# ~2015] 11S.C.R.179 LAXMIDEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS

- **Citation:** [2015] 11 S.C.R. 179
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3385 of 2012
- **Bench:** Vikramajit Sen, Abhay Manohar Sapre
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2015-11s-c-r-179-laxmidevi-v-state-of-bihar-ors-30280
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
s. 17 - Land expropriated by the State pursuant to the
exercise of special powers in cases of urgency contained in
s. 17 thereof for construction of residential quarters for State
officials - Award not passed within stipulated time making
the proceedings lapse - Subsequent notifications also lapsed
- Writ petition on the ground that resort to s. 17 was malafide
- Writ petition disposed of with direction to pass award within
4 months - Award not passed till date - On appeal, Held:
Appellants land owners were being denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which
commenced in 1987 despite the directions of the High Court
passed as early as in 1988 to pass an award within four
months - Respondent State ·is directed to initiate fresh
acquisition proceedings or take any other action available
to it in acc9rdance with law - This would upholds. 11 A even
in cases of acquisition u/s. 17 while preserving the
requirement of s. 17 that the unencumbered possession of
land remain vested in th~ Government - It also protects the
· rights 9f the landowners who had approached the court to
stop the government from undoing an emergency acquisition
while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved land owners
seeking to enforce their right to fair compensation for their
land - Even equity demands that the party bearing the
consequence of the delay in the award ought not to be the
179
A
B
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 11 S.C.R.
A
innocent land owner but the errant State - Respondent State
is restrained from contending that the land is no longer
required by it or that it should revert to the appellants.
s. 11 A-Acquisition - Distinction between setting aside
B of acquisition and reversion of possession to the erstwhile
landowners.
Legislation: Held: A statute prescribes the manner in
which an action is to be performed, it must be carried out
c strictly in consonance thereto or not at all.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The right to file Objections to the Section
4 Notification, recognized by Section SA mandate that
D Objection must be filed within thirty days of the issuance
of the Notification. Section SA further obligates the
Collector to submit a Report to the Government in
respect of the Objections preferred by persons
interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any aspect
E of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
Section 6 envisages the making of a Declaration by the
appropriate Government to the effect that the specified
lands are needed for a public purpose, or for a Company;
F and post 1984, this Declaration has to be made within
one year of the date of the publication of the Section 4
Notification. Thereafter the Collector has to take Orders
for the acquisition of land and to mark and measure it.
Section 11 postulates the holding of an enquiry by the
G Collector into Objections on sundry grounds. Section
11A has been introduced by Act68of1984 prescrib!ng a
limitation of two years for the making of an Award by the
Collector. It is only post this event that Section 16
empowers the Collector to take possession of the land
H which thereupon vests absolutely in the Govarnment,
LAXMI LEV: v. STATE OF BIHAR
181
free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is not a pandect; A
it could have been devised by Parliament to be so, inter
alia, by the use of a non obstante clause, or in the
alternative by clear and unequivocal language. The
salient concomitants of Section 17(1) deserve
enumeration. Firstly, the Section is attracted even though B
an Award has not been made which clearly indicates that
the completion of this exercise has not been obliterated
or dispensed with but has been merely deferred. An
unambiguous and unequivocal statement could have
been made excluding the requirement of publishing an C
Award. Secondly, it is·available only on the expiration of
fifteen days from the issuance of the Section 9 notice.
Thi~ hiatus of fifteen days must be honoured as its
purpose appears t

## Text

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~2015] 11S.C.R.179
LAXMIDEVI
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3385 of 2012)
JULY03, 2015
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
s. 17 - Land expropriated by the State pursuant to the
exercise of special powers in cases of urgency contained in
s. 17 thereof for construction of residential quarters for State
officials - Award not passed within stipulated time making
the proceedings lapse - Subsequent notifications also lapsed
- Writ petition on the ground that resort to s. 17 was malafide
- Writ petition disposed of with direction to pass award within
4 months - Award not passed till date - On appeal, Held:
Appellants land owners were being denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which
commenced in 1987 despite the directions of the High Court
passed as early as in 1988 to pass an award within four
months - Respondent State ·is directed to initiate fresh
acquisition proceedings or take any other action available
to it in acc9rdance with law - This would upholds. 11 A even
in cases of acquisition u/s. 17 while preserving the
requirement of s. 17 that the unencumbered possession of
land remain vested in th~ Government - It also protects the
· rights 9f the landowners who had approached the court to
stop the government from undoing an emergency acquisition
while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved land owners
seeking to enforce their right to fair compensation for their
land - Even equity demands that the party bearing the
consequence of the delay in the award ought not to be the
179
A
B
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 11 S.C.R.
A
innocent land owner but the errant State - Respondent State
is restrained from contending that the land is no longer
required by it or that it should revert to the appellants.
s. 11 A-Acquisition - Distinction between setting aside
B of acquisition and reversion of possession to the erstwhile
landowners.
Legislation: Held: A statute prescribes the manner in
which an action is to be performed, it must be carried out
c strictly in consonance thereto or not at all.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The right to file Objections to the Section
4 Notification, recognized by Section SA mandate that
D Objection must be filed within thirty days of the issuance
of the Notification. Section SA further obligates the
Collector to submit a Report to the Government in
respect of the Objections preferred by persons
interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any aspect
E of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
Section 6 envisages the making of a Declaration by the
appropriate Government to the effect that the specified
lands are needed for a public purpose, or for a Company;
F and post 1984, this Declaration has to be made within
one year of the date of the publication of the Section 4
Notification. Thereafter the Collector has to take Orders
for the acquisition of land and to mark and measure it.
Section 11 postulates the holding of an enquiry by the
G Collector into Objections on sundry grounds. Section
11A has been introduced by Act68of1984 prescrib!ng a
limitation of two years for the making of an Award by the
Collector. It is only post this event that Section 16
empowers the Collector to take possession of the land
H which thereupon vests absolutely in the Govarnment,
LAXMI LEV: v. STATE OF BIHAR
181
free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is not a pandect; A
it could have been devised by Parliament to be so, inter
alia, by the use of a non obstante clause, or in the
alternative by clear and unequivocal language. The
salient concomitants of Section 17(1) deserve
enumeration. Firstly, the Section is attracted even though B
an Award has not been made which clearly indicates that
the completion of this exercise has not been obliterated
or dispensed with but has been merely deferred. An
unambiguous and unequivocal statement could have
been made excluding the requirement of publishing an C
Award. Secondly, it is·available only on the expiration of
fifteen days from the issuance of the Section 9 notice.
Thi~ hiatus of fifteen days must be honoured as its
purpose appears to be to enable the affected or 0
aggrieved parties to seek appropriate remedy before
they are divested of the possession and the title over
their land. Thirdly, possession of the land can be taken
only if it is needed for public purpose, which term stands
defined in the preceding Section 3(f). A conjoint reading E
of Sections 17 and. 3(f) makes it apparent that urgency
provisions cannot be pressed into service or resorted
to if the acquisition of land is for Companies. Fourthly,
possession of such lands would vest in the Government
only when the foregoing factors have been formally and F
strictly complied with. This Section enables the
curtailment of a citizen's Constitutional right to property
and can be resorted to only if the provisions and
preconditions are punctiliously and meticulously
adhered to, lest the vesting be struck down and set aside G
by the Court in its writ jurisdiction. [Paras 5, 7, 8, 11, 12]
[192-F-H; 193-A; 194-E-G; 196,F; 201-C; 202-A-E, F-H]
2. Section 17(3) postulates that atthe time of taking
possession of lands under the urgency provision the H
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A Collector must offer compensation to the persons
interested in those lands. Section 17(3A) requires the
Collector to tender payment of eighty per cent of the
compensatio·n estimated by him, obviously and
pointedly, to the person interested in compensation for
B such land, unless the .Collector is precluded or
prevented from making such payments because of
exigencies enumerated in Section 31 of the L.A. Act. In
other words, the Collector cannot by way of first recourse
deposit the estimated compensation even in the Court
C to which the filing of a Reference under Section 18 is
provided. The use of the word "shall" indicates that the
provisions are prima facie mandatory in nature unless
the statute or the language employed in the Section
0
indicates otherwise. The language of sub-Section (3A),
inasmuch as it commences with the words "Before
taking possession of any land ..... ", makes it
incontrovertibly clear that what follows are the
prerequisities thereto. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that
E the statute has ordained a precise and particular
methodology which must be adhered to as a precursor
to divesting the owner of land of its possession and title.
It is axiomatic that if a statute prescribes the manner in
which an action is to be performed, it must be carried
F out strictly in consonance thereto or not at all. [Paras
13, 14] [202-F-H; 203-B-F]
3. But for the statutory enablement, the action could
not have been taken; ergo everything surrounding that
G empowerment must be meticulously performed.
Possession of the land can be taken on grounds of
urgency if and only if there is contemporaneous
payment of eighty per cent of the estimated
compensation, otherwise making the acquisition
H vulnerable to vitiation because of the Taylor v. Taylor
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR
183
principle. The use of the word "estimated" in the Section A
delineates the distinction from "actual" compensation;
an estimate always remains a rough or approximate
1 calculation only or an approximate judgment and /or a
price specified as that which is likely to be charged. It
would do violence to the statute and fly in the face of B
common sense if an estimate is treated per se as a
conclusive calculation. Any doubt that may remain is
immediately dispelled upon a perusal of Section 17(38)
which clarifies that the estimated amount tendered/paid
under sub-Section (3A) will be taken into account for C
determining the amount of compensation and thereafter
logically permitting the shortfall or the excess to be
adju~ted. In other words, the amount of compensation
has to be determined and computed under the relevant 0
sections of the L.A. Act. A reading of sub-Section (4)
so.unds the death knell to the arguments put forward for
the Respondent State, iriasmuch as it allows the option
tci the appropriate Government to make the provisions
of Section 5A inapplicable. Paraphrased differently, even E
where the urgency provisions contained in Section 17
are resorted to, ordinarily the provisions of Section 5A
have to be adhered to, i.e. inviting and then deciding the
Objections filed by the landowners. Significantly, subsection (4) of Section 17 does not, as it very easily could F
have, exempt compliance with the publication of the
Declaration under Section 6 and the hearing of parties
preparatory to the passing of an Award under Sections
9 to 11 of the Act. There is, therefore, not even an iota of
doubt that remains pertaining to the absolute necessity G
of the passing of an Award under Section 11 of the L.A.
Act. The tender of the estimated compensation is the
precondition, the sine qua non, enabling the Government
to take possession of land under the foregoing
subsections; and must be followed by the exercise of H
184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A computation of compensation in a procedure
corresponding to that in Section 11. [Para 14] 204-8-G;
20S-A-C]
4. The L.A. Act postulates that the urgency clause
8
can be pressed into service at two stages. Firstly,
ordinarily possession can be taken fifteen days after the
publication of the Section 9 notice. The decision to
procure possession on an urgency basis can be taken
by the Government either at the very inception of the
C proceedings or at any time
preceding
or
contemporaneous to the date of the issuance of the
Section 9 notice. In both these contingencies the
valuable right of the landowner to file Objections and
resist the acquisition by virtue of Section SA remains
D unimpaired. Secondly, the Government can invoke subsection (4) and dispense with the valuable Section SA
right; in which event, logical, cogent and well-reasoned
notings must be simultaneously articulated in writing for
taking this momentous and monumental decision. In the
E case in hand, since the land is located in the State of
Bihar, Section 17(1) enables possession to be taken on
the expiry of fifteen days of the publication of the Section
6 Declaration. [Para 1 S] [20S-D-G]
F
S. The Act enables, in this statutory sequence of
events, the owner of the land to approach the Court in a
challenge to the invocation of the urgency provisions.
Ubi jus ibi remedium, every grievance has a remedy in
law, is a legal maxim which is immediately recalled. The
G apparent infraction of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Act do not arise in the present case because of the Bihar
Amendment of Section 17. This is also in line with a plain
reading of Section 17(1), which states that "once
H possession of the land is taken by the Government under
Section 17, the land vests absolutely in the Government,
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR
185
free from all encumbrances". In Section 48(1) the taking A
over of the possession of the land is of seminal
sign.ificance in that the provision succinctly states that
"the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land the possession of which has not
been taken". Where the landowners do not assail the B
acquisition, it may be open to them to seek a mandamus
for payment to them, after a reasonable period, of the
remaining compensation, which will thereupon
metamorphose from a mere estimation to the actual
compensation for the expropriation. [Para 20, 21) [211C
G-H; 212-A-D; 213-F-G]
6. The Appellants are being denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which
commenced in 1987, despite the directions of the High D
Court passed as early as in 1988 to pass an award within
fo'ur months. The raison d'etre behind the introduction
of S~ction 11Awas for the landowners to have a remedy
in the event of an award .not being passed expeditiously.
If Satendra Prasad Jain is interpreted to mean that Section E
11A will not apply to any acquisition under the urgency
provisions, landowners such as the Appellants will have
no protection, even if they are not paid full compensation
for their land for decades. This cannot be in keeping with F
the legislative intent behind this Section. Furthermore,
circumstances require this Court to reconsider its view
that even if the stated public interest or cause has ceased
to exist, any other cause can sullstitute it, especially
where the urgency provisions have been invoked.
In G
allowing the acquisition of land that the Government
finds necessary to be set aside, it i~ not necessarily to
be held that the land revert to the Appellantis, as the
alternative ·of permitting the Government to keep
possession provided it re-acquires the land with a new H .
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A Section 4 notification exists. This option, particularly in
the present factual matrix, does the least violence to the
intent and content of the L.A. Act, in that it upholds
Section 11A even in cases of acquisition under Section
17 while pres3rving the requirement of Section 17 that
B the unencumbered possession of the land remain vested
in the Government. It also protects the rights of the
landowners, thus fulfilling the intent of Section 11A, while
allowing the Government to acquire land in cases of
emergencies withoufits title being challenged, which is
C the avowed intention of Section 17. Any other
interpretation of the law would serve to protect only
those landowners who had approached the Court to stop
the Government from undoing an emergency
0
acquisition, while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved
landowners seeking to enforce their right to fair
compensation for their land. Even equity demands that
the party bearing the consequence of the delay In the
Award ought not to be the innocent landowner, but the
E errant State. [Para 24, 25] [215-C-G; 216-C-G]
F
G
.H
J.E.D. Ezra vs. The Secretary of State for India
(1902-1903) 7 CWN 249; Delhi Airtech Services
(P) Ltd .YS. StateofU.P 2012 (12) SCR 191: (2011)
9 SCC 354; Nandeshwar Prasad vs. State of U.P.,
AIR 1964 SC 1217: 1964 SCR 425; Union of
India vs. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564; Union of
India v. GM. Kokil 1984 SCR 292: 1984 (Supp)
SCC 196; Taylor vs. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426;
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (1935-36) 63 IA
372; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1038;
State of U.P v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358;
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a 1999 ( 1)
SCR 1121: (1999) 3 SCC 422; Hussein
Ghadially v. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425;
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR
187
Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of U.P. 1993 (2)
A
Suppl. SCR 336: (1993) 4 SCC 369; Lt. Governor
of Himacha/ Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma 1971
(1) SCR 413: (1970) 2 sec 149; Sanjay Singh
vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad
2007 (3) SCC 720: 2007 (1) SCR 235; Krishena
B
Kumarvs. Union of India 1990 (4) SCC 207: 1990
. (3) SCR 352 ; Sanjay Singh vs. U.P. Public
Service Commission, Allahabad 2007 (3) SCC
720: 2007 (1) SCR 235 ; Islamic Academy of
c
Education vs. State of Karnataka 2003 (6) SCC
697: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 474; Allahabad
Oevelopment Authority vs. Naziruzzaman ( 1996)
6 SCC 424: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 435; General
Manager, Telecommunication vs. Dr. Madan·
D
Mohan Pradhan 1995 Supp (4) SCC 268: 1995
(5) Suppl. SCR 1; Banda Development Authority,
Banda vs. Mota Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394:
2011 (7) SCR 435 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
E
2012 (12) SCR 191
referred to.
Para 1
1964 SCR 425
referred to.
Para 6
·(2014) 6 sec 564
referred to.
Para 6
1984 SCR 292
referred to.
Para 11
F ·'
1954 SCR 1038
referred to.
Para 14
AIR 1964 SC 358
referred to.
Para 14
1999 (1) SCR 1121
referred to.
Para 14
(2014) 8 sec 425
referred to ..
Para 16
G
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336
referred to.
Para 16
1971 (1) SCR 413
referred to.
Para 17
2007 (1) SCR 235
referred to.
Para 18
1990 (3) SCR 352
referred to.
· Para 19
H
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 11 S.C.R.
A
2007 (1) SCR 235
referred to.
Para 23
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 474
referred to.
Para 23
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 435
referred to.
Para 23
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 1
referred to.
Para 23
B
2011 (7) SCR 435
referred to.
Para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
3385of2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2010 in Civil
C Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4474 of 2006 of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna.
D
Neeraj Jain, Vankita Subramoniam, Ajay Kumar, Avinash
Kumar for the Appellant.
Gopal Singh, Rash mi Sriva.stava for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. The legal nodus that we are
E called upon to unravel in this Appeal is whether the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (L.A. Act for brevity) as amended from
time to time, requires an Award to be passed even in respect
cf lands expropriated by the State pursuant to the exercise of
special powers in cases of urgency contained in Section 17
F thereof. It is indeed ironical that what was, as far back as in
1987, perceived as an imperative, urgent and exigent
necessity, justifying the steamrolling of the rights of citizens,
has proved substantially to be a fallow and ill-conceived
G requirement even after the passage of three decades; till date,
tracts of the acquired land remain unutilized; the initially
declared purpose of construction of residential quarters for
State officials having novated to portions of the land being
used as helipads for 'State Dignitaries'. We must not forget
H that even though ownership of property has ceased to be
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VlKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
189
conceived of as a Fundamental Right, it continues to receive A
Constitutional protection. It is also the regrettable reality that
Governments are increasingly relying on rulings of this Court
to the effect that even if the public purpose providing the
predication for the compulsory acquisition of a citizen's land
has proved to be an illusion or misconception, another purpose B
can conveniently be discovere.d or devised by the State for
retention by it of the expropriated land. Our opinion intends to
insulate genuinely urgent projects from lapsing and not to
annihilate the constitutional rights of the individual from the might C
of the State even though it transgresses the essence of the
statute. It has become alarmingly commonplace for lands to
be expropriated under the banner of urgency or even under
the normal procedure, only to be followed by a withdrawal or
retraction from this exercise enabling a favoured few to harvest 0
the ill-begotten windfall. The ambivalence or cleavage of
opinion of this Court in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. vs. State
of UP (2011) 9 sec 354 on the necessity to pay the erstwhile
owners of land of even its unilaterally assessed value has
emboldened and spurred the State into contending before us
E
that no sooner the urgency mantra is mouthed, no other
provision of the L.A. Act has any relevance or efficacy, including
the legal necessity of passing an Award.
2. We shall succinctly narrate the salient facts of the F
Appeal before us. The State Government had by means of
Notification No.2/86-87 dated 18.11.1987 and 3/86-87 dated
18:11.1987 initiated steps for acquiring tracts of lands in Mouza
Sansarpur and in Hardas Chak.
These Notifications had
Simultaneously excluded the provisions of Section 5A of the· G
L.A. Act from applying to the acquired lands, which, because
of the significance of its language, is reproduced below:
"This Notification is hereby issued under the provisions
of section 4 of th.e Bihar Act No.11, 1961 as amended
H
190
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
Act No.1, 1894 for those persons who are concerned
with it.
The map of the above land can be seen in the office
of the Land Acquisition Officer, Khagaria. Government
.of Bihar do hereby authorize the Land Acquisition Officer,
Khagaria and his staff and the office bearers of the
Executive Engineer Bhawan Nirman Khagaria in the
preliminary investigation of this project that they should
conduct the survey of the land after entering it and they
are directed to all the cicts specified under section 2 of
the Section 4 of the above Act.
And whereas it is the opinion of the Governor of Bihar
that the above mentioned barren land/agricultural land
and its part thereof is necessary for immediate
acquisition. Therefore, it is directed under sub section 4
of the section 17 of the above Act that the provisions of
the section 5A of the above act shall not apply to the
above land/lands".
E
3. This first Notification under Section 4 came to be
followed by subsequent Notifications, lucidly illustrating the
understanding of the Respondent State that the preceding
Notification had lapsed by operation of the statute.
The
Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the
F L.A. Act on 16.9.1999 in respect of which the Appellants filed
Objections under Section 5A on a consideration of which the
· · Land Acquisition Officer had opined that the Notification issued
in 1987 could not be continued with as the Award had not been
passed with.in the stipulated time period thereby making it
G necessary to issue the 1999 Notification. This Notification also
expired because a Declaration under Section 6 had not been
promulgated within one year. Hence yet another Notification
was published on 13.8.2001, for which the Appellants filed their
'
H Objections under Section 5A yet again. This Notification also
lapsed, since the sequence of events as contemplated in the
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
191
L.A. Act had not been duly completed. Once again, in 2004, A
fresh steps were initiated for acquisition which also expired
for the same reason. The Respondent State now vainly essays
to take unfair and ill-founded advantage of decisions and
opinions of this Court to contend that the subject acquisition
stands completed in all respects, thereby endeavouring, illegally B
in our considered opinion, to avoid performance of their
statutory obligations of computing compensation and then
paying it.
4. The Impugned Order accepts the version of the C
Respondent that large parcels of these lands have been utilized
for constructing residential quarters for senior Officers of the
State, and that the Appellant has been paid eighty per cent of
the compensation, although twenty per cent supposedly still
remains outstanding. Per contra, it is the contention of the D
Appellant that the incontrovertible position that portions of the
land have remained unutilized for decades is clearly indicative
of the fact that they are not reql.lired by the State any more.
Within a week of the publication of the Section 4 Notification,
that is on 24.11.1987, notices under Section 17(1) of the L.A.
E
Act were also issued, which resulted in the filing of writ petitions
in the following year, in which it was contended that resort to
Section 17 of the L.A. Act was mala fide, and that
compensation, as envisaged in the statute itself, had not even
F
been tendered to the oyvners. It is significant that in CWJC
No.4007 of 1988, a Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna had directed on 12.7.1988 that the Award
for compensation must be made within four months. It is riot in
dispute that an Award has, till date, not been passed even G
though that direction has attained finality. The Writ Petition
was disposed of observing - (i) possession of the land had
already been taken by the State; (ii) eighty per cent
compensation had been paid to the Appellants; (iii) the
remainder twenty per cent along with interest would be paid to H
192
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201S] 11 S.C.R.
A the owners on their appearance before the Land Acquisition
Officer; (iv) they would be entitled to raise the claim of higher
interest considering that the land had been acquired in 1987;
and (v) Appellant was entitled to raise objections with respect
to the value of the land. In ·view of these directions, it was
B palpably clear to all the parties, especially the State
Government, that the entitlement to raise objections with
respect to the value of the land was possible only once
proceedings connected with and preparatory to passing an
Award on Section 11 reached its culmination. It seems facially
C obvious to us that since the State has not assailed these
directions it ought not to be permitted to canvas in this Appeal
that the passing of an award is unnecessary in cases where
the State has taken recourse to the urgency provisions
0
contained in Section 17 of the Act. A perusal of the Counter
Affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar makes it patently
evident that an award as contemplated in Section 11 of the
L.A. Act has not been passed; and that Notifications under
Section 4 have again been.passed subsequent to the two
E Notifications detailed above.
S. An overview of the L.A. Act discloses that it is divided
into VIII Parts/Chapters. Part II commences with Section 4,
which postulates the publication of a preliminary notification,
F whereupon Officers of the State are authorized to enter and
survey the lands proposed to be acquired and carry out
activities ancillary to that purpose; and Section S obligates
the Officials to compensate for damages caused as a
consequence thereof. The right to file Objections to the Section
G 4 Notification, recognized by Section SA, was introduced into
the L.A. Act by Act 38 of 1923, and this provision was again
amended by Act 68 of 1984 to mandate that Objection must
be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the Notification.
Section SA further obligates the Collector to submit a Report
H to the Government in respect of the Objections preferred by
LAX.Ml DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J J 193
persons interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any A
aspect of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
6. The insertion of Section 5A seems to have been
spurred on by the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court in J.E.D. Ezra vs. The Secretary of State for India B
(1902-1903) 7 CWN 249. In that case, the properties of Ezra
were sought to be acquired under the pre-amended provision
for expansion of the offices of the Bank of Bengal. In the
challenge to the. said acquisition; it was argued that the person
whose property was going to be taken away should be allowed C
a hearing on the principles of natural justice. However the
Court held that it could not grant relief in the absence of any
provision in the Act enabling or envisaging or mandating that
such an opportunity should be made available to the
landowners. In order to remedy this shortcoming in Act of 1894,
D
an amendment by way of incorporation of Section 5A was
introduced on 11th July, 1923. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the said Amendment is as follows:
"The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 does not provide E
that person having an interest in land which it is proposed
to acquire, shall have the right of objecting to such
acquisition; nor is Government bound to enquire into
and consider any objections that may reach them. The
object of this Bill is to provide that a Local Government F
shall not declare, under section 6 of the Act, that any land
is needed for a public purpose unless time has been
allowed after the notification under section 4 for persons
interested in the land to put in objections and for such
objections to be considered by the Local Government." G
(Gazette of India, Pt. V, dated 14th July, 1923, page 260)
The importance of Section 5A cannot be
overemphasised. It is conceived from natural justice and has
matured into manhood in the maxim of audi alteram partem,
H
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A
i.e. every person likely to be adversely affected by a decision
must be granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard. This
right cannot be taken away by a side wind, as so powerfully
and pellucidly stated in NandeshwarPrasadvs. State ofU.P.,
AIR 1964 SC 1217. So stringent is this right that it mandates
B that the person who heard and considered the Objections can
alone decide them; and not even his successor is competent
to do so even on the basis of the materials collected by his
predecessor. Furthermore, the decision on the Objections
should be available in a self contained, speaking and reasoned
C order; reasons cannot be added to it later as that would be
akin to putting old wine in new bottles. We can do no better
than commend a careful perusal of Union of India vs. Shiv
Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564, on these as well as cognate
D considerations.
7. Section 6 envisages the making of a Declaration by
the appropriate Government to the effect that the specified
lands are needed fora public purpose, or fora Company; and
post 1984, this Declaration has to be made within one year of
E the date of the publication of the Section 4 Notification. We
are not concerned in this Appeal with the Provisos or
Explanations to Section 6 or to other sub-Sections and shall
therefore not advert to them any further. Thereafter the Collector
F
has to take Orders for the acquisition of land and to mark and
measure it. Section 9 enjoins the Collector to cause public
notice to be given of his intention to take possession of the
land and to entertain claims for compensation. Section 11
post4lates the holding of an enquiry by the Collector into
G ObjeCtions on sundry grounds. For the purposes with which
we are presently concerned, amendments to Section 6 and
the insertion of the new Section 11 A, both of which prescribe
a time limit within which requisite action has to be taken by the
Government justify special mention. The prefatory note -
H Statement of Qbjects and Reasons of Act No.68 of 1984 as
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
195
are relevant are reproduced: [Current Central Legislation A
Vol.10 1984 • 3,5,6,9]
Prefatory Note - Statement of Objects and Reasons -
With the enormous expansion of the State's role in
promoting public welfare and economic development B
since independence, acquisition of land for public
purposes, industrialisation, building of institutions, etc.,
has become far more numerous than ever before. While
this is inevitable, promotion of public purpose has to be
balanced with the rights of the individual whose land is c
acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means of
livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private
enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing
as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it.
The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to D
be deprived of their property rights in land need to be
adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view
the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of
the community. The pendency of acquisition '
proceedings for long periods often causes E ·
hardship to the affected parties and renders
unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to
them.
The main proposals for amendment are as follows:-
(iii) A time-limit of one year is proposed to be provided
for completion of all formalities between the issue of the
preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and
the declaration for acquisition of specified land under
Section 6( 1) of the Act.
(v) It is proposed to provide for a period of two years
from the date of publication of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act within which the Collector should
. make his award under the Act. If no award is made within
F
G
that period, the entire proceedings forthe acquisition of H
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the land would lapse.· He has also been empowered to
correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award
within a certain period from the date of the award.
(vi) The circumstances under which the Collector should
take possession of the land before the award is made in
urgent cases are being enlarged to include a larger
variety of public purposes.
(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil
court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken
advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is
usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent
landowners and that this causes considerable inequality
in the payment of compensation for the same or similar
quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed
to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose
land is covered under the same notification to seek redetermination of compensation, once any one of them
has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation
from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act.
(Emphasis added)
8. Section 11A has been introduced by Act 68 of 1984
prescribing a limitation of two years for the making of an Award
F
by the Collector. It is only post this event that Section 16
empowers the Collector to take possession of the land which
thereupon vests absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances. We may clarify that the word 'vest' has two
connotations - the first and primary one relates to possession
G of land; and the second, an adjunctory one, pertains additionally
to the title of that land. But this distinction has not been drawn
in India since this Court has held in several cases that 'vesting'
in the circumstances with which we are presently concerned,
covers and encompasses the possession as well as the title
H of the land.
. LAXMI DEVI v. SI.ATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
197
9.
!tis in this progression that the L.A. Act provides for A
special powers in the case of perceived urgency, in terms of
Section 17, which we shall reproduce for facility of reference.
"17. Special powers in cases ofurgency.-(1) In cases
of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government, so B
directs, the Collector, though no such award has been
made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, subsection (1), take possession of any land needed for a
public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest c
absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances.
(2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel
of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it 0
becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to
acquire the immediate possession of any land for the
maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making
thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing
convenient connection with or access to any such station,
E
or the appropriate Government considers it necessary
to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the
purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertai11ing
to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication
or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the F
publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and
with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government,
enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall
thereupon vest absolutely in the Government fre;e from
all encumbrances:
G
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of
any building or part of a building under this sub-section
without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight
hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice H
as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier
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to remove his movable property from such building
without unnecessary inconvenience.
(3) In every case under either of the preceding subsections the Collector shall at the time of taking
possession offer to the persons interested compensation
forthe standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and
for any other damage sustained by them caused by such
sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24;
and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such
crops and' trees and the amount of such other damage
shall be allowed for an awarding compensation for the
land under the provisions herein contained.
(3A) Before taking possession of any land under subsection (1) or sub-section 92), the Collector shall, without
prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3),-
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the
compensation for such land as estimated by him to the
persons interested entitled thereto, and
(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or
more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31 , subsection (2),
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions
of section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second proviso
thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of
compensation under that section.
(3B)The amount paid or deposited under sub-section
(3A), shall be taken into account for determining the
amount of compensation required to be tendered under
section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited
exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector
under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within
three months from the date of Collector's award, be
recovered as an arrear of land revenue.
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.)
199
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the A
appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate
Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A
shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a. declaration
may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at B
any time after the date of the publication of the notification
under section 4, sub-section (1 )."
Sub-sections (3A) and (3B) have been introduced into
the LA.Act byAct6Bof 1984with effect from 24.9.1984. c
10. The L.A. Act, as amended by the State of Bihar by
the Bihar Act 11 of 1961, is also being reproduced below for
the purpose of clarity:
"17. Special powers in cases of urgency. -(1) In cases D
of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so
directs the Collector, though no such award has been
made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the declaration mentioned in section 6, or
with the consent in writing of the person interested, at E
any time after the publication of the notification under
Section 4 in the village in which the land is situated, take
possession of any waste or arable land needed for public
purposes or for a company. Such land shall thereupon
vest absolutely in the Government free from· all F
encumbrances.
Explanation.-This sub-section shall apply to any waste
or arable land, notwithstanding the existence thereon of
forest, orchard or trees.
G
(2)Whenever it becomes necessary for the purpose of
protecting life or property from flood, erosion or other
natural calamities or for the maintenance of
communication other than a railway communication or it
becomes necessary for any Railway Administration H
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(other than the Railway Administration of the Union), owing
to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable
river or other unforeseen emergency for the maintenance
of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a
riverside or ghat station, or providing convenient
connection with or access to any such station, to acquire
the immediate possession of any land, the Collector may,
immediately after the publication of the declaration
mentioned in s.