# [2020] 7 S.C.R. 1014

- **Citation:** [2020] 7 S.C.R. 1014
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020-04-27
- **Case number:** Contempt Petition Criminal No. 2 of 2019
- **Bench:** Deepak Gupta, Aniruddha Bose
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/2020-7-s-c-r-1014-34629
- **Pages:** 64

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art. 129 and 142 - Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 - s. 15 - The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt
of the Supreme Court, 1975 - Powers of the Supreme Court of India
in relation to dealing with contempt - The amicus curiae contended
that the Supreme Court being a Court of Record is not bound by the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Held: A bare
reading of Art.129 clearly shows that Supreme Court being a Court
of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record
including the power to punish for contempt itself - This is a
Constitutional power which cannot be taken away or in any manner
abridged by statute - Art.142 also provides that the Supreme Court
can punish any person for contempt of itself but this power is subject
to the provisions of law made by Parliament - The power under
clause (2) of Art.142 is not the primary source of power of Court of
Record which is Art.129 and there is no such restriction in Art.129
- The Supreme Court has also framed rules in this regard known as
the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme
Court, 1975 and the r.3 of the same shows the 3 ways for initiating
contempt proceedings i.e. a) suo motu; or (b) on a petition made by
Attorney-General, or Solicitor-General; or (c) on a petition made
by any person, and in the case of a criminal contempt with the
consent in writing of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General
- S.15 of the Act, 1971 is not the source of power to issue notice for
contempt and it only provides the procedure in which such contempt
is to be initiated - As far as suo motu petitions are concerned, there
is no requirement for taking consent of anybody because the Court
is exercising its inherent powers to issue notice for contempt - This
is not only clear from the provisions of the Act also clear from the
Rules laid down by the Supreme Court.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - The Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 - Two letters
[2020] 7 S.C.R. 1014
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dated 20.3.2019 and 19.3.2019 signed by alleged contemnor nos.
1 and 2 were circulated - The tenor of the letters was highly
disrespectful, and scandalous and scurrilous allegations were
levelled against the two Judges of the Supreme Court - A Bench
issued notice to the contemnors and directed that the matter be placed
before the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate bench
to hear and decide the contempt case - The alleged contemnors
filed applications for discharge of notices issued to them - The
main ground for discharge was that the notice sent was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
- Held: The Supreme Court has its own Rules, i.e. The Rules to
Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975
and Form I lays down the manner in which notice is to be issued -
The only requirement of the Rules and the Form is that the brief
nature of the contempt is to be stated in the Form - There is no
requirement of giving all the documents with the Form - A perusal
of the order whereby contempt proceedings were initiated clearly
shows that the grounds for initiating contempt were reflected in the
order itself - Therefore, the notice was legal and valid.
Contempt of Court - Supreme Court - Challenge to suo motu
proceedings - Two letters dated 20.03.2019 and 19.03.2019
admittedly signed by contemnor Nos. 1 & 2 were circulated - The
tenor of the letters was highly disrespectful, and scandalous and
scurrilous allegations were levelled against the two Judges of the
Supreme Court - A Bench of Supreme Court issued notice to the
contemnors - The contemnors contended that the proceedings are
not suo motu proceedings and, therefore, should not have been
entertained without the consent of the Attorney-General or SolicitorGeneral - Held: Contempt is basically a matter between the Court
and the contemnor - Any person can inform the Court of the
contempt committed -

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 7 S.C.R.
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
(Suo Motu Contempt Petition Criminal No. 2 of 2019)
APRIL 27, 2020
[DEEPAK GUPTA AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Constitution of India - Art. 129 and 142 - Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 - s. 15 - The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt
of the Supreme Court, 1975 - Powers of the Supreme Court of India
in relation to dealing with contempt - The amicus curiae contended
that the Supreme Court being a Court of Record is not bound by the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Held: A bare
reading of Art.129 clearly shows that Supreme Court being a Court
of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record
including the power to punish for contempt itself - This is a
Constitutional power which cannot be taken away or in any manner
abridged by statute - Art.142 also provides that the Supreme Court
can punish any person for contempt of itself but this power is subject
to the provisions of law made by Parliament - The power under
clause (2) of Art.142 is not the primary source of power of Court of
Record which is Art.129 and there is no such restriction in Art.129
- The Supreme Court has also framed rules in this regard known as
the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme
Court, 1975 and the r.3 of the same shows the 3 ways for initiating
contempt proceedings i.e. a) suo motu; or (b) on a petition made by
Attorney-General, or Solicitor-General; or (c) on a petition made
by any person, and in the case of a criminal contempt with the
consent in writing of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General
- S.15 of the Act, 1971 is not the source of power to issue notice for
contempt and it only provides the procedure in which such contempt
is to be initiated - As far as suo motu petitions are concerned, there
is no requirement for taking consent of anybody because the Court
is exercising its inherent powers to issue notice for contempt - This
is not only clear from the provisions of the Act also clear from the
Rules laid down by the Supreme Court.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - The Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 - Two letters
[2020] 7 S.C.R. 1014
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dated 20.3.2019 and 19.3.2019 signed by alleged contemnor nos.
1 and 2 were circulated - The tenor of the letters was highly
disrespectful, and scandalous and scurrilous allegations were
levelled against the two Judges of the Supreme Court - A Bench
issued notice to the contemnors and directed that the matter be placed
before the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate bench
to hear and decide the contempt case - The alleged contemnors
filed applications for discharge of notices issued to them - The
main ground for discharge was that the notice sent was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
- Held: The Supreme Court has its own Rules, i.e. The Rules to
Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975
and Form I lays down the manner in which notice is to be issued -
The only requirement of the Rules and the Form is that the brief
nature of the contempt is to be stated in the Form - There is no
requirement of giving all the documents with the Form - A perusal
of the order whereby contempt proceedings were initiated clearly
shows that the grounds for initiating contempt were reflected in the
order itself - Therefore, the notice was legal and valid.
Contempt of Court - Supreme Court - Challenge to suo motu
proceedings - Two letters dated 20.03.2019 and 19.03.2019
admittedly signed by contemnor Nos. 1 & 2 were circulated - The
tenor of the letters was highly disrespectful, and scandalous and
scurrilous allegations were levelled against the two Judges of the
Supreme Court - A Bench of Supreme Court issued notice to the
contemnors - The contemnors contended that the proceedings are
not suo motu proceedings and, therefore, should not have been
entertained without the consent of the Attorney-General or SolicitorGeneral - Held: Contempt is basically a matter between the Court
and the contemnor - Any person can inform the Court of the
contempt committed - If he is to be arrayed as a party then the
contempt will be in his name but when the Court does not array him
as a party, the Court can on the basis of the information itself take
suo motu of the contempt - In the present case, the Court on the
basis of the information itself took suo motu note of the contempt
and the matter was then placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice
for listing it before the appropriate Bench - The matter listed was a
suo motu contempt petition right from the beginning.
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
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Contempt of Court - Supreme Court - Suo motu proceedings
- Judge in their own cause - Two letters dated 20.03.2019 and
19.03.2019 admittedly signed by contemnor Nos. 1 & 2 were
circulated - The tenor of the letters was highly disrespectful, and
scandalous and scurrilous allegations were levelled against the two
Judges of the Supreme Court - A Bench of Supreme Court issued
notice to the contemnors - The Bench also directed that the matter
be placed before the Chief Justice of India to constitute an
appropriate Bench to hear and decide the contempt case - The
contemnors contended that the Bench could not have issued the
notice without the matter being placed before it and further that
this amounted to them acting as judges in their own cause - Held:
The Bench was already dealing with Suo Motu Contempt Petition
(Crl.) No. 1 of 2019 - The said letters were placed before the Bench
- After issuing notice, the bench directed that the matter be placed
before Hon'ble Chief Justice for placing before the appropriate
Bench - This is valid and proper procedure and the Bench did not
act as Judge in their own cause - Only notice was issued and
thereafter the matter was assigned to another Bench.
Constitution of India - Freedom to criticise the judgments of
the Court - Held: Any citizen of the Country can criticise the
judgments delivered by any Court including the Supreme Court -
However, no party has the right to attribute motives to a Judge or to
question the bonafides of the Judge or to raise questions with regard
to the competence of the Judge - Judges are part and parcel of the
justice delivery system.
Contempt of Court - Supreme Court - Suo motu proceedings
- Two letters were circulated - The tenor of two letters dated
20.03.2019 and 19.03.2019 admittedly signed by contemnor Nos.
1 & 2 was highly disrespectful, and scandalous and scurrilous
allegations were levelled against the two Judges of the Supreme
Court - The notice was issued to all the four alleged contemnors -
The contemnor no. 4 filed an application for discharge and his
application was allowed - Held: The first letter dated 20.03.2019
by contemnor No. 1 is basically in relation to the order dated
12.03.2019 in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 of 2019, in
which contemnor No. 4 was held guilty of contempt and notice was
issued to contemnor No. 4 for hearing him on issue of punishment -
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In the meantime, both the contemnors No. 1 and 2 sent these letters
praying that action be taken against the members of the Bench of
the Supreme Court - The contemnor no. 3 indicated in his discharge
application that the letters sent by contemnors no. 1 and 2 were
sent with the knowledge and consent of contemnor no. 3 - Also, the
contemnor no. 3, while arguing the matter was supporting each
and everything said in letters by contemnors no. 1 and 2 - Therefore,
all three alleged contemnor nos. 1, 2 and 3 were working in tandem
and making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against the
members of the Bench of Supreme Court, probably with intention
that the members would thereafter not take action against contemnor
no. 4 in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 of 2019 - Thus, all
three alleged contemnors no. 1, 2 and 3 are guilty of contempt.
Holding all three contemnors guilty of contempt, the Court
HELD: Powers of the Supreme Court
1.1. A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this
Court being a Court of Record shall have all the powers of such
a Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of
itself. This is a constitutional power which cannot be taken away
or in any manner abridged by statute. [Para 7][1026-F]
1.2 Article 142 also provides that this Court can punish
any person for contempt of itself but this power is subject to the
provisions of any law made by parliament. A comparison of the
provisions of Article 129 and clause (2) of Article 142 clearly
shows that whereas the founding fathers felt that the powers under
clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any law made by
parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article 129 is
concerned. The power under clause (2) of Article 142 is not the
primary source of power of Court of Record which is Article 129
and there is no such restriction in Article 129. [Para 7]
[1027-C-D]
1.3 This Court has framed rules in this regard known as
The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme
Court, 1975. A bare perusal of Rule 3 shows that there are 3
ways for initiating contempt proceedings. The first is suo motu,
the second is on a petition made by the Attorney General or the
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Solicitor General, and the third is on the basis of a petition made
by any person and where criminal contempt is involved then the
consent of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General is
necessary. [Paras 17 and 18][1032-G][1033-B-C]
1.4 In exercise of the aforesaid powers the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 was enacted by Parliament. Section 15 deals
with cognizance of criminal contempt and the opening portion of
Section 15 clearly provides that the Supreme Court or the High
Courts may take action (i) suo motu (ii) on a motion moved by the
Advocate General in case of High Court or Attorney General/
Solicitor General in the case of Supreme Court and (iii) on a
petition by any other person with the consent in writing of the
Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor General as the case
may be. [Para 23][1035-B-D]
1.5 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court
Bar Association v. Union of India held that Section 15 is not a
substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction and,
therefore, is only a procedural section especially in so far as suo
motu contempts are concerned. It is thus clear that the powers of
the Supreme Court to punish for contempt committed of itself is
a power not subject to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the
only requirement is to follow a procedure which is just, fair and in
accordance with the rules framed by this Court. [Para 29][1039G-H]
2. This Court is clearly of the view that the powers of the
Supreme Court to initiate contempt are not in any manner limited
by the provisions of the Act. This Court is vested with the
constitutional powers to deal with the contempt. Section 15 is
not the source of the power to issue notice for contempt. It only
provides the procedure in which such contempt is to be initiated
and this procedure provides that there are three ways of initiating
a contempt - (i) suo motu (ii) on the motion by the Advocate
General/Attorney General/Solicitor General and (iii) on the basis
of a petition filed by any other person with the consent in writing
of the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor General. As
far as suo motu petitions are concerned, there is no requirement
for taking consent of anybody because the Court is exercising its
inherent powers to issue notice for contempt. This is not only
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clear from the provisions of the Act but also clear from the Rules
to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court,
1975 laid down by this Court. [Para 31][1040-G-H][1041-A-B]
Objections as to issuance of notice
3.1 The only requirement of the Rules and the Form is that
the brief nature of the contempt is to be stated in the Form. There
is no requirement of giving all the documents with the Form. A
perusal of the order whereby contempt proceedings were initiated
clearly shows that the grounds for initiating contempt were
reflected in the order itself. This order was admittedly sent to
the alleged contemnors. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court,
the notice was strictly in accordance with Form-1, which only
requires that the notice should briefly state the nature of the
contempt. Once the order was attached to the notice that became
part and parcel of the notice itself. [Para 32][1042-B-D]
Whether these proceedings can be termed suo motu?
4.1 As far as the present case is concerned, the order passed
by this Court clearly shows that this Court after taking note of
the letter sent by the President of the Bombay Bar Association
and the President of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society, the
annexures attached to this letter and after specifically noting the
prayers made in the complaints of alleged Contemnor nos. 1 and
2 along with the allegations made in both the complaints was of
the view that the allegations levelled against the Members of
the Bench were scandalous in nature and therefore, notice was
issued to the alleged contemnors and against Contemnor no. 4
who has since been discharged. [Para 34][1044-B-C]
4.2 When this Court reads the order dated 27.03.2019 in
suo motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 1 of 2019 as a whole, it is
more than obvious that the Court itself took cognizance of the
complaints and the documents thereto as well as the allegations
levelled therein. Contempt is basically a matter between the Court
and the contemnor. Any person can inform the Court of the
contempt committed. If he is to be arrayed as a party then the
contempt will be in his name but when the Court does not array
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him as a party, the Court can on the basis of the information itself
take suo motu notice of the contempt. In the present case, the
Court on the basis of the information itself took suo motu note of
the contempt and the matter was then placed before Hon'ble the
Chief Justice for listing it before the appropriate Bench. The
matter has been listed as a suo motu contempt petition right from
the beginning and dealt with as such. [Paras 34 and 35]
[1044-C-G]
Judge in their own Cause
5. This Court is clearly of the view that the Bench was fully
justified in taking note of the letter sent by the Bombay Bar
Association and the President of the Bombay Incorporated Law
Society and the documents annexed thereto which included the
complaints sent by alleged Contemnors no. 1 and 2. After issuing
notice the bench directed that the matter be placed before Hon'ble
the Chief Justice for placing before the appropriate bench. This
is valid and proper procedure and the bench did not act as judge
in their own cause. Only notice was issued and thereafter the
matter was assigned to this bench. [Para 40][1047-F-H]
Source of Information
6.1 In the instant case, the disclosure of the information is
made in the order itself where it is clearly recorded that the action
has been taken on the basis of the letter sent by the President of
the Bombay Bar Association and the President of the Bombay
Incorporated Law Society to the President of India and the Chief
Justice of India in response to the complaints made by the alleged
contemnors. The complaints of contemnor nos. 1 and 2 were also
attached with the letters and after taking note not only of the
letter of the President of the Bombay Bar Association and the
President of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society but also the
prayer clauses of both the complaints sent by the alleged
contemnors and the scandalous allegations made in the
complaints, the notice was issued. The source of information is
the letter sent by the Bombay Bar Association and the President
of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society, as is apparent from the
order initiating contempt proceedings. [Para 43][1048-G-H]
[1049-A-C]
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Freedom to criticise
7.1 There can be no manner of doubt that any citizen of the
country can criticise the judgments delivered by any Court
including this Court. However, no party has the right to attribute
motives to a Judge or to question the bona fides of the Judge or
to raise questions with regard to the competence of the Judge.
Judges are part and parcel of the justice delivery system. By and
large Judges are reluctant to take action under contempt laws
when a personal attack is made on them. However, when there is
a concerted attack by members of the Bar who profess to be the
members of an organization having a large following, then the
Court cannot shut its eyes to the slanderous and scandalous
allegations made. If such allegations which have not only been
communicated to the President of India and the Chief Justice of
India, but also widely circulated on social media are permitted to
remain unchallenged then the public will lose faith not only in
those particular Judges but also in the entire justice delivery
system and this definitely affects the majesty of law.
[Para 48][1051-G-H][1052-A-B]
Defence of Truth
8.1 Truth as a defence is available to any person charged
with contempt of Court. However, on going through all the written
arguments and the pleadings, other than saying that the Judges
had misinterpreted the judgments of this Court or had ignored
them or that Judge of the Supreme Court was biased, there is no
material placed on record to support this defence. The allegations
are also scurrilous and scandalous and such allegations cannot
be permitted to be made against the Judges of highest Court of
the country. [Para 95][1077-A-C]
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998)
4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 - followed.
Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur
Through Registrar 1992 (1) SCALE 416; Pallav Sheth
v. Custodian & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 549 : [2001] 1 Suppl.
SCR 387; Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice
of India (1996) 5 SCC 216 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 677;
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
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In Re: Arundhati Roy (2002) 3 SCC 343 : [2002] 2
SCR 213 - relied on.
Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurta & Another. (2010)
8 SCC 673 : [2010] 10 SCR 631 - inapplicable.
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges
of the Pepsu High Court [1954] SCR 454; Shri C. K.
Daphtary and Others v. Shri O.P. Gupta and Others
(1971) 1 SCC 626 : [1971] Suppl. SCR 76; P.N. Duda
v. P. Shiv Shanker and Others (1988) 3 SCC 167 :
[1988] 3 SCR 547; Anil Kumar Gupta v. K. Subba Rao
and Ors. ILR (1974) 1 Del 1; Delhi Judicial Service
Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat
and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 406 : [1991] 3 SCR 936; In
Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584 : [1995]
2 SCR 638; Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute and
Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 254 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 477;
Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala & Others. (2008)
3 SCC 542 : [2008] 4 SCR 701; Aarish Asgar Qureshi
v. Fareed Ahmed Qureshi and Anr. 2019 (4) SCALE
606 - referred to.
The Law of Contempt: Contempt of Courts and
Legislatures, Fifth Edn., Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur (2013) - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1954] SCR 454
referred to
Para 8
[1971] Suppl. SCR 76
referred to
Para 9
[1988] 3 SCR 547
referred to
Para 13
1992 (1) SCALE 416
relied on
Para 20
[1991] 3 SCR 936
referred to
Para 21
[1995] 2 SCR 638
referred to
Para 22
[1998] 2 SCR 795
followed
Para 24
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 387
relied on
Para 30
[2010] 10 SCR 631
inapplicable
Para 33
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[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 477
referred to
Para 33
[2008] 4 SCR 701
referred to
Para 40
[1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 677
relied on
Para 46
[2002] 2 SCR 213
relied on
Para 46
2019 (4) SCALE 606
referred to
Para 81
INHERENT JURISDICTION: Suo Motu Contempt Petition
(Criminal) No. 2 of 2019.
Petition for recall of the Judgment dated 27.04.2020 in NFL Vs.
Tuncky (2013) 9 SCC 600 and in M.S. Ahlawat Vs. State (2000) 1
SCC 27.
Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. (A.C.), Nitin Saluja, Nobin Akhtar,
Shivanshu Singh, Manish Jha, Sheezan Hashmi, Paratho Sorkar, Shivam
Mehra, Jairam Yadav, Prem Sunderjun, M/s. Rajan Tripathi, Vijay Dubey,
T.N. Dubey, Akhilesh Kr. Pandey, S.K. Pandey, Gopal Sharan Pathak,
Harsh Singhal, Rajesh Shrma, Firoj Saifi, Rajeev Kr. Gupta, Raman
Kumar, Vishal Arun Kumar, Pawan Kr., D.S. Badiar, Ishwarlal Agarwal,
Ghanshyam Upadhyay, Abhishek Mishra, Dipali Ojha, Nicky Pokar,
Manan Bansal, Rajat Kapoor, Anjan Datta, M.S. Gahlan,Birendra Pandey,
Rahul Gupta, Shashank Sharma, Baijnath Yadav, Fatima, Balraj Dewan,
Hemant Kr. Srivastava, Prateek Khandelwal, Kajal Singh, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
Mr. Nilesh C. Ojha, Respondent. (In person).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
1. A Bench of this Court while dealing with Suo Motu Contempt
Petition (Criminal) No.1 of 2019 took note of a letter dated 23.03.2019
received by the office of the Judges of the Bench on 25.03.2019. This
was a copy of the letter sent by the President of the Bombay Bar
Association and the President of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society
to the President of India, Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of
the Bombay High Court. In the said letter, reference was made to two
complaints - one made by the Indian Bar Association, dated 20.03.2019
through alleged contemnor no. 1, Shri Vijay Kurle, State President of
Maharashtra and Goa of the Indian Bar Association, and the second
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complaint dated 19.03.2019 made by alleged contemnor no. 2, Shri Rashid
Khan Pathan, National Secretary of the Human Rights Security Council.
It was mentioned that these complaints have not only been sent to the
President of India and the Chief Justice of India but also have been
circulated in the social media and the complaints were attached as
Annexures-1 and 2 to the said letter. The Bench took note of the letter
and the complaints attached to the said letter and specifically noted the
prayers made in both the complaints and found that both the complaints
are substantially similar. The Bench on noting the allegations made in
the complaints was of the view that scandalous allegations have been
made against the members of the said Bench and, therefore, notice was
issued to Shri Vijay Kurle, alleged contemnor no. 1, Shri Rashid Khan
Pathan, alleged contemnor no. 2, Shri Nilesh Ojha, alleged contemnor
no. 3 and Shri Mathews Nedumpara, alleged contemnor no. 4. The Bench
also directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India
to constitute an appropriate Bench to hear and decide the contempt
case.
2. After notice was issued, Shri Nedumpara filed an application,
being Criminal M.P. No. 60568/2019 for discharge in which he stated
that he barely knew Shri Vijay Kurle and Shri Nilesh Ojha, and did not
know Shri Rashid Khan Pathan at all. He denied any role in sending
those complaints. Therefore, vide order dated 02.09.2019 we had
discharged Shri Mathews Nedumpara but made it clear that if during
the course of proceedings any evidence comes up against him, he would
be summoned again. On the same date, Shri Nilesh Ojha who appears in
person stated that the Registry has not given complete copy of the
annexures attached with the letter of the Bombay Bar Association and
Bombay Incorporated Law Society to him along with the notice. The
Registry was directed to supply the annexures to him. On 30.09.2019
we were informed that the Registry has not given complete annexures.
Thereafter, we had directed the Registry to supply 3 sets of Annexures
P1 to P15 attached with the letter which were sent to alleged contemnor
nos. 1 to 3. On the same date, we appointed Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned
senior counsel, as amicus curiae to assist the Court. On 04.11.2019,
alleged contemnor nos. 1 to 3 admitted that all the documents have been
supplied to them and thereafter, fresh replies were permitted to be filed.
3. In the letter of the Bombay Bar Association and the Bombay
Incorporated Law Society reference was made not only to the allegations
in the complaints levelled against the 2 Hon'ble Judges of this Court but
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also other allegations were made which indicated that alleged contemnor
nos. 1 to 3 had committed contempt of the Bombay High Court also.
On 09.12.2019 we had clarified that in view of the original order taking
suo motu notice and the documents placed on record, the charge against
Shri Vijay Kurle, alleged contemnor no. 1 was only in respect of the
scandalous allegations levelled against 2 Judges of this Court in the letter
dated 20.03.2019 sent by him as State President of Maharashtra and
Goa of the Indian Bar Association. We have also clarified that as far as
Shri Rashid Khan Pathan, alleged contemnor no. 2, is concerned, the
charge against him only relates to the scandalous allegations made against
2 Judges of this Court in the letter dated 19.03.2019 sent by him. As far
as Shri Nilesh Ojha, alleged contemnor no. 3 was concerned, the only
document against him was also the letter dated 20.03.2019 which letter
was not signed by him, but admittedly, he is President of the Indian Bar
Association. We had given opportunity to Shri Nilesh Ojha to explain his
position whether the letter dated 20.03.2019 was sent with his consent
or under his authority.
4. It would be pertinent to mention that Shri Vijay Kurle and Shri
Rashid Khan Pathan have not denied that they are the authors of the
letters which are signed by them.
5. The basis of the present contempt are the two letters dated
20.03.2019 and 19.03.2019 admittedly signed by alleged contemnor nos.
1 and 2 i.e. Shri Vijay Kurle and Shri Rashid Khan Pathan respectively.
These letters are very lengthy running into more than 250 pages combined.
Therefore, it would not be feasible to extract the entire letters but we
have no doubt in our mind that the tenor of the letters is highly
disrespectful, and scandalous and scurrilous allegations have been levelled
against 2 Judges of this Court.
6. The three alleged contemnors have raised a number of
preliminary issues. We may summarise the same as follows:-
(i)
That the Bench of Justice R. F. Nariman and Justice Vineet
Saran could not have taken cognizance of the case because
the case was not assigned to them by the Chief Justice and
that both the Judges acted as Judge in their own cause.
(ii)
That the Bench has not suo motu taken notice of the contempt
and therefore the Registry cannot treat it as a suo motu
petition.
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]
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(iii) That even in suo motu contempt proceedings the consent of
the Attorney General is necessary.
(iv) That the proper procedure of framing a charge is not followed
because the defects at the initial stage cannot be cured by
later orders/developments.
(v) That the Judges were bound to disclose the source of
information.
Powers of the Supreme Court
7. Before we deal with the objections individually, we need to
understand what are the powers of the Supreme Court of India in relation
to dealing with contempt of the Supreme Court in the light of Articles
129 and 142 of the Constitution of India when read in conjunction with
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. According to the alleged contemnors,
the Contempt of Courts Act is the final word in the matter and if the
procedure prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act has not been
followed then the proceedings have to be dropped. On the other hand,
Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned amicus curiae while making reference to a
large number of decisions contends that the Supreme Court being a
Court of Record is not bound by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts
Act. The only requirement is that the procedure followed is just and fair
and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
"129. Supreme Court to be a court of record.- The Supreme
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court being
a Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record
including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a constitutional
power which cannot be taken away or in any manner abridged by statute.
Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:
"142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court
and orders as to discovery, etc.- (1) The Supreme Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so
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made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such
manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by
Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such
manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by
Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the
territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for
the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery
or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment
of any contempt of itself."
Article 142 also provides that this Court can punish any person
for contempt of itself but this power is subject to the provisions of any
law made by parliament. A comparison of the provisions of Article 129
and clause (2) of Article 142 clearly shows that whereas the founding
fathers felt that the powers under clause (2) of Article 142 could be
subject to any law made by parliament, there is no such restriction as far
as Article 129 is concerned. The power under clause (2) of Article 142
is not the primary source of power of Court of Record which is Article
129 and there is no such restriction in Article 129. Samaraditya Pal in
the Law of Contempt1 has very succinctly stated the legal position as
follows:
"Although the law of contempt is largely governed by the 1971
Act, it is now settled law in India that the High Courts and the
Supreme Court derive their jurisdiction and power from Articles
215 and 129 of the Constitution. This situation results in giving
scope for "judicial self-dealing".
The High Courts also enjoy similar powers like the Supreme Court
under Article 215 of the Constitution. The main argument of the alleged
contemnors is that notice should have been issued in terms of the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and any violation of the
Contempt of Courts Act would vitiate the entire proceedings. We do not
accept this argument. In view of the fact that the power to punish for
contempt of itself is a constitutional power vested in this Court, such
power cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment.
1 Pgs. 9-10, The Law of Contempt: Contempt of Courts and Legislatures, Fifth Edn.,
LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur (2013)
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]
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8. To appreciate the rival contention, we shall have to make
reference to a number of decisions relied upon by both the parties. The
first judgment on the point is Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice
and Judges of the Pepsu High Court2. It would be pertinent to mention
that the said judgment was given in the context of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1952. The issue before this Court in the said case was
whether contempt proceedings could said to be the proceedings under
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.PC) and the Supreme Court had
the power to transfer the proceedings from one court to another under
the Cr.PC. Rejecting the prayer for transfer, this Court held as follows:-
"....We hold therefore that the Code of Criminal Procedure does
not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The
High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own
procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and
that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This
rule was laid down by the Privy Council in In re Pollard (L.R. 2
P.C. 106 at 120) and was followed in India and in Burma in In re
Vallabhdas (I.L.R. 27 Bom. 394 at 390) and Ebrahim Mamoojee
Parekh v. King Emperor (I.L.R. 4 Rang. 257 at 259-261). In our
view that is still the law."
9. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri C. K. Daphtary
and Others v. Shri O.P. Gupta and Others3 was dealing with a case
where the contemnor had published a pamphlet casting scurrilous
aspersions on 2 Judges of this Court. During the course of argument, the
contemnor raised a plea that all the evidence has not been furnished to
him and made a request that the petitioner be asked to furnish the
"pamphlet" or "book" annexed to the petition. The Court rejected this
argument holding that the booklet/pamphlet had been annexed to the
petition in original and the Court had directed that the matter be decided
on affidavits.
10. In respect of the absence of a specific charge being framed,
the Court held that a specific charge was not required to be framed and
the only requirement was that a fair procedure should be followed. Dealing
with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 this Court held as follows:-
2 1954 SCR 454
3 1971 (1) SCC 626
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"58. We are here also not concerned with any law made by
Parliament. Article 129 shows that the Supreme Court has all the
powers of a Court of Record, including the power to punish for
contempt of itself; and Article 142(2) goes further and enables us
to investigate any contempt of this Court."
11. Thereafter, this Court approved the observations in Sukhdev
Singh Sodhi's case (supra) and held as follows:-
"78. In our view that is still the law. It is in accordance with the
practice of this Court that a notice was issued to the respondents
and opportunity given to them to file affidavits stating facts and
their contentions. At one stage, after arguments had begun
Respondent No. 1 asked for postponement of the case to engage
some lawyers who were engaged in fighting elections. We refused
adjournment because we were of the view that the request was
not reasonable and was made with a view to delay matters. We
may mention that the first respondent fully argued his case for a
number of days. The procedure adopted by us is the usual
procedure followed in all cases."
12. According to the alleged contemnors, both the aforesaid
judgments are per incuriam after coming into force of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. They are definitely not per incuriam because they
have been decided on the basis of the law which admittedly existed, but
for the purposes of this case, we shall treat the argument of the alleged
contemnors to be that the judgments are no longer good law and do not
bind this Court. It has been contended by the alleged contemnors that
both the aforesaid cases are overruled by later judgments. We shall now
refer to some of the decisions cited by the parties.
13. In P.N. Duda v. P.Shiv Shanker and Others4 the respondent,
Shri P. Shiv Shiv Shanker, who was a former judge of the High Court
and was the Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs delivered a
speech which was said to be contemptuous. A petition was filed by the
petitioner P. N. Duda who was an advocate of this Court but this Court
declined to initiate contempt proceedings. At the outset, we may note
that while giving the reasons for not initiating contempt, though this Court
held that the contempt petition was not maintainable, it went into the
merits of the speech delivered by Shri P. Shiv Shanker and held that
4 (1988) 3 SCC 167
RE : VIJAY KURLE & ORS.
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]
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there was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of
the justice and bringing administration into disrepute. It was held that
Shri P. Shiv Shanker was not guilty of contempt of this Court. Having
held so, the Court went on to decide whether the petition could have
been entertained on behalf of Shri Duda. In the said petition, Shri Duda
had written a letter to the Attorney General seeking consent for initiating
contempt proceedings against Shri P. Shiv Shanker. A copy of the said
letter was also sent to the Solicitor General of India. While seeking
consent, the petitioner had also stated that the Attorney General may be
embarrassed to give consent for prosecution of the Law Minister and in
view of the said allegations, the Attorney General felt that the credibility
and authority of the office of the Attorney General was undermined and
therefore did not deny or grant sanction for prosecution. The Court held
that the petitioner could not move the Court for initiating contempt
proceedings against the respondent without consent of the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General. The relevant portion of the judgment
reads as follows:-
"39. The question of contempt of court came up for consideration
in the case of C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta. In that case a petition
under Article 129 of the Constitution was filed by Shri C.K.
Daphtary and three other advocates bringing to the notice of this
Court alleged contempt committed by the respondents. There this
court held that under Article 129 of the Constitution this Court
had the power to punish for contempt of itself and under Article
143(2) it could investigate any such contempt. This Court reiterated
that the Constitution made this Court the guardian of fundamental
rights. This Court further held that under the existing law of
contempt of court any publication which was calculated to interfere
with the due course of justice or proper administration of law
would amount to contempt of court. A scurrilous attack on a Judge,
in respect of a judgment or past conduct has in our country the
inevitable effect of undermining the confidence of the public in
the Judiciary ; and if confidence in Judiciary goes administration
of justice definitely suffers. In that case a pamphlet was alleged
to have contained statements amounting to contempt of the court.
As the Attorney General did not move in the matter, the President
of the Supreme Court bar and the other petitioners chose to bring
the matter to the notice of the court. It was alleged that the said
President and the other members of the bar have no locus standi.
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This Court held that the court could issue a notice suo motu. The
President of the Supreme Court bar and other petitioners were
perfectly entitled to bring to the notice of the court any contempt
of the court. The first respondent referred to Lord Shawcross
Committee's recommendation in U.K. that "proceedings should
be instituted only if the Attorney General in his discretion considers
them necessary". This was only a recommendation made in the
light of circumstances prevailing in England. But that is not the
law in India, this Court reiterated. It has to be borne that decision
was rendered on March 19, 1971 and the present Act in India
was passed on December 24, 1971. Therefore that decision cannot
be of any assistance. We have noticed Sanyal Committee's
recommendations in India as to why the Attorney General should
be associated with it, and thereafter in U.K. there was report of
Phillimore Committee in 1974. In India the reason for having the
consent of the Attorney General was examined and explained by
Sanyal Committee Report as noticed before."
14.