# 3 S.C.R. 775 RAVI YASHWANT aHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, RAIGAD AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2012] 3 S.C.R. 775
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2012-03-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2085 of 2012
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S. Chauhan, Jagdish Singh Khehar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/3-s-c-r-775-ravi-yashwant-ahoir-v-district-collector-raigad-and-ors-28337
- **Pages:** 51

## Headnote

A
B
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and
Industrial Townships Act, 1965 - s.558 - Complaint by the
Ex-President and the then sitting Municipal Councillor C
regarding the misconduct of the President-appellant -
Allegations that appellant did not call for a meeting for a
period of three months as required uls.81(1) and also
obtained undue financial gain by giving contract to a particular
contractor at higher rate - Show cause notice served on the
D
appellant after conducting preliminary inquiry - Competent
authority declaring the appellant disqualified for the remaining
tenure and further disqualifying him for a period of six years
even as member of the council - Propriety of - ·Held: The
competent authority did not make any reference to the
E
pleadings taken by the appellant either in his reply to show
cause or during the course of hearing - The order simply
revealed that the competent authority noticed certain things
- Not calling the meeting of the General Body of the House
would at most be a technical misconduct committed
F
inadvertently in ignorance of statutory requirements - It was
nobody's case that the appellant had done it intentionally/
purposely in order to avoid some unpleasant resolution/
demand of the council - So far as .the other charges were
concerned, it was a consensus collective decision of the
Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant G
could not have been held guilty of the said charges - High
· Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry
- Complainant being a political rival, could not have been
775
H
776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A entertained as a party to the /is - Thus, it was a clear case of
legal malice and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to
be quashed - The duly elected member/chairman of the
council could not have been removed in such a casual and
cavalier manner without giving strict adherence to the
B safeguards provided under the statute.
Constitution of India, 1950: Executive order - Municipal
Council - Removal of elected office bearer - Held: An elected
official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously
without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation
C of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State
by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations
to achieve ulterior purpose - Removal of a duly elected
Member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial
proceeding in nature - Therefore, the principles of natural
D justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance
should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision
providing for the same - In service jurisprudence, for removal,
termination or reduction in rank, a full fledged inquiry is
required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article
E 311 of the Constitution - The case of elected office bearer is
to be understood in an entirely different context as compared
to the government employees, for the reason, that for the
removal of the. elected officials, a more stringent procedure
and standard of proof is required.
F
Administrative law: Administrative order - Recording of
reasons, necessity- Held: Even in administrative matters, the
reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the
authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order - Right to
reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
G reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind
of the authority before the court - Another rationale is that the
affected party can know why the decision has gone against
him ~ Spelling out reasons for the order made is one of the
salutary requirements of natural justice.
H
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 777
RAIGAD AND ORS.
Jurisprudence: Legal right - Held: A legal right is an
A
averment of entitlement arising out of law - A person who
suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or
omission - The complainant has to establish t

## Text

_Characters 0–39,866 of 97,719. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39866 for what follows._

[2012) 3 S.C.R. 775
RAVI YASHWANT aHOIR
v.
DISTRICT COLLECTOR, RAIGAD AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2085 of 2012)
MARCH 2, 2012
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN & JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]
A
B
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and
Industrial Townships Act, 1965 - s.558 - Complaint by the
Ex-President and the then sitting Municipal Councillor C
regarding the misconduct of the President-appellant -
Allegations that appellant did not call for a meeting for a
period of three months as required uls.81(1) and also
obtained undue financial gain by giving contract to a particular
contractor at higher rate - Show cause notice served on the
D
appellant after conducting preliminary inquiry - Competent
authority declaring the appellant disqualified for the remaining
tenure and further disqualifying him for a period of six years
even as member of the council - Propriety of - ·Held: The
competent authority did not make any reference to the
E
pleadings taken by the appellant either in his reply to show
cause or during the course of hearing - The order simply
revealed that the competent authority noticed certain things
- Not calling the meeting of the General Body of the House
would at most be a technical misconduct committed
F
inadvertently in ignorance of statutory requirements - It was
nobody's case that the appellant had done it intentionally/
purposely in order to avoid some unpleasant resolution/
demand of the council - So far as .the other charges were
concerned, it was a consensus collective decision of the
Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant G
could not have been held guilty of the said charges - High
· Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry
- Complainant being a political rival, could not have been
775
H
776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A entertained as a party to the /is - Thus, it was a clear case of
legal malice and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to
be quashed - The duly elected member/chairman of the
council could not have been removed in such a casual and
cavalier manner without giving strict adherence to the
B safeguards provided under the statute.
Constitution of India, 1950: Executive order - Municipal
Council - Removal of elected office bearer - Held: An elected
official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously
without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation
C of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State
by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations
to achieve ulterior purpose - Removal of a duly elected
Member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial
proceeding in nature - Therefore, the principles of natural
D justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance
should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision
providing for the same - In service jurisprudence, for removal,
termination or reduction in rank, a full fledged inquiry is
required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article
E 311 of the Constitution - The case of elected office bearer is
to be understood in an entirely different context as compared
to the government employees, for the reason, that for the
removal of the. elected officials, a more stringent procedure
and standard of proof is required.
F
Administrative law: Administrative order - Recording of
reasons, necessity- Held: Even in administrative matters, the
reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the
authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order - Right to
reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
G reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind
of the authority before the court - Another rationale is that the
affected party can know why the decision has gone against
him ~ Spelling out reasons for the order made is one of the
salutary requirements of natural justice.
H
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 777
RAIGAD AND ORS.
Jurisprudence: Legal right - Held: A legal right is an
A
averment of entitlement arising out of law - A person who
suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or
omission - The complainant has to establish that he has been
deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained
injury to any legally protected interest - In case he has no
B
legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be
heard as a party in a tis - A fanciful or sentimental grievance
may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the
individual - There must be injuria or a legal grievance which
can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione va/untas reasons c
i.e. a claim devoid of reasons - Torts.
Strictures: Strictures against State Authorities - State
Authorities were asked to produce original record by Supreme
Court within a period of two weeks - Neither the record
produced before Supreme Court nor any application filed to
D
extend the time to produce the same - In such a fact-situation,
adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the State.
Words and phrases: Expressions 'misconduct',
'disgraceful conduct', 'malice in law' - Connotation of.
E
The appellant was elected as member of Uran
Municipal Council and, subsequently, elected as a
President of the Municipal Council. He was served with
F
a show cause notice by the State of Maharashtra calling
upon him to explain why action under Section 558 of the
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and
Industrial Townships Act, 1965 be not taken against him.
The chargesheet contained six charges. The competent
authority i.e. Chief Minister declared the appellant
disqualified for his remaining tenure and further declared
G
him disqualified for a period of six years even as member
of the Council. The appellant filed a writ petition which
was dismissed.
In the instant appeal, it was contended for the
H
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A appellant that only three charges i.e. charge nos.3, 5 and
6 were held proved against the appellant; that one charge
was that the appellant did not call for a meeting for a
period of three months as required under Section 81 (1)
of the 1965 Act, for which the appellant had furnished
B explanation which was worth acceptance; that the officer
concerned of the municipal council did not inform the
appellant, nor the members asked to hold such meeting
as required under Section 81 (1) of the Act 1965, so it was
merely an inadvertent act and could not be intentional,
c therefore, the question of committing any misconduct
could not arise.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
·HELD: 1.1. Mere error of jl!dgment resulting in doing
D of negligent act does not amount to misconduct.
However, in exceptional circumstances, not working
diligently may be a misconduct. An action which is
detrimental to the prestige of the institution may also
amount to misconduct. Acting beyond authority may be
E a misconduct. When the office bearer is expected to act
with absolute integrity and honesty in handling the work,
any misappropriation, even temporary, of the funds etc.
constitutes a serious misconduct, inviting severe
punishment. [Para 9] [803-H; 804-A-B]
F
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable AIR
1992 SC 2188: 1992 (3) SCR 634; Disciplinary Authoritycum-RegionalManager & Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik
(1996) 9 SCC 69: 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 314; Government
of Tamil Nadu v. K.N. Ramamwthy AIR 1997 SC 3571: 1997
G (7) SCC 101; Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
& Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 566: 2007 (4) SCR 968; State Bank of
India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal AIR2008 SC 2594: 2008 (7) SCR
631; Government of A.P. v. P. Posetty (2000) 2 SCC 220;
M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 80: 2005
H (3) Suppl. SCR 1026; Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 779
RAIGAD AND ORS.
Punjab & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1124: 2002 (1) SCR 102- relied
A
on.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition P. Ramanatha
Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 - referred to.
1.2. Conclusions about the absence or lack of B
personal qualities in the incumbent do not amount to
misconduct holding the person concerned liable for
punishment. It is also a settled legal proposition that
misconduct must necessarily be measured in terms of
the nature of the misconduct and the court must examine
C
as to whether misconduct has been detrimental to the
public interest. The expression 'misconduct' has to be
understood as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, unlawful behaviour,
wilful in character. It may be synonymous as misD
demeanour in propriety and mismanagement. In a
particular case, negligence or carelessness may also be
a misconduct for example, when a watchman leaves his
duty and goes to watch cinema, though there may be no
theft or loss to the institution but leaving the place of duty
E
itself amounts to misconduct. It may be more serious in
case of disciplinary forces. Further, the expression
'misconduct' has to be construed and understood in
reference to the subject matter and context wherein the
term occurs taking into consideration the scope and
F
object of the statute which is being construed.
Misconduct is to be measured in terms of the nature of
misconduct and it should be viewed with the
consequences of misconduct as to whether it has been
detrimental to the public interest. [Paras 12-14] [805-A-G]
G
Union of/ndia & Ors. v. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022:
1979 (3) SCR 504; General Manager, Appellate Authority,
Bank of India & Anr. v. Mohd. Nizamuddin AIR 2006 SC 3290:
2006 (7) sec 410 - relied on.
H
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A 2. DISGRACEFUL CONDUCT :
The expression 'disgraceful conduct' is not defined
in the statute. Therefore, the same has to be understood
in given dictionary meaning. The term 'disgrace' signifies
8 loss of honor, respect, or reputation, shame or bring
disfavour or discredit. Disgraceful means giving offence
to moral sensibilities and injurious to reputation or
conduct or character deserving or bringing disgrace or
shame. Disgraceful conduct is also to be examined from
the context in which the term has been employed under
C the statute. Disgraceful conduct need not necessarily be
connected with the official of the office bearer. Therefore,
it may be outside the ambit of discharge of his official
duty. (para 15] (805-H; 806-A-B]
D REMOVAL OF AN ELECTED OFFICE BEARER:
3.1. The municipalities have been conferred
Constitutional status by amending the Constitution by
14th Amendment Act, 1992 w.e.f. 1.6.1993. The
E municipalities have also been conferred various powers
under Article 2438 of the Constitution. Amendment in the
Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-A confers upon
the local self Government a complete autonomy on the
basic democratic unit unshackled from official control.
Thus, exercise of any power having effect of destroying
F the Constitutional Institution besides being outrageous
is dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country.
Therefore, an elected official cannot be permitted to be
removed unceremoniously without following the
procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions
G of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting
a casual approach and resorting to manipulations to
achieve ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian
of law cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the
Institution. The democratic set-up of the country has
H always been recognized as a basic feature of the
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 781
RAIGAD AND ORS.
Constitution, like other features e.g. Supremacy of the
A
Constitution, Rule of law, Principle of separation of
powers, Power of judicial review under Articles 32, 226
and 227 of the Constitution etc. It is not permissible to
destroy any of the basic features of the Constitution even
by any form of amendment, and therefore, it is beyond
B
imagination that it can be eroded by the executive on its
whims without any reason. The Constitution accords full
faith and credit to the act done by the executive in
exercise of its statutory powers, but they have a primary
responsibility to serve the nation and enlighten the c
citizens to further strengthen a democratic State. Public
administration is responsible for the effective implication
of the rule of law and constitutional commands which
effectuate fairly the objective standard set for
adjudicating good administrative decisions. However,
D
wherever the executive fails, the Courts come forward to
strike down an order passed by them passionately and
to remove arbitrariness and unreasonableness, for the
reason, that the State by its illegal action becomes liable
for forfeiting the full faith and credit trusted with it. [Paras
E
16-18) [806-C-H; 807-A-E]
His Holiness Keshwananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru & Ors.
v. State of Kera/a & Anr. AIR 1973 SC 1461: 1973 (0) Suppl.
SCR 1; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR
1980 SC 1789: 1981 (1)SCR 206; Union of India v.
F
Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. AIR 2002 SC
2112: 2002 (3) SCR 696; Special Reference No. 1 of 2002
(Gujarat Assembly Election Matter) AIR 2003 SC 87: 2002
(3) Suppl. SCR 366; Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors.
AIR 2006 SC 3127: 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1; Scheduled G
Castes and Scheduled Tribes officers Welfare Council v.
State of U.P. & Ors.,AIR 1997 SC 1451: 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR
544; State of Punjab & Ors. v. G.S. Gi/I & Anr. AIR 1997 SC
2324: 1997 (3) SCR 412 - relied on.
H
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A
3.2. Basic means the basis of a thing on which it
stands, and on the failure of which it falls. In democracy
all citizens have equal political rights. Democracy means
actual, active and effective exercise of power by the
people in this regard. It means political participation of the
B people in running the administration of the Government.
It conveys the State of affair in which each citizen is
assured of the right of equal participation in the polity.
There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal
proposition that removal of a duly elected Member on the
c basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding
in nature. Therefore, the principles of natural justice are
required to be given full play and strict compliance
should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision
providing for the same. Principles of natural justice
0 require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected
office bearer. [Para 19, 23] [807-F-G; 809-C-E]
R.C. Poudya/ v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1993 SC
1804: 1993 (1) SCR 891; Peoples Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2003 SC 2363:
E 2003(2) SCR 1136; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh etc. etc.
AIR 1999 SC 2378: 1999 (3) SCR 977; Mohinder Kumar v.
State, Panaji, Goa (1998) 8 SCC 655; Ali Mustafa Abdul
Rehman Moosa v. State of Kera/a AIR 1995 SC 244; G.
Sadanandan v. State of Kera/a & Anr. AIR 1966 SC 1925;
F Indian National Congress (/) v. Institute of Social Welfare &
Ors. AIR 2002 SC 2158: 2002 (3) SCR 1040; Bachhitar
Singh V. State of Punjab & Anr. AIR 1963 SC 395: 1962
Suppl. SCR 713; Union of India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC
364: 1964 SCR 718; Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of
G Punjab & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2524: 2001 (3) SCR 1146 -
relied on.
3.3. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local selfgovernment has to be put on a higher pedestal as against
H a government servant. If a temporary government
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 783
RAIGAD AND ORS.
employee cannot be removed on the ground of A
misconduct without holding a full fledged inquiry, it is
difficult to imagine how an elected office bearer can be
removed without holding a full fledged inquiry. In service
jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be
imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure
B
prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction
in rank, a full fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will
be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the
Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an
entirely different context as compared to the government c
employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the
elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard
of proof is required. [Para 24) [809-F-H; 810-A]
3.4. In a democratic institution, like ours, the
incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for D
which he has been elected unless his election is set
aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is
removed by the procedure established under law. The
proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of
natural justice and the decision must show that the
E
authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and
the explanation furnished by the elected office bearer
sought to be removed. The elected official is accountable
to its electorate because he is being elected by a large
number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions
F ·
as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified
to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but
it also takes away the right of the people of his
constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the
right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can
G
claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he
cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the
provisions provided by the legislature for his removal.
[Paras 26-27) [810-E-H; 811-A-B]
Jyoti Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosa/ & Ors. AIR 1982 SC
H
784
SUPREME COURT ~EPORTS
[201'2] 3 S.C.R
A 983: 1982 (3) SCR 318; Mohan/al Tripathi v, District
Magistrate, Rai Barelly & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2042: 1992 (3)
SCR 338; Ram Beti etc, v. District Panchayat Rajadhikari &
Ors. AIR1998 SC 1222: 1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 582 - relied
on.
B RECORDING OF REASONS:
4.1. It is a settled proposition of law that even in
administrative matters, the reasons should be recorded
as it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a speaking
C and reasoned order. The emphasis on recording reason
is that if the decision reveals the 'inscrutable face of the
sphinx', it can be its silence, render it virtually impossible
for the courts to perform their appellate function or
exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the
D validity of the decision. Right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons
at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the
authority before the court. Another rationale is that the
affected party can know why the decision has gone
E against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural
justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other
words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx
is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial
performance. [Paras 29, 36] (811-G; 814-H; 815-A-B]
F
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of UP. & Ors.
AIR 1991 SC 537: 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 625; L./.C. of India
& Anr. v. Consumer Education and Research Centre & Ors.
AIR 1995 SC 1811: 1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 349; Union of India
v. M.L. Capoor & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 87: 1974 (1 ) SCR 797;
G Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial
Corporation & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 935: 1992 (1) SCR 616;
State of West Bengal v, Atul Krishna Shaw & Anr. AIR 1990
SC 2205: 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 91; S.N. Mukherjee v. Union
of India AIR 1990 SC 1984: 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 44;
H Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1407:
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 785
RAIGAD AND ORS.
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 53; Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern
A
Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (2010) 13
SCC 336: 2010 (13) SCR 621; Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India v. L.K Ratna & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 71:
1986 (3) SCR 1048 - relied on.
Malice in law:
B
5. The State is under an obligation to act fairly
without ill will or malice- in fact or in law. Where malice is
attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal
ill-will or spite on the part of the State. "Legal malice" or C
"malice in law" means something done without lawful
excuse. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of
others. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or
indirect object. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully
without reasonable or probable cause, and not D
necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. Mala fide
exercise of power does not imply any moral turpitude. It
means exercise of statutory power for "purposes foreign
to those for which it is in law intended." It means
conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another,
E
a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to
disregard the rights of others, where intent is manifested
by its injurious acts. Passing an order for unauthorized
purpose constitutes malice in law. [Para 37] [815-C-G]
Addi. Distt. Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla AIR
F
1976 SC 1207: 1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 172; Union of India thr.
Govt. of Pondicherry & Anr. ~ V. Ramakrishnan & Ors. (2005)
8 SCC 394: 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 291; Kalabharati
Advertising v. Hem ant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors. AIR 2010
SC 3745: 2010 (10) SCR 971 - relied on.
G
6. Section 55 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils,
Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965
provides for removal of the President of the Council by
No Confidence Motion. Sections 55A and 558 proli!de a
H
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A mode of removal of duly elected President on proved
misconduct or negligence etc. In the instant case, on a
complaint filed by the Ex-President and the then sitting
Municipal Councillor, Uran Municipal Council
(Respondent No.5) regarding the misconduct of the
B appellant, prelimina.ry inquiry was conducted through
Collector. The Collector made an inquiry through Deputy
Collector and submitted the inquiry report and as no
action was taken by the Statutory Authority against the
appellant, the complainant filed a writ petition before the
c High Court which was disposed of directing respondent
no. 2 (Minister of State, Urban Development, the then Chief
Minister) to take a decision on the complaint. The charge
sheet/show cause notice containing 6 charges was
served upon the appellant. In response to the said
0 chargesheet, the appellant furnished explanation denying
all .the charges framed against him and furnished a
detailed explanation. In this respect, hearing was held
wherein the appellant as well as the complainant
appeared alongwith their advocates and made their
submissions before the competent authority. The
E impugned order was passed holding the appellant guilty
of three charges imposing the punishment. It is evident
from the said order that the competent authority did not
make any reference to the pleadings taken by the
appellant either in his reply to show cause or during the
F course of hearing. The order simply revealed that the
competent authority noticed certain things. The
explanation furnished by the appellant for not holding the
meeting and acceptance of tender by the council itself
and not by the appellant, was not considered at all. No
G reasoning was given by the Statutory Authority for
reaching the conclusions. The High Court also erred in
not dealing with any of the issues raised by the appellant
while furnishing his explanation rather relied upon the
findings recorded by the competent authority. There was
H nothing in the judgment of the High Court wherein the
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 787
RAIGAD AND ORS.
grievance of the appellant was considered nor any
A
reasoning was given to uphold the findings recorded by
the Statutory Authority imposing such a severe
punishment. The complainant at the most, could have led
the evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status
B
of an adversial litigant. The complainant cannot be the
party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement
arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a
person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers
from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission.
There may be some harm or loss ~hat may not be c
wrongful in the eyes of law because it may not result in
injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the
complainant but juridically harm of this description is
called damnum sine injuria. The complainant has to
establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal
D
right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected
interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim
to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A
fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to
confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There
must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be
appreciated and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons
i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. Under the garb of being
necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make
a case as that of general public interest. A person having
a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party
E
F
in the lis, as the person wants to become a party in a
case, has to establish that he has a proprietary right
which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the
reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the
injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party G
unless he answers the description of aggrieved party.
The High Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of
political rivalry. The case of the appellant was not
considered in correct perspective at all. In such a factH
788 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A situation, the complaint filed by the respondent No. 5
could at the most be pressed into service as a material
exhibit in order to collect the evidence to find out the
truth. As all the charges proved against the appellant
were dealt with exclusively on the basis of documentary
B evidence, there was nothing on record by which the
complainant could show that the General Body meeting
was not called, as statutorily required, by the appellant
intentionally. [Paras 38, 41-45] [815-G-H; 818-0-H; 819-AD; 820-A-H; 821-A-G]
c
, Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate
General of Maharashtra AIR 1971 SC 385: 1971 (2) SCR
863; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir
Ahmed & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 578: 1976 (3) SCR 58; Maharaj
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 2602:
D 1977 (1) SCR 1072; Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors.
(2002) 1 sec 33: 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 504; Kabt.ishiki
Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company & Ors. (2008)
1 o sec 766: 2008 (9) SCR 670 - relied on.
E
. 7. Not calling the meeting of the General" Body of the
House may be merely a technical misconduct committed
inadvertently in ignorance of statutory requirements. It
was nobody's case that the appellant had done it
intentionally/purposely in order to avoid some unpleasant
F resolution/demand of the council. No finding of fact was
recorded either by the competent authority or by the High
Court that some urgent/important work could not be
carried out for want of General Body meeting of the
council. Merely not to conduct oneself according to the
G procedure prescribed or omission to conduct a meeting
without any corresponding loss to the corporate body,
would not be an automatic misconduct by inference,
unless some positive intentional misconduct is shown.
It was an admitted fact that the meeting was not called.
However, in the absence of any imputation of motive, not
H
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 789
RAIGAD AND ORS.
calling the meeting by the appellant could not in itself, be
A
enough to prove the charge. Section 81 of the Act 1965
requires that for the disposal of the general business, the
President should call the meeting of the Council within a
period of two months from the date on which the last
preceding ordinary meeting was held. The statutory
B
provisions further provided that in case the President
fails to call the ordinary meeting within the said stipulated
period, the Chief Officer may report such failure to the
Collector and the Collector can call the ordinary meeting
of the Council following the procedure prescribed therein. c
The President can also call the meeting on the request
of the members not less than one-fourth of the total
number of councils. Therefore, the cogent reading of all
the provisions makes it clear that in case the President
fails to call the meeting, there are other modes of calling
D
the meeting and in such an eventuality where reasonable
explanation has been furnished by the appellant to the
show cause notice on this count, the competent
authority could not have passed such a harsh order.
[Para 46] (821-G-H; 822-A-F]
E
8. So far as the other charges regarding laying down
the pipelines at a much higher rate were concerned, it was
a positive case of the appellant that as earlier contractor
had abandoned the work in between and there was a
scarcity of water in the city, the Chief Officer, the Junior
F
Engineer considered the technical aspect and then
recommendations were forwarded under the signatures
of the appellant, the Chief Officer and Junior Engineer to
the council, which ultimately passed the resolution
accepting the said tenders. In such a fact-situation, it was
G
a collective consensus decision of the house after due
deliberations. Admittedly, it was not even the ratification
of contract awarded by the appellant himself. Thus, even
by any stretch of imagination it cannot be held to be an
individual decision of the appellant and the competent
H
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A authority failed to appreciate that the tenders were
accepted by the Council itself and not by the appellant
alone. Therefore, he could not be held responsible for
acceptance of tenders. In the counter affidavit filed by
respondent No.5, complainant, he has not stated
B anywhere that the tenders were not accepted by the
council, rather allegations were made that the tenders
were accepted at a higher rate so that the contractor could
get the financial gain. [Para· 47] [822-G-H; 823-A-D]
9. The first charge proved against the appellant for
C not calling the meeting of Council, did not warrant the
order of removal and the explanation furnished by
appellant could have been accepted. Other charges could
not be proved against the appellant, in view of the fact,
that the tenders at a higher rate were accepted by the .
D Council itself and the appellant could not be held
exclusively responsible for it. Respondent no. 5, being a
political rival, could not have been entertained as a party
to the lis. The charge of not calling the meeting of the
Council was admitted by the appellant himself, thus, no
E further evidence was required, for the reason, that the
admission is the best evidence. The competent authority
could have considered his explanation alone and
proceeded to take a final decision. So far as the other
charges were concerned, it was a consensus collective
F decision of the Council to accept the tender at higher rate
and the appellant could not have been held guilty of the
said charges. Thus, the instant case was a crystal clear
cut case of legal malice and therefore, the impugned
orders are liable to be quashed. The duly elected
G member/chairman of the council could not have been
removed in such a casual and cavalier manner without
giving strict adherence to the safeguards provided under
the statute which had to be scrupulously followed. [Para
48] [823-F-H; 824-A-C]
H
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 791
RAIGAD AND ORS.
10. The appellant had raised a question of fact before
A
the High Court as well as before this Court submitting
that at the time of hearing before the competent authority,
respondent No.5 had raised new grounds and the
appellant raised serious objections as he had no
opportunity to meet the same. Thus, in order to give the
B
appellant an opportunity to rebut the same the
competent authority had adjourned the case and directed
the Secretary to fix a date so that the appellant may meet ·
those new objections/grounds. However, the order
impugned removing the appellant from the post and c
declaring him further disqualified for a period of six years
was passed. It is not evident from the order impugned as
what could be those new grounds which had not been
disclosed to the appellant. Thus, to ascertain as to
whether in order to give an opportunity to the appellant
0
to meet the alleged new grounds, the competent
authority had adjourned the case, this Court while
reserving the judgment on 13.2.2012 asked the Standing
Counsel for the State to produce the original record
before this Court within a period of two weeks. For the
reasons best known to the State Authorities, neither the
E
record was produced before this Court nor any
application was filed to extend the time to produce the
same. In fact, this Court was deprived of seeing the
original record and to examine the grievance of the
appellant. In such a fact-situation, the court has no option
except to draw the adverse inference against the State.
This Court while entertaining the petition had granted
interim protection to the appellant which was extended
F
till further orders a~d, thus, the orders impugned
remained inoperative. Thus, it will be deemed as no order G
had ever been passed against the appellant. A copy of
the order be sent directly to the Chief Secretary, State of
Maharashtra, Bombay, who may conduct an enquiry and
send his personal affidavit as under what circumstances
the State Authorities could decide not to ensure
H
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
A compliance of the order of this Court dated 13.2.2012,
wit.hin a period of four week from the date of receipt of
this order, to the Registrar General of this Court who may
place it alongwith the file before the Bench. [Paras 49, 50)
[824-D-H; 825-A-B, D-F]
B
Case Law Reference:
' r,
1992 (3) SCR 634
relied on
Para 8
1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 314·
relied on
Para 9
'
c
1997 (7) sec 101
relied on
Para 9
. 2007 (4) SCR 968
relied on
Para 9
. 2008 (7) SCR 631
relied on
Para 9
D
· (2000) 2 sec 220
relied on
Para 10
. 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 1026
relied on
Para 11
: 2002 (1) SCR 1021
relied on
Para 11
: 1979 (3) SCR 504
relied on
Para 12
E
,, 2006 (7) sec 410
relied on
Para 13
1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
Para 17
1981 (1) SCR 206
relied on
Para 17
F
1 2002 (3) SCR 696
relied on
Para 17
'
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 366
relied on
Para 17
1 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
Para 17
G
, 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 544
relied on
Para 18
, '1993 (1) SCR 891
relied on
Para 18
..
2003 (2) SCR 1136
relied on
Para 19
H
1999 (3) SCR 977
relied on
Para 21
I~
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 793
RAIGAD AND ORS.
(1998) 8 sec· 655
relied on
Para 21
-A
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 52
relied on
Para 21
AIR 1966 SC 1925
relied on
Para 22
2002 (3) SCR 1040
relied on
Para 23
B
1962 Suppl. SCR 713
relied on
Para 23
1964 SCR 718
relied on
Para 23
2001 (3) SCR 1146
relied on
Para 25
c
1982 (3) SCR 318
relied on
Para 27
1992 (3) SCR 338
relied on
Para 27
1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 582
relied on
Para 27
1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 625
relied on
Para 29
D
1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 349
relied on
Para 30
1974 (1) SCR 797
relied on
Para 30
1992 (1) SCR 616
relied on
Para 30
E
1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 91
relied on
Para 31
1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 44
relied on
Para 32
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 53
relied on
Para 33
F
2010 (13) SCR 621
relied on
Para 34
1986 (3) SCR 1048
relied on
Para 35
1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 172
relied on
Para 37
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 291
relied on
Para 37
G
2010 (10) SCR 971
relied on
Para 37
1971 (2) SCR 863
relied on
Para 44
1976 (3) SCR 58
relied on
Para 44
H
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A.
1977 (1) SCR 1072
relied on
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 504
relied on
2008 (9) SCR 670
relied on
[2012] 3 S.C.R.
Para 44
Para 44
Para 44
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
c
2085 of 2012.
,.
From the Judgment & Order dated 18.06.2009 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4665 of
2009.
'
Vinay Navare, Keshav Ranjan, Satyajeet Kumar, Abha R.
Sharma for the Appellant.
Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Mike Prakash Desai, Sanjay V.
D Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondents.
· The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. 'B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
against the impugned judgment and order dated 18.6.2009
E passed by the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4665
of 2009 by which the High Court has affirmed and upheld the
judgment of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra declaring
that the conduct of the appellant was unbecoming of the
President of Uran Municipal Council and declared him to be
F disqualified for remaining tenure of municipal councilorship
under Section 55B of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils,
Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965
(hereinafter called as the ·Act 1965) and further declared him
disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order
G i.e. 21.3.2009.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:
A. That the appellant was elected as member of Uran
Municipal Council and, subsequently, elected as a President
H of the Municipal Council. The appellant was served with a show
RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 795
RAIGAD AND ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
cause notice dated 3.12.2008 by the State of Maharashtra
A
calling upon him to explain why action under Section 558 of
the Act 1965 be not taken against him. The chargesheet
contained the following six charges:
Charge No.1
B
Uran Charitable Medical Trust has built up
unauthorized construction on Survey Nos. 8 + 9 + 10 + 11
situated at Mouje Mhatawali to the extent of 1140 square
meters for their hospital and you are the Trustee of the said
Trust. Municipal Council had issued notice dated
C
17.10.2006 for demolishing the said unauthorized
construction on its own. Shri Dosu Ardesar Bhiwandiwala
had filed Regular Civil Suit No.95/07 against the said
notice in the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Uran and
the same was decided on 19.12.2007 in which plaintiffs
D
application was rejected.
Junior Engineer of Uran Municipal Council lodged a
complaint with Uran police Station under Sections 53 and
54 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 against the said unauthorized construction on
E
24.7.2007. Shri Jayant Gosal and three others filed Public
Interest Litigation No. 57 of 2008 concerning the said
unauthorized construction of the said Trust in the Bombay
High Court and the same is presently subjudice. You are
the Trustee of the said Trust and as President of the
F
Municipal Council, you are duty bound to oppose the
unauthorized construction. However, you did not take any
action to oppose the same and it appears that you have
supported the unauthorized construction. You have,
therefore, violated Sections 44, 45, 52 and 53 of the
G
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.
Charge No.2
The Municipal Council had called the General Body
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
796~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 3 S:C.R .
. :Meeting on 22.3.2007 by way of Resolution No. 2 Survey
~·Nos. 8 + 9 + 10 + 11 at Mouje Mhatawali area
; :admeasuring about 4000 square meters was proposed for
reservation of garden. However, instead of that, the
resolution was passed for reserving the same for hospital,
nursing home and medical college. At that time, you were
upresiding over the meeting. By this illegal Act, you have
~violated Sections 44( 1 ){e) and 42(1 ), (2) and (3) of
1,.Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Panchayat Samit! and
~~ndustrial Township Act, 1965.
·6
~Charge No.3
..
~~
;After you were elected as the President on 20.12.2006, a
rGeneral Body Meeting was held on 9.1.2007. Although it
·is required under Section 80(1) of the Maharashtra
. Municipal Councils, Panchayat Samiti and Industrial
Township Act, 1965 to hold the General Body Meeting once
in two months, no such meeting was held for a period of
~ .
.
three months between 28.2.2007 and 28.5.2007.