# ' . \ _,. 3 S.C.R. .SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS JAI DEV v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB - **Citation:** [1963] 3 S.C.R. 489 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1960-09-14 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1962 - **Bench:** Gajendragadkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, J. R. Mcj'Dholkar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/3-s-c-r-supreme-court-reports-jai-dev-v-the-state-of-punjab-2640 - **Pages:** 25 ## Headnote Oriminal Law-Murder;_Self-defence-Bcope-Threat to posses'sib'I} of land-Indian Penal Gode (Act 45· of 1860), ss: 99; JOO-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), :11':-342. - ' ·?' The 11ppellants along with four others were charged with <;.-· ~having committed offences under s. 148 and ss. 202 and 326, ' .lead with s, 149, of the Indfan Penal Code. The incident ''which gave rise to the present criminal proceedings ·related to a cultivable field in respect of which a dispute arose as to its pos~ssion b"tween the appellants and the faction of the complainant~On September 14, 1960, a rioting .took place in the field which resulted in the death of six persons and injuries to nine persons. The appellant's case was that they were.in possessions of the field and were cultivating it at the time of the incident whereas the prosecution contended that the complainant's party was in possession and that the appellants virtually invaded it and caused a massacre. The High .Coμrt found that the crop in the field had been ploughed by 'the appellants and their companions and that when the cip~ratioris were being carried . on by' them on the day of rioting, the villagers, who did not tolerate the strangers, came ,to·the field armed with weapons to' take forcible possession of the field, that as soon as ·fire-arms were used for the first time killing a person, the villae ers started running away and ,that, after all the villagers had run away, the appellants used their rifles a~ainst their respective victims when the latter were 'standing at a COPsiderable distance from them. 'The High Court took the· view that as at the relevant time the property had been saved from 'the trespass, there was no 'justification for using any force against the running villagers and so, the appellants who were proved to have caused the deaths of the victims could not claim protection ·of the right I of private defence and Were guilty of the. offence of murder 'under's 302. ' . ' • -~ t '·· ' · Hela, that the appellants were rightly convicted under s.302 of t,he Indian Peria! Code on the findings given by the :High·Court. ...t 19112 190' ! ai Deo v. Slol• oJ P•si•6 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] In exercising the right of private defence, th~ force which a person defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reawnably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose, The use of• the force must be stopped as soon as the threat has disappeared. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious~ In exercising its powers under s, 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court must take care to put all the relevant circumstances appearing in the evidence to the accused, so that he might get an opportunity to say what he wanted to do so in respect of the prosecution case against him, but it is not vecessary that the Court should put to the accused detailed questions which may amount to his cross .. examin~tion. Hekl, that the failure to 'put• the specific point of the distance from which the appallants used their rifles, under is. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not vitiate the trial or affect the conclusion of the High Court, ## Text _Characters 0–39,826 of 50,010. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39826 for what follows._ ' . \ _,. 3 S.C.R. .SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS JAI DEV v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB (And Connected Appeal) 489 (P. B, GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA, and J. R. MCJ'DHOLKAR, JJ.) Oriminal Law-Murder;_Self-defence-Bcope-Threat to posses'sib'I} of land-Indian Penal Gode (Act 45· of 1860), ss: 99; JOO-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), :11':-342. - ' ·?' The 11ppellants along with four others were charged with <;.-· ~having committed offences under s. 148 and ss. 202 and 326, ' .lead with s, 149, of the Indfan Penal Code. The incident ''which gave rise to the present criminal proceedings ·related to a cultivable field in respect of which a dispute arose as to its pos~ssion b"tween the appellants and the faction of the complainant~On September 14, 1960, a rioting .took place in the field which resulted in the death of six persons and injuries to nine persons. The appellant's case was that they were.in possessions of the field and were cultivating it at the time of the incident whereas the prosecution contended that the complainant's party was in possession and that the appellants virtually invaded it and caused a massacre. The High .Coμrt found that the crop in the field had been ploughed by 'the appellants and their companions and that when the cip~ratioris were being carried . on by' them on the day of rioting, the villagers, who did not tolerate the strangers, came ,to·the field armed with weapons to' take forcible possession of the field, that as soon as ·fire-arms were used for the first time killing a person, the villae ers started running away and ,that, after all the villagers had run away, the appellants used their rifles a~ainst their respective victims when the latter were 'standing at a COPsiderable distance from them. 'The High Court took the· view that as at the relevant time the property had been saved from 'the trespass, there was no 'justification for using any force against the running villagers and so, the appellants who were proved to have caused the deaths of the victims could not claim protection ·of the right I of private defence and Were guilty of the. offence of murder 'under's 302. ' . ' • -~ t '·· ' · Hela, that the appellants were rightly convicted under s.302 of t,he Indian Peria! Code on the findings given by the :High·Court. ...t 19112 190' ! ai Deo v. Slol• oJ P•si•6 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] In exercising the right of private defence, th~ force which a person defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reawnably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose, The use of• the force must be stopped as soon as the threat has disappeared. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious~ In exercising its powers under s, 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court must take care to put all the relevant circumstances appearing in the evidence to the accused, so that he might get an opportunity to say what he wanted to do so in respect of the prosecution case against him, but it is not vecessary that the Court should put to the accused detailed questions which may amount to his cross .. examin~tion. Hekl, that the failure to 'put• the specific point of the distance from which the appallants used their rifles, under is. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not vitiate the trial or affect the conclusion of the High Court, CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1962.- Appeals by special leave from the judgment 11.nd order dated October 4, 1961, of the Puujab High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos, 635 and 636 of 1961 and Murder Reference No. 59 of 1961. Frank Anthony, Ghanshiam and P.O. Aggarwala for the appellants. N. S. Bindra, Kartar Singh, Assistant Advocate· General for the State of Punjab and P. D. Menon, for the respondents. 1962. July 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by, Goj1nrlrogadkarJ. . GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The two appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh along with four 'Others Yudhbir Singh, Dhanpat . Singh, Sajjan Singh and Parbhati were charged with having committed offenoes under ~.lfS a1J,q ss.302 a?ld 326 both read wit4 s.149 of,tqe 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 491 Indian Penal Code. The case against them was that on September 14, 1960, they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in the area of Dhani Khord and that the common object of this unlawful assembly was to commit the offence of rioting while armed with deadly weapons and that in pursuance . of the said common object the offence of rioting was committed. That is how the charge under s. 148 was framed. The prosecution further alleged that on the same day and at the -same time and place, while the accused persons were mem hers of an unlawful assembly, they had another common object of committing the murders of Hukma, Jai Narain, Jai Dev, Amin Lal, Mst. Sagroli and Mst.J>il Kaur and that in pursuance of the said common object, the said persons were murdered. Dhanpat Singh killed Hukma, Sajjan Singh attacked Hukma, Yudhbir Singh shot at Amin Lal, Jai Dev shot at Mst. Sagroli and victim Jaidev, and Hari Singh shot at Jai Narain and Parbhati killed Mst. Dil Kaur. _ [t is the murder of t.hese six victimes which gave .rise to the charge against the six accused persons under s. 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. An ·assault made by the members of the said assembly on Ram Chander, Jug Lal, Mst. Chan Kaur, Sirya, Murti and Murligave rise to a similar charge under· s. 326/149. At the same trial along with these six persons, Basti Ram was tr.ied on the charge that he had abetted the commiesion of the offence of murder by the members of the unlawful assembly and thus rendered himself liable to .be punished under s. 302{109 of the Indian Penal Code. The 0ase against these seven accused persons was tried by the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurgaon. He held that the charges•against Parbhati and Basti Ram had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubte ; so, he acquitted both the said accused persons. In respect of the remaining five accused :persons1 the lea:rned Jud~e h<;ild that a.ll the three J961 Jai Dev v. The State of Punjab Gajendrogadkar J. 492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) llJfB charges framed against them had been provE;d ·beJsi Dev yond & reasonable doubt. For the offence of murder, , v. "the learned Judge directed that all the five should --- 'fl• s1at1 °1 Pu.;a• be banged ; for th~ offence under s. 326/149 ·he G-J•n•at•IJm "· . sentenced each one of them two years' rigorous - 1 imprisonment and for the offence under s. 148. he sentenced each one to suffer R. I. for one year. These two latter sentences were ordered to run concurrently and that too if the death penalty imposed on them was not confirmed by the High Court. · · . Against this order of oonv.iction and sentence, three appeals were 'prefered on behalf of the five condemned persons. The sentences of death imposed on them were also submitted for confirmation. The Punjab High Court dealt with the confirmation proceedings and the three appeals together and held that the oonviotion of Yudhbir Sin~h. Dhanpat Singh and Sajja.n Singh was not justified and so, the said order of conviction was set aside .and consequently,. they were ordered to be acquitted and discharged. In regard to Jai Dev and Hari Singh the High Court differed f~om the view taken ·by the trial Court and held that they were guilty not under s. 302/149 but only under s. .302. of the lndi~n Pena.I Code. In the result, the appeals preferred by them wore dismissed and their conviction for the oilenoe of murder and the sentences of death imposed on them were confirmed. It is this order which is challenged by the two appellants before us in their appeals · ·Nos. 56 and 57 of 1962. These two appeals ha.ve brought to this Court "by special leave. • The incident whioh has given rise to the present criminal proceedings occurred in Khosra No.388 in Ma.uza. Ahrod known as 'lna.mwala ·field' on , September 14 •. 1960, at about 10.30 A.M. This inoident has Jed to the dea.th of six persons already . .... ... .l-- 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 493 mentioned as well as the death of Ram Pat who belonged to the faction of the appellants. It has a.lso resulted in injuries to nine persons three of whom belonged to the side of the appellants and ·Six to the side of the complainants. The incident itself was in a sense a tragic and gruesome culmination .of the battle for possession of' the land which was waged between the appellants on the one hand . and the faction of the complainants,on the other. One of the principal points which fell to be considered in the courts below was: who was in possJsiiion of' the said field at the material time .? The appellants pleaded that they were in possession of the field· and were cultivating the field at the time of the incident, whereas the prosecution contends that the compl!J,inants' party was in possession of the fielrsons was set out and a case was made out against the· villagers. In fact, it was by reason of this F.I.R. that the investigation originally commenced. Subsequently, when it was discovered that on the scene of the offence six persons on the complainants' side had been killed and six injured, information was lodged setting out the contrary version and that led to two cross-proceedings. In one proceeding the members of the complainants party were the' accused, whereas in the other proceeding the appellants and their companions were the accused persons. ::5ince the trial ended in the conviction of the appellants and their companions, the case made out in the complaint filed by the appellant Jai Dev has been held to be not proved. At this stage, it would be convenient to refer very briefly to the findings recorded by the trial Court and the conclusions reached by the Hiph Court in appeal. The trial Court found that the evidence adduced by the accused persons in support of their case that they had obtained possession of .fai Ddv v. The Slate of Puoja1'. Gajendragadk•r J. I I I 19aB I I I 1 Jai D~v . .. · - v. I The Stall of Punjab I / ·Oaj1ndr•gJdksrJ. . · 496 SuPREME CO-ORT REPORTS (1963) the land before the date of the offenee; was not satisfaotory and that the documents and the entries made in the revenue papers were no more than pfl.per entries and were not "as good a~ they looked". According to tb.e learned trial Judge, the actual possession of the land all along .remained with the complaints' party Jug Lal and his companions and that the crop standing at the spot at the time of the incident had beeri sown by an.d belonged to the complaints party. This finding necessarily meant that the ploughing of the land by the accused persons was without any lawful justification and · constituted an act of tresepass. The trial Court aecordingly held that the accused persons were the aggressors and that the complainants' party in fact had a right of private defence. That ,is how it ell.me to the con'olusion that the six accused persons were members of an unlawful assembly and had gone to the field in question armed with deadly weapons with a common object of committing the offences which were charged against them. Dealing with the oase on this basis, the trial Judge did not think it necessary to enquire which of the viotiins had been killed by whioh of the particu'lar acchiied persons. As we have already indicated, he was not satisfied that the charge had been proved against Parbhati or against Basti Ram; but in regard to the remaining five persons, he held that the evidence conclusively established the· charges under 'B. 148 and ss. 302 and 326{ 149. In dealing wit)l. the defence, the trial Judge has categorically rejected the defence version that Amin Lal was armed with a pistol and that after ·the said pistol fell 'down from his hQnds it was picked up by Yudhbir Singh, · According to the trial Court, no one , on the complainanl:!!, side was armed with fire-arms, whereas -three persons on the side of the accused were armed ,_ with fire-arms. ·Yudhbir Singh had a pistol and the _ appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh had rifles. '· 3 S.C:R~: SUPREME COURT·REPORTS 497 When the matter was argued before the High Court, the High Oourt was not inclined to accept the ~nding of t~e trial Court on the,' question of possession .. In its judgment, the High Court has referr!'d in detail to the disputes which preceded ph~., ~o~mission of these. offences in regard to the po~ses~9p. of the land .. It appears that this land was ,give_n aJ: ill charitable gift by. the prnpriet~iy . p~ody.of the vHlage Ahrod to.one. Baba Kanhar Dass. pla:QYi ye~:i-s agq. Thereafter, it co;i:itinued. in the ~longed.lo t~e village Kulana and so, the villagers 9f Ahrod treated them as strangers ~!tnd, they _were !Lllnoyec;l that the land whioh had been gifted by the . yi'll!Jogers .. to Kanba~ Dass by way of a. charitable gift had been sold by him to . strangers. In their _r,~sentm~nt, the proprietary body of Ahrod filed a .d~~laratory suit challenging the sale-deed soon ·after, the sale-deed was executed. When that suit · ~~i~ed: two pre:eoiption suits were filed .but they we_re al~o dismi~sed. The appellants and their two bf9thers then ~led a s_uit for possession. In that _suit ·a de£!.ee was p~ssed and the documentary . evidence produoed in the oase shows that in execu- . ti?n _or the decree po'sse~sion was delivered to .. the _decree-hold~rs. It appears that some persons offere~L r~sestence to the delivery of possession and 15 bigh~s of land was claimed by the resisters. Liti- . gation followed in respf'.ct of that and what.~ver may be ~he position wfth }egard to those 15; bighas, according to tqe High Coilrt, possession of 56 t;>ighas .anq 6:biswas of land was definitely d~livered over to Basti Ram and his brothers on Decembor 23, 1959. In other wor~s, reversing the finding of the tria.l Cou~~ on ~hi~. point, ~he High Court c!lme to the conclusion that the field where the offences 1962 Jai Dev ., . The Stale of Punja Gajendragadkar J . 196Z Joi Dtt> v. The Sia:~ of Punjab GtJjendroga.dkar J. 498 SUPREMil ciouRT REPoRTS tl963j took place was in the possession of the appellants and~their companions. The High Court has also fq_und that the crop in the field had been ploughed· by the appellants and their companions and that the operations which were carried on by them on the morning of September 14, 1960, did not constitute trespass in any sense. On the evidence, the High Court has come to the conclusion that the villagers who did not tolerate that the strangers should take posses· sion of the land had come to the filed to take possession and they were armed. It appears that the number of villagers was much larger than the number of persons on the side of the accused party, though the weapons carried by the .latter included fire-arms and so, the latter party had superiority in arms. The High Court has, therefore, come to the conclusion that the party of the accused persons was entitled to exercise its right of private defence. The property of which they were in possession was threatened by persons who were armed with weapons and so, the right to defend their propety a.gainst an assault whih threatened grievous hurt; if not death, !tVe them the right to use foroe even t the extent of causing death to the assailants. It is substantially as a result of this finding that the High Court tqok the view that Sajjan Singh, Yudhbir Singh and Dhanpat Singll who were responsible for the death of the three of thE' victims were not guilty of any offence. In tho circumstances, they were entitled to defend their property against assailants, who threatened them with death, even by causing their death. That is how these three accused persons have been acquitted in appeal. In regard to the appellents Jai Dev and Hari Singh, the High Court has held that at the time when these two appellants caused the deaths of Jai Dev and Jai Narain respectively, there was no apprehension of an;y . danger at all. - a S.c.R. Stti>REME dOURT REPORTS 499 As soon as Amin Lal was · shot dead, all the villagers who had come to the field ran away and there was no longer any justification whatever for using any force against the runnin~ villagers. Since at the relevant time the property had been saved form the trespass and the assailants had been completely dispersed, the right of private defence ceased to exist and so, the appellants who were proved to have ca.used the two deaths could not claim prate· ction either of the right of private defence or could not even plead that they had mc:rely exceeded the right of private defence; so, they are guilty of the offence of murder under s. 302. That is how the appellants have been convicted of the said offence and have been ordered to be hanged. The question which the appeal raises for our decision thus lies within a ve1·y narrow compass. The ~ndings of fact recorded by the High · Court in favour of the appellants would be accepted as bin· ding on the parties for the purpose of this appeal. In other words, we would deal with the case of the appellents on the basis that initially they and their. companions had the right of private defence. Mr. Anthony contends that having regard to the circu· mstances under which the appellants fired from their rifles, it would be erroneous to hold that the right of private defence had come to an end, According to him, allowance must be made in favour of the appellants in determining the issue. because it is now found that they were faced with an angry mob whose members were armed with weapons and who appeared determined to dispossess the appel· lants and their friends of thei field in question. The decision of the point thus raised by Mr .. Anthony would substantially depend upon the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 100 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 100 provides, in~r alia, that the right of private "lefence of tha body extends under the 196S Jat Dev v .. fht Slate of PUtl}ab Gojendrttgffkar J, 196B ,lo..~ Gajendrrigaikar J. 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] restrictions mentioned in s. 99, to the voluntary causing. of death if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be an assault as may reason· ably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will . otherwise be the consequence of such assault. In other words, if the person claiming the right of private defence has to face assailants who can be reasonably apprehended to cause grievous hurt to him, it would be open to him to defend himself by causing the death of the assailant. In appreciating, the v11,lidity of the appellants' argument, it would be necessary to recall the basic assumptions underlying the law of self-defenm~. In a well-ordered civilised society it is generally assn· med that the State would take care of the persons and properties of individual citizens- and that normally it is the function of the State to affor.d protection to such persons and their properties. This, however, does not mean that a person suddenly called upon to face an assault must run away and 'thus protect himself, He is entitled to resist · the attack and aefend himself. The same is the position if he has to meet au attack on his property. ,In other words, where an individual citiZen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available, ~he individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property. That being so, it is a necessary corollary to the doctrine. of private defence that the violence which the citizen defending 'himself or Ji.is property is entitled to use must not be unduly di~proportionate to the injury which is to be aver- 'ted or which is reasonably aprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicfous. · ·There can be no doubt ·that in judging the cond·' ·uct•of·a .person.who•proves·that he.had a. right· of .. I _; 3 S:C.iR, ,SUPREME COURT REP.ORT 501 priva.te defence, allowance has necessarily tp be made for his feelings at the relevant time. He is faced. with a.n assault which causes a reasoBable a,pprehflnsion of death or grievous hurt and that , inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and bonfusion. At such a moment, the uppermost feeling in his mind would be toward off the danger and to save himself or his pr_operty, and so. he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right. It is no doubt true that in striking a decisive blow, he must not use more force than appears to be reasonably necessary. But in dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the ,prevailing circumstances, it would be inappro· priate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which would be so natural in a court room, for instance, long after the· incident· has · taken plaoe. That .is why in same judicial decisions it has been observed that the means which a threatened person adoptR of the force which he uses should no~ be -weighed in golden scales, To begin with, the· parson exercising 8. right of private defence must consider wheher the threat to his person or his property is real and immediate. If he reaches the conclusion reasonably that the threat is immediate and real, he is entitled to exercise his right. In the exercise of his right, he mm1t use force necessary for the purpose and he must stop using the force as soon as the threat has disappeared, So long as the threat lasts and the right of private defence can be legitimately exercised, it would not be fair to require, as Mayne ·has observed, that "he should modulate his defence step by step. according to the attack, before there .is. reason t'l believe the attack il!I over" ( '). 'The \law of private defence does not require that the person assaulted or facing an apprehension of an as1nult must run.away for safety. It entitles him•;to .. defend ~iinself and law gives "him the right ·to ' ' . ' ' ( -- : (I) Maynes Crip!inal Law of Indians, 4th Bd. P .. 29.1 19~2 JaiDe• ;v, . Thi St,.t• •f Pf±njall a .. ;entlr.ga~k•r. J. \ ... -.· ' . 196B Jai Deo . v. Th• State of Pimjab Gajrndragadkar J. .... •. 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] secure his victory over his assailant by using the necessary force. This necessarily postulates that as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to rout, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. If the danger is continuing, the right is there; if the danger or the apprehension about it has ceased to exist, there is no longer the right . of private defence, (vide ss. 102 and 105 of the Indian Penal Code); This position cannot be and has not been disputed before us and so, the narrow question which we must proceed to examine is whether in the light of this legal position, the appellants could be said to have had a right of private defenc@.at the time when the appellant Jai Dev fired at the victim Jai Dev and the appllant Hari Singh fired at the victim Jai Narain. In dealing with this question, the m:ost significant circumstance against the appellants is that both the victims were at a long distance from appellants when they were shot dead. We will take the case of victim J ai Dev first. According to Gurbux Singh (P. W. 37), Assistant Sub-Inspector, the dead body of Jai Dev was .found at a distance of 70 paces from the place of the tractor, but it was discovered that it had been dragged from a place at a longer distance where Jai Dev stood when he was_ fired dead. From that place to the place where his dead body was actually found there was a trail of blood which unambiguously showed that Jai Dev fell down at a more distant place and that he was dragged nearer the scene of the offence after he fell down. This statement is corroborated by the memo prepared on Septeiμber 14, 1960 (item No. 104). Blood-stained earth was take!> from both these spots. Roughly stated, the spot where Jai Dev was shot at can be said to be about 300 paces away from ~lj.e traotror ~f!.ere the a.ppe!l~nt J~i :Pev stooq. It ~ - 3 s.c.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS 503 . true that Gurbux Singh made'no express reference to the trail of blood in rough site plan which he ·had prepared ·on the day of the offence. But iten 8 in the plan, we were told, does refer to the dragging and that is enough c9rroboration to the evidence of Gurbux Singh. Besides, in considering the effect of the omission to mention the trail of blood in the rough plan, we cannot ignore the fact that at that time Gurbux Singh's mind was really concentrated on the F. I. R. · received by the Police from the appellant Jai Dev himself and that means that at that time· the impression in the mind ofGurbux Singh must have been that the de11e.ased ,Jai Dev belonged to the party of the aggressore and so, blood marks caused by the dragging of his body may not have a-ppeared to him to be of any significance. However that may be, the sworn testimony or-Gurbux Singh is corroborated· by the memo contemporaneously prepared and it would be idle to suggest that this evidence should be disbelieved because the rough site plan prepared by Gurbux Singh does not refer to the trail of blood. · · Mr, Anthony has, however, strongly relied on the statement of Juglal (P. W. 13) who has narrated the incident as it took place, and in that connection ~as st.ated that the accused Jai Dev then opened fire from his rifle killing J ai Dev deceased at the . spot. It is suggested that the words "at the spot" _. show that the victim Jai Dev, was standing at the spot when the appellant Jai J'ev shot at him. We are not inclined to accept this ' • ' & ~ i 0 t I offence when the appellant Jai Dev fired at him. . ' . .... - ~ ~ ,, Mr. Anthony has also relied on .the statement of Chuni Lal (P,W. 16), in support of the same argti- .ment. But ;it is clear that this.witnl"SS was obvious. ly making a mistake between .the _two docume11.ts -P.N.F. and P.N.E. A statement like this which.is the result of confusion cannot legitimately be pres!led into service for the purpose of showing that: victim Jai Dev was near about .the scence of .the offence. Then again,.the statement ofHira Lal (P.W:-5). on which Mr. Anthony relies .shows ,that .in.the committing Court he bad said that Jai Dev had ;lieen injured at the spot; but he has added that he had said BO because Subsequently after the OOOUrrimce, '.he saw the deai body of Jai ·Dev near the scene· 'of the offence. T~er9fore, in ·our opiniqn: having regard to the evidence on the '·record, tbe High Court was right in coming . to the c'oricliision that Jai Dev deceased was standing al 'a . fairly long distance.: from the scenll of the, offence ,_ . when be was shot at. ' · - ...... . · That ~!'-kes .us to the c~se of the ,':!otim JaiNar!l,!P· Jai Narain was m fact not m the Inamwala field at all. ''According tp the' prosecution, he was'C>ri 'the ii\aohan ·in the a._ai~ining field .whfoh ~e i:a·s· oU.1Hvatiri'g ·.~pd it was whilst he was m his own field that the appellant Hari Singh fired at him. The distance between r- ... f1 (. - '' ..... l. • • 3 s.c.R. S~R,EME OO~T ~EPORTS 505 the appellant and the victim has been fo111nd to be about 400 paces. Now this conclusion is also sup• ported by evidence on the record. Jai Narain's mother, Chand Kaur (P.W. 10) says that she saw her son falling on the ground from the maohan, and that clearly means the machan in the field of which Jai Narain was in possession. The position of this field is shown in the rough plan and sketch prepared by the Sub-Inspector (P.A.J.). The evidence of Hira Lal (P.W/5) eupports the same conclusion, and Gurbux Singh swears to the same fact. He says that the dead body-of Jainarain was found lying at a distance of.more than 400 paces from the point where the tractor was said to be standing at the time of the occurrence. That is the effect of the evidence -of Juglal (P. ·w. 13) also. Thus, there can be no doubt that the victim Jainarain was at a long distance from the field in question and like the appellant Jai Dev who took a clean aim at the victim Jai Dev who was standing a distance and shot him dead, the appellant Hari Singh also took a clean aim at the victim Jai Narain who was away from him and shot him dead. That is the conclusion of the High Co~rt and we see no reason to interfere with it, In the course of his arguments, Mr. Anthony relied on the fact that some of the prosecution witnesses on whose evidence the High Court has relied were not accepted by the trial Court as truthful witnesses, and he contends that the High Oourf1 should not have differed from the appreciation of evidence recorded by the trial Court. There are two obvious answers to this point. In the first place, it is not wholly accurate .to say that the trial Oonrt ha9 completely disbelieved the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. It may be ooncedr.d in favour of Mr. Anthony that in dealing with a part of a prosecution case relating to Parbhati and Basti - Ram, the trial Court did not accept the evidence of 1962 v. The Stole of Punjab Gajer,dragadkar J • 190! Joi Dev v. Phe State of Punjab Ga;'ent!ragadkar J. 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] the witnesses which incriminated them, and in that connectiQl:l, he has referred to the criticism made by the defence against those witnesmes and has observed that there is force in that criticism. But, while appreciating the effect of the observations made by the trial Court in dealing with that pa1ticular aspect of the matter, we cannot lose sight of the fact that as to the actual occurrence the trial Court, in substance, has believed the major part of the prosecution evidence and has stated that the said evidence is quite consistent with medical evidence. In other words, the sequence of events, the part played by the assailants as against the specific victims and the rest of the prosecution story have, on the whole, been believed by the trial Court. In this connection, we ought to add that the trial Court did not feel called upon to consider the individual case of each one of the accused persons because it held that a. charge under s. 149 had been proved. But when the High Court came to a contrary conclusion on that point, it became necessary for the High Court to examine the case against each one of the accused persons before it, and so, it would ·not be accurate to say that the High Court has believed the witnesses whom the trial Court had entirely disbelieved. That is the first answer to Mr. Anthony's contention. The second answer to the said ciontention is that even if the ' trial Court had disbelieved the evidence, it was open to the High Court, ,on a reconsideration of the matter, to come to a contrary conclusion. It is true that in dealing with oral evidence a Court of Appeal would normally be reluctant to differ from the appreciation of oral evidence by the trial Court, because obviously the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses; but.that is not to say that even in a proper case, the Appeal Court cannot interfere with such appreciation. Besides, the criticism made by the trial Court is not so. much in relation to the demeanour of the witnesses as in 3 S.C.R. SUPREllffi COURT REPORTS 507 regard to their partisan character and the over• statements whic!l they made as partisan • witμesses a.re generally apt to do. Therefore, we see no justifioa.iton for contending that the finding of the High Court as to the distances at which the victims Jai Dev and Ja.i Nara.in were shot a.t should not be &CC9pted. , Mr. Anthony then argued that the fact that the victims were at a Ion~ distance from the assailants when thev were fired at, will not · really be decisive oft.he point which we are called upon to consider in the present appeal. He contends that if the assailants were surrounded by a very big mob some of whom were armed with deadly weapons and all of whom were determined to dispossess them. at any cost, it was open to the appellants and their companions to shoot at the mob because they were themselves reasonably apprehensive of an assault by the mob which would have led at lea.st to griev• ous hurt, if not death; and he argues that if three of the assailants who had fire-arms fired almost simultaqeously,that would be within the legitimate exercise of the right of private defence and the fact that somebody was killed who was standing at a distance, would make no difference in law. The argument thus presented is no doubt prima facie attractive; but the assumption of fact on which it· · is based is not justified in the circumstances of this case .. The High Court has found that at the time when the appellants fired shots from their rifles, the villa~ers had already started running away and there was no danger either to the property or to the bodies of the assailants. In this connection, it is important to rememb9r · that the defence version that Amin Lal had a ·pistol had been rejected by . both the courts, so that whereas the crowd that threatened the appellants and their friends was larger in number, the weap· one in the hands of the assailants were far more 1982 Jai Dev v. Tiu State of Punjab ' v. Gaj1nd•ag1_1tfkar J, .. 1962 Jai D1u v. The 'ltott of Punj .. b · Gajendragad ~ ar J. • 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] powerful than the weapons in the hands of the crowd. Having regard to the events that took place and the nature of the assault as it developed, it is clear that Amin Lal who was one of the leaders of the villagers was shot dead and that, according to the evidence, competely frightened the villagers who• began· to run away helterskelter. Sunda (P.· W.4) has described how Amin Lal stepped forward for the help of Hukma, but· he was fired at from the pistol by Yudhbir Singh, and having re<'eived a fatal injury on his chest Amin Lal fell down dead on the ground. This witness adds "the members of the complainant. party feeling frightened because of· the firing opened by Yudhbir Singh ran in the direction of the village abadi". Similarly, the statement of Mst. Sarian (P. W; 12) would seem to show that when the victim Jai Dev was fired at, he had run away. On the probabilities, it is very easy to )Jelieve that when the villagers found that the appellants and their friends were inclined to use t~ir firearms, they must have been frightened, even the large number of the villagers· would have meant nothing.