not prepared,
however, to accept the contention of the appellant
that the omission to record the reason vitiates the
admission 'of the evidence. Clearly, the object of
the provision is to keep a clear record of what
weighed with the appellate court in allowing the
. additional evidence to be produced-whether this
was done on the ground (i) that the court appealed
from had refused to admit evidence which ought to
have been admitted, or (ii) it allowed it because it
required it to enable it to pronounce judgment in the
appeal or (iii) it allowed this for any other substantial
cause.
Where a further appeal lies from the decision
of the appellate court \uch recording of the reasons
is necessary and useful also to the court of further
appeal for deciding whether the •discretion under the
(I) 11866J I! M,I.A 28
(2) (1931) 35 C.W.N. 925.
1963
K . Venkattiram 1ah
v.
A. Seetharama Reddy
Das GtJpta, J.
/
1963
1(. V1nK:1ra.ramiah
v.
A. S£1.h1rama Reidy
l>aJ l.upta, J -
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
rule has been judicially exercised by the court below.
The omission to record the reason must therefore be
treated as a serious defect.
E vcn so, we arc unable
to pcr.uade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.
for, it rlocs 110~ seem reasonable to think that
the
lcgisL1ture
intended
that
even
though
in the circumstances of a particular case it could
be defini tcly
ascertained
from
the
record . why
the
appellate
court
allowed
additional
evidence and it is clear that the power was properly
exercised
within
the
limitation
imposed
by
the first
clause of the Ruic all that should be
set at naught merely because the provision in the
second clause was not complied with. It may be
mentioned that as early as 1885 when considering
a similar provision in the corresponding section of
the Code of 1882, viz., s. 5S!i, the High Court of
Calcutta held
that this
provision
for recording
reasons
is merely directory and
not imperative
vide Gopal Singh v . .Jhakri Rai ('). We are aware
of no case in which the correctness of this view has
been doubted. It is worth noticing that when the
HJ08 Code was framed and Or. 41 r. '27 took the
place of the old section 5ll8, the legislature was
content to leave the provision as it was and did not
think it necessary to say - anything to make the
requirement of recording reasons imperative. It is
true that the word "shall" is used in R. 2i (2); but
that by itself does not make it mandatory. We are
therefore of opinion_ that the omission of the
High Court
to record reasons for allowing additional evidence docs not vitiate such admission.
Nor are we prepared to agree with the learned
Counsel that this omission justifies the conclusion
that the High Court acted mechanically in the
matter, without applying its mind to the requirements of the Ruic. The record before us shows that
the hearing of the appeal before the High Court
commenced on July
18,
1!)61
and
after the
(I) (1885) I.L.R. 12 Cal. 37,
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
appellant's Counsel had concluded his arguments the
respondent's Counsel started addressing the Court.
He continued his
arguments on
the next date,
i.e., July 19. On the next date, i.e., July, 20
19fil
an application was made on behalf of
the respondent, Seetharam Reddy, praying that two
registers of admission and withdrawals of the Govern·
ment Muslim High School, Kurnool, be received
and admitted as additional evidence in the appeal.
(It may be stated that the petition itself bears the
date, July 18, but the supporting affidavit bears the
date 20 July).
It was stated on affidavit that
both these registers had been summoned along with
the other documents by the appellant, Venkataramiah,
and were actually produced before the Election
Tribunal by the Head Master and further that these
had been transmitted to the High Court along with
the records of the case.
It was stated that these
documents had "an important bearing" upon the case
and were "required to be looked into" to arrive at a
just and correct conclusion in regard to Issue No. 1.
On the following date i. e.,
of July 21, the
appellant Venkataramiah put in his counter-affidavit
objecting to the respondent's prayer and in para, 6
of this counter affidavit we find
the following
statement :-
"In the circumstances it is submitted that the
provisions of Or. 41 Rule 27 C. P. C., are
not complied with. It was not offered as
evidence before the Tribunal. Admittedly it
was available at the time of tl!e trial and it is
not the case of the petitioner that notwith·
standing exercise of due diligence, was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced
by him at the time when the decision was
pronounced by the Tribunal. It is not in the
interest of justice nor it is necessary to enable
this Court to pronounce judgment to admit
them as additional evidence. On the other
1963
K. Venkataramiah
v.
A. Seeiharama Redtfy
Das Gupta, J,
1963
}(. VtnJararllmia~
v.
A. SrtrJ1aram:J Rufd_,
Das (ju pt a, J.
4~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
hand, the admission of the registers as evidence
would enable the party to go behimJ his case
stated by him in his counter affidavit before
the Election Tribunal and set up altogether an
inconsistent case.
Hence the said Admission
Registers arc neither relevant nor material."
The
High Court pa5sed the
order for the
taking of additional evidence on the same date.
How the Hi~h Court considered the matter is best
shown by a passage from the judgment pronounced
by the Court in the appeal.
After pointjng out that
the Tribunal "was not prepared to place any reliance
on Exhibits R-11 and R-12 and was of the opinion
that the 1st respondent did not study in Government
Mohammadan. Iligh School, Kurnool,
and that
Exhibit R-12 was concocted, if it was to be argued
that it relates to the present Ist respondent,"
the
judgment proceeds thus :-
"During the course of the argument§ before
m, it was noticed that two admission registers
relating to the High School for the relevant
period were in fact surnmoncd for by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner and were produced before the Tribunal. For some reason, which is not
clear to us, these registers were not proved and
marked as exhibits. These registers were sent to
the High Court for hearing of the above appeal
and they.were placed before us.
\\'e arc told
that the Ist respondent also applied that these·
registers may be summoned for from the High
School.
But when he has realised that the peti·
tioner himself has summoned for them, it was not
necessary for the !st respondent to summon for
them again. Whatever it be, these registers were
before the Tribunal and arc before us.
But
as neither party could rely upon them without
their being proved and exhibited, the Ist respondent filed
C.~1.P. No. 7115/IJI under Or. 41
r,2i and section 151 C.P.C. to receive them as
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2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
evidence and mark the registers as exhibits. By
our order dated 21-7-1961 we permitted the 1st
respondent in the appeal to prove these documents before the Election Tribunal.
We also
directed that the appellant is at liberty to
cross-examine the persons, who might be summoned to prove these documents. We also directed the Tridunal to record the evidence adduced
in proof of these two registers and submit the
same to the High Court for consideration in the
above appeal.
The Tribunal accordingly recalled R.W.8, the Head Master, Government
Muslim High School, Kurnool, and also examined R.W.10, the Head Master of the same
school for the years 1936 to 1945. The Register of Admissions am! Withdrawals relating to
the School from 7-7-1919 to 15-1-1938 is marked
as exhibit R-19 and the register from 30-6-1926
to 14-2-1949 is marked as Exhibit R-20. The
entries in the two registers relating to the 1st
respondent are Exhibits R-21 and R-24."
In view of what the High Court has stated in
this passage it is not possible to say that the High Court
made the order for admission of additional evidence
without applying its mind. It seems clear that the High
Court thought, on a consideration of the evidence, in
the light of the arguments that had been addressed
already before it that it would assist them to arrive
at the truth on the question of Seetharam Reddy's
age if the entries in the admission registers of the
School were made available. It was vehemently
urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that
there was such a volume of evidence before the
High Court that it could not be seriously suggested
that the Court required any additional e"Sidence "to
enable it to pronounce judgment". The requirement,
it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the
High Court, and it will not be right for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have
1963
K. Venkataramiah
v.
A. Seetharama Redd;
D'JS Gupta, J.
1963
K. Vtnkolarmniah
v.
A. Sttlharama Reddy
DarG11pta, J.
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46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
required such additional evidence to enable "us" to
pronounce judgment.
Apart from this, it is V.·cll to
remember that the appellate court has the power to
allow additional evidence not only if it requires such
evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment" but
also for "any other substantial cause."
There may
well be cases where even though the court finds that
it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the
record as it i~, and so, it cannot. strictly say that it
requires additional evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment," it still considers that in the interest
of justice something which remains obscure should
be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in
a more satisfactory manner.
Such a case will be
one for allowing additional evidence "for any other
. subslantial cause" under R.2i(l) (b) of the Code.
It is easy to sec that such requirement of the
Court to enable it to pronounce jugrncnt or for any
other StJbstantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily
unless some inherent lacuna or defect become appar-
' cnt on an examination of the cvidcncC:
That is why
in Par8otim's case('), the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted
obscrvcd:-
"lt may be required to enable the Court to
pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the
Court that requires it.
This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard
a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but
"when on examining the evidence as it stands,
some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent."
As the Privy Council proceeded to point out:-
"lt may well be that the defect may be
pointed out by a party, or that a party, may
(I) (1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 254.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
move the Court to supply the defect, but
the requirement must be the requirement of the
Court upon its 'appreciation of the evidence as
it stands."
We are satisfied that in the present case the
High Court allowed additional evidence to be admit·
ted as it required such evidence either to enable it to
pronounce judgment or for any other substantial
cause within the meaning of Rule 27(l)(b) of Or. 41
of the Code. The contention that the decision of
the High Court on the question of the respondent's
age was vitiated by reason of it being based on
inadmissible evidence, must therefore fail.
Another difficulty in the appellant's way may
also be mentioned. As has been said above, the appellant did file before the High Court a petition objecting
to the reception of additional evidence. We find it
. stated however in the High Court's order refusing the
. application for a certificate under Art. 133 (l)(c)
of the Constitution that no objection that the requirements of Or. 41 r. 27. C.P.C., were not satisfied, was
raised either at the time when the court directed
the Tribunal to record the statements or at the time
of the hearing of the appeal. This order was passed
by the learned Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice
Chandrasckhara Sastry, who had made the order
allowing admission of additional evidence and also
heard the appeal. We are bound to hold therefore
that though the apppeliant did make an application
objecting to the admission of additional evidence he
did not press that application.
On the principle laid down in Jagarnath
·Pershad v. Hanuman Persliad (1), that when additional evidence was taken with the assent of both
sides or without objection at the time it was taken,
it is not open to a party to complain of it later on,
the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the
(I) (1909) L.R. 36 I.A. 221.
/§63
K. VenkaMramiah
v.
A. S.etharam1 R1ddJ
D11s G11pta, /.
1963
;,-. VtnAtUtnami::~
v .
.1. Stclharan:a Redd_)
Dus f.,":1pta, J.
1963
Fcbrua')I, IJ.
,, ...
""·~-· ..... ~
...
... , ... .-~-·'
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
additional evidence was taken in this case in bn:ach
of thr prrn·i•iom of l:m.
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There is nothing therefore that would justify
us in· interfering with the findings of facts on which
the High Court based its decision.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
THE COLL.ECTOR OF SOUTH SATARA
& ANR.
v.
LAX:\fAN MAHADEV DESHPANDE & ORS.
(P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCIIOO,
1\1. HIDAYA1TLLAH, K. C. DAS GrPTA and
]. c. SHAil, .JJ.)
ll"a/~01 /11,ntl.-:-Jlr.:nouption by
(/01:ernntf.nl-.\'at~trc uf tit-(',
t•·n lllC of land ltr:.ld original1.y aJt u:aLa11. 111n,[ 1 afrcr C1J1n111 ut~1ti•Jli
of ,w·"icc-lion./my llcrcdila(// OJ/i•:C·i Ad, l.\'71 ([/I of IS]./),
s.<. 4, J', (1) (2), cl. (3),
·?~-/,oss of ll"aian riJ/d8 ;,. la11J-
(Jranl of co1np(;n.sation if ~onte-nipfrllCJl-lfrJJnbay ?ara1an 11 a111l
!lalkuo1i Walans (Abolition) Act, IU(JO (B'"''· L.\. of 1950),
.<s. 3, 4, G, 9 (/) (2) (") (J).
Ou abolition of his u1ata11, the respondent applied lo the
c~iitcctor claiining co1npcnsatiou un<lcr s. 9 of the llotnliay
Parag,\na antl Kulkarni Watans (1\bolition) :\ct, 19'.:>0, for
extinction of his right in che 11.'alan larid, ar.cl of his ''right !o
enjoy part of the land revenue." The (;"J[!cctor rejected the
application and in appeal the order \Vas
afl'1nned by t!1c
Revenue 'l'rihunal.
'l'l1t Iligh Con~ t ia a
petiti.Hl uuLl.t:r
;\rt. 227 of the C\lllStitution set aside thC' order of the Col!ccto:-
and directed hirn to assess and pay C·Hnpensation to the respondent under s. 9 (I~ of the Act.
llel<l, that the u·alan property-if any-the hereditary
office, and the rights and piivilcges attached thereto, 1ogcther
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