# 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS YELLAPPAGOUDA SHANKARGOUDA PATIL v. BASANGOUDA SHIDDANGOUDA PATIL

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 221
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Petition No. 530 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/3-s-c-r-supreme-court-reports-yellappagouda-shankargouda-patil-v-basangouda-1573
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Hereditary Office-Decree for partition of Watan land upheld
by Privy Council in appeal-Abolition of Privy Council's jurisdiction-Issue of certificate by Collector-Application for cancellation of decree, if can be entertained by the Supreme Court-Bombay
Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Bom. III of r874), s. IO-Abolition of
Privy Council jurisdiction Act, r949 (V of I949), ss. 5, 8-Constition of India, Arts. 374(2), r35.
T.he respondent brought a suit for partition against the petitioner in respect of certain Watan lands. The trial court decreed
- the suit but the High Court of Bombay reversed that decree in
appeal. The Privy Council restored the decree of the trial court
and an Order-in-Council was drawn ('hp accordingly. Execution
of the said decree was resisted by the petitioner on the ground
that the lands in suit being admittedly remuneration attached to
the office of the Patil and as such governed by the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Born. III of r874) were not liable to
partition. A certificate under s. IO of the Act was issued by the
Collector at the instance of the petitioner and the executing
Court cancelled the execution case. The respondent appealed to
the High Court and that court following its own Full Bench decision in Rachapa v. Amingouda, (I88r) V Born. 283, held the certificate to .be invalid since it was not addressed to the Privy Council which had passed the. decree and set aside the order of the
executing court. Thereafter a fresh certificate under s. IO of the
Act was issued by the Collector and addressed to this Court and
the petitioner applied to this Court under that section for the
cancellation of the said decree granted by the Order-in-Council,
the Privy Council having ceased to have any jurisdiction in the
meantime. The question for decision was whether as a result of •
the constitutional changes this court could be said to have passed
the decree and could entertain the petition.
Held, that the petition must be allowed.
· The combined effect of ss. 5 and 8 of the Abolition of the
Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, r949, and Arts. 374(2) and I35
of the Constitution was that this petition which lay to the Privy
Council before it ceased to exercise its jurisdiction, could be presented to the Federal Court before the commencement of the
Constitution and thereafter to this Court.
The certificate issued by the Collector and addressed to this
t:ourt was, therefore, valid and must be given effect to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil Misc.
Petition No. 530 of 1959.
•
Match 9.
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
Petition for cancellation of the decree dated
Yella;;,~ouda N ove~ber 25, 1_9~9, gr:'1nted to t~e Respondent by the
Shankargouda PalilOrder-m-Counml m Privy Counml Appeal No. XI of
v.
1948 .
. Basangouda .
G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India and
Shiddangoudu Patil B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioner.
K. R. Bengeri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
respondent.
1960. March 9.
delivered by
The Judgment of the Court was
Gajendragadkar ].
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This petition has been made
under s. 10 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act,
1874 (hereinafter called the Act), for cancellation of
the decree granted to the respondent by the Order-inCouncil dated November 25, 1949, in so far as the
said decree purports tp operate on or include any
right to the office of the Patilki and 11 Watan lands
attached thereto. These lands are situated at Kirtgeri
in the Taluk of Gadag. They form part of a Watan
and, according to the revenue records, they have been
assigned as remuneration to the. officiator for the time
being under s. 23 of the Act. The petitioner has
obtained a certificate prescribed under s. 10, and he
contends that as a result of the said certificate this
Court should cancel the decree as claimed by him in
the petition.
It appears that the respondent had filed a suit
against the petitioner in the Court of the First Class
Sub Judge at Dharwar (Civq Suit No. 18 of 1934) and
in the said suit he ha

## Text

-
y
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
YELLAPPAGOUDA SHANKARGOUDA PATIL
v.
BASANGOUDA SHIDDANGOUDA PATIL
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Hereditary Office-Decree for partition of Watan land upheld
by Privy Council in appeal-Abolition of Privy Council's jurisdiction-Issue of certificate by Collector-Application for cancellation of decree, if can be entertained by the Supreme Court-Bombay
Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Bom. III of r874), s. IO-Abolition of
Privy Council jurisdiction Act, r949 (V of I949), ss. 5, 8-Constition of India, Arts. 374(2), r35.
T.he respondent brought a suit for partition against the petitioner in respect of certain Watan lands. The trial court decreed
- the suit but the High Court of Bombay reversed that decree in
appeal. The Privy Council restored the decree of the trial court
and an Order-in-Council was drawn ('hp accordingly. Execution
of the said decree was resisted by the petitioner on the ground
that the lands in suit being admittedly remuneration attached to
the office of the Patil and as such governed by the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Born. III of r874) were not liable to
partition. A certificate under s. IO of the Act was issued by the
Collector at the instance of the petitioner and the executing
Court cancelled the execution case. The respondent appealed to
the High Court and that court following its own Full Bench decision in Rachapa v. Amingouda, (I88r) V Born. 283, held the certificate to .be invalid since it was not addressed to the Privy Council which had passed the. decree and set aside the order of the
executing court. Thereafter a fresh certificate under s. IO of the
Act was issued by the Collector and addressed to this Court and
the petitioner applied to this Court under that section for the
cancellation of the said decree granted by the Order-in-Council,
the Privy Council having ceased to have any jurisdiction in the
meantime. The question for decision was whether as a result of •
the constitutional changes this court could be said to have passed
the decree and could entertain the petition.
Held, that the petition must be allowed.
· The combined effect of ss. 5 and 8 of the Abolition of the
Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, r949, and Arts. 374(2) and I35
of the Constitution was that this petition which lay to the Privy
Council before it ceased to exercise its jurisdiction, could be presented to the Federal Court before the commencement of the
Constitution and thereafter to this Court.
The certificate issued by the Collector and addressed to this
t:ourt was, therefore, valid and must be given effect to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil Misc.
Petition No. 530 of 1959.
•
Match 9.
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
Petition for cancellation of the decree dated
Yella;;,~ouda N ove~ber 25, 1_9~9, gr:'1nted to t~e Respondent by the
Shankargouda PalilOrder-m-Counml m Privy Counml Appeal No. XI of
v.
1948 .
. Basangouda .
G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India and
Shiddangoudu Patil B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioner.
K. R. Bengeri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
respondent.
1960. March 9.
delivered by
The Judgment of the Court was
Gajendragadkar ].
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This petition has been made
under s. 10 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act,
1874 (hereinafter called the Act), for cancellation of
the decree granted to the respondent by the Order-inCouncil dated November 25, 1949, in so far as the
said decree purports tp operate on or include any
right to the office of the Patilki and 11 Watan lands
attached thereto. These lands are situated at Kirtgeri
in the Taluk of Gadag. They form part of a Watan
and, according to the revenue records, they have been
assigned as remuneration to the. officiator for the time
being under s. 23 of the Act. The petitioner has
obtained a certificate prescribed under s. 10, and he
contends that as a result of the said certificate this
Court should cancel the decree as claimed by him in
the petition.
It appears that the respondent had filed a suit
against the petitioner in the Court of the First Class
Sub Judge at Dharwar (Civq Suit No. 18 of 1934) and
in the said suit he had claimed partition and possession of the properties as an adopted son of Shiddangouda. These properties were and are in the possession of the petitioner. The trial court passed a decree
in favour of the respondent. The petitioner then
preferred an appeal, No. 182 of 1935, in the High
Court of Bombay. His appeal was allowed and the
decree passed by the trial court was reversed. The
respondent then challenged the High Court decree
and went up to the Privy Council in Appeal No. 11
of 1948. His appeal was allowed, and the PriVl;.
Council held that the decree passed by the trial court
should be restored.
Accordingly an Order-in-Council
was drawn up on November 25, 1949;underthis order
.. '
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
the respondent was entitled to recover by partition a
I96o
half share in the properties in. suit. He was also
.
fi
d f
'll h
Yellappagouda
entitled to mesne pro ts, past an
uture, ti
t e Shankargouda Patil
recovery of possession or three years and an enquiry
v.
was directed in that behalf. Amongst the properties
Basangouda
.
in which the respondent had thus become entitled to Shiddangouda Patil
claim a share are the 11 lands in question .
In due course the respondent filed an execution Gajendragadkar l ·
application Darkhast No. 41 of 1950, in the Court of
the Subordinate Judge at Dharwar. The petitioner
then contended that the 11 lands in question 'were
governed by the provisions of the Act, they were
assigned as remuneration to the office of the Patil.,
and as such they could not be partitioned. ·rt was
also urged on his behalf that in the original suit the
respondent had not claimed any. declaration that he
was entitled to the office of Patil and that without
such a claim the 11 lands in question could not be
claimed by the respondent. In support of these pleas
the petitioner relied upon the provisions of the Act
contained in ss. 7, 10, 11, 13, 24, 25 and 36.
Pending the m;:ecution proceedings the petitioner
applied for the grant of the prescribed certificate
under s. 10 of the Act, and a certificate was accordingly issued by the Collector addressed to the Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Dharwar. Thereupon the said
court acted upon the certificate and cancelled the
execution process which had been issued against the
Patilki-a.ssigned property of Kirtgeri. The respondent
challenged the said order before the Bombay High
Court and his challenge was upheld by the said High
Court. The High Court fo1lowed its own earlier Full
Bench decision in Rachapa v. Amingouda(1) and held
that the certificate issued by the Collector under s. 10
was invalid in that it was addressed not to the Privy
Council which was the court which passed the decree
but to the Civil Judge at Dharwar. In the result the
order cancelling the execution process which had been
• passed by the executing court was set aside and a
direction was issued that the execution proceedings
should proceed according to law.
Thereafter the petitioner applied for a reissue of a
certificate under s. 10 and prayed that the certificate
(1) (1881) V Bom. 283,
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z96o
should be addressed to this Court as in the meanwhile
the Privy Council had ceased to have any jurisdiction
ShYekllappagdouPda 1.1and this Court had become its successor. A certificate
on argou a
ai
,
8
v.
has accordingly been ISsued on January 13, 195 ,
Basangouda
addressed to this Court. The certificate says that the
Shiddangouda Patil property in question has been assigned as remunera-
-
tion to the office of Patil and as such it is inalienable
Gajendragadkar ].
d
t ) " bl
t
f
· ·1
t
d
th
an no
la e
o process o
c1 v1 cour an so
e
process of attachment levied against the said property
should be removed and the decree in so far as it relates
to the said property should be cancelled. It appears
that after this certificate was issued by the Assistant
Commissioner, Gadag Division, the respondent filed
an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, Dharwar. His
appeal, however, failed and the certificate issued by
the Assistant Commissioner has been confirmed. It
is with this certificate that the petitioner has moved
this Court for the cancellation of the decree in question in regard to the 11 properties at Kirtgeri.
On behalf of the respondent it has been urged before
us that the decision of the Bombay High Conrt
operates as res jud,icata and so, in view of the said
decision, the present certificate also should be held to
be invalid. The argument is that the effect of the
decision of the Bombay High Conrt is that the certificate should have been addressed to the Privy Council,
and since it is addressed to this Court it is in valid.
We are not impressed by this argument. What the
Bombay High Court has, held is that the certificate
must be issued to the court which passed the decree,
and if in law this Court can be said to be in effect and
in substance the Court that passed the decree, then
the certificate must be hel<l to be perfectly valid.
Therefore, there is no substance in the argument of
res judicata. The main question which falls to be
considered is whether this Conrt can, in view of the
constitutional changes which have taken place in the
meantime, be said to be the Court that has passed the _
present decree. In our opinion, the answer to this
-~
question must be in favour of the petitioner. Let us,
therefore, proceed to consider the relevant statutory
provisions.
-
••••. ,,..<
·~
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RE£0RTS
225
Section 2 of the Abolition of the Privy Council
z960
Jurisdiction Act, 1949, has provided, inter alia, that Y 11
as from the appointed day which was October 10, 1949,sha~k;;:::;:~atil
the jurisdiction of His Majesty in Council to entertain
v.
appeals and petitions from or in respect of any judgBasangouda
ment, decree or order of any court or tribunal within ShiddangoudaPatil
the territory of India shall cease save hereinafter G . d-dk 1
provided. Section 4(b) provides that nothing containaJen raga ar •
ed in s. 2 shall affect the jurisdiction of His Majesty
in Council to dispose of any Indian appeal or petition
on which the Judicial Committee has, after hearing
the parties, reserved judgment or order. This provision applied to Appeal No. 11 of 1948 between
the parties then pending before the Privy Council.
Section 5 confers on the Federal Court corresponding
jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of Indian appeals
and petitions which His Majesty in Council has,
whether by virtue of His Majesty's prerogative or
otherwise, immediately before the appointed day. In
other words, after the appointed day the Federal Court
was given jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of not
only Indian appeals but also petitions, and that would
naturally include a petition like the present with
which we ·are dealing. Section 8 dealt with the effect
of the orders of His Majesty in Council; it provided
that any order made by His Majesty in Council on an
Indian appeal or petition, whether before or after the
appointed day shall, for all purposes, have the effect
not only as· an order of His Majesty in Council but
also as if it were an order or decree made by the
Federal Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred
by this Act. This then was the position with regard
to the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court
vis-a-vis the appeals and petitions pending before the
Privy Council and orders niade on them.
The next relevant provisions are contained in.
Art. 374 and Art. 135 of the Constitution. Art. 374(2)
provides that all suits, appeals and proceedings, Civil
or Criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the
commencement of the Constitution, shall stand
removed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
the same and the judgments and orders of the Federal'
29
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r96o
Court delivered or made before the commencement of
the Constitution shall have the same force and effect
Yellappagouda
"f h
h d b
d l"
d
d b
h S
Shankargouda Patil as I t ey a
een e ivere or ma e y t e upreme
v.
Court. It is with the latter part of Art. 374(2) that
Basangouda
we are concerned in the present petition. \Ve have
Shiddangouda Patil already seen that the. Order in Council issued in
--
accordance with the judgment of the Privy Council
Gajendragadkar J. in Appeal No. 11of1948 had to be treated as if it was
an order and decision of the Federal Court under the
relevant provisions of the Act of 1949. Now another
fiction has been introduced by Art. 374(2) and the
said order and decree has now to be treated as if the
decree had been passed and the order had been made
by the Supreme Court. That takes us to Art. 135.
This article provides that until Parliament by law
otherwise provides the Supreme Court shall also have
jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter
to which the provisions of Art. 133 or Art. 134 do not
apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that
matter were exercisable by the E'ederal Court immedlll.tely before the commencement of this Constitution
under any existing law. We have already noticed
that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to deal with a
petition like the present before the commencement of
the Constitution ; that jurisdiction can now be exercised by this Court as a result of Art. 135. The
position, therefore, is that the petition which could
have been presented to the Privy Council if the jurisdiction of the Privy Council had not been abolished
could have been presented before the Federal Court
before the commencement of the Constitution and can
be presented to this Court after the commencement of
the Constitution. We, therefore, feel no doubt that
as a result of the relevant statutory provisions to
which we have referred the certificate issued in the
present case to this Court is valid and must be given
effect to.
It is not disputed that the properties in respect of
which the certificate has been issued are properties
assigned as remuneration to Patilki office and are
governed by the provisions of the Act. It is also
conceded that if the certificate is duly issued under
s. 10 of the Act it makes it obligatory on the court to
...
..
f-
-
...
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
cancel. the decree in regard to the properties covered
x960
by the certificate. Section 10 provides, inter alia, " 11
d
h
h
.
h 11
h
C JI
h
b
, e appagou a
t at w en it s a
appear to t e
o ector t at y ShankargoudaPatil
virtue of, or in execution of, a decree or order of any
v.
court any watan or any part thereof, or any of the
Basangouda
·
profits thereof, recorded as such in the revenue records Shiddangouda Patil
or registered under this Act, and assigned under s. 23 G .
-
as remuneration of an officiator has or have, after the aJendragadkar f .
. date of this Act coming into force, passed or may pass
without the sanction of the State Government into
the ownership or beneficial possession of any person
other than the officiator for the time being, the court
shall, on receipt of a certificate under the hand and
seal of the Collector, stating the particulars mentioned
in the section, cancel the decree or order complained
of so far as it concerns the said watan or any part
thereof. The only objection against the validity of
the certificate is that it has been addressed to a wrong
court. Since we have overruled that objection it
follows that that portion of the decree which concerns
the watan properties must be cancelled.
In the result the petition is allowed and the decree
in question in so far as it purports to operate on or
include any right to the office of Patilki and watan
lands attached thereto at Kirtgeri as enumerated in
the certificate is cancelled. Under the circumstances
of this case there will be no order as to costs.
Petition allowed.
THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL
MILLS LTD.
v.
KUSHAL BHAN
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial, Dispute-Dismissal of employees by enquiry committee pending trial in Criminal Court-Subsequent acquittal of the
employee-Jurisdiction of Tribunal, to refuse approval of dismissalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (XIV of r947), s. 33(2), proviso.
The appellant company served a charge-sheet on the respondent who was one of its employees alleging that he had stolen
the cycle of the company's Head Clerk, A criminal case relating
March xo.