# 3 S.C.R. 450 NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SALEM TOWN, TAMIL NADU

- **Citation:** [2015] 3 S.C.R. 450
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-03-10
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1311 of2006
- **Bench:** Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, Vikramajit Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/3-s-c-r-450-nagaraj-v-state-rep-by-inspector-of-police-salem-town-tamil-nadu-30524
- **Pages:** 76

## Headnote

Penal Code 1860- s.302 - Murder- Prosecution
. case that appellant and victim were working together in a
o business - In connection thereof, they checked in at a hotel
- Same day appellant locked the hotel room and left alone
with the room key and did not return - Two days later, room
boy noticed bad odour coming from the said room- However,
the room was opened the next day with the master key given
E by the manager- Decomposed body of the victim found in
the room -Eighteen months later appellant surrendered
before the Judicial Magistrate - Appellant allegedly
voluntarily confessed that he killed the victim - However, in
the statement uls. 313 Cr.PC. appellant denied his complicity
F in the offence - On basis of circumstantial evidence, courts
below convicted and sentenced the appellant uls. 302 - On
appeal, held: High Court was not correct in drawing an adverse
inference against the accused because of what he stated or
G what he failed to state in his examination uls. 313 CrPC - It
was incumbent on the High Court to deal with the so-called
confession in detail - Reading of the judgment does not
immediately reveal whether the conviction of the accused
by the courts below was predicated on his alleged confession
H - Investigation conducted by the police was not satisfactory
450
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 451
SALEM TOWN, T. N.
- Both the prosecution and the High Court took the deposition A
of the room boy to be trustworthy, ignoring the fact that the
room boy as well as the Manager had access to the hotel
room for three days before the body of the deceased was
found - They had as much motive and opportunity to have
committed the crime as was remotely attributed to the B
accused- Thus, the statement of the said witnesses cannot
be relied - Failure of the prosecution to prove the case
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused to be given benefit
of doubt.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 No suspicious or ulterior slant can be
attributed to the accused for surrendering before the
judicial magistrate after one and a half years, particularly D
given that there were no outstanding warrants for his
arrest or even for participating in the investigation. The
statement of the accused that he did so because he was
being harassed by the police to turn himself in seems
very credible to us. In that case, there is no explanation E
as to why the police did not arrest him even though they
were frequenting his home, and the prosecution's
version is not dependent on his interrogation, save for
the alleged confession. [Para 11] [461-G-H; 462-A-B]
F
1.2 No identification parade was conducted. This
aspect has no doubt been discussed in the impugned
judgment; but it was held that there was no suspicion
as to the complicity of the accused, who was allegedly G
seen by several witnesses without any suggestion to
them during the course of the cross examination that .
the accused was not present at all. At least in the trial of
capital offences, a duty is cast on the court to ensure
that the accused has adequate legal assistance. It is H
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 3 S.C.R.
A evident that in this case this is strikingly absent. Keeping
in perspective that the identification was a year and a
half after the witness allegedly last saw the accused, an
identification parade should have been properly
conducted. Moreover, identification by the Manager was
B not possible, as he had died before the trial commenced.
The identification by PW3 and PW4 took place two and
a half years after the incident, again without an
identification parade, and eventually in the course of
C court proceedings. Further, PW3 admitted that he only
met the Accused once, which was on 24.7.2000. There
is clearly a severe lapse on the part of the prosecution
with no plausible and acceptable explanation
forthcoming. [Para 12] [462-C-F]
D
1.3 The conviction is predicated on circumstantial
evidence alone. Fingerprints have not been lifted from
the scene, the murder

## Text

_Characters 0–39,970 of 122,508. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39970 for what follows._

A
B
(2015] 3 S.C.R. 450
NAGARAJ
v.
STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
SALEM TOWN, TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 1311 of2006)
MARCH 10, 2015
C
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Penal Code 1860- s.302 - Murder- Prosecution
. case that appellant and victim were working together in a
o business - In connection thereof, they checked in at a hotel
- Same day appellant locked the hotel room and left alone
with the room key and did not return - Two days later, room
boy noticed bad odour coming from the said room- However,
the room was opened the next day with the master key given
E by the manager- Decomposed body of the victim found in
the room -Eighteen months later appellant surrendered
before the Judicial Magistrate - Appellant allegedly
voluntarily confessed that he killed the victim - However, in
the statement uls. 313 Cr.PC. appellant denied his complicity
F in the offence - On basis of circumstantial evidence, courts
below convicted and sentenced the appellant uls. 302 - On
appeal, held: High Court was not correct in drawing an adverse
inference against the accused because of what he stated or
G what he failed to state in his examination uls. 313 CrPC - It
was incumbent on the High Court to deal with the so-called
confession in detail - Reading of the judgment does not
immediately reveal whether the conviction of the accused
by the courts below was predicated on his alleged confession
H - Investigation conducted by the police was not satisfactory
450
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 451
SALEM TOWN, T. N.
- Both the prosecution and the High Court took the deposition A
of the room boy to be trustworthy, ignoring the fact that the
room boy as well as the Manager had access to the hotel
room for three days before the body of the deceased was
found - They had as much motive and opportunity to have
committed the crime as was remotely attributed to the B
accused- Thus, the statement of the said witnesses cannot
be relied - Failure of the prosecution to prove the case
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused to be given benefit
of doubt.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 No suspicious or ulterior slant can be
attributed to the accused for surrendering before the
judicial magistrate after one and a half years, particularly D
given that there were no outstanding warrants for his
arrest or even for participating in the investigation. The
statement of the accused that he did so because he was
being harassed by the police to turn himself in seems
very credible to us. In that case, there is no explanation E
as to why the police did not arrest him even though they
were frequenting his home, and the prosecution's
version is not dependent on his interrogation, save for
the alleged confession. [Para 11] [461-G-H; 462-A-B]
F
1.2 No identification parade was conducted. This
aspect has no doubt been discussed in the impugned
judgment; but it was held that there was no suspicion
as to the complicity of the accused, who was allegedly G
seen by several witnesses without any suggestion to
them during the course of the cross examination that .
the accused was not present at all. At least in the trial of
capital offences, a duty is cast on the court to ensure
that the accused has adequate legal assistance. It is H
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 3 S.C.R.
A evident that in this case this is strikingly absent. Keeping
in perspective that the identification was a year and a
half after the witness allegedly last saw the accused, an
identification parade should have been properly
conducted. Moreover, identification by the Manager was
B not possible, as he had died before the trial commenced.
The identification by PW3 and PW4 took place two and
a half years after the incident, again without an
identification parade, and eventually in the course of
C court proceedings. Further, PW3 admitted that he only
met the Accused once, which was on 24.7.2000. There
is clearly a severe lapse on the part of the prosecution
with no plausible and acceptable explanation
forthcoming. [Para 12] [462-C-F]
D
1.3 The conviction is predicated on circumstantial
evidence alone. Fingerprints have not been lifted from
the scene, the murder weapon has not been recovered,
and any credible motive is absent. It cannot even be
E contended that the accused was the last person to be
seen with the deceased since several persons including
the Manager, PW1, and the guests in the adjoining rooms
could have accessed the room where the deceased was
eventually found. While circumstantial evidence is
F sufficient to return a conviction, this is possible if it
contains all the links that connect the accused to the
incident, and the inconsistencies are extremely trivial in
character. Furthermore, motive assumes great
significance where a conviction is sought to be
G predicated on circumstantial evidence alone, and its
absence can tilt the scales in favour of the accused
where all links are not avowedly present. The High Court
erred in concluding that the complicity of the accused
H in the murder of the deceased had been proved beyond
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 453
SALEM TOWN, T. N.
· reasonable doubt. [Para 13] [462-G-H]; [463-A-C]
A
1.4 The impugned judgment found the answers
of the accused u/s. 313 CrPC evasive and u_ntrustworthy,
and held this to be another factor indicating his guilt.
Section 313 is of seminal importance in our criminal law B
jurisdiction. [Para 14] [463-D-E]
1.5 Refusal to answer any question put to the
accused by the court in relation to any evidence that may
have been presented against him by the prosecution or c
the accused giving an evasive or unsatisfactory answer,
would not justify the court to return a finding of guilt on
this score. Even if it is assumed that his statements do
not inspire acceptance, it must not be lost sight of that
the burden is cast on the prosecution to prove its case D
beyond reasonable doubt. Once this burden is met, the
Statements under Section 313 assume significance to
the extent that the accused may cast some incredulity
on the p·rosecution version. It is not the other way
around; in the legal system the accused is not required E
to establish his innocence. This is said because the
conclusion of the High Court that the substance of his
examination u/s. 313 was indicative of his guilt cannot
be accepted. If no explanation is forthcoming, or is F
unsatisfactory in quality, the effect would be that the
conclusion that may reasonably be arrived at would not
be dislodged, and would, therefore, subject to the quality
of the defence evidence, seal his guilt. Article 20(3) of
the Constitution declares that no person accused of any G
offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. In the instant case the High Court was not correct
in drawing an adverse inference against the accused
because of what he has stated or what he failed to state
H
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A in his examination under Section 313 CrPC. [Para 15]
(465-0; 466-A]
1.6 ltwas incumbent on the High Court to deal with
the so-called confession in detail. It is far from unknown
B that confessions are extracted from an accused under
myriad threats, including his own physical safety. It is
clarified that a reading of the judgment does not
immediately reveal whether the conviction of the accused
by the courts below was predicated on his alleged
C confession. (Para 16] [466-B-C]
1. 7 It is thus abundantly clear thatthe investigation
conducted by the police was less than satisfactory, nay,
it was non-existent. It is necessary to have a specialized
D section of the Police to investigate cases of heinous
nature. Both the prosecution and the High Court took
the deposition of PW1 to be unimpeachably true,
ignoring the fact that he as well as the Manager had
access to the hotel room for three days before the body
E of the deceased was found, and during that time they
made decisions which cannot but raise suspicion in the
minds of any reasonable person. There is as much
opportunity and as much motive for them to have
F committed the crime as has been tenuously attributed
to the accused to have done so. To rely substantially on
the statement of such witnesses is forensically unsafe,
to say the least. Given the failure of the prosecution to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of
G the doubt would have to be bestowed on the accused.
[Para 17] [466-D-G]
Parsuram Pandey vs. State of Bihar 2004 (5) Suppl.
SCR 475: (2004) 13 sec 189; Arsaf Ali VS. State of
H
Assam 2008 (10) SCR 1115: (2008) 16 SCC 328; Sher
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 455
SALEM TOWN, T. N.
Singh vs. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29 - referred
A
to.
Case Law Reference
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 475
2008 (10) SCR 1115
(2015) 1 SCR 29
Referred to.
Referred to.
Referred to.
Para 15
B
Para 15
Para 15
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. C
1311 of 2006
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.10.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 426 of
2003
D
Ritu Rastogi (A. C.) for the Appellant.
M. Yogesh Kanna, Santha Kumaran, J. Janani for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. This Appeal by Special Leave
E
is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of Madras
dated 5.10.2005 whereby the conviction of the Accused/ F
Appellant Nagaraj under Section 302 IPC came to be affirmed.
The Accused was sentenced to Life Imprisonment and was
further directed to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of which
he would have to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
months.
G
2. The sequence of events leading to the fateful incident,
as presented by the prosecution is as follows. According to
Mari Chetty PW3, the Accused and the Deceased came to
H
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A
his house in Bargurat9.30a.m. on 24.7.2000to borrow money
from him for the purposes of their textile business. This was
the first time PW3 met the Accused; and the Deceased
informed him that the Accused had joined him in business on
the basis of commission. He and the Accused also informed
B PW3 that they were going to Bangalore and then to Salem for
their business. Thereafter, according to Rajammal PW4, the
mother of the Deceased, the Accused and Deceased left
Srinivasapuram for Salem at 2.00 p.m.; she has corroborated
C that the Accused was working in the textile business with the
Deceased. The details of the travel plans given by her are
contradictory, as in her cross-examination she mentioned that
they were going to Bangalore before visiting Salem. She also
stated that the Deceased informed her at the time of leaving,
o notthat the Accused and the Deceased visited her before their
departure. On 25.7.2000, at 9.00 a.m, the Accused and the
Deceased visited Veeravel's shop in which Senthil PW2 was
employed. The Deceased was the uncle of PW2. During a
conversation with Veeravel, the Deceased told him that the
E Accused's name was Nagaraj, that he was from Bargur and
he had joined the Accused in business on commission basis.
At 9.30 a.m., the Accused and the Deceased arrived at
Sampath Kumar Lodge. Kandasamy PW1 , the room boy, has
stated that the Accused entered the Lodge with another person
F and asked for a room. PW1 initially stated that they arrived
with one textile bag/bundle, but in the cross-examination has
said thattheAccused and the Deceased had one bag each.
Upon being allotted Room No.115, the Accused signed the
G Lodge/Hotel Register and paid Rs.100/~ as advance. At 10.00
a.m, the Accused and the Deceased briefly visited Veeravel's
shop again. PW2 heard them say thatthey had booked Room
No.115 at Sampath Kumar Lodge. According to PW1 they
returned to the Hotel in about ten minutes and that at 11.00
· H a.m, he saw the Accused leaving the Hotel room. The Accused
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 457
SALEM TOWN, T. N. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
put two textile bags down and locked the door, and then told A
PW1 that he was going to sell the textile goods. He did not
return the room key and he plso did not return at night. On
27.7.2000, at about 1.00 p.m. PW1 noticed a bad odour
coming from Room No.115. He searched for a key with which
to open the door but could not find one. The Manager, when B
informed, said that there is nothing they could do as there was
no key. On 28.7.2000 at about 10.00 a.m, PW1 noticed that
the odour had become worse. He informed the Manager, who
this time around, gave him the master key. He entered the C
room, where he found nothing but he found the body of the
Deceased in the bathroom. The body was decomposing, and
there were injuries on the left portion of the head. PW1
informed the Manager about this, who informed the Salem
Town Police Station. An FIR was lodged by the Manager at D
noon. According to the FIR, on being informed of the situation
by PW1, the Manager had gone to the room and had then also
seen the body of the Deceased. The FIR also stated that the
Accused and the Deceased arrived at the Hotel with one textile
bundle, and the Accused took one bundle with him when he E
left. The FIR specifically stated that there was no bag/bundle
in the room when the Manager went in. The FIR also stated
that at the time of signing the Register, the Deceased informed
the Manager that they would be staying for one day only. At
12.30 p.m, the police arrived at the Hotel and conducted a
F
search of the room. According to the cross-examination of
PW1, a bag was found in the room and was recovered by the
police, but this was not mentioned in the Observation Mahazdar
or in the examination of PW10 who prepared the Observation G
Mahazdar. At 1.15 p.m., PW10 conducted his enquiry, during ·
which he collected samples of blood-stained cement and
cement mixture, and interrogated some witnesses. However,
significantly, the Lodge Register and the Receipt Book were
not taken custody of.
H
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015) 3 S.C.R.
A
3. According to the Post Mortem report dated
29. 7 .2000, the Deceased had been dead for three to five days.
PW?, who conducted the Post Mortem, has deposed that the
Deceased appeared to have died of head injuries. The
following injuries were found:- (i) lacerated injury over left
B parietal region; (ii) lacerated injury over left temporal region;
(iii) contusion over the occipital region;( iv) fissured fracture
over left parietal bone extending on to the left temporal bone.
4. It is only eighteen months later, on 29.11.2001, that
C the Accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate. It is
not in dispute that in this long period the police had not taken
any steps for his interrogation or his arrest. The police seemed
to have sprung into action only when the Accused surrendered
D on his own. On being permitted by the Court PW11 took the
Accused into police custody on 11.12.2001 and brought him
to the Police Station, where he was interrogated. According
to PW11 and PW6, theAccused allegedly voluntarily confessed
to killing the Deceased with an iron rod, which he allegedly
E subsequently threw into a waste-water channel. The Accused
took PW11 and the witnesses to the place where he had
allegedly thrown the rod, but it was not found. The Accused
was then taken to Sampath Kumar Lodge and shown to PW1,
who thereupon identified him. The next day the Accused was
F remanded to judicial custody. The Charge Sheet dated
28.11.2002 charged the Accused of the commission of the
murder of the Deceased under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code. The motive attributed for the murder was his previous
enmity with the Deceased because of the n.on-payment of
G pending dues but there is no evidentiary foundation for arriving
at this conclusion. The Accused pleaded not guilty.
H
5. When the Accused was questioned under Section
313 CrPC, he emphatically denied his complicity in the offence,
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 459
SALEM TOWN, T. N. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
and said that he had no connection with the Deceased and A
had never visited Sampath Kumar Lodge. According to his
Section 313 statement and his written statement, he was in
his home in Bargur, and the police started visiting his home
and troubling him; he engaged an advocate and surrendered
before the Court; he was taken into custody by PW11, and B
was 'coerced' on 11.12.2011 and on 12.12.2011, was made
to sign a paper; he has denied that hevoluntarily confessed to
the crime or that he accompanied the police to any place.
6. It is worth noting a number of inconsistencies in the C
case of the prosecution. Neither the Register nor the Receipt
Book was produced by the prosecution as evidence. This is a
serious lapse, as these documents would have been the best
evidence to indicate that the Accused and the Deceased were D
at Sampath Kumar Lodge together. Further, no explanation
has been given for their non-production. The High Court has
held that the failure to produce these does not damage the
case of the prosecution, as there is no reason to doubt the
statement of PW1 according to which the Accused and the E
Deceased came to the Lodge and stayed in that particular
room. However, the failure to produce them has resulted in
the prosecution relying on circumstantial evidence instead of
direct evidence, thus weakening its case.
7. The various witnesses have given contradictory F
statements regarding the number of bags with the Accused
and the Deceased. It is not clear whether they brought one
textile bag with them to Sampath Kumar Lodge or two. While
PW1, in his deposition, stated thatthe Accused left with two G
textile bags, the Manager, in the FIR has only me.ntioned one.
Further, PW1 in his cross-examination stated that one bag was
. found in the room at the time the police came to investigate,
but nothing further is mentioned of this. we have already noted
H
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A that PW1 has variously stated that the Accused had one bag,
then two bags, and that he had left with one bag and then with
two bags. But if one bag/bundle was found in the room by the
Police, then there would have been three bags/bundles. There
are inconsistencies in the cross-examination of PW1 regarding
B his duty timings. Although he initially stated that the duty timings
ofthe room boys changed on alternate days, he later claimed
. that he was only on duty in the daytime and the night duty was
allotted to another room boy.
C 8. No reason is given for the fact that Room No. 115 was not
. ·opened for three days, which is particularly curious given the
Manager in his Complaint/FIR stated that the Deceased had
said that they would be staying for one day and only a meagre
D deposit of Rs.100 had allegedly been received. PW1 saw the
Accused and the Deceased leave and enterthe Hotel multiple
times on the morning of the 25. 7.2000, butthought nothing of
the fact that there was subsequently no movement from the
room or the fact that the Accused had left with the key and had
E not come back. They did not ask PW1 for drinking water again.
Given that they had had to ask him for this on the first day, it
would be the natural assumption that they would have to ask
him to replenish it. Further, at the time of checking in, they had
asked PW1 for a bedsheet who had said that it was being
F washed and that he would provide it in the evening. PW1 should
have been suspicious that there were no demands for either
of these, particularly if he assumed that the Deceased was
still in the room. There is also no explanation for the fact that
no attempt was made to open the room for three days for the
G purposes of cleaning it. When PW1 first noticed the odour, the
Manager informed him that there was nothing they could do
about it since the key was not available. However the events
of the next day reveal that the door could have been opened
H with a master key. The explanation of PW1 that he thought the
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 461
SALEM TOWN, T. N. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
smell was from a dead rat is not satisfactory. The natural A
reaction would have been to clean it, not to leave it to rot further.
The Manager was not alive at the Trial and hence his Statement
has not been subjected to the acid test of cross-examination;
his Statement cannot be relied upon.
9. The room was finally opened by PW1, and was
possibly investigated by the Manager, though the accounts
regarding this are contradictory, before the police were finally
called. There was, therefore, plentyoftimeforthecrimescene
B
to have been tampered with before the police arrived. There C
was also the possibility of other parties, including PW1 and/or
the Manager to have perpetrated the murder. According to
the cross examination of PW1, the adjacent room to Room
No. 115 was also occupied, but this fact was not taken into 0
consideration in the police investigation, and the inhabitants
of the adjacent room have not been questioned, even though
their evidence may have been compelling.
10. No explanation has been given for the fact that the
Accused was not arrested after the investigation commenced,
E
despite the fact that seemingly the prosecution perceived that
the finger of suspicion pointed at him and liim alone. Notices
requiring him to participate in the investigation are conspicuous
by their absence, and that too for a long duration of eighteen F
months. In fact he was only taken into custody after he voluntarily
surrendered. The High Court has held that he was absconding,
but this is not borne out from the records as admittedly there
was no warrant for his arrest on the record.
11. No suspicious or ulterior slant can be attributed to
the Accused for surrendering before the Judicial Magistrate
after one and a half years, particularly given that there were no
outstanding warrants for his arrest or even for participating in
G
the investigation. The statement of the Accused that he did so H
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 3 S.C.R.
A because he was being harassed by the police to turn himself
in seems very credible to us. In that case, there is no explanation
as to why the Police did not arrest him even though they were
frequenting his home, and the prosecution's version is not
dependent on his interrogation, save for the alleged
B confession.
· 12. No ideritification parade has been conducted. This
aspect has no doubt been discussed in the impugned ·
judgment; but it was held that there was no suspicion as to the
C complicity of the Accused, who was allegedly seen by several
witnesses without any suggestion to them during the course of
the cross examination that the Accused was not present at all.
At least in the trial of capital offences, we think that a duty is
cast on the Cou1t to ensure that the Accused has adequate
D legal assistance. It is evident that in this case this is strikingly
absent. · Keeping in perspective that the identification was a
year and a half after the witness allegedly last sawtheAccused,
an identification parade should have been properly conducted.
E Moreover, identification by the Manager was not possible, as
he had died before the Trial commenced. The identification
by PW3 and PW4 took place two and a half years after the
incident, again without an identification parade, and eventually
in the eourse of Court proceedings. Further, PW3 has admitted
F thatheonlymettheAccused once, which was on 24.7.2000.
G
H
There is clearly a very severe lapse on the part of the
prosecution with no plausible and acceptable explanation
forthcoming.
13. The conviction is predicated on circumstantial
evidence alone. Fingerprints have not been lifted from the
scene, tht;i murder weapon has not been .recovered, and any
credible motive is absent. It cannot even be contended that
the Accused was the last person to be seen with the Deceased
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 463
SALEM TOWN, T. N. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
since several persons including the Manager, PW1, and the A
guests in the adjoining rooms could have accessed the room
where the Deceased was eventually found. While
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to return a conviction, this
is possible if it contains all the links that connect the Accused
to the incident, and the inconsistencies are extremely trivial in
B
character. Furthermore, motive assumes great significance
where a conviction is sought to be predicated on circumstantial
evidence alone, and its absence can tilt the scales in favour of
the Accused where all links are not avowedly present. We C
think that the High Court erred in concluding that the complicity
of the Accused in the murder of the Deceased had been proved
beyond reasonable-doubt.
14. The Impugned Judgment has found the answers of
the Accused under Section 313 CrPC evasive and D
untrustworthy, and held this to be another factor indicating his
guilt. Section 313 CrPC is of seminal importance in our
criminal law jurisdiction ~nd, therefore, justifies reiteration and
elucidation by this Court. We shall start, with profit, by E
reproducing extracts from 41 st Report of the Law Commission
made in the context of Section 342 of the old Criminal
Procedure Code which corresponds to this Section where the
Commission observed, inter alia, thus:
"24.40. Section 342 is one of the most .important
sections in the Code. It requires that the Court must, at
the close of prosecution evidence, examine the accused
"for the purposes of enabling him to explain any
F
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him."
G
The section for a moment, brushes aside all counsel, all
prosecutors, all witnesses, and all third persons. It seeks
· to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the
accused for the purpose of enabling the accused to give
H
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A
B
c
D
E
F
his explanation.
For a while the section was
misunderstood and regarded as authorizing an
inquisitorial interrogation of the accused, which is not its
object at all. The key to the section is contained in the
first sixteen words of the section. Giving an opportunity
to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing
in the evidence is the only object of the examination. He
may, if he chooses, keep his mouth shut or he may give a
full explanation, or, he is. so advised, he may explain only
a part of the case against him.
*****
24.45 We have, after considering the various aspects
of the matter as summarized above, come to the
conclusion that S.342 should not be deleted. In our
opinion the stage has not yet come for its being removed
from the statute book. With further increase in literacy
and with better facilities for legal aid, it may be possible
to take that step in the future."
(ii) 'Clause 320 - The existing provision in S.342 (2)
·enabling a Court to draw an inference, whether adverse
or not from an answer or a refusal to answer a question
put to the accused during the examination, is being
omitted as it may offend Art. 20(3) of the Constitution" -
S.O.R."
15. In the context of this aspect of the law it is been held
l>y this Court in Parsuram Pandey vs. State'of Bihar (2004) 13
G SCC 189 that Section 313 CrPC is imperative to enable an
accused to explain away any incriminating circumstances
proved by the prosecution. It is intended to benefit the accused,
its corollary being to benefit the Court in reaching its final
H conclusion; its intention is not to nail the accused, but to comply
NAGARAJ v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 465
SALEM TOWN, T. N. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
with the most salutary and fundamental principle of natural A
justice i.e. audi a/teram partem, as explained in Arsaf Ali vs.
State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328. In Sher Singh vs. State
of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29 this Court has recently clarified
that because of the language employed in Section 304B of
the IPC, which deals with dowry death, the burden of proving B
innocence shifts to the accused which is in stark contrast and
dissonance to a person's right not to incriminate himself. It is
only in the backdrop of Section 304B that an accused must
furnish credible evidence which is indicative of his innocence, C
either under Section 313 CrPC or by examining himself in the
witness box or through defence witnesses, as he may be best
advised. Having made this clarification, refusal to answer any
question put to the accused by the Court in relation to any
evidence that may have been presented against him by the o
prosecution or the accused giving an evasive or unsatisfactory
answer, would not justify the Court to return a finding of guilt on
this score. Even if it is assumed that his statements do not
inspire acceptance, it must not be lost sight of that the burden
is cast on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable E
doubt. Once this burden is met, the Statements under Section
313 assume significance to the extent that the accused may
cast some incredulity ori the prosecution version. It is not the
other way around; in our legal system the accused is not
required to establish his innocence. We say this because we F
are unable to subscribe to the conclusion of the High Court
that the substance of his examination under Section 313 was
indicative of his guilt. If no explanation is forthcoming, or is
unsatisfactory in quality, the effect will be that the conclusion G
that may reasonably be arrived at would not be dislodged, and
would, therefore, subject to the quality of the defence evidence,
seal his guilt. Article 20(3) of the Constitution declares that no
person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. In the case in hand, the High Court H
466
SUPREME COURTREPORTS .
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
.. · ..
A was not correct in drawing an adverse inference against the
Accused because of what he has stated or what he has failed
to state in his examination under Section 313 CrPC.
16. We also think that it was incumbent on the High
B Court.to.deal with the so-called confession in detail.· It is far
from unknown that confessions are extracted from an accused
under myriad threats, including his own physical safety. We
must hasten to clarify that a reading of the Judgment does not
immediately reveal whether the conviction of ttie Accused by
C the Courts below was predicated on his alleged Confession.
17. It is thus abundantly clear that the investigation
conducted by the police was less than satisfactory, nay, it was
non-existent. We are constrained to reiterate yet again that it
D is necessary to have a specialized section of the Police to
investigate cases of heinous nature. Both the prosecution and
the High Court took the deposition of PW1 to be unimpeachably
true;ignoring the fact that he as well as the Manager had access
to Room No. 115 for three days before the body of the
E Deceased was found, and during that time they made
decisions which cannot but raise suspicion in the minds of
any reasonable person. There is as much opportunity and as
much motive for them to have committed the crime as has
F been tenuously attributed to the Accused to have done so. To
rely substantially on the statement of such witnesses is
forensically unsafe, to say the least. Given the failure of the
prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the
benefit of the doubt would have to be bestowed on the
G Accused.
18. The impugned Judgment is set aside. The
conviction of the Appellant is quashed.
H Nidhi Jain
Appeal allowed.
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 467
KALYANI MATHIVANAN
v.
K. V. JEYARAJ AND ORS.
Civil Appeal No. 5946-5947 of2014
MARCH 11, 2015.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
N. V. RAMANA, JJ.]
Service law-Appointment- Post of Vice-Chancellor
A
B
'C
of the University- Appellant's appointment to the said post
challenged, on the ground that as per the UGC Regulations
2010, appellant did not fulfill the eligibility criteria -Appellant
neither a distinguished academician, with a minimum of 10 D
years experience as professor in a University system nor 10
years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed
research/academic organization -Appellant's case that she
was qualified for the post as per the 1965 Act; and that UGC
Regulations, 2010 were directory and cannot override the E
provisions of the 1965 Act- Appointment set aside by the
High Court- On appeal, held: Post of Vice-Chancellor under
the 1965 Act is a post of an Officer - Provisions regarding
Vice-Chancellor was made for the first time under UGC F
Regulations, 201 O"'" UGC Regulations, 2010 are mandatory
to teachers and other academic staff in all the Central
Universities and Colleges thereunder; and directory for the
Universities, Colleges and other higher educational
institutions under the State Legislation as the matter has been G
left to the State Government to adopt and implement the
Scheme - Thus, UGC Regulations, 2010 is partly mandatory
and is partly directory- UGC Regulations, 2010 having not
adopted by the State, the conflict between State Legislation
.H
467
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A
and Statutes framed under Central Legislation does not arise
- Once it is adopted by the State Government, the State
Legislation is to be amended appropriately and there shall
be no conflict between the State Legislation and the Central
Legislation - Thus, the appointment of the appellant as Vice
B Chancellor, Madurai Kamaraj University upheld - UGC
Regulations of Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of
Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and
Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards
C inHigher Education 2010- Regulations 7.0.0., 7.3.0., 7.4.0
- University Grants Commission Act, 1956 - ss. 12, 14, 26,
28- Madurai Kamaraj University Act, 1965 - ss. 2(m), (n),
(t), 8, 9, 10, 12, 23, 24, 32-Constitution of/ndia, 1950-Art.
246, Seventh Schedule List I entry 66, List Ill entry 25, Art.
D 254.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The appointment of the appellant as
ViceChancellor, Madurai Kamaraj University as made by
E the G.O. (1D)No.80, Higher Education (H2) Department,
Government of Tamil Nadu dated 9th April, 2012 is upheld
and the judgment and order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court is set aside. [Para 45] [525-A-B]
F
1.2 The post of Vice-Chancellor under the
University Act, 1965 isa post of an Officer. The University
Grants Commission Act 1956 as also University Grants
Commission Regulations, 2000 are silent in regard to
G post of Vice-Chancellor. The provisions regarding ViceChancellor have been made for the firsttime under UGC
Regulations, 201 o. UGC Regulations, 2010 is not
applicable to the Universities, Colleges and other higher
educational institutions coming under the purview of the
H · State Legislature unless State Government wish to adopt
KALYANI MATHIVANAN v. K. V. JEYARAJ AND ORS.
469
and implement the Scheme subject to the terms and A
conditions therein. The University Act has not been
amended in terms of UGC Regulations, 2010 nor was
any action taken by the UGC under Section 14 of UGC
Act, .1956 as a consequence of failure of University to
comply with the recommendations of the Commission B
under Section 14ofthe UGCAct, 1956. (Para 39, 40] (520F-H; 521-A-B, C-D]
1.3 To the extentthe State Legislation is in conflict
with Central Legislation including sub-ordinate C
legislation made by the Central Legislation under Entry
25 of the Concurrent List shall be repugnant to the
Central Legislation and would be inoperative. The UGC
Regulations being passed by both the Houses of D
Parliament, though a sub-ordinate legislation has binding
effect on the Universities to which it applies. UGC
Regulations, 2010 are mandatory to teachers and other
academic staff in all the Central Universities and Colleges
thereunder and the Institutions deemed to be Universities E
whose maintenance expenditure is met by the UGC. UGC
Regulations, 2010 is directory for the Universities,
Colleges and other higher educational institutions under
the purview of the State Legislation as the matter has
been left to the State Government to adopt and F
implement the Scheme. Thus, UGC Regulations, 2010 is
partly mandatory and is partly directory. UGC
Regulations, 2010 having not adopted by the State Tamil
Nadu, the question of conflict between State Legislation
and Statutes framed under Central Legislation does not G
arise. Once it is adopted by the State Government, the
State Legislation to be amended appropriately. In such
case also there shall be no conflict between the State
Legislation and the Central Legislation. [Para 44] [524H
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 3 S.C.R.
A B-H]
1.4 The finding of the Bombay High Court in
*Suresh Patilkhede case that Regulation 7 .3.0 of the UGC
~egulations, 2010 is not traceable to clause (e) or (g) of
B . Section 26(1) of UGC Act, 1956 cannot be accepted. Also
it cannot be accepted that Regulation 7.3.0 of the UGC
Regulations, 2010 being a sub-ordinate legislation under
the Act of Parliament cannot override the preliminary
legislation enacted by the State Legislature. However,
C the finding of the Bombay High Court that Regulation
7.3.0 has to be treated as recommendatory in nature is
upheld in so far as it relates to Universities ~nd Colleges
under the State Legislation. [Para 43) [523-F-H; 524-A]
D
E
F
G
H
Annamalai University vs. Secretary to Government,
Information and Tourism Department and Others 2009
(3) SCR 355: (2009) 4 sec 590 - relied on .
.
Suresh Patilkhede of Thane vs. Chancellor, University
of Maharashtra 2012 (6) ALLMR 336; State of Tamil
Nadu and another vs. Adhiyhaman Education &
Research
Institute and Others 1995 (2)
SCR 1075: (1995) 4SCC104; Dr. Preeti Srivastava
and another vs. State of M.P. and others 1999 (1)
Suppl. SCR 249: (1999) 7 SCC 120- referred to.
Case Law Reference
2012 (6) ALLMR 336
Referred to.
Para 9
1995 (2) SCR 1075
Referred to.
Para 34
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 249
Referred to.
Para 35
2009 (3) SCR 355
Relied on.
Para 36
KALYANI MATHIVANAN v. K. V. JEYARAJ AND ORS.
471
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
A
5946-5947 of2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.06.2014 of
the High Court of Madras in Madurai bench in W. P. (MD)
Nos.11350of2012and3318of2013
B
WITH
C. A. Nos. 8602-8603 and 6455-6456 of 20:14
K. K. Venugopal, Rakesh Dwivedi, Guru Krishna C
Kumar, R. Venkataramani, Subramonium Prasad,AAG, Gopal
Sankranarayanan, Prerna Priyadarshni, Pooja Dhar,
Vikramaditya, MegaAggarwal, S. Janani, M. Yogesh Kanna,
V. Shyamohan, C. Y. Dhinoja,Abhishek Kumar, G Balaji, Athira . D
Nair, Mahalakshmi Pavani, Mahalakshmi Balaji & Co., Satya
Mitra Garg, ManjuAggarwal, Neelam Singh, Geetha Kovilan
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. These
appeals have been preferred· by the appellants against a
common judgment and order dated 26th June, 2014 passed
E
by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, Madurai
Bench in Writ Petition (MD) No.11350 of 2012 and Writ Petition F
(MD) No.3318of2013.
The aforesaid writ petitions were preferred by K.V.
Jeyaraj and I. Ismail respondents/writ petitioners praying for
issuance of a writ of quo warranto directing the appellant- Dr. G
Kalyani Mathivanan to show cause under what authority she
continues to hold the office of the Vice-Chancellor, Madurai
Kamaraj University.
H
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 3 S.C.R.
A
2. By the impugned judgment the High Court held that
the appellant-Dr. Kalyani Mathivanan did not satisfy the
eligibility criteria stipulated by the UGC Regulations of
Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other
Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures
B for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education 2010
(hereinafter referred to as the 'UGC Regulations, 201 O') for
appointment as Vice-Chancellor and non-fulfilment of such
eligibility criteria cannot be completely white washed on the
C specious plea that the University Grants Commission
Regulations, 2010 are not mandatory. The High Court set aside
the order of appointment of the appellant-Dr.