# 352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP. M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD v. THE ST ATE OF BIHAR

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 352
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/352-supreme-court-reports-1963-supp-m-s-william-jacks-co-ltd-v-the-st-ate-of-2775
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

1962
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD.
v.
THE ST ATE OF BIHAR
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYALJJ.)
Saks Pa:x:-8ak8 in the ooum of inter-state tra&-property passed in Calcutta-Actual delivery given to purchaser
in Bihar far consumption-whether taz could be levied under
Bihar Act-Whether the Bales Pa:x: Continuance Order, 195J
saves 8Uch taz-Deftnitian of sale in the Bihar Sales Paz
Act-Whether the sale wmea within lhed,,ftnition-Canstitution
of India, Art. 206 (1) and (2), Bihar Bales Pa:x:
Act, 1947
(Bihar 19 of 1947) ss. 25, 33-Pke Bale.< Paz Continuance
Order, 1950-Phe Sales Paz Laws Validation Act, 1956
(VII of 1956).
Between January 26, 1950, and September 30, 1951,
the appellant had sold from Calcutta various goods to parties
in Bihar. These sales had been made in the course of interState trade and were of species mentioned in the explanation
to cl. (I) of Art. 286 of the Constitution on which, in view of
the provisions of cl. (2) of that Article as it stood then and as
interpreted by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, no tax could be imposed by a State law. The
respondent State had however before the decision by this
Court in the Bengal Immunity Co. case imposed tax on these
sales under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, relying on other decisions since overruled which interpreted the explanations to
Art. 286 (I} in a different manner. The appellant objected to this
imposition.
On the question being referred to the High Court the
rtspondent sought to justify the tax on other grounds. It
contended that the sales made between January 26, 1950, and
March 31, 1951, could be legally taxed under the Act because
of cl. (2) of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, made
under the proviso to Art. 286 (2) of the Conslitution and the
sales made between April I, )951, and September 30, 1951,
could he "° taxed because of the provisions of the Sales Tax
Validation Act,
1956. The High
Court accepted the
respondents' contention. On appeal to this Court the decision
oftheHighCourtregarding the sales between April I, 1951,
and September 30, 1951, was not challenged.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
Held, the Sales Tax Continuance Order of 1950 only
1962
authorised the continuation after the commencement of the
M 1,. William 1..,11
of the Constitution and up to March 31, 1951, of "any tax
Iii Co. Lid.
on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully
y,
levied by the Government of any State immediately before the n. Si.11 •I 81/uJr
commencement of the Constitution" notwithstanding the bar
imposed against such imposition by Art. 286 (2) of the. Consti•
tution. The tax on the sales made by the appellant between
January 26, 1950, and March 31, 1951, were not of the variety
which was immediately before the commencement of the Con·
stilution being lawfully levied by any law of the State of Bihar.
The contention of the respondent that the sale defined in the
Act included these sales and were therefore being taxed U11.dcr
it from beforeJanuary 26, 1950, was not tenable.
Section 33 of the Act read with the decision of thi1
Court in M. P. V. Sundararamier di Oo . . v. TTt• Slate of Andhra
Praduh might on the ban under Art. 236 being lifted be
construed as authorising the imposition of a tax on these sales
does not affect the question in the present case for this section
was introduced into the Act by the adaptation of Laws (Third
Amendment) Order,
1951, and came
into force from
January 26, 1950, and could not thereforebe a law levying a
tax immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.
M. P. V.
Sund~raramier di Oo v. TM State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1958] S. C. R. 1422 considered
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 112 to 113 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
September 21, 1959, of the Patna High Court in
Civil Misc. Judi. Case No. 593 of 1957.
Rajeshwur Prasad and R. P. Verma, for the
appellant.
A. V. Viswana

## Text

1962
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD.
v.
THE ST ATE OF BIHAR
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYALJJ.)
Saks Pa:x:-8ak8 in the ooum of inter-state tra&-property passed in Calcutta-Actual delivery given to purchaser
in Bihar far consumption-whether taz could be levied under
Bihar Act-Whether the Bales Pa:x: Continuance Order, 195J
saves 8Uch taz-Deftnitian of sale in the Bihar Sales Paz
Act-Whether the sale wmea within lhed,,ftnition-Canstitution
of India, Art. 206 (1) and (2), Bihar Bales Pa:x:
Act, 1947
(Bihar 19 of 1947) ss. 25, 33-Pke Bale.< Paz Continuance
Order, 1950-Phe Sales Paz Laws Validation Act, 1956
(VII of 1956).
Between January 26, 1950, and September 30, 1951,
the appellant had sold from Calcutta various goods to parties
in Bihar. These sales had been made in the course of interState trade and were of species mentioned in the explanation
to cl. (I) of Art. 286 of the Constitution on which, in view of
the provisions of cl. (2) of that Article as it stood then and as
interpreted by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, no tax could be imposed by a State law. The
respondent State had however before the decision by this
Court in the Bengal Immunity Co. case imposed tax on these
sales under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, relying on other decisions since overruled which interpreted the explanations to
Art. 286 (I} in a different manner. The appellant objected to this
imposition.
On the question being referred to the High Court the
rtspondent sought to justify the tax on other grounds. It
contended that the sales made between January 26, 1950, and
March 31, 1951, could be legally taxed under the Act because
of cl. (2) of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, made
under the proviso to Art. 286 (2) of the Conslitution and the
sales made between April I, )951, and September 30, 1951,
could he "° taxed because of the provisions of the Sales Tax
Validation Act,
1956. The High
Court accepted the
respondents' contention. On appeal to this Court the decision
oftheHighCourtregarding the sales between April I, 1951,
and September 30, 1951, was not challenged.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
Held, the Sales Tax Continuance Order of 1950 only
1962
authorised the continuation after the commencement of the
M 1,. William 1..,11
of the Constitution and up to March 31, 1951, of "any tax
Iii Co. Lid.
on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully
y,
levied by the Government of any State immediately before the n. Si.11 •I 81/uJr
commencement of the Constitution" notwithstanding the bar
imposed against such imposition by Art. 286 (2) of the. Consti•
tution. The tax on the sales made by the appellant between
January 26, 1950, and March 31, 1951, were not of the variety
which was immediately before the commencement of the Con·
stilution being lawfully levied by any law of the State of Bihar.
The contention of the respondent that the sale defined in the
Act included these sales and were therefore being taxed U11.dcr
it from beforeJanuary 26, 1950, was not tenable.
Section 33 of the Act read with the decision of thi1
Court in M. P. V. Sundararamier di Oo . . v. TTt• Slate of Andhra
Praduh might on the ban under Art. 236 being lifted be
construed as authorising the imposition of a tax on these sales
does not affect the question in the present case for this section
was introduced into the Act by the adaptation of Laws (Third
Amendment) Order,
1951, and came
into force from
January 26, 1950, and could not thereforebe a law levying a
tax immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.
M. P. V.
Sund~raramier di Oo v. TM State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1958] S. C. R. 1422 considered
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
Nos. 112 to 113 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
September 21, 1959, of the Patna High Court in
Civil Misc. Judi. Case No. 593 of 1957.
Rajeshwur Prasad and R. P. Verma, for the
appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Ra,•tri, D. P. ,Singh R. K.
G·1rg, R. 0. Agarwal an:!. M. K. &mamurthi, for the
respondent.
1962. November 21. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
.
. SAR~AR, J;-The appellant is a company dealmg m various kmds of machinery. It has its place
M/1. Willianl lt1tb
IY C.. Ud.
••
Tiu S111" of BiMr
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
of business in Calcutta, in the State of West Bengal.
Between January 26, 1950 and September 30, 1951,
it sold diverse machinery to various parties in the
State of Bihar. In respect of these sales the appellant was assessed to sales tax under the Bihar Sales
Tax Act, 194 7. These appeals arise out of such
assessments but, as will be seen later, the dispute now
is much narrower than what it was in the beginning.
Before proceeding further we may briefly refer
to the procedure of the sale. The price payable for
the goods was F. O. R. Calcutta and it is not in
dispute that the property in them passed to the
purchaser as soon as the· appellant put the goods on
the railway at Calcutta. It has however been found
and is no longer in dispute, that the actual delivery
of the goods was given to the purchasers in Bihar for
consumption there. The arguments in this Court
have proceeded on the basis accepted by both sides,
that the sales were in the course of inter-State trade
and were of the kind contemplated in the explanation in Art. 286(1) of the Constitution before its
amendment by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1956. In this judgment we shall be concerned
with Art. 286 as it stood before the amendment.
The contention of the appellant before the
Superintendent of Sales Tax, Patna, who was the
assessing authority, was that the sales were interState sales and, therefore, the Bihar Act could not
tax such sales in view of cl. (2) of Art. 286 though
they were within the explanation to cl. ( l) of that
Article. It was contended that so far as the Bihar
Act purported to taK such sales, it was invalid. The
Superintendent of S&les Tax rejected this cont~ntion
relying on the case of Bengal Immunity Company
Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (1) which held that sales
of the variety drscribed in the explanation to cl. (l)(a)
of Art. 286 could be taxed by the law of the legislature of the State where the goods were actually delivered for consumption inspite of the ban imposed by
(I) (1952) I.L.R. 82 Pat, 19.
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
cl. (2) of that Article on State legislatures taxing
sales made in the course· ·of inter-State trade. He,
therefore, held that the Bihar Act could validly tax
the appellant's sales even though they were interState sales. The appellant appealed from this decision to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar •
By the time that authority heard the appeal the
judgment of this Court in the 8tat,e of Bomhay v.
The Unit,ed Motors (1) had been delivered.
This
judgment confirmed the view taken in the Patna case
earlier mentioned. It said that cl. (2) of Art. 286
does not affect the power of the State in which delivery of goods is made for consumption there to tax
inter·State sales or purch'llies and that the effect of
the explanation was that the transactions mentioned
in it were outside the ban imposed by Art. 286(2).
In view of this judgment, the Deputy Commissioner
dismi!!Sed the appeal. A further revision application
by the appellant to the Board of Revenue, Bihar, also
failed. Before the decision by the Board of Revenue,
however, this Court had decided in the appeal from
the judgment in the Patria case, earlier mentioned,
that the Uni.red Motors ca8e (') had been wrongly
decided and that until )>arliament by Jaw made under
Art. 286(2) provided otherwise, a State could not
impose or authorise tl:).e imP,OSition, of any. tax on
sales or purcha>es of goods. when such sales or purchases took place in the,. cqurse of inter-State trade or
commerce notwithstanding that tlie goods under such
sales were !lCtually delivered in that State for consumption there:.see Bengal Immunity Company Ltd.
v. Strite of Bihar ('). Curiously however this case
escaped the attention pf the learned member of the
Board of Revenue, Biliar, for if he had noticed it he
would not have based himself on the Unit,ed Motor11
case (') as he had dorie. The appellant thereafter
moved the Board of Revenue under s. 25 of the Bihar
Act for referring two questions to th«" High Court
for decision and a reference was accordingly made.
<•> (1953) s.c.R. 1069.
(2) 11955) 2 S.C.R. 603.
1961
M/t. William Jdl
& Co.Ltd.
v.
Tu Stat1 ot BU.a
Sarkar,. I.
1902
M/1. William Jab
81 Co. Lti.
Y.
Tli1 Stot1 of Bihar
S.,k.,., J.
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)SUPP.
The present appeal iS against the judgment of the
High Court given on the reference.
There are two appeals before u.~. They arise
out of two assessment orders made in r~pect of two
different periods. The High Court heard the two
references together and dealt with them by one judgment. The questions framed iu each case were in
identical terms and perhaps, therefore, were not confined to the period with which each case was concermd.
A3 we have said l'arlier, two questions had been
referred to the High Court but the appellant has not
in this Court challenged the answer ~iven by the High
Court to the second question. We are, therefor<',
concerned in tht'Se appeals only with the first question
which is in these terms :
"Whether the sales by the petitioner of (sic.)
goods which were actually delivered in Bihar
as a direct result of such sales for the purpose
of consumption in Bihar during the period
January 26, 1950 to September 30, 1951, were
sales which took place in the course of interState trade or commerce within the meaning of
Article 286(2) of the Constitution of India (as
it stood prior to the passing of the Constitution
(Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956) and as such
were not liable to the levy of Bihar Sales· Tax,
or whether in view of the s'.lbsequent pa'ISing
by Parliament of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act VII of 1956) such sales
became liable to the levy of Bihar Sales Tax
for any part of the above period, say from
April 1, 1951, up to September 30, 1951."
The High Court answered this qu"Stion in these
words:
"A3 regards the first question, it is clear
that for the period from the January 26,
1950, to March 31, 1951, the assessment
..
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
is covered by the Sales Tax Continuance Order,
1950, promulgated by the President, and the
assessment of the tax for this period is not
liable to be attacked on the ground that there
is a violation of the provisions of Article 286(2)
of the Constitution. For the second ,period,
namely, from April 1, 1951, to September
30, 1951, the
assessment is
covered by
the provisions of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, and the imposition of sales-tax
for this period also is legally valid."
The question in this appeal is whether the High
Court was right in its view that the assessment
between January 26, 1950 to March 31, 1951 is
covered by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950.
There is no dispute now that the Sales Tax Validation Act, 1956 validated the collection of the tax on
sales made during the period (rom April 1, 1951 to
September 30, 1951.
In view of the judgment of this Court in the
Bengal Immunity Company case (') a dispute as to
whether the sales by the appellant could be taxed by
a Bihar law was no longer open .. It was because of this
that the dispute took a different tum and was based
on the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950.
The contention of the appellant is this : The
Sales Tax Continuance Oder, 1950 was made in
exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to
cl. 2 of Art. 286 of the Constitution. That proviso
was in these terms :
"Provided that the President may by
order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods
which was being lawfully
levied by
the Government of any State
immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the
(I) ( 1955] 2. S.C.R. 603,
1162
M/1. WUli .. ., Jdl
Ill c;.. Lii .
••
TM 511114 of Bih••
s.,rr.r, J.
1912
M/1. Williom lads
e <A.Ltd.
v.
n, Stal• of BIMr
S.rkor, /.
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until
the thirty-first day of:March 1951."
Clause (2) of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950
reads as follows :
"Any tax on the sale or purchase of goods
which was being
lawfully levied by the
Government of any State immediately before
the commencement of the Constitution of
India shall, until the thirty-first day of March,
1951, continue to be levied notwithstanding
that the imposition of such tax is contrary to
the provisions of clause (2) of the Article 286
of the said Constitution."
Clause (2) of Art. 286 of the Constitution, it will
be remembert'd, prohibited a State law from taxing
a sale in the course of inter-State trade.
Now, a tax which can be legitimately levied
under the Order of 1950 must be a tax which was being
lawfully levied by a State Government immediately
before January 26, 1950. It is said by the appellant
that before this date neither the Bihar Sales Tax Act
nor any other Act purported to tax a sale of the kind
with which we are concerned. If no Act did so, then no
question of its lawfully levying a tax on such sales
could at all arise. There was no tax as contemplated by the Order and none, therefore, the levy of
which the Order continued.
Learned counsel for the appellant drew our
attention to the definition of sale in the Bihar Act
a8 it stood at the relevant time. It was only a sale
which came within the definition that the
Act
purported to tax. Learned counsel's contention is
that the sales in this case do not come within the
definition and, therefore,
were not taxed by. the
Bihar Act at all.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31!9
Now the definition of sale in the Act is in
these terms :
"sale" means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of
property in goods for cash or deferred pay·
ment or other valuable consideration, includ·
ing a transfer of property in goods involved
in the execution of contract but does not in·
elude a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or
pledge:
Provided that a transfer of goods on hire·
purchase or other instalment system of payment
shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller
retains a title to any goods as security for pay·
ment of the price, be deemed to be a sale :
Provided
further that
notwithstandin1
anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale
of Goods Act, 1930 (Ill of 1930), the 1ale
of any goods-
(i) which arc actually in Bihar at the
time when, in respect thereof, the
contract of sale as defined in section
4 of that Act is made, or
(ii) which are produced or manufactured
in Bihar by the producer cir manu·
facturer thereof,
shall, . wherever the delivery or contract or sale
in made, be dceined for the purposes or this
Act to have taken place in Bihar :
Provided further that the sale of good1
in respect of a forward contract, whether goods
under such contract are actually delivered or
not, shall be deemed to have taken place on
the date originally agreed upon for delivery.
1961
M /1. Willio. /M1
at Co.Lu.
Y.
n. Stal• of •ihar
S..lar, J.
1962
M/1. Willia• Juu
1Y C.. Ltd.
v.
TA1 Stal,./ Bibr
s.,k•r, I.
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
It is obvious that the sales with which this case is
concerned did not come within this definition at all
nor even under the last proviso in it and these sales
were not taxed by the Bihar Act.
Then there is s. 33. That section provides as
follows :
8. 33. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act,-
(a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods
shall not be imposed under this Act-
(i) where such sale
or
purchase
takes place outside the State of
Bihar;
..........................................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2)
The explanation to clause (I) of
Article 286 of the Constitution shall apply for
the interpretation of sub-clause (i) of clause (a)
of sub-section ( l).
Now, it has been held by this Court in M. P. V.
Bundararamier & Co. v. 1'he State of And!ira
Pradesh (1) that an enactment of this kind did in fact
impose a tax on the class of sales covered by the
explanation to Art. 286(l)(a) but that the imposition
was conditional on the ban mentioned in Art. 286(2)
being lifted by law of Parliament as provided therein.
We do not think that the respondent State can derive
any advantage from this provision. It was inserted
in the Bihar Act by the Adaptation of Laws (Third
Amendment) Order, 1951, and was brought into
force from January 26, 1950. Even though on the
ban being lifted it might have been possible under
(I) (1958] s.o.R. U22.
•
I
,•
-~
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
this provision to tax the explanation sales, that is,
the sales of the kind with which this case is concerned,
that cannot assist the respondent State in this case
for since s. 33 only came into force from January 26,
1950, s. 33 could not be a law levying a tax on any
sales immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution and the levy of tax under it, therefore,
could not have been continued under the provisions
of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950.
It follo'ivs that the. sales were not taxed by the
Bihar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 before the Constitution
came into force. It is not contended that the Government of Bihar had been taxing these sales before
January 26, 1950, under any other provision. We,
therefore, think that the High Court wa, in error in
holding that the levy of the tax on the sales by the
appellant between January 26, 1!!50, and March 31,
1951, with which this case is concerned, was covered
by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950. We will
set aside the judgment of the High Court in so far as
it so holds and answer the 9uestion which we have
earlier set out in so far as it is outstanding, in the
negative. In our view, these sales were not liable to
tax.
We think it right here to point out that the
question as framed might suggest that the Court was
asked to decide whether the sales were sales within
the meaning of Art. 286(2) of the Constitution. But
as we have said earlier, that was not the point of the
question. The courts below have held that the sales
were in the course of inter-State trade in which the
goods were actually delivered in Bihar for consumption there and that view has not been disputed in ·this
Court.
The appeal will, therefore, be allowed. We do
not make any order as to costs as the appellant
abandoned in this Court its contest to one of the two
1962
M/s. WlllU... Jaw
& Co. Lid.
y,
7711 Slal1 of Biluir
Sarkar,/.
11162
M/1. Willi11111 JMb
& C•. Lia.
"·
TA1 Sta,. of Billar
s. .... J.
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
questions that had been referred and as.it had not in
the High Court contended that the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, did not apply to the sales for
the reason on which it based itself in this Court.
A. ppeal allowed.
BISWAMBHAR SINGH AND ORS.
STATE OF ORISSA
(B. P. SINHA., c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANonoo, K. C. DAS GUI'TA and
J. C, SHAH, JJ.)
Sortrtign-Zamindar whtther
•ov.rtign-Elatu-ln,.,._
mtdiariu-Oonatitutionality of Acl XVII of 1954-TM Oriaao
E•lalt8 Abolilion Act, 1962 (Orisaa 61of1962), u. 2 (vJ, 2 (11).
When the Orissa Estates Abolition Act came into force
in February 1952, the appellants along with another person
moved the High C',ourt under Art. 226 of the Constitution
challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The High Court
held that the Act was valid and the lands of the appellants
could be taken over by the State. When the case came to
this C.ourt in appeal, it held that the Act did not apply to the
proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh as they were not intennediaries as defined in s. 2 (h) of the Act. The Zamindar of
Nagra was held to be an intermediary as he had acknowledged
overlordship of the Raja of Gangpur, The Orissa legislature
passed Act XVII of 1954 and changed the definitions of 'estate'
and 'intermediary' to cover the cases of the proprietors of
Hemgir and Sarpgarh.
The appellant., the Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarpgarh,
moved the High Court for a writ of mandamus against the
State of Orissa and the Collector of Sundargarh. The appellants claimed sovereign status and contended that the Amending Act did not apply to them, Their petition• ~e dismiaKd