# 434. WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LTD v. WORKMEN

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 434
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-08-20
- **Bench:** P. Jaganmohan Reddy, N. Owivedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/434-western-india-match-company-ltd-v-workmen-5991
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Probation 'for a period longer tlw.n tfrat· provided by the'
employrr's Standing Order-Validity.
lllllustrial Employmellt (Standing Orders) Act,
1946-0bject ar.d
polic.y
of.
• .4 A
'B
U.P. lndusfrial Disputes Act, s. 68-Scope of-'May' in sub. s. (2) .~lwuld
.iC
be read as 'shall'.
Ltrbour Court-Power to modify Standin~; On/ers-rower to order reinstatement.
Under the Standing Order for the Watch and Ward staff of the appelh.>nt.
'a permanent workman· is one 'who has completed a probationary period of
two months as such and is employed on a permanent post;' and 'a probationer'
i.~
is a workman 'who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy and
u
hfls not completed two momlrs service.'
A watchman was appointed by the appellant on probation for a period of
6 months. His period of probation was extended, and during the extended
period. his services were terminated. There was an -industrial dispute and the
questions.
(1)
wh~ther the termjnation was legal or justified. and
(2) to
what relief the workman was entitled, were refer!ed to the Labour Court. The
Labour Court held that the order of discharge was neither mala fide nor an
E
act of Yictimisation; but set a~ide the order of discharge and directed reinstate~
ment of the employee on the view that the term regarding 6 months' probation
in the employee's letter of appointment was in contravention of the Standing
Order and was invalid.
Di>missing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (1)
The Labour Court has not travet:ed beyond the terms of
reference. because, the validity or invalidity of the discharge depends on the
validitv of the term regarding 6 months' probation.
[4370-E] .
(::!) Since, according to the Standing Order, a workman shall not be kept
on probation for more than 2 months, the letter of appointment (or special
agreement) is inconsistent with the Standing Order to t:b_e extent of the additional 4 months' probation.
[437E-GT
(3) The inconsistent part of the agreement. is ineffective and unenforceable.
[439EJ
(a) To uphold the special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the
principle of three party participation. in the settlement of the terms of employment, incorporated in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
The Act gives effect to the new thinking that Society' has also an interest in
the settlement of the terms of employme!lt of industriaJ.labour, While formerly
there were two parties at the negotiating table-the employer and the workman
-it is now thought that there should also be present a third party, namely
the State, representing society. The Certifying Officer under the Act. as the
statutory representative of society, adjudges on the fairness or reasonable~ess
of Standing Orders after considering and weighing the ~ocial interest in the
F
G
H
·. ~::c~(:;_~------ - ---- ...
--····~----=
-:::-.--
WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. v. WORKM"N (D
'"
wivedi J.)
435
· A
claims _of the _employer an~ the demands of the w
.
,.
JI)COt, m the tliStant case, 1n so far as it rovid orkmen ... The special agreeprobation, contravenes the Standinl! Order. p 1439.!:_/.jr adJ1t1or.a1 4 months of
(bJ The terms o~ employment specified in the'St·
·
over the correspondmg terms in the contract of and!ng 9rdcr. would prevail
· eo.forcement of the Standing Order. lf a
ri
semce tn ~xiStencc on the
tho Standing Order! will not survive an agre:m~~t agree'!lent Inconsistent with
. J
with th< Standing Order should atsd not prevail.
~~~~eo·~~~~-~~d inconsistent
D
E
F
G
Agm Ekclric Supply Cu. Ltd. v. Shri Alladiu (1970j 1 s c R
JJtdla
Ltd.
v.
Seco11d
[lrdu.rtrial
'Tril>umr/
· W · 808. A •·ery
~.J-.R.
1972
S .C.
1626.
Till' Unill'll Prorinus £1
. ••.rtS
Bm11al,
W. Affalulbad v. Tlt~ir Workmatt, [1972) 2 s c c 54 . nd <·~·tr1"" Eupdp/v
Ct>.
· ·
D ·
"b ti
C
L I
<--[
• • •
• a
" 0 till ro e Elec
mcrty
rslrr II on
o.
It v • .,.. tm Erodt' El<'ctricity Di 1 "b ·
c
·
Etrtployt'rs Urrion, [1966) 2 :i.C.R. 498. 504, followed. s"
111
'
011
0
• Ltd.
MJs J.
K. Couou
Man

## Text

434.
WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LTD.
v.
WORKMEN
August 20, 1973
[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND S, N. OWIVEDI, JJ.]
Industrial Dispute-Probation 'for a period longer tlw.n tfrat· provided by the'
employrr's Standing Order-Validity.
lllllustrial Employmellt (Standing Orders) Act,
1946-0bject ar.d
polic.y
of.
• .4 A
'B
U.P. lndusfrial Disputes Act, s. 68-Scope of-'May' in sub. s. (2) .~lwuld
.iC
be read as 'shall'.
Ltrbour Court-Power to modify Standin~; On/ers-rower to order reinstatement.
Under the Standing Order for the Watch and Ward staff of the appelh.>nt.
'a permanent workman· is one 'who has completed a probationary period of
two months as such and is employed on a permanent post;' and 'a probationer'
i.~
is a workman 'who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy and
u
hfls not completed two momlrs service.'
A watchman was appointed by the appellant on probation for a period of
6 months. His period of probation was extended, and during the extended
period. his services were terminated. There was an -industrial dispute and the
questions.
(1)
wh~ther the termjnation was legal or justified. and
(2) to
what relief the workman was entitled, were refer!ed to the Labour Court. The
Labour Court held that the order of discharge was neither mala fide nor an
E
act of Yictimisation; but set a~ide the order of discharge and directed reinstate~
ment of the employee on the view that the term regarding 6 months' probation
in the employee's letter of appointment was in contravention of the Standing
Order and was invalid.
Di>missing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (1)
The Labour Court has not travet:ed beyond the terms of
reference. because, the validity or invalidity of the discharge depends on the
validitv of the term regarding 6 months' probation.
[4370-E] .
(::!) Since, according to the Standing Order, a workman shall not be kept
on probation for more than 2 months, the letter of appointment (or special
agreement) is inconsistent with the Standing Order to t:b_e extent of the additional 4 months' probation.
[437E-GT
(3) The inconsistent part of the agreement. is ineffective and unenforceable.
[439EJ
(a) To uphold the special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the
principle of three party participation. in the settlement of the terms of employment, incorporated in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
The Act gives effect to the new thinking that Society' has also an interest in
the settlement of the terms of employme!lt of industriaJ.labour, While formerly
there were two parties at the negotiating table-the employer and the workman
-it is now thought that there should also be present a third party, namely
the State, representing society. The Certifying Officer under the Act. as the
statutory representative of society, adjudges on the fairness or reasonable~ess
of Standing Orders after considering and weighing the ~ocial interest in the
F
G
H
·. ~::c~(:;_~------ - ---- ...
--····~----=
-:::-.--
WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. v. WORKM"N (D
'"
wivedi J.)
435
· A
claims _of the _employer an~ the demands of the w
.
,.
JI)COt, m the tliStant case, 1n so far as it rovid orkmen ... The special agreeprobation, contravenes the Standinl! Order. p 1439.!:_/.jr adJ1t1or.a1 4 months of
(bJ The terms o~ employment specified in the'St·
·
over the correspondmg terms in the contract of and!ng 9rdcr. would prevail
· eo.forcement of the Standing Order. lf a
ri
semce tn ~xiStencc on the
tho Standing Order! will not survive an agre:m~~t agree'!lent Inconsistent with
. J
with th< Standing Order should atsd not prevail.
~~~~eo·~~~~-~~d inconsistent
D
E
F
G
Agm Ekclric Supply Cu. Ltd. v. Shri Alladiu (1970j 1 s c R
JJtdla
Ltd.
v.
Seco11d
[lrdu.rtrial
'Tril>umr/
· W · 808. A •·ery
~.J-.R.
1972
S .C.
1626.
Till' Unill'll Prorinus £1
. ••.rtS
Bm11al,
W. Affalulbad v. Tlt~ir Workmatt, [1972) 2 s c c 54 . nd <·~·tr1"" Eupdp/v
Ct>.
· ·
D ·
"b ti
C
L I
<--[
• • •
• a
" 0 till ro e Elec
mcrty
rslrr II on
o.
It v • .,.. tm Erodt' El<'ctricity Di 1 "b ·
c
·
Etrtployt'rs Urrion, [1966) 2 :i.C.R. 498. 504, followed. s"
111
'
011
0
• Ltd.
MJs J.
K. Couou
Manufoclur~rs. L~d., Kurrpur , .. J. N. Tewari
A.l. R. 1959 All. o39 and BaNmu Electrtc Light arrtl Pouw Co. J.:d. Belrlupura
v. Guvtrllltltlrl of Uttar l'radtsh ami Othtrs. [1962] 1 L. L.J
14, overruled. ·
_
(c) ~ction 68 (1) of tbc U.P. Industrial Disputes A;t de~ls with a ~ettle
ment .amved at by agr~m~t _between th~ employer nnd workmen otherwise
than . m the course o~ con~tha!!on proceedtng. Sub·section · (2) provides that
after th~ set!lement IS amved .a.t •• the parties to th_e settlement or any one
of them may apply to the Coocil<ation Officer for reg<stration ot the settlemCilt.
In the context of au !H. (3) the word •may' should be rc~d us 'shall". Suh-
.ectjon (3) provides that while considering the question of the registration
qf a senlcmenl. the conciliation officer shall examine whether it is inexpedient
to do so on public ground affecting social justice or whether the settlement
bas ~n brought- about as a result of collusion. fraud or misrcprescn•.ation. In
the present case, the Conciliation Officer having had no say in the making
of tbc special agr~ment· the consent of the employee is meaningless.
439F.:.
440A]
( 4) It is true that a Labour Court may determine terms and conditions
of employment which may be inconsistent with a Standin~ Order; but in the
proent· cnse,· the reference did not give any such jurisdiction to the Labour
Court to determine the terms and conditions of employment of the wc.rkman.
[4408-c)
(S) (a) The appellant did not plead in its written statement before the
labour Court that the worlc. of the discharged emplo_yee WB;~ unsattsfactory
during the probationni-v period, nor did it lead a11~· ~VIde~ce m proo! of1 the
umati~factory work
The argume11t was olso not ra1std tn the Spec1:1l
e~ve
'
}d
be
"tt~d to raise the contentton
petition.
Therefore, the appellant cou
not
perm< ' .
r
of the
that since the discharge was occasioned by the unsau_sfactory ~0 ~440E-FJ
employee the Labour Court should not have ordered re-tnstatemen ·
·
:
.
r d" h gc not only
(b) -me· Labour Court may mterfcre With an o~d~r 5' t"
1
~c ;~t also when
when it was mode mala {.de or as a measure of v<cllm<sa 10 ;_"- to lead to the
it finds that it was arbitrary or capridous or ~o unreasonable£M& as there was
inference that it was not made bona fiJ~.
I~ t~e h~~~~~oyee was unsatis!acno -plea :~nd no evidence to show that theJwor f 0d~hargc is arbitrary. [441A-BJ
lory. rhe conclusion is obvious that the or er o
.
.
W k
and anotl<~r. [19631 2 L.L.J.
TtJia Oil MiiiJ Companv Lid. v. Its
or men
Th
Workmm and anorhu.
78 M fi f'rwrclr Eldn and Co. Pri~·att Ltd. '! · Bo':nbav v. V. A . .Robt/lt>W
}{ . /\.J.R. 1971 S.C. 2414 -and Air lndra Corporarwn,
·
·
~nd a11other, [19721 1 L .L.J. SOl. referred to.
and hence the special agree·
!The q~;~tion wherbe~ a Standi'.'st Order ~ l~w [44oc-D1
~~lent. In contravention of it, was v01d, not dec<dc •
-l
-l .
1_:
1!
• I
436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 S.C.R.
OvJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1698.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated April
19, 1968
of the Labour Court II Lucknow in Adjudication Case No. 3 of 1967
L.C. (I), LucknowfAdiudication Case No. 184 of 1967 L.C. (11)
Lucknow published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated August 10, 1968.
C. K. Daphtary, P. C. Bharatri and 0. S. Mathur, for the appellant.
S. C. Aggarwal and V.I. Francis, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivc~·ed by
OWIVEDI, J.-The Wesetrn India Match Company Limited, Bareilly
(hereinafter called the Company) is governed by the Industrial Employment {Standing Orders) Act, 1946 {hereinafter called the A~t). It
appears that it has a separate Standing Order for the Watch and Ward
Staff· According to the Standing Order, there are five categories of
workmen:
{1) Pe.rmanent,
(2) Probationer,
{3} Substitute,
(4)
Temporary, and {5) Appreiitice. A permanent workman is one "who
has conwleted a probationary period of two months as such and is
employed on a permanent post." A probationer is a workman "who is
provisionally employed to fill a
permanent
vacancy and has not
completed two months seryice". {emphasis added)
The Company appointed one Prem Singh as a watchman en Sep·
tember 1 •. 1965. The l~tter of appointment states that he would be
'.'on probation for a period of six months." We shall hereafter refer
to this contract of service as a "special agreement." The period of
probation expired on March 1, 1966, but he continued to serve on his
post. On April 13, 1966 the Company passed an order extending the
period of his probation by two months with r~trospective effect from
March 1, 1966. Nine d~ys later on April 22, 1966, the Company
passed this order: "the above watchman has been discharged with
effect from 1-5-1966 for the reasons mentioned below:
.
( 1) probation period not !lpproved, services are no
longer
required by the Company."
This order gave rise to an industrial dispute. The dispute was referred
for· adjudication by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Labour
Court (II), Lucknow. The referring order was made on April, 9, 1968.
The question referred to the Labour Court is :
"Whether the employers have terminated the
services of
the workman Shri Prem Singh, son of Shri Bhartu, Watchman T. No. 247, with effect from 1-5-1966, legally and/or
justifiably ? If not, to wnat relief is the workman concerned
entitled·"
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
Prem Singh was
represented
before the Labour Court by . tbe
H
Match~s Mazdoor Sangh, Bareilly. The case of the Sangh was that
the employment of Prem Singh on probation for six months was in
contravention of the Standing Order. It was maintained that on the
A
B
c
D
E
•
F
G
H
WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. l'. WORKMEN (Dwiredi J.)
437
expiry of two months Prem Singh automatically became a permanent
w~kman. It ":as also said that during the entire period of his proba~on Pre~ St~gh was never told by the Company that it was not
satisfied With his work. According to the Company, the term of six
months' probation was valid. It was. said that as his work was not
found satidactory, he was discharged.
The Labour' Court has found th-m t~e dischrtrgc was neither mala
fide nor an act of victimisation for trade union activities. However,
tl)e Labour Court has s·~t aside the order of discharge and has directed
his reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages.
This is
so, because it has taken the view that the t'!rm regcrding six monhs•
probation was in contravention of the Standing Order and was invalid.
It has held that on completing two months' probation Prem Singh
automatically became a permanent employee.
Shri Daphtary, counsel for the Company, has
submitted
that
the Labour Court has gone beyond the terms of reference. It is pointed
out that the Government Order of reference does not expressly empower the Labour Court to decide whether the teim regarding six
months' probati~n was .valid or invalid. In our view, the Labour
Court has not travelled beyond the terms of reference. It was called
upon to decide whether the order of discharge was legal and/or iusti-.
tied. The validity or invalidity of the discharge obviously depended
on the validity or invalidity of the term regarding six months' proba·-
tion: If this term was invalid the order of discharge also. would obvious~
ly be invalid.
The next submission of .Shri Daphtary is that the special agreement
is not inconsistent with ~e Standing Order. According to the Standing
Order, a workman shal). not be kept on probation for more than two
months .. If he has worked during these two months to the .satisfaction
of the Company, he becomes permanent.
But as a result of special
agreemeri ·., even though he has worked during these two mont!.s to the.
satisfaction of the Company, he will not be a permanent workrnaf!.
While the Standing Order says : "Confirm him on the expiry of two
months'', the special agreement says: ''No, wait till
the expiry of
six months." There is thus a confi.ict between them. They cannot coexist. So ~e are of opinion that the special agreement is inconsistent
with the standing Order to the extent of the additional four Il)Onths'
probation.
The terms of employment- specified in the Standing Order would
prevail over the corresponding terms in the contract of service in exia
·stence on the enforcement of the Standing Order. It was in effect so
held in the Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Shri Alladin. (1) Avery
India Ltd. v. Second Industrial Tribunal West Benga/.(2) and
th~
·united Provi~s Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Allahabad v. Their
Wor~·
men. (II). While the Standing Orders are in force, it is not permissible
to· the employer to seek statutory modification of them so that there
may be one set of Standing Orders for some employees and another
(I) [1970] 1 S. C. "R.. 808
(2) A. T. R. 1972 S. C. 1926
(3) [19721 2 S. C. C- 54
43S
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974] 1 S.C.R.
set ~or the rest of the employees.
Jn Salem Erode Electricity DistriA
butwu Company Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co.
Ltd. Employees Union(l), Gajendragadkar C. J. said:
:' (T)here is no scope for having two separate Standing Orders
lll respect to any one of them. Taketh~ case of classification
of workmen. It is inconceivable that there can be two separate Standing Orders in respect of this matter. What we have
B
said about classification is equally true about each one of the
other said clauses; and so, the conclusion appears to be
irresistible that the object of the Act is to certify Standing
Orders in respect of the matters covered by he Schedule; and
having regard to these matters, Standing Orders so certified
1;:,;ould be uniform and would apply to all wotkmen alike who
~re employed in any industrial e~tabliShment·"
C
·· It a -prior agreement, inconsistent with the Standing Orders will
not survive, an agreement posterior to and inconsistent with the Standing Order should als{} not prevail. Again, as the employer cannot
enforce two s~ts of . Standing Orders governing the classification of
workmen, it is also not open to him to enforce · simultaneously tbe
S'tanding Order regulating the classification of workmen and a special
&
·agreement between him an and individual workman c;ettling his cate·
gorisation.
In view of the decisions of this Court cited earlier, the decisions
in M/s ./_ K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. Kanpur v. J. N. Tewari(2) and
the Bo11wras Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. Berhlupura v. Goverir
ment of Uttar Pradesh and others(3 ) no longer lay down good law.
They take the view that notwithstanding the Standing Orders it is
·open to the employer to conclude an agreement with. an individual
workman which may be inconsistent with the Standing. Orders. These
decisions are overruled.
·
·
' In the sunny days of the market economy theory people sincerely
believed that' the economic law of demand .and· supply in the labour
·market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain between the employer
and the workman. Such a b~\rgain, they took it for granted,
would
secure fair terms and conditions of employment to the workman. This
Jaw they venerated as natural law. They had an abiding faith in · the
verity of this law.
But the experience of the working of this law
over a long period has belied their faith. Later generations discovet¢
that the workman did not possess adequate bargaining strength to r,erure
fair terms and conditions of service. When . the workmen also made
this disco..-ery, they organised themselves in trade unions and insisted on
collective bargaining with the employer. The advent of trade union
and collective bargaining created new problems of maintaining indusrial peace and production for the society. It was therefore considered
that the society ha~ also an interest in the settlement of the terms ~
employment of industrial labour. While formerly there were two parties
at the negotiating table the employer and the
workman, it is now
(1) [1966] 2 S. C_.R. 498 at p. 504.
(2) A. T. R. 1959 All. 639
(3) [1962] l L. L. J. 14.
E
G
H
•
_WESTERN INDIA MATCH ~. v. -WORKMEN (Dwivtdi j,)
439--
A:- . thought that there should also qe present a third-party the State as;
representinb . the interest of the society. · The Act gives effect to this i
new. thinking,· By. s.4 the Officer ¢rtifying the
Standing Order is.
directed to adjlldi.cate upon ''the fairness or. reasonableness, of the.
provisions of the Standing Order. The Certifying Officer is the statutory,
representative of the society. It seems to us that while adjudging the
fairness or reasonableness of any ·Standing Order, the Certifying
B:~ Officer. Should ~nsider a.n4 weigh the social interest in the· claims of
the employer and ·the. se<;ial interest in the· demands of the workmen.
-Se¢on 10 proyides the· mode of modifjlng. the Standing- Orders· The.
·emptoyer or the. workman. may apply_ to the Certifying Officer in the,
~bed manner for the modifica.Uon of the Standing Otders. Section.
'13 (2l,provides that an employer who does. any act ·in _contravention of.
the Standing .Order shall be punishable with .fine which. may extend m·
C ~ one fmndred rupees. It also provides for the imposition of a
further.
fine' in the case of a continuing offence. The fine may extend to twenty-;
five rupees for every day after the first during whith the offence-·
-~tinues.·
_
·
. '~ ,-Th~ special agreement, in so far as it' provides for 'additional fou'r
.months of probation, is an act in contravention of the Standing Order~
D ·· we· have already held that. It plainly follows from s~tions 4, 10 and
:_13(2) that the inconsistent part of the special agreement cannot pre·._
-vail over the Standing Order-. As long as. the Standing Order is in force,
it is binding on the Comp~y as well as ,the workme~ To uphol~ the
special agreement would mean giving a go by to the Acts principle
ot th•ee-party participation in the settlement of terJIL'\ of employment.
SO we are of opinion that the inconsistent part of the special agreement.
· E j is· indfective and unenforceable.
· ··
'
-. ~ ---It is_poin~ ~ton behalf ot the eompany thai ~.1s o£ the .indus-·
trial Disputes Act provides that any settlement between the employer~
aad the· workman is· binding on them. It is said that accordingly the
special agreement in the present case would be binding on Pr~_ Singq.:
F .. · lt.is not necessary to co~true s.18 in this case because it is governed'
by ~e provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. Section: ·
6B ( 1) of this Act . deals with a settlement arrived at by agreement
between· the enj.ploy_er and workmen otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding, SUb-section (2) thereof provides that after the'
settlement is ~ived at, the parties to the settleme1;1t or any one ofthem •may• apply to the Conciliation Officer of .the_ area concerned for
G • the. ret;istration of the settlement· Sub-section (3) is important. It pro-
\'ipes that while considering the question of the registration of a settle-·
ment. the Conciliation Officer shall examine whether it is inexpedient to·
do' so on public ground ~eetiog social justice or whether the settle-'
ment has been brought about as a result of colbersion, fraud or misrepre
sentation. We think that the word 'may' in su~tion (2) should be
read as 'shall' in the context of sub-section (3). If social justice is to
11: be ensured and if collusion, fraud or misrepresentation is to be eJiminated, it is necessary that every privately negotiated
settlement
should be submitted for registration to the Co~ciliation Officer. It may
re observed that the U. P. Act also insists on tbe . thre~ party
--------------------
. 4;·10
SUPREME COUlt.T REPORTS
{ 1974] 1 s.~ ..
p~icipation in the settlement of terms of employment. In the ·(~suit,
A
lhe Company cannot enforce the special agreement on the· pretext
that Prem Singh had voluntarily agreed to. it. The conciliation officer
having had no say in the making of this agreement, the - consent of
. Prem Singh is meaningless. _
- ·
·.
.
It is then said that· the Standing Order can be-modified in a suitable
B
~e by the Labour Co~.- In this connectio~ reliance is p~
on the
Management of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v •.
The Workmen(l), It is true that the Labour Court may determine.
term;;· and conditions of ·e~oym.ent which may-be inconsistent with
the Standjng O:der. But in the present case the referene did not .gi\·~ ·
jurisdiction to the Labour Court to determine terms · and
condit~ons
of employment of Prem Singh. The reference direaed the Labour Court~
to decide whether the discharge of Prem Singh from service as legal · C
justifiable.
·
·
·
Shri . Agarwala has argued that the Standing Order is ·a law and
aCcordingly the special agreement in contravention of it is . void In
. support of his argument he has relied on a nllOlber of decisions of this
Court · Shri Daphtary has argued to the conttary , arid has relied on
D
some other decisions. In the view that we have taken earlier, it is not
necessary -to consider- this question.· Accordingly, _we do not refer to
the authonties cited before us. . .
. ·
·.
··
. ,
,:
. Another contenti9n of · Shri Daphtary is that in the circumstances' ·
of this case the Labour. Court should not have made an order for
rtinstatement of Prem Singh. Stress is laid on the assertion in the order . E
· of discharge that his work during the entire probationary period was
not satisfactory. In support of his argumentShri Dapbtary has relied
on the Hindustan Steel Ltd. Rourkela v. Roy (A.K. and others)(%). ' ··
This d.:cision does not assist him, for in the case before us the Com·
pany did not plead in its written statement filed befcre the Labour Court
that the work of Prem Singh was unsatisfactory during the probationary .
period, nor did it lead any evidence in proof of _his unsatisfactory work.
P
The argument does not appear to have been raised in the Special
Leave Petition also. Accordingly, it is not possible to permit this argu~
ment to be raised now. (See Binny Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (3) and ,
tlie Management _of Panitole Tea "Estate v~ The Workmen(•).
·In-the end, Shri DaphtarY has urged that as the Labour CO~ ha!
f.Oun4 that the discharge of Prem Singh from service was neither mala
0 ·
fide nor a measure of victimisation, he should not have been reinstated •.
to service. Reliance is placed on the Tata Oil Mills Company-Ltd •. v.
Its Workmen and another(5)~ Mfs'Vranci& Elein and Co. PriVate Ltd. v.
The Workmen and another(8) and the Ai,...Jndia Corporation, Bombay
v. V. A. Rebellow and another(1 ). It is settled law now that. the.
_ (l) [19681 I S. C. R. 581
-(J) [1972] 1 L. L. J. 478
15) [19631 2 L. L. J. 78 ~
(2) [1970] 1 L L. J. 228
(4) (1971]3S.C;R~--774
(6) A. r: R. 1971 S.C. 2414
{7) (1972] 1 L. L:J. 501.
.
--~
H
A
B
f
I
WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. v. WORKMEN (Dwivedi /.)
441
Labour Court may interfere with the order of discharge where it is
satisfied that it was made mala fide or was a measure of victimisation or
unfair lab;:,ur practice. It has also been held by this Court that the
Labour Court may interfere with the order of discharge if it finds that ·
the order is arbitrary or capricious· or so unreasonable as to lead to the
inference that it is not made bona fide. As there was no plea and no
evidence to show that the work of Prem Singh was unsatisfactory, the
conclusion is obvious that the order of discharge is arbitrary. Accordingly, the Labour Court could interfere and make an order of reinstate,
ment.
There is no force hi this appeal and accordingly it is dismissed with
costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismi.ssed.