# ·354 UNION OF INDIA v. ·MIS. KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD - **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 784 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1968-04-15 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 332 of 1965 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/354-union-of-india-v-mis-khas-karanapura-colliery-ltd-4344 - **Pages:** 5 ## Headnote ·354 UNION OF INDIA v. ·MIS. KHAS KARANAPURA COLLIERY LTD. April 15, 1968 ;.,,_ [R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S." HEGDll, JJ.] • '.: 9"< . CiiJlstitu:ion of India, 1950, Art. 226--Jurisdiction of court to deal .. With _-qU~siign not specifically raised in writ petition-Land of lesttl for wjnnfog-coo1 notified under s. 4(1) of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition .ami Development) Act (20 of 1957)-lf lessee aggriev.d-Wri• petition filed;ifllltput 5 months after issue of notifiCation-lf amounts to /aches. .A B Tiit'¥espondent was a lessee of 1401 bighas of land and was carrying C -oil ·mining operations on the land for winning coal. On 9th October 1963, the appellant-Government issued a notification under s. 4( 1) of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, giving notice of the Government's intention to prospect for coal in f200 bighas .remises on whfoh procesaes ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation fot''sale of coal obtained as a result of the mining operations are being carried. In other words the entire area is' exempt from being notified wider s. 4(1) either because it is protected by the first part of s. 4(4) or by its second part. These conclusions were ch8llenged before us.. It was urged on fiehalf of the appellant that the words "any land in which coal mining ·operations are actually carried on" found in the first part of s. 4 ( 4) do not permit of a liberal interpretation so as to bring in the conception of a commercial or economic unit; they merely mean the actual area where mining is talcing place. As regards tlfo alternative conclusion based on the second part of s. 4 ( 4) it wasi urged that on the pleadings. t)l6re was no occasion for the High Court to consider whether the requirements of that part are satisfied. Jn additioo, two other contentions were advanced on behalf of the appellant. They are ' ( i) no relief under Art. 226 should have been given as - the r~ndent was guilty of !aches, and (ii) the writ petition was premature. We are in agreeriient with the High Court that there is no substance in the last twO contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant. As seen earlier, the impugned notification was issued on October 9, 1963 ·and the writ petition was filed on March 23, 1964, well within Six months of the date of the notification. This delay is not sufficient to refuse the relief prayed for. In support of the contention that the petition was premature, Dr. Syed Mohemmad, learned counsel for the appellant, uraed that the respondent has no real grievance yet, as only a notification under s. 4(1) had been issued; further proceedings are yet to take place, and the respondent can be aggrieved only when a notificaA B c D E F G H .__ .} • A B .. UNION v. K. K. COLLIERY (Hegde, l.) 787 . tion under section 7t is issued. We think'that ihis contention is misconceived. As soon as the notification under s. 4 ( 1) was issued, in view of s. S:j: the mining lease granted in favour of the respondent ceased to have effect for so long as that notification was in force._ Too effect of thaCiiotificatiOn was to require the respondent to bring to a halt all his operations in the area not!fied till action was taken under s. 7 or till the-period prescribed in that section came to an end. Hence it cannot denied that the respondent was seriously aggrieved by the fmpiigneu notification. · - ___ This takes us to the remaining two conteiiuons noticed earlier. ---It was strenuollsly argued by Dr. Syed Mohammed _-that s. 4(1) empowers the Government to notify al! lands excepting those in c which coal mining operations are actually being carried_ on; the notification in question has excluded 201 bighas in which mining was actually carried on; hence there is nothing illegal in that notification. He wanted us to construe the words "any land in which coal mining operations are being actulilly carried" strictly. The High Court has rejected this contention after taking into consideraD tion the purposes of the Act, its preamble and the various provisions therein. But we have not thought it necessary to go into that controversy :is in our opinion the impugned notification definitely _ violates the second limb of s. 4 ( 4) and hence it is invalid. It covers land on. which amongst other ·buildings, railway siding, boiler-rooms, office room, fan house· and air shaft premises are situate. It cannot be denied that in these premises processes ancilE lary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result of the mining operations are being carried on. This conclusion of ours is resisted· on the _plea that in the writ petition no .specific case is pleaded under the second part of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 4 and therefore it is not open for us to consider that aspect ·of F G H the case. We are unable to accept this contention. It is true that (t) .. 7. (1) If the Central Govemmfnt is satisfied that coal is obtainable in the whole or any part of the land notified under sub-section (1) of section 4, it may, within a period of two years from the date of the said notification or within such further period not exceeding one year in the aggreate as the Central_ Government may specify in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, give notice of its intention to acquire the v,.·hole or any part of th~ 1and or of any : rights ~nor over such land, as the case may be. . · (2) If no notice to acquire the land or any rights in or over such land is given under sub-section (1) \\i.thin the period allowed thereunder, the notification issued under sul:rsection (1) of section 4 shall cease to have effect on the expiration of three years from the date thereof." Ct) "'5. On the issue of a notific.ition under sub--section (1) of section 4 in respect of any land- (a) any prospecting licence which authorises any person to prospect for coal or any other mineral in the land shall cease to have effect; and , (b) any mining lease in so far as it authorises the lessee or any person claiming through him to undertake any operation in the land, cease to have effect for so long as the notification under that sub-section is in force." 788 SuPIUIMB COU&T IU!PO&TS [1968] 3 S.C.R. the pleadings on this J,X>int are rath"'r vague; but all the- facts necessary for determimng that question are before the court. That aspect of the case appear& to have been fully argued · before the High Court without any objection. The High Court has considered and decided that question. Hence the appellant cannot now be pennitted to contend that for want of n~essary pleadings . that q_uestion cannot be gone into. If areas in which those premises are situate could not have been notified under s. 4 ( 1 )-as in our judg· ment they could not have been-it is not for us to decide whether any of the other areas included in the lease-hold could have been notified; we cannot make out a new notification for the appellant. One other contention was vaguely touched at the hearing of the appeal, and that was that though there are ten seams m the colliery only four seams are at present worked after obtaining the necessary permission, the remaining sii seams are not yet opened up for the working; hence those seams cannot be said to-have been wiirked on the date of the notification. Mr. A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the _respondent, urged that ~I! the ten seams were being W<>rkoo. in contormity with the provisions . of law: According to him, once permission is obtained for grading the coal in a seam and he says that su~h permission had been obtained in respect -Of ail the seams, in law it means that those seams are being actually worked. . We need not go inio this question in view of our earlier oonclusion~ At the hearing reference was made to the decision of this Court in Messrs. B11rrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of lndia( 1). The·rule laid down in that case does not bear on any of the issues arising for. decision in this appeal. For the reasons mentioned· alY>ve, this appeal fails and is dismissed . with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed. (1) (196211 s.c.R. 44. A B c D E ...