# [2002] 2 S.C.R. 213

- **Citation:** [2002] 2 S.C.R. 213
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2002-03-06
- **Bench:** G.B. Pattanaik, R.P. Sethi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2002-2-s-c-r-213-18442
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Sections 2(c), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 15.
Contempt-Law of Contempt-Enactment-Held, the purpose is to secure
public respect and confidence in judicial processes and to instil confidence of
the common man in the institution of Judiciary.
Contempt-Fair criticism-Distinction betwee~onduct of the CourtCommenting of-Subject to good faith and in public interest which could be
checked from surrounding circumstances including the knowledge and intention
v,,
'e person.
Contempt-Suo-motu proceedings-Held, Contemptuous part of the
affidavit demonstrates the wrong done to public-It weakens the faith of public
in general-ft scandalizes the authority of the Court~-Thus contempt
pro_ceedings could be initiated against the contemnor-On facts, contemnor
held guilty of contempt and sentenced
Conten1pt-Suo-motu proceedings-Motive-Held, when action is taken
at the instance of the Court, there is no nzotive and prejudice on the part of
the Judge in initiating the proceedings.
A
B
c
D
E
Criminal Contempt-Defamatory statements made in pleading/Petition/ F
Affidavit-Amounts to contempt unless it is shown that such statements are
made in good faith by the contemnor while discharging his public duties/
functions-Penal Code, 1860-Section 499.
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 19(/), 19(2), 129 & 215;
Right of free expression-Limitation-Held, if a person tries to undermine
the dignity of the Court, Court can invoke its power under Article 129 or 215
to initiate Contempt proceeding, if it is found that there is a direct attac/c on
the Institution itself
213
G
H
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002) 2 S.C.R.
A .
An Organisation called Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a Writ Petition
in this Court. The main issue in the petition was about the construction of
Sardar Sarova·r Reservoir l>a_m in Gujarat and its adverse- impact on
environment and displacement of people fronf their ancestral homes.
Respondent, a writer, who is n9t a _party to the said writ proceedings,
published an article on the plight of the residents of the area where proposal
B . for· construction of Dam had been initiated, in an English Magazine as well
as in a book written by her. Expressing its displeasure on the distorted writing,
this Court .obsen:ed that Judicial process and Judicial.institution cannot be
permitted to be. scandalised or subjected to contumacious violation of rig~ts
in such a blatant manner as had been done by the respondent. However, the
C Court did not initiate Contempt proceedings against the respondent in the
larger interest of the issues in the petition pending in the Court, viz., Oustee's
rehabilitation and resettlement. Subsequently, the Court pronounc;ed its
judgment.
Thereafter, Contempt Petition was filed by some of the Advocates
D alleging that respondent 'led a huge crowd and held a 'Dharna' in front of
this Court and shouted slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to
this Court and when the petitioners protested they were attacked and assaulted
by the respondents. In the Contempt proceedings, notices were issued .
. Re_spondents filed affidavits admitting the holding of 'Dharna' outside the
E Supreme Court by the activists of 'Narmada Bachao Andolan' and oustees
aggrieved by the Judgment of this Court relating to building of the Dam on
the Narmada River, but Respondent No. 3 in lier affidavit made specific
contemptuous remarks against this Court. However, in view of denial of the
alleged involvement in shouting abusive slogans against the Court, the
Contempt proceeding was dropped. But in view of the contemptuous remarks
F
made in the affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3~ suo-motu contempt
proceedi~g had been initiated against respondent No. 3. The Court_ found
Respondent No. 3, had prima facie committed contempt of this Court. A Notice
was issued to her to show cause -as to why Contempt proceedings should not
be initiated against her for the offending statements made in her ttffidavit.
G
Respondent-Contem~or raised prel

## Text

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/
IN RE: ARUNDHATI ROY-CONTEMNOR
MARCH 6, 2002
[G.B. PATTANAIK AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Sections 2(c), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 15.
Contempt-Law of Contempt-Enactment-Held, the purpose is to secure
public respect and confidence in judicial processes and to instil confidence of
the common man in the institution of Judiciary.
Contempt-Fair criticism-Distinction betwee~onduct of the CourtCommenting of-Subject to good faith and in public interest which could be
checked from surrounding circumstances including the knowledge and intention
v,,
'e person.
Contempt-Suo-motu proceedings-Held, Contemptuous part of the
affidavit demonstrates the wrong done to public-It weakens the faith of public
in general-ft scandalizes the authority of the Court~-Thus contempt
pro_ceedings could be initiated against the contemnor-On facts, contemnor
held guilty of contempt and sentenced
Conten1pt-Suo-motu proceedings-Motive-Held, when action is taken
at the instance of the Court, there is no nzotive and prejudice on the part of
the Judge in initiating the proceedings.
A
B
c
D
E
Criminal Contempt-Defamatory statements made in pleading/Petition/ F
Affidavit-Amounts to contempt unless it is shown that such statements are
made in good faith by the contemnor while discharging his public duties/
functions-Penal Code, 1860-Section 499.
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 19(/), 19(2), 129 & 215;
Right of free expression-Limitation-Held, if a person tries to undermine
the dignity of the Court, Court can invoke its power under Article 129 or 215
to initiate Contempt proceeding, if it is found that there is a direct attac/c on
the Institution itself
213
G
H
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002) 2 S.C.R.
A .
An Organisation called Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a Writ Petition
in this Court. The main issue in the petition was about the construction of
Sardar Sarova·r Reservoir l>a_m in Gujarat and its adverse- impact on
environment and displacement of people fronf their ancestral homes.
Respondent, a writer, who is n9t a _party to the said writ proceedings,
published an article on the plight of the residents of the area where proposal
B . for· construction of Dam had been initiated, in an English Magazine as well
as in a book written by her. Expressing its displeasure on the distorted writing,
this Court .obsen:ed that Judicial process and Judicial.institution cannot be
permitted to be. scandalised or subjected to contumacious violation of rig~ts
in such a blatant manner as had been done by the respondent. However, the
C Court did not initiate Contempt proceedings against the respondent in the
larger interest of the issues in the petition pending in the Court, viz., Oustee's
rehabilitation and resettlement. Subsequently, the Court pronounc;ed its
judgment.
Thereafter, Contempt Petition was filed by some of the Advocates
D alleging that respondent 'led a huge crowd and held a 'Dharna' in front of
this Court and shouted slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to
this Court and when the petitioners protested they were attacked and assaulted
by the respondents. In the Contempt proceedings, notices were issued .
. Re_spondents filed affidavits admitting the holding of 'Dharna' outside the
E Supreme Court by the activists of 'Narmada Bachao Andolan' and oustees
aggrieved by the Judgment of this Court relating to building of the Dam on
the Narmada River, but Respondent No. 3 in lier affidavit made specific
contemptuous remarks against this Court. However, in view of denial of the
alleged involvement in shouting abusive slogans against the Court, the
Contempt proceeding was dropped. But in view of the contemptuous remarks
F
made in the affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3~ suo-motu contempt
proceedi~g had been initiated against respondent No. 3. The Court_ found
Respondent No. 3, had prima facie committed contempt of this Court. A Notice
was issued to her to show cause -as to why Contempt proceedings should not
be initiated against her for the offending statements made in her ttffidavit.
G
Respondent-Contem~or raised preliminary objection that the Bench/
Judge which ordered to issue notice in Contempt Petition should not be a party
to the present proceeding; and that respoildent-contemnor apprehended bias
on the part of Judge/Bench to whom respondent claims to have allegedly
attributed motives; and that on the ground of a reference made to the
H Constitution Bench in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Remakrishan Hegde case
:,
...
IN RE: ARUNDHATI ROY
215
which stated that truth can be pleaded as defence in Contempt Proceeding ·.A
and on the same issue decision of the Court in the matter of Perspective
Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra has been referred to be
reconsidered, therefore, the present proceedings required to await the
Judgment of the Constitution Bench; and that no proceeding for Contempt
can be initiated against any person on the ground of his/her scandalising the B
Court.
Dismissing the objections and convicting the respondent-contemnor, the
Court
HELD : 1.1. 'Rule of μw• is the basic rule of governance of any civilised C
democratic polity. Constitutional scheme adopted by India is also based upon
the concept of Rule of Law. Everyone, whether individually or collectively, is
'
.
unquestionably under the supremacy of law, notwithstanding how powerful,
rich and high he or she may be. For achieving the establishment of the rule
of law, the Constitution has assigned the special task to the Judiciary. The
rule oflaw unfolds its contents and establishes its concept through the Courts.
For the judiciary to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to
the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the
Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. For restoring confidem;e
amongst the people for the independence of judiciary, its impartiality and the
glory of law has to be maintained, protected and strengthened. The confidence E
in the Courts of justice cannot, in any, way, be-allowed to be tarnished,
diminished or wiped out by contumacious behaviour of any person. The only
weapon of protecting itself from the onslaught to the institution is the contempt
of Court in the armoury of judicial repository. 1220-C-D~E-FJ
In Re: Harijai Singh and Anr., 11996] 6 SCC 466, relied on.
'Road to Justice ' written by Lord Denning, referred to.
..
Frankforther, J in Pennekamp v. Florida, {1946), 90 Led 1295, referred
to.
1.2. The law of contempt has been enacted to ·secure public respect. and
confidence in the judici.al process. If s.uch confidence is shaken or broken, the
confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic
F
G
set up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous' for; · . ,
tl)e society itself. (222-B]
H
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002] 2 S.C.R.
A
. 2.1. In the instant case, notice was issued to the respondent not for having
attributed motives to a particular judge but for imputing motives to the Court
in general for allegedly harassing her as if the judiciary were carrying out
personal vendetta against her. The contemptuous part of affidavit of the
respondent, do~ not attribute any motive or make any allegation against any
judge. It has to be kept in mind that the present proceedings are
B distinguishable from the proceedings contemplated under Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act (228-B-C]
2.2. When action is at the instance of the Court, there is no question of
any motive of and prejudice from any Judge. Accepting the plea raised by
C the respondent would amount to depriving all the Judges of the Court to her
the matter and thus frustrate the contempt proceedings, which cannot be the
mandate of law. The apprehension caused by the respondent is imaginary,
without basis and not bonafide. [228-H; 229-A)
3. Contempt proceedings have been initiated against the respondent on
D the basis of the offending and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit making
wild allegations against the Court and thereby scandlising its authority. There
is no point or fact in those proceedings which requires to be defended by
pleading the truth. (229-D)
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Rama Krishna Hegde, (2000) IO SCC 331,
E distinguished.
4. No wrong appears to have been done to any judge personally by filing
the offending affidavit but the contemptuous part of the affidavit demonstrates
the wrong done to the public. The respondent has tried to cast an injury to
the public by creating an impression in the mind of the people of this country
p
regarding the integrity, ability and fairness f the institution of judiciary.
(231-C)
., Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19531
SCR 1169, referred to.
G
5.1. The law of contempt itself envisages various exceptions as
incorporated in Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Besides the defences envisaged under
the Act, the Court can, in appropriate cases, consider any other defence put
forth by the respondent which is not incompatible with the dignity of the Court
and the law of contempt (239-F)
H
Sheela Borse v. Union of India and Ors., (1988) 4 SCC 226, relied on.
/
-
IN RE: ARUNDHA TI ROY
217
5.2. A person claiming the benefit of second exception to Section 499 of A
the Indian Penal Code, is required to show that the opinion expressed by him
was in good faith which related to the conduct of a public servant in the
discharge or his public functions or respecting his character so far as his
character appears in that conduct. Under the law or contempt statements
made in pleadings, petitions and affidavits of the parties, in a number of cases, B
have been held defamatory statements amounting to offences under the section
unless it is shown that they fall within any of the exceptions. The statements
made in an affidavit filed in the Court amount to a criminal contempt.
[240-G)
Surender Nath v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court, ILR 10 Cal, C
109 and Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, AIR, (1952) SC 149,
referred to.
Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, New Delhi and Ors., [1955) 3 SCC 619, relied on.
5.3. Fair criticism of the conduct of a judge, the institution of the D
judiciary and its functioning may not amount to contempt if it is made in
good faith and in public interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public
interest, Courts have to see all the surrounding circumstances inclu~ing the
person responsible for comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which
the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. All E
citizens cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the Courts in
the name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution
itself. Litigant losing in the Court would be the first to impute motives to the
judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism which cannot be allowed
for preserving the public faith in a important pillar or democratic set up, i.e.,
judiciary. In the instant case the respondent has not claimed to possess any F
special knowledge of law and the working of the institution of judiciary and
has only claimed herself to be a writer of repute. It is also not denied that the
respondent was directly or indirectly associated with the Narmada Bachao
Andolan and was, therefore, interested in the result of the litigation. She has
not claimed to have made any study regarding the working of this Court or G
judiciary in the country and claims to have made the offending imputations
in her proclaimed right of freedom of speech and expression as a writer.
[245-B-C]
P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker and Ors .. (1988] 3 SCC 167, distinguished.
Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of India, [1996) 5 SCC 216, H
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002] 2 S.C.R.
A referred to.
E.M Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, [1970) 2 SCC
325, referred to.
5.4. The Constitution of India has guaranteed freedom of speech and
B expression to every citizen as a fundamental right While guaranteeing such
freedom, it has also provided under Article 129 that the Supreme Court shall
be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Similar power has been conferred
on the High Courts of the States under Article 215. Under the Constitution,
there is no separate guarantee of the freedom of the press and it is the same
C freedom of expression, which is conferred on all citizens under Article 19(1).
Any expression of opinion would, therefore, be not immune from the liability
for exceeding the limits, either under the law of defamation or contempt of
Court or the other constitutional limitations under Article 19(2). If a citizen,
therefore, in the garb of exercising right of free expression under Article 19(1 ),
D tries to scandalise the Court or undermines the dignity of the Court, then the
Court would be entitled to exercise power under Article 129 or Article 215,
as the case may be. In relation to a pending proceeding before the Court, while
showing cause to the notices issued, when it is stated that the Court displays
a dis(urbing willingness to issue notice on an absurd despicable, entirely
on.substantiated petition, it amounts to a destructive attack on the reputation
E and the credibility of the Institution and it undermines the public confidence .
in the judiciary as a whole and by no stretch of imagination, can be held to
be a fair criticism of the Court's proceeding. When a scurrilous attack is made
in relation to a pending proceeding and the notice states that the issuance of
notice to show cause was intended to silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to
F
G
harass and intimidate those who disagree with it, is a direct attack.on the
Institution itself, rather the conduct of an individual Judge. The meaning of
the expression used cannot come within the extended concept of fair criticism
or expression of opinion, particularly to the case of the contemnor in the
present case, who on her own right is an acclaimed writer in English.
[246-E-F-G-H; 247-A-B]
6.1. One has t(l find out whether there can be a balancing between the
two public i~tere~ts, the freedom of expression and the 1ttgnity of the Court.
The observations of this Court in the earlier contempt case against the present
contemnor is also relevant. In the offending portion of her affidavit, the
respondent has accused the Court of proceeding with absurd, despicable and
H entirely unsubstariiated petition which, according to her, amounted to the
-
IN RE : ARUNDHA TI ROY
219
Court displaying a disturbing willingness to issue notice. She has further A
attributed motives to the Court of silencing criticism and muzzling dissent
by harassing and intimidating those who disagree with it. Her contempt for
the Court is evident from the assertion "by entertaining a petition based on
an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme
Court is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm". In the B
affidavit filed in these proceedings, the respondent has reiterated what she
has stated in her earlier affidavit and has not shown any repentance. She
wanted to become a champion to the cause of the writers by asserting that
persons like her can allege anything they desire and accuse any person or
Institution without any circumspection, limitation or restraint. Such an
attitude shows her persistent and consistent attempt to malign the Institution C
of the judiciary found to be most important pillar in the Indian democratic
set up. (247-D-H; 248-A-B-Cl
Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'b/e the Chief Justice of India., (1996] 5 SCC 216,
relied on.
Andre Paul v. Attorney General., (1936) AC 322, referred to.
6.2. The well-known proposition of law is that it punishes the archer as
soon as the arrow is shot-no matter if it misses to hit the target. The respondent
D
is proved to have shot the arrow, intended to damage the Institution of the
judiciary and thereby weaken the faith of the public in general aud if such E
an attempt is not prevented, disastrous consequences are likely to follow
resulting in the destruction of rule of law the expected norm of any civilised
society. [248-D!
6.3. On the basis of the record, the position of law and findings on
various pleas raised and the conduct of the respondent, the respondent has F
committed criminal contempt of this Court by scandalising its authority with
malafide intentions, The respondent is, therefore, held guilty for the contempt
of Court, punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The
ends of justice would be met if she is sentenced to symbolic imprisonment of
simple imprisonment for one day besides paying a fine of Rs. 2,000 and in
default of payment of fine, to under go imprisonment for three months.
G
[248-E-G]
In Re: S. Mulgaokar. [1918] 3 SCC 339, relied on.
Shri Baradakanta Mishra v, The Registrar ofOrissa High Court and Anr.,
[197411 sec 374, referred to.
H
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002] 2 S.C.R.
A
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.)
No. IO of 2001.
Shanti Bhushan, Prashant B!.11shan, Sanjeev K. Kapoor, Narender Verma,
Vishal Gupta, Sanjay Pathak and Anil Mittal for the Contemner.
B
Altaf, Additional Solicitor General, Sanjay R. Hegde and P. Parmeswaran
for Union of India
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SETHI, J. 'Rule of Law' is the basic rule of governance of any civilised
C democratic polity. Our Constitutional scheme is based upon the concept of
Rule of Law which we have adopted and given to ourselves. Everyone,
whether individually or collectively is unquestionably under the supremacy
of law, Whoever the· person may be, however high he or she is, no-one is
above the law notwithstanding how powerful and how rich he or she may ·be.
For achieving the establishment of the rule of law, the Constitution has assigned
D the special task to the judiciary in the country. It is only through the courts
. that the rule of law unfolds its contents and establishes its concept. For the
judiciary to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit
with which it is sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts
have to be respected and protected at all costs. After more than half a century
E of independence, the judiciary in the country is under a constant threat and
being endangered from with.in and without. The need of the time is of restoring .
confidence amongst the people for the independence of judiciary. Its
,impartiality and the glory of law has to be maintained, protected and
strengthened. The confidence in the courts of justice, which the people possess,
cannot, in any way, be allowed to be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by
F contumacious behaviour of any person. The only weapon of protecting itself
from the onslaught to the institution is the long hand of contempt of court left
in the armoury of judicial repository which, when needed, can reach any
neck howsoever high or far away it may be. In In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra
(the alleged contemner), AIR( 1995) SC 2348 this Court reiterated the position
G of law relating to the powers of contempt and opined that the judiciary is 11:ot
only the guardian of the rule of law and third pillar but in fact the central
pillar of a democratic State. If the judiciary is to perform its duti~s and
functions effectively and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly
entrusted to it, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected
and protected at all costs. Otherwise the very comer-stone of our constitutional
H scheme will give way and with it will disappear the rule of law and the
. ..._
IN RE :ARUNDHATIROY [SETHl,J.]
221
civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the courts are entrusted A
with extraordinary powers of punishing those who indulge in acts, whether
inside or outside the courts, which tend to undennine the authority of law and
bring it in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising it. When the court exercises
this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the
individual judge who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the
majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the B
judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver
fearless and impartial justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts
which tend to create disaffection and disrespect for the authority of the court
by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets
eroded.
C
No person can flout the mandate of law of respecting the courts for
establishment of rule of law under the cloak of freedoms of speech and
expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Such a freedom is subject to
reasonable restrictions imposed by any law. Where a provision, in the law,
relating to contempt imposes reasonable restrictions, no citizen can take the D
liberty of scandalising the authority of the institution of judiciary. freedom
qf speech and expression, so far as they do not contravene the statutory limits
as contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, are to prevail without any
' hindrance. However, it must be n nembered that the maintenance of dignity
of courts is one of the cardinal principles of rule of law in a democratic set E
up and any criticism of the judicial institution couched in language that
apparently appears to be mere criticism but ultimately results in undennining
the dignity of the courts cannot be pennitted when found having crossed the
limits and has to be punished. This Court in In Re: Harijai Singh and Anr.
[1996] 6 sec 466 has pointed out that a free and healthy Press is indispensable
to the function of a true democracy but, at the same time, cautioned that the F
freedom of Press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in
all circumstances. Lord Dening in his Book "Road to Justice" observed that
Press is the watchdog to see that every trial is conducted fairly, openly and
above board but the watchdog may sometimes break loose and has to be
punished for misbehaviour. Frankfarther, J in Pennekamp v. Florida, ( 1946) G
90 Led 1295 at p. 1313] observed:
"If men, including Judges and journalists were angels, there would be
no problems of contempt of Court. Angelic Judges would be
undisturbed by extraneous influences and angelic journalists would
H
I
not seek to influence them. The power to punish for contempt, as a
222
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002] 2 S.C.R.
means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the community
. as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide, is not a privilege
accorded to Judges. The power to punish for contempt of court is a
safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the function which they
exercise."
B
The law of contempt has been enacted to secure public ~espect and
confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken, the
confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic
set up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous
for the society itself.
C
In this backdrop of the mandate of rule of law, we are called upon to
deal with the case of the respondent against whom suo motu contempt
proceedings have been initiated by this Court. The re~pondent, who is stated
to be an author of name and fame, has landed herself in the dock of the court,
apparently by drifting away from the path on which she was traversing by
D contributing to the art and literature. During whole of the proceeding she has
not shown any repentance or remorse and persistently and cons_istently tried
to justify her action_ which, prima facie, was found to be contemptuous. To
frustrate the present proceedings, the respo~dent has resorted to all legal
tactics and pretences. In view of this we have no option but to deal with the
case on its merits, not being influenced by any other factor or circumstance
E except our commitment to protect the dignity and respect of the institution
of judiciary so that the c.onfidence of the common man is not shaken in the
institution.
The facts of the case, which are not seriously dispu!ed, are that an
organisation, namely, Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a petition under Article
F 32 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition No. 319 of 1994 in this
Court. The petitioner was a movement or andolan, whose leaders and members
were concerned about the alleged adverse environmental impact of the
construction of the sardar Sarovar Reservoir Dam in Gujarat and the farreaching and tragic consequences of the displacement of hundreds of thousands
G of people from their ancestral homes t~at would result from the submerging
of vast extents of land, to make up the reservoir. During the pendency of the
writ petition this Court passed various orders. By one of the orders, the Court
·permitted to increase the ·height of the dam to RL 85 meters which was
resented to and protested by the writ petitioners and others including the
respondent herein. The respondent Arundhati Roy, who is not a party to the
H writ proceedings, published an article entitled "The Greater Common Good"
_J
IN RE : ARUNDHA Tl ROY [SETHI, I.]
223
·which was published in Outlook Magazine and in some portion of a book
written by her. Two judges of this Court, forming the three-judge Bench felt
that the comments made by her were, prima facie, a misrepresentation of the
proceedings of the court. It was observed that judicial process and institution
cannot be permitted to be scandalised or subjected to contumacious violation
A
in such a biatant manner, as it had been done by her. The action of the B
respondent had caused the court much anguish and when the court expressed
its displeasure on the action of the respondent in making distorted writing or
manner in which leaders of the petitioner Ms. Meda Patkar and one
Dharmadikhari despite giving assurance to the court acted in breach of the
injunction, the Court observed:
"We are unhappy at the way the leaders of NBA and Ms. Arundhati
Roy have attempted to undermine the dignity of the CQurt. We
expected better behaviour from them."
Showing its magnanimity, the Court declared:
c
"After giving this matter our thoughtful consideration and keeping in D
view the importance of the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of
the PAFs, which we have been monitoring for the last five years, we
are not inclined to initiate proceedings against the petitioner, its leaders
or Ms. Arundhati Roy. We are of the opinion, in the larger interest
of the issues pending before us, that we need not pursue the matter E
any further. We, however, hope that what we have said above would
serve the purpose and the petitioner and its leaders would hereafter
desist from acting in a manner which has the tendency to interfere
with the due administration of justice or which violates the injunctions
issued by this Court from time to time."
The third learned Judge also recorded his disapproval of the statement
made by the respondent herein and others and felt that as the court's shoulders
are broad enough to shrug off their comments and because the focus should
not shift from the resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees, no action in
F
contempt be taken against them. .
G
However, after the judgment was pronounced in IA No. 14 of 1999 on
15th October, 1999 reported at [1999] 8 sec 308, an incident is stated to
have taken place on 30th December, 2000 regarding which Contempt Petition
No.2 of 200 I was filed by J.R. Parashar, Advocate and others. According to
the appellgations made in that petition, the respondents named therein, led a H
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002) 2 S.C.R.
A huge crowd and held a Dhama in front of this Court and shouted abusive
slogans against the court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity and
dishonesty to this institution. It was alleged that when the petitioners therein
protested, they were attacked and assaulted by the respondents. In the evening
on the same day, the respondents are stated to have attacked, abused and
B assaulted the petitioners. A complaint was stated to have been lodged with
the Tilak Marg Police Station on the next day. In the aforesaid contempt
proceeding notices were issued to the respondents in response to which they
filed separate affidavits. All the three respondents therein admitted that there
was a Dha~a outside the gates of this Court on 30th December, 2000 which
was organised by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the gathered crowd were
~
C persons who lived in the Narmada Valley and were aggrieved by the majority
D
E
judgment of this Court relating to the building of the dam on the Narmada
River. In her affidavit the respondent, amongst other averments, had stated:
"On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too busy, the
Chief Justice of India refused to allow a sitting judge to head the
judicial enquiry into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves
matters of national security and corruption in the highest •ilaces.
Yet when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated
petition in which all the three respondents happen to be people who
have publicly -though in markedly different ways - questioned the
policies of the government and severely criticized a recent judgment
of the Supreme Court, the Court displays a di:;turbing willingness to
issue notice.
It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence
F
criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who
disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even
a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court
is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm. "
G
(Emphasis Supplied )
The assertions in the aforesaid contempt petition attributed that the
contemnors shouted abusive slogans against the court including slogans
ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the institution undoubtedly made
the action of the contemnor gross contemptuous and as such the court had
initiated the contempt proceedings by issuing notice. But in view of the
H denial of the alleged contemnors to the effect that they had never shouted
_1
IN RE : ARUNDHA TI ROY [SETHI, J.]
225
such slogans and used such abusive words as stated in the contempt petition, A
instead of holding an inquiry and permitting the parties to lead evidence in
respect of their respective stand, to find out which version is correct, the
court thought it fit not to adopt that course and decided to drop the proceedings.
But in the very show cause that had been filed by the respondent No. 3, Smt.
Arundhati Roy, apart from denying that she had not used any such words as
ascribed to her, she had stated in three paragraphs, as quoted earlier which B
were absolutely not necessary, after denying that she had never uttered the
words ascribed to her and those paragraphs having been found prima-facie
contemptuous, the suo-motu proceedings had been initiated and notice had
been issued. However, the Court felt that respondent No. 3 therein (Arundhati
Roy) was found to have, prima facie, committed contempt as she had imputed C
motives to specific courts for entertaining litigation and passing orders against
her. She had accused courts of harassing her as if the judiciary were carrying
out a personal vendetta against her. She had brought in matters which were
not only not pertinent to the issues to be decided but has drawn uninformed
comparisons to make statements about this Court which do not appear to be
protected by law relating to fair criticism. It was stated by her in the court D
that she stood by the comments made by her even if the same are
contumacious. For the reason recorded therein, the Court issued notice in-the
prescribed form to the respondent herein asking her to show cause as to why
she should not be proceeded against for contempt for the statements in the
offending three paragraphs of her affidavit, reproduced hereinearlier.
E
In her reply affidavit, the respondent has again reiterated what she had
stated in her earlier affidavit. It is contended that as a consequence of the
Supreme Court judgment the people in the Narmada Valley are likely to lose
their homes, their livelihood and their histories and when they came calling
on the Supreme Court, they were accused of lowering the dignity of the court F
which, according to her is a suggestion that the dig(lity of the court and the
dignity of the Indian citizens are incompatible, oppositional, adversarial things.
She stated:
"I believe that the people of the Narmada valley have the constitutional G
right to peacefully protest against what they consider an unjust and
unfair judgment. As for myself, I have every right to participate in
any peaceful protest meeting that I choose to. Even outside the gates
of the Supreme Court. As a writer I am fully entitled to put forward
my views, my reasons and arguments for why I believe that the
judgment in the Sardar Sarovar case is flawed and unjust and violates H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002] 2 S.C.R.
the human rights of Indian citizens. I have the right to use all my
skills and abilities such as they are, and all the facts and figures at my
disposal, to persuade people to my point of view.;'
She also stated that she has written and published several essays and
articles on Narmada issue and the Supreme Court judgment. None of them
was intended to show contempt to the court. She justified her right to disagree
with the court's view on the subject and to express her disagreement in.any
publication or forum. In her belief the big dams are economically unviable,
ecologically destructive and deeply undemocratic. In her affidavit she has
further stated:
"But whoever they are, and whatever their motives, for the petitioners
to attempt to misuse the Contempt of Court Act and the good offices
of the Supreme Court to stifle criticism and stamp out dissent, strikes
at the very roots of the notion of democracy.
In recent months this Court has issued judgments on several major
public issues. For instance, the closure of polluting industries in Delhi,
the conversion of public transport buses from diesel to CNG, and the
judgment permitting the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam_ to
proceed. All of these have had far-reaching and often unanticipated
impacts. They have materially affected, for better or for worse, the_
lives and livelihoods of millions of Indian citizens. Whatever the
justice or injustice of these judgments, whatever their finer legal points,
for the court to become intolerant of criticism or expressions of dissent
would mark the beginning of the end of democracy.
An 'activist' judiciary, that intervenes in public matters to provide a
corrective to a corrupt, dysfunctional executive, surely has to be more,
not less accountable. To a society that is already convulsed by political
bankruptcy, economic distress and religious and cultural intolerance,
any form of judicial intolerance will come as a crippling blow. If the
judiciary removes itself from public scrutiny and accountability, and
severs its links with the society that it was set up to serve in the first
place, it would mean that yet another pillar of Indian democracy will
crumble. A judicial dictatorship is a fearsome a prospect as a military
dictatorship or any other form of totalitarian rule.
The Tehelka tapes broadcast recently on a national television network
H
show the repulsive sight of Presidents of the Bhartiya Janata Party
,_ ' '
~
'--
~-
~
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IN RE: ARUNDHATI ROY [SETHI, J.)
227
and the Samata Party (both part of the ruling coalition) accepting A
bribes from spurious arms dealers, Though this ought to have been
considered prima facie evidence of corruption, yet the Delhi High
Court declined to entertain a petition seeking an enquiry into the
defence deals that were referred to in the tapes. The bench took
strong exception to the petitioner approaching the court without
substantial evidence and even warned the petitioner's counsel that if B
he failed to substantiate its allegations, the court would impose costs
on the petitioner.
On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too busy, the
Chief Justice of India refused to allow a sitting judge to head the C
judicial enquiry into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves
matters of national security and corruption in the highest places.
Yet when it cornes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated
petition in which all the three respondents happen to be people who
have publicly -though in markedly different ways - questioned the D
policies of the government and severely criticized a recent judgment
of the Supreme Court, the Court displays a disturbing willingness to
issue notice.
It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence
criticism and muzzle dissent. to harass and intimidate those who E
disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on an FIR that even
a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court
is doing its own reputation and credibility considerable harm.
In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm that as a writer I have right to state
my opinions and beliefs. As a free citizen of India I have the right to
be part of any peaceful dharna, demonstration or protest march. I
have the right to criticize any judgment of any court that I believe to
be unjust. I have the right to make common cause with those I agree
with. I hope that each time I exercise these rights I will not dragged
to court on false charges and forced to explain my actions."
We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at length
and perused the relevant record.
Before dealing with the main case we propose to dispose of the
preliminary objection raised by Shri Shanti Bhushan, Senior Advocate who
F
G
has appeared for the respondent-contemner. Without filing a formal application H
•
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2002) 2 S.C.R.
A it has been urged on behalf of the respondent that the Hon'ble Judges who
issued notice in Criminal Petition No.2 of 2001 should not be a party to the
present proceeding and the case be transferred to some other Bench, allegedly
on the ground that the respondent-contemner had reasonable apprehension of
bias on the part of the said Judges to whom she claims to have allegedly
attributed motives. Such a prayer was made after the commencement of the
B proceedings which, we feel, was not bonafide. The apprehension expressed
by the respondent much less being reasonable in fact has no basis. It has to
be kept in mind that notice was issued to the respondent not for having
attributed motives to a particular Judge but for imputing motives to the Court
in general for allegedly harassing her as if the judiciary were carrying out
C personal vendetta against her. The contemptuous part of her affidavit, noticed
hereinbefore, does not attribute any motive or make any allegation against
any judge. It has to be kept in mind that the present proceedings are
distinguishable from the proceedir1gs contemplated under Section 14 ·Of the
Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Initially on the
petition of one J.R. Parashar, notice had been issued by a Bench cqnstituting
D ofG.B. Patnaik and U.C. Banerjee, JJ. When the contemners appeared in that
case, and filed show cause, no prayer had been made seeking recusal of any
judge. Finally that application registered as Contempt Petition No. 2/200 l
was heard by a Bench of G.B. Patnaik and Ruma Pal, JJ. and disposed of by
the judgment ·dated 28th August, 2001 discharging the contemners and
E initiating a suo motu proceedings because of disparaging comments in the
show cause filed by Arundhati Roy. In pursuance to such notice, the proceeding
was registered as Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No. 10/2001.