# 3 S.C.R. 90 MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [2013] 3 S.C.R. 90
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2013-01-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 1278-1279 of 2010
- **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/3-s-c-r-90-mohinder-singh-v-state-of-punjab-28939
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.366, 432 and
C 433A - Double murder - Appellant-accused committed
murder of his wife and daughter in the background of inimical
relationship between them on account of criminal cases
registered against him by his wife for committing rape on the
said daughter, for which he was sentenced to rigorous
o imprisonment for 12 years, and for attacking her after release
on parole for which an FIR was registered against him -
Appellant had committed the offence with a deadly weapon
i.e. 'Ku/hara' (Axe) - Trial court convicted the appellant u/
s.302 IPC and sentenced him to death - High Court affirmed
E the conviction and confirmed the death sentence - Held: In
the peculiar facts and circumstances, the case did not fall
within the category of 'rarest of rare case' though it called for
stringent punishment - Appellant was feeling frustrated
because of the attitude of his wife and children - It was thirst
F for retaliation, which became the motivating factor in this case
- Appellant not such a dangerous person that sparing his life
will endanger the community - He did not harm his other
daughter, namely, PW-2 even though he had a good chance
for the same -
Moreover, probability of appellant's
G rehabilitation and reformation not foreclosed - Therefore, his
sentence modified from one of death penalty to that of life
imprisonment till the end of his life - Appellant to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life meaning thereby the end of his
life subject, however, subject to remission granted by the
H
90
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
91
appropriate Government satisfying the conditions prescribed
A
in s.432 CrPC and further substantiate check u/s.433A CrPC
by passing appropriate speaking orders.
According to the prosecution, the appellant-accused
committed murder of llis wife and daughter-'G' in the
8
background of inimical relationship between them on
account of criminal cases registered against him by his
wife for committing rape on 'G', for which he was
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 12 years, and for
attacking her after release on parole for which an FIR
was registered against him. The appellant had entered
C
the scene of occurrence to commit the said offence
carrying a deadly weapon i.e. 'Kulhara' (Axe) which was
used in the commission of both the killings. The
appellant committed the offence in the presence of his
youngest daughter (PW-2). The trial court convicted the
D
appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to
death. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the appeal of the appellant and confirmed the
death sentence imposed on him by the trial court.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
Per Sathasivam, J. [for himself and Kalifulla, J.]
HELD: 1. In terms of Section 366(1) of CrPC, when
E
the Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the
F
proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and
the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed
by the High Court. The scope and application of the
above section is only in cases where a sentence of death
has been passed by the Court of Session. The Court of G
Session should refer the proceedings to the High Court
and the High Court can only deal with them as a Court
of reference. It is the practice of the High Court to be
satisfied on the facts as well as the law of the case, that
the conviction is right, before it proceeds to confirm that H
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 3 S.C.R.
A sentence. In other words, the High Court has to come to
its own independent conclusion as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused, independently of the opinion
of the Judge. In a reference for confirmation of death
sentence, the High Court must examine the entire
B evidence for itself independent of the Session Court's
views. While confirming the capital sentence, the High
Court is under an obligation to itself consider what
sentence should be imposed and not be content with the
trial Court's decision on the point unless some reason

## Text

_Characters 0–39,955 of 56,083. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39955 for what follows._

A
B
[2013) 3 S.C.R. 90
MOHINDER SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1278-1279 of 2010)
JANUARY 28, 2013
[P. SATHASIVAM AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.366, 432 and
C 433A - Double murder - Appellant-accused committed
murder of his wife and daughter in the background of inimical
relationship between them on account of criminal cases
registered against him by his wife for committing rape on the
said daughter, for which he was sentenced to rigorous
o imprisonment for 12 years, and for attacking her after release
on parole for which an FIR was registered against him -
Appellant had committed the offence with a deadly weapon
i.e. 'Ku/hara' (Axe) - Trial court convicted the appellant u/
s.302 IPC and sentenced him to death - High Court affirmed
E the conviction and confirmed the death sentence - Held: In
the peculiar facts and circumstances, the case did not fall
within the category of 'rarest of rare case' though it called for
stringent punishment - Appellant was feeling frustrated
because of the attitude of his wife and children - It was thirst
F for retaliation, which became the motivating factor in this case
- Appellant not such a dangerous person that sparing his life
will endanger the community - He did not harm his other
daughter, namely, PW-2 even though he had a good chance
for the same -
Moreover, probability of appellant's
G rehabilitation and reformation not foreclosed - Therefore, his
sentence modified from one of death penalty to that of life
imprisonment till the end of his life - Appellant to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life meaning thereby the end of his
life subject, however, subject to remission granted by the
H
90
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
91
appropriate Government satisfying the conditions prescribed
A
in s.432 CrPC and further substantiate check u/s.433A CrPC
by passing appropriate speaking orders.
According to the prosecution, the appellant-accused
committed murder of llis wife and daughter-'G' in the
8
background of inimical relationship between them on
account of criminal cases registered against him by his
wife for committing rape on 'G', for which he was
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 12 years, and for
attacking her after release on parole for which an FIR
was registered against him. The appellant had entered
C
the scene of occurrence to commit the said offence
carrying a deadly weapon i.e. 'Kulhara' (Axe) which was
used in the commission of both the killings. The
appellant committed the offence in the presence of his
youngest daughter (PW-2). The trial court convicted the
D
appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to
death. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the appeal of the appellant and confirmed the
death sentence imposed on him by the trial court.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
Per Sathasivam, J. [for himself and Kalifulla, J.]
HELD: 1. In terms of Section 366(1) of CrPC, when
E
the Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the
F
proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and
the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed
by the High Court. The scope and application of the
above section is only in cases where a sentence of death
has been passed by the Court of Session. The Court of G
Session should refer the proceedings to the High Court
and the High Court can only deal with them as a Court
of reference. It is the practice of the High Court to be
satisfied on the facts as well as the law of the case, that
the conviction is right, before it proceeds to confirm that H
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 3 S.C.R.
A sentence. In other words, the High Court has to come to
its own independent conclusion as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused, independently of the opinion
of the Judge. In a reference for confirmation of death
sentence, the High Court must examine the entire
B evidence for itself independent of the Session Court's
views. While confirming the capital sentence, the High
Court is under an obligation to itself consider what
sentence should be imposed and not be content with the
trial Court's decision on the point unless some reason is
c shown for reducing the same. Where, in addition to an
appeal filed by an accused sentenced to death, the High
Court has to dispose of the reference for confirmation of
death sentence under Section 366 of the Code, the High
Court, while dealing with reference, should consider the
proceedings in all its aspects and come to an
D independent conclusion ori the material on record apart
from the views expressed by the Sessions Judge. The
confirmation of death sentence cannot be based only on
the precedents and or aggravating facts and
circumstances of any other case. [Para 5] [101-G-H; 102E A-E]
2.1. In the instant case, the accused-appellant had
earlier committed rape on his deceased daughter-'G' in
1999 and in that case, his deceased wife was a witness
F wherein the accused was convicted under Sections 376
and 506 IPC and sentenced to RI for 12 years. It is also
subsequently taken on record that his deceased wife sent
the accused out of his house and as a consequence, he
had to live separately in a rented house with no means
G of livelihood. It was thirst for retaliation, which became
the motivating factor in this case. The case of the
accused does not come within the category of "rarest of
rare" case to award death penalty. [Para 15] [106-G-H;
107-A-B]
H
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
93
2.2. The doctrine of "rarest of rare" confines two
A
aspects and when both the aspects are satisfied only
then the death penalty can be imposed. Firstly, the case
must clearly fall within the ambit of "rarest of rare" and
secondly, when the alternative option is unquestionably
foreclosed. Bachan Singh case suggested selection of B
death punishment as the penalty of last resort when,
alternative punishment of life imprisonment will be futile
and serves no purpose. [Para 16] [107-C-D]
2.3. In life sentence, ttiere is a possibility of achieving
C
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution in different
degrees. But the same does not hold true for the death
penalty. It is unique· in its absolute rejection of the
potential of convict to rehabilitate and reform. It
·extinguishes life and thereby terminates the being,
therefore, puts an end anything to do with the life. This
D
is the big difference between two punishments. Thus,
before imposing death penalty, it is imperative to consider
the same. [Para 17] [107-E-F]
2.4. "Rarest of rare" dictum hints at this difference
E
between death punishment and the alternative
punishment of life imprisonment. Life imprisonment can
be said to be completely futile, only when the sentencing
aim of reformation can be said to be unachievable.
Therefore, for satisfying the second aspect to the "rarest
F
of rare" doctrine, the court will have to provide clear
evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind of
reformatory and rehabilitation scheme. [Para 18] [107-GH; 108-A]
2.5. Treating the instant case on the touchstone of the
G
guidelines laid down in Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh and
other decisions and balancing the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances emerging from the evidence on
record, the instant case cannot appropriately be called
H
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A the "rarest of rare" case warranting death penalty. Also
it is difficult to hold that the appellant is such a dangerous
person that sparing his life will endanger the community.
Also it cannot be said that the circumsta!'lces of the crime
are such that there is no other alternative but to impose
B death sentence even after according maximum weightage
to the mitigating circumstances in favour of the accused.
This case is the one in which humanist approach must
be taken in the matter of awarding punishment. [Para 19]
[108-B-D]
c
2.6. It is well settled law that awarding of life sentence
is a rule and death is an exception. Life imprisonment
cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20
years or even 30 years, rather it always means the whole
natural life. This Court has always clarified that the
D punishment of a fixed term of imprisonment so awarded
would be subject to any order passed in exercise of
clemency powers of the President of India or the
Governor of the State, as the case may be. Pardons,
reprieves and remissions under Article 72 or Article 161
E of the Constitution of India are granted in exercise of
prerogative power. There is no scope of judicial review
of such orders except on very limited grounds such as
the non-application of mind while passing the order, nonconsideration of relevant material, or if the order suffers
F from arbitrariness. The power to grant pardons and to
commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise
the same fairly, reasonably and in terms of restrictions
imposed in several provisions of the Code. A convict
undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in
G custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission
granted by the appropriate Government under Section
432 of the Code which in turn is subject to the procedural
checks mentioned in the said provision and further
substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code. [Paras
H 20, 21 and 22] [108-E-H; 109-A-C-H; 110-A-B]
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
95
2.7. One significant factor in this case, which we
A
should not loose sight of is that he did not harm his other
daughter, namely, PW-2 even though he had a good
chance for the same. Further, it was highlighted that he
being a poor man and unable to earn his livelihood since
he was driven out of his house by his deceased wife. It B
is also his claim that if he was allowed to live in the
house, he could easily meet both his ends and means,
as the money which he was spending by paying rent
would have been saved. It is his further grievance that
his deceased wife was adamant that he should live c
outside and should not lead a happy married life and that
was the reason that their relations were strained. This
also shows that the accused was feeling frustrated
because of the attitude of his wife and children.
Moreover, the probability of the offender's rehabilitation
0
and reformation is not foreclosed in this case. Likewise,
it is seen from the affidavit filed by the sister of the
accused that his family has not totally renounced as yet.
Hence, there is a possibility for reformation in the present
appellant. For the reasons aforementioned, this is not a
E
case where death penalty should be imposed .. The
appellant-accused, therefore, instead of being awarded
death ·penalty, is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life, meaning thereby, the end of his life
but subject to any remission granted by the appropriate
Government satisfying the conditions prescribed in
Section 432 CrPC further substantiate check under
Section 433-A CrPC by passing appropriate speaking
orders. [Paras 23, 24] [110-B-G; 111-A-B]
F
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
G
and Machhi Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC
470: 1983 (3) SCR 413 - relied on.
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC
537; Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of Haryana 2012 (11) Scale
H
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 140 and Panchhi & Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 177:
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40
referred to
Para 11
B
(1980) 2 sec 684
relied on
Para 12
1983 (3) SCR 413
relied on
Para 13
(2012) a sec 537
referred to
Para 21
c
2012 (11) Scale 140
referred to
Para 22
Per Kalifulla, J. [Supplementing]
1.1. The conduct of the appellant, if analyzed, based
on the previous crimes committed by him, it is found that
D in the year 1999 as found by the courts below the
appellant committed rape on his deceased daughter 'G'
when she was minor and that too after beating her. To
which beastly action, unfortunately the other deceased
(viz) his wife, was an eye-witness. The conduct of the
E appellant in the commission of the said offence was not
only bordering on immorality of the highest order but
would be extremely difficult for anyone to lightly brush
aside such a conduct by stating that either it was
committed in a fit of anger or rage or such other similar
F situation. When the father himself happens to be the
assailant in the commission of such beastly crime, one
can visualize the pathetic situation in which the girl would
have been placed and that too when such a shameless
act was committed in the presence of her own mother.
G When the daughter and the mother were able to get their
grievances redressed by getting the appellant convicted
for the said offence of rape one would have in the normal
course expected the appellant to have displayed a
conduct of remorse. Unfortunately, the subsequent
H conduct of the appellant when he was on parole
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
97
disclosed that he approached the victims in a far more
A
vengeful manner by assaulting the hapless victims which
resulted in filing of an FIR once in the year 2005 and
subsequently when he was on parole in the year 2006.
The monstrous mindset of the appellant appears to have
not subsided by mere assault on the victims who
B
ultimately displayed his extreme inhuman behaviour by
eliminating his daughter and wife in such a gruesome
manner in which. he committed the murder by inflicting
the injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased
and that too with all vengeance at his command in order c
to ensure that they met with instantaneous death. The
nature of injuries as described in the postmortem report
speaks for itself as to the vengeance with which the
appellant attacked the hapless victims. He was not even
prepared to spare his younger daughter (viz) PW-2 who,
0
1however, escaped the wrath of the appellant by bolting
herself inside a room after she witnessed the grotesque
manner in which the appellant took away the life of his
wife and daughter. [Para 9) [116-F-H; 117-A-H]
1.2. However, the case still does not fall within the
E
category of 'rarest of rare case' though it calls for a
stringent punishment. Therefore, the sentence is modified
from one of death penalty to that of life imprisonment till
the end of his life. The appellant deserves to be sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life meaning
F
thereby the end of his life subject, however, to remission
granted by the appropriate Government satisfying the
conditions prescribed in Section 432 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and further substantiate check under
Section 433A of the Code by passing appropriate G
speaking orders. [Paras 10, 11) [118-B-C, F-G]
Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684;
Machhi Singh and others Vs. $t·:te of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC
470: 1983 (3) SCR 413; Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali
Manohar Mishra Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767:
H
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 2008 (11) SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar
Vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498: 2009 (9) SCR
90; Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur & Anr. Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2010) 14 SCC 641: 2009 (12) SCR 1093;
Haresh Mohandas Rajput Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 12
B SCC 56: 2011 (14) SCR 921; State of Maharashtra Vs.
Goraksha Ambaji Adsul AIR 2011 SC 2689: 2011 (9) SCR
41; Mohammed Ajma/ Mohammadamir Kasab @ Abu
Mujahid Vs. State of Maharashtra JT 2012 (8) SC 4; Gopal
Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1961 SC
c 600: 1961 SCR 440 and Mohd. Munna Vs. Union of India
and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 417: 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 -
relied on.
Ravji@ Ram Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2
SCC 175: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 195; Shivaji@ Dadya
D Shankar A/hat Vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 15 SCC 269:
2008 (13) SCR 81; Mohan Anna Chavan Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2008) 7 SCC 561: 2008 (8) SCR 1072; Bantu
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 11 SCC 113: 2008 (11)
SCR 184; Surja Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan (1996) 6 SCC
E 271: 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 783; Dayanidhi Bisoi Vs. State
of Orissa (2003) 9 SCC 310 and State of Uttar Pradesh Vs.
Sattan @ Satyendra & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 736: 2009 (3) SCR
643 - referred to.
F
Case Law Reference:
(1980) 2 sec 684
relied on
Para 5
1983 (3) SCR 413
relied on
Para 5
2008 (11) SCR 93
relied on
Para 8
G
2009 (9) SCR 90
relied on
Para 8
2009 (12) SCR 1093
relied on
Para 8
2011 (14) SCR 921
relied on
Para 8
H
~011 (9) SCR 41
relied on
Para 8
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
99
JT 2012 (8) SC 4
relied on
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 195 referred to
2008 (13) SCR 81
referred to
2008 (8) SCR 1072
2008 (11) SCR 184
referred to
referred to
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 783 referred to
(2003) 9 sec 310
referred to
2009 (3) SCR 643
1961 SCR 440
referred to
relied on
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 8
Para 10
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233 relied on
Para 11
A
B
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
D
Nos. 1278-1279 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 30.05.2008 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Murder
Reference No. 8 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 1033-DB
of 2007.
E
Tripurari Raj, B.S. Bilowria, M.S. Kh~n. Vishnu Sharma for
the Appellant.
V. Madhukar, AAG, Srajita Mathur, Anvita Cowshish,
Kuldip Singh for the Respondent.
The Judgments of the Court was deliverd by
P. SATHASIVAM,J. 1. These appeals are filed against the
common final judgment and order dated 30.05.2008 passed
F
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Murder Reference No. 8 of 200T and Criminal Appeal No.
G
1033-DB of 2007 whereby the High Court accepted the murder
reference and confirmed the death sentence imposed on the
appellant herein by the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana by order
dated 22.11.2007 in Session Case No. 32 of 2006 and
dismissed the appeal filed by him.
H
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A
2. Brief facts:
(a) According to the prosecution, on 08.01.2006, the
appellant-accused has committed murder of his wife-Veena
Verma and daughter-Geetu Verma in the background of
inimical relationship between them on account of criminal cases
B registered against him by his wife for committing rape on his
minor daughter-Geetu Verma, for which he was sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 12 years, and for attacking her after
release on parole in January, 2005 for which an FIR was
c
registered against him.
(b) On the date of incident, i.e., 08.01.2006, at around
06:30 p.m., when Shalu Verma-the complainant, daughter of
the appellant-accused was present along with her motherVeena Verma and sister-Geetu Verma in their house at village
Partap Singh Wala, Haibowal, Ludhiana, at that time, the
D appellant-accused, who was living separately in a rented
accommodation, came to the said place carrying a Kulhara
(axe) in his hand. The complainant informed her mother about
the same. When Veena Verma came to the lobby of the house,
the appellant-accused gave an axe blow on her head. She
E fell on the ground and, thereafter, he gave two more blows using
axe on her neck and hand. Immediately after that, he stepped
towards Geetu Verma and gave 3 repeated blows on her head.
Both of them smeared with blood and died on the spot. When
he approached Shalu, she went into the room and bolted the
F same from inside. The appellant-accused fled away leaving
the axe at the spot. After sometime, she came outside the
room and raised hue and cry.
(c) On the basis of the statement of Shalu (PW-2), a First
Information Report (FIR) being No. 6 was registered against
G the appellant-accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short "the IPC") at P.S. Haibowal, Ludhiana. On
the same day, the appellant-accused was arrested froni his
rented house and the case was committed to the Court of
Session, Ludhiana and numbered as Session Case No. 32 of
H 2006
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
101
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(d) The Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, by order dated A
22.11.2007, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of IPC
and sentenced him to death.
(e) Against the said order, the appellant preferred an
appeal before the High Court and the State filed a reference
under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 B
(in short 'the Code') for confirmation of death sentence. By a
common impugned order dated 30.05.2008, the High Court
while accepting the murder reference confirmed the death
reference imposed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal
filed by the appellant-accused.
C
(f) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant preferred
these appeals by way of special leave before this Court.
(g) This Court, by order dated 20.07.2009, issued notice 0
on the special leave petitions confining to sentence only. Even
on 16.07.2010 when this Court granted leave, nothing has been
stated about the above said initial notice. Hence, in these
appeals, we are concerned about the quantum of sentence
imposed on the appellant.
3. Heard Mr. Tripurari Raj, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State.
E
4. Though at the outset, learned counsel for the appellant F
insisted us to go into the entire merits of the case including
the circumstances relied on by the prosecution and accepted
by the Courts below, in view of the fact that this Court has
issued notice confining to sentence only, we rejected his plea.
5. We are conscious of the fact that in terms of Section G
366(1) of the Code, when the Court of Session passes a
sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the
High Court, and the sentence shall not be executed unless it
is confirmed by the High Court. The scope and application of
the above section is only in cases where a sentence of death H
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A
has been passed by the Court of Session. The Court of
Session should refer the proceedings to the High Court and the
High Court can only deal with them as a Court of reference. It
is the practice of the High Court to be satisfied on the facts as
well as the law of the case, that the conviction is right, before it
B proceeds to confirm that sentence. In other words, the High
Court has to come to its own independent conclusion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused, independently of the opinion
of the Judge. In a reference for confirmation of death sentence,
the High Court must examine the entire evidence for itself
c independent of the Session Court's views. While confirming the
capital sentence, the High Court is under an obligation to itself
consider what sentence should be imposed and not be content
with the trial Court's decision on the point unless some reason
is shown for reducing the same. Where, in addition to an appeal
0
filed by an accused sentenced to death, the High Court has to
dispose of the reference for confirmation of death sentence
under Section 366 of the Code, the High Court, while dealing
with reference, should consider the proceedings in all its
aspects and come to an independent conclusion on the
material on record apart from the views expressed by the
E Sessions Judge. The confirmation of death sentence cannot be
based only on the precedents and or aggravating facts and
circumstances of any other case.
6. Keeping the above principles in mind, let us analyze the
F materials placed before the trial Judge as well as the
confirmation order of the High Court. In view of the limited notice
and in the light of the mandates provided under Section 366
of the Code relating to confirmation of death sentence by the
High Court, we are of the view that considering two earlier
G orders passed by this Court on 20.07.2009 and 16.07.2010
confining to the sentence, we intend to concentrate only to the
question, namely, acceptability or otherwise of the "sentence"
hereunder.
H
7. No doubt, it is a case of double murder by the appellant-
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
103
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
accused who murdered his wife and daughter in a gruesome
A
manner in the background of inimical relationship between the
family on account of criminal cases registered against the
appellant-accused at the instance of his deceased wife -
Veena Verma and deceased daughter- Geetu Verma for which
he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 12 years'·for s
committing rape on his daughter-Geetu Verma. In that case
his deceased wife was a witness. It is seen that after release
on parole in January, 2005, he attacked on his wife and an FIR
was registered against him for violating the conditions of
. release. It is further seen that the accused committed the c
offence in the presence of his youngest daughter Shalu (PW2). It is also proved that the appellant had entered the scene
of occurrence to commit the said offence carrying a deadly
weapon i.e. 'Kulhara' (Axe) which was used in the commission
of both the killings. The members present in the house were
0
his family members, viz., wife and two daughters.
8. We noticed the following special reasons given by the
trial Court for warranting the death sentence and the High Court
for confirming the same which are as follows:
(i) The appellant-accused had earlier committed rape on
E
his deceased daughter- Geetu Verma in the year 1999 when
she was a minor after giving beatings and threat to her and in
that case his wife-Veena Verma (since deceased) was a
witness and that a case under Sections 376 and 506 IPC was
F
registered against him which finally resulted in rigorous
imprisonment for 12 years.
(ii) While on parole in January 2005, the appellant-accused
having violated the conditions of release, attacked his wifeVeena Verma and an FIR being No. 58 dated 06.04.2005 was
G
registered against him under Sections 323, 324 and 506 IPC
which is pending in the Court of JMIC, Ludhiana on the date of
·alleged occurrence.
(iii) The appellant-accused entered into the house with a
H
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A deadly weapon 'Kulhara' (Axe) and caused unprovoked brutal
attacks on the victims.
(iv) The appellant-accused caused repeated blows on the
vital parts of the body of his wife and daughter resulting in
instantaneous deaths in the presence of his youngest daughter
8 of tender age, who by running into a room and bolting its from
inside, saved herself when the accused proceeded towards her.
(v) The appellant-accused gave first blow to his wife -
Veena Verma from behind with Kulhara (axe) on her head and
c when she fell down on the ground he caused successive blows
on her neck and the head and, thereafter, he attacked his
daughter-Geetu Verma and caused repeated Kulhara blows
till her death. Thereafter, he proceeded towards his youngest
daughter Shalu (PW-2) and showed Kulhara to her, who ran into
0 a room and bolted it from inside.
(vi) In the case of the deceased - Veena Verma, out of 4
incised wounds, Injury Nos. 1 & 2 were caused on head, Injury
No.3 on neck and Injury No. 4 resulted in partial amputation of
left index finger from 1/3rd with clean cut margins. Regarding
E the deceased - Geetu Verma, who had been earlier subjected
to diabolical act of rape by the appellant-accused during her
minority in 1999, as many as 9 injuries were caused, out of
which 7 were incised wounds and 2 were abrasions. Further,
out of 7 incised wounds 3 had been caused on head region
F itself, 1 on the left mastoid and rest 3 on left and right elbow
and fingers. In both the cases, the victims died instantaneous
death.
(vii) Apart from taking revenge for his conviction and
sentence, the appellant-accused has committed the offence for
G personal gain as he wanted the house, being occupied by his
deceased wife and children, to. be vacated for his personal use.
9. The crime of double murder of his wife and daughter in
a gruesome and diabolical manner will irrefutably be taken into
H consideration as aggravating circumstance. However, for some
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
105
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
reasons, the High Court did not find any mitigating
A
circumstance in favour of the accused for the purpose of
balancing aggravating against mitigating. Even, the High Court
recorded at page 38 of the impugned order as under:-
" ... In this background, looking for a strong mitigating
8
circumstance, may not yield any result and this offence has
in fact, ceased to remain a simple case of murder. This
has rather acquired an enormity to the extent of rushing into
the category of the "rarest of rare case."
It is pertinent to mention that in spite of the onerous duty
C
bestowed on the reference court to balance the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, the High Court evaded the same.
10. On the other hand, the Sessions Court had attempted
to draw a balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances o
by stating two mitigating circumstances as follows:
1.
Firstly, his age at the time of commission of crime .
i.e. 41 years.
2.
Secondly, that the accused is a poor man, who had
E
no livelihood.
While it is true that the above two circumstances alone will
. not make good for commuting the death sentence to life
sentence, however, before we move on to enumerate the other
F
mitigating circumstances in this case, it is necessary to
consider few case laws which reiterate that brutality is not the
sole criterion of determining whether a case falls under the
"rarest of rare" categories.
11. In Panchhi & Ors. vs. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177,
G
this Court held that brutality is not the sole criterion of
determining whether a case falls under the "rarest of rare"
categories, thereby justifying the commutation of a death
sentence to life imprisonment. This Court observed:
H
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A
"No doubt brutality looms large in the murders in this case
particularly of the old and also the tender age child. It may
be that the manner in which a murder was perpetrated
may be a ground but not the sole criterion for judging
whether the case is one of the "rarest of rare cases" as
B
indicated in Bachan Singh's case."
12. The Constitution Bench of this Court, by a majority,
upheld the constitutional validity of death sentence in Bachan
Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. This Court took
C particular care to say that death sentence shall not normally be
awarded for the offence of murder and that it must be confined
to the "rarest of rare" cases when the alternative option is
foreclosed. In other words, the Constitution Bench did not find
death sentence valid in all cases except in the aforesaid cases
wherein the lesser sentence would be wholly inadequate.
D
E
F
13. In Machhi Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab, (1983)
3 SCC 470, a three-Judge Bench of this Court while following
the ratio in Bachan Singh (supra) laid down certain guidelines
amongst which the following is relevant in the present case:
"A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before
the option is exercised."
14. We have extracted the above reasons of the two courts
only to point out that, in a way, every murder is brutal, and the
difference between the one from the other may be on account
G of mitigating or aggravating features surrounding the murder.
15. In the instant case, as already mentioned, the accused
had earlier committed rape on his deceased daughter-Geetu
Verma in 1999 and in that case, his deceased wife - Veena ·
H Verma was a witness wherein the accused was convicted under
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
107
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Sections 376 and 506 IPC and sentenced to RI for 12 years.
A
It is also subsequently taken on record that his deceased wife
sent the accused out of his house and as a consequence, he
had to live separately in a rented house with no means of
livelihood. It was thirst for retaliation, which became the
motivating factor in this case. In no words are we suggesting
B
that the motive of the accused was correct rather we feel it does
not come within the category of "rarest of rare" case to award
death penalty.
16. The doctrine of "rarest of rare" confines two aspects
and when both the aspects are satisfied only then the death
C
penalty can be imposed. Firstly, the case must clearly fall within
the ambit of "rarest of rare" and secondly, when the alternative
option is unquestionably foreclosed. Bachan Singh (supra)
suggested selection of death punishment as the penalty of last
resort when, alternative punishment of life imprisonment will be
D
fUtile and serves no purpose.
17. In life sentence, there is a possibility of achieving
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution in different degrees.
But the same does not hold true for the death penalty. It is
E
unique in its absolute rejection of the potential of convict to
rehabilitate and reform. It extinguishes life and thereby
terminates the being, therefore, puts an end anything to do with
:: the life. This is the big difference between two punishments.
Thus, before imposing death penalty, it is imperative to
consider the same.
18. "Rarest f rare" dictum, as discussed above, hints at
F
this difference between death punishment and the alternative
punishment of life imprisonment. The relevant question here
would be to determine whether life imprisonment as a
G
punishment would be pointless and completely devoid of any
reason in the facts and circumstances of the case. As
discussed above, life imprisonment can be said to be
completely futile, only when the sentencing aim of reformation
can be said to be unachievable. Therefore, for satisfying the H.
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 3 S.C.R.
A second aspect to the "rarest of rare" doctrine, the court will have
to provide clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any
kind of reformatory and rehabilitation scheme.
19. Treating the case on the touchstone of the guidelines
laid down in Bachan Singh (supra), Machhi Singh (supra) and
8 other decisions and balancing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances emerging from the evidence on record, we are
not persuaded to accept that the case can appropriately be
called the "rarest of rare" case warranting death penalty. We
also find it difficult to hold that the appellant is such a dangerous
C person that sparing his life will endanger the community. We
are also not satisfied that the circumstances of the crime are
such that there is no other alternative but to impose death
sentence even after according maximum weightage to the
mitigating circumstances in favour of the accused. In our
D considered view, this case is the one in which humanist
approach must be taken in the matter of awarding punishment.
20. It is well settled law that awarding of life sentence is a
rule and death is an exception. The application of the "rarest
E of rare" case principle is dependant upon and differs from case
to case. However, the principles laid down and reiterated in
various decisions of this Court show that in a deliberately
planned crime, executed meticulously in a diabolic manner,
exhibiting inhuman conduct in a ghastly manner, touching the
F conscience of everyone and thereby disturbing the moral fiber
of the society, would call for imposition of capital punishment
in order to ensure that it acts as a deterrent. While we are
convinced that the case of the prosecution based on the
evidence adduced confirms the commission of offence by the
appellant, however, we are of the considered opinion that still
G the case does not fall within the four corners of the "rarest of
rare" case.
21. Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to
imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even 30 years, rather
H it always means the whole natural life. This Court has always
MOHINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
109
{P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
clarified that the punishment of a fixed term of il)'lprisonment
A
so awarded w6uld be subject to any order passed in exercise
of clemency powers of the President of India or ,the Governor
of the State, as the case may be. Pardons, ~eprieves and
remissions under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution ·
of India are granted in exercise of prerogative power. As
B
observed in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar, (2012)
8 SCC 537, there is no scope of judicial review of such orders
except on very limited grounds such as the non-application of
mind while passing the order, non-consideration of relevant
material, or if the order suffers from arbitrariness. The power c
to grant pardons and to commute sentences is coupled with a
duty to exercise the same fairly, reasonably and in terms of
restrictions imposed in several provisions of the Code.
22. In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the Code
itself provides several conditions. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of
D
Section 432 of the Code lay down basic procedure for making
an application to the appropriate Government for suspension
or remission of sentence either by the convict or someone on
his behalf. We are of the view that exercise of power by the
appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432
E
of the Code cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this
is only an enabling provision and the same would be possible
subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Those conditions are
mentioned either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. This
Court in various decisions has held that the power of remission
F
cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to
grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair
to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid down in Section
· 432 of the Code itself provides this check on the possible
misuse of power by the appropriate Government. As rightly
G
observed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of
Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140, there is misconception that a
prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to
release on completion of either 14 years or 20 years
imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is
H
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 3 S.C.R.
A expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to
any remission granted by the appropriate Government under
Section 432 of the Code which in turn is subject to the
procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further
substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code.
B
23. One significant fac;tor in this case, which we should not
loose sight of is that he did not harm his other daughter, namely,
Shallu (PW-2) even though he had a good chance for the same.
Further, it was highlighted that he being a poor man and unable
C to earn his livelihood since he was driven out of his house by
his deceased wife. It is also his claim that if he was allowed
to live in the house, he could easily meet both his ends and
means, as the money which he was spending by paying rent
would have been saved. It is his further grievance that his
deceased wife was adamant and he should live outside and
D should not lead a happy married life and that was the reason
that their relations were strained. This also shows that the
accused was feeling frustrated because of the attitude of his
wife and children. Moreover, the probability of the offend~r's
rehabilitation and reformation is not foreclosed in this case.
E Likewise, we can see from the affidavit filed by the sister of the
accused that his family has not totally renounced as yet. This
is also clear that pending the above appeals, the appellantaccused, through his sister - Pramjit Kaur, filed an application
for modification of earlier orders of this Court dated 20.07.2009
F and 16.07.2010 for widening the scope of the appeals and
sought permission to raise all available grounds. For this
application, only his sister - Pramjit Kaur has filed an affidavit
strengthening the above points. As mentioned above, the
affidavit of his sister shows that his family has not totally
G renounced him. Hence, there is a possibility for reformation in
the present appellant.