# '456 'PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1983] 1 S.C.R. 456
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1982-09-18
- **Bench:** P.N. Bhagwati, Baharul Islam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/456-people-s-union-for-democratic-rights-and-others-v-union-of-india-others-8577
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

•
Public Interest Litigation, scope and need for-Violation of various labour 4
laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work connected with the
\T_
Asian Games like Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 24, Minimum wages Act, 1948,
Equal Remuneration Act. The employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970, Interstate Migrant workman (Regulation of Employment and conditions of Service) Act,
1970 and contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970-Locus~standi-
•
Maintainability of the writ and remedial relief that could be granted-Duties of
Court regarding sentencing in cases of violation of Labour Laws-Constitution of ·
India Articles 14, 23, 24 and 32--Scope of Article 23 Meaning of''begar" Duty of
State when violation of Arts. 11, 23 and 24 is complained.
Petitioner No. 1,, is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting
democratic rights. It c'ommissioned three social scientists for the purpose of
investigating. and inquiring into the conditions under which"the workmen engaged
in the various Asiad Projects were working. Based on the report made by these
three social scientists after personal investigati~n and study the 1st petitioner addressed a letter to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati complaining of viola#on of
.... various labourlaws by the reSpondents' and/or their agents and seeking interfe--
rence by the Supreme Court to render social justice by means of appropriate
directions to thC affected workmen. The' Supreme Court 'treated the letter as a
writ petition on the judicial side and issued notice; to· the Union of India, Delhi
Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.
The allegations in the petition were :
(i) The various authorities to whom the execution of the different
projects was entrusted engaged contractors for the purpo~e of carrying out the construction work of the projects and they were
registered as principal emploYers under section 7 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and~AboJition) Act; 1970. These contractors
engaged workers through "Jamadars" who brought them from
different parts of India particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh and Orissa and paid to these Jamadars the minimum wage
of Rs. 9.25 per day pe·r worker and not to the workmen direct. The
Jamadars deducted Rupee one p~r day per worker as t~eir commis-
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.(ii)
PEOPLE'~ UNION v. UNION OJ! INDIA:
. 457
sion with the result that there was a violation of the provisions Or
... the Minimum Wages Act;
.
Th~.,provisions of Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated as'
the women w~>rkcrs wei:e being paid RS. 7/- per day, the balance of
the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by . the
Jamadars:
(iii) There was violation of Article 24 of the Constitution and of the
prov.isions of the Employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970 in
asmuch 3.s children below 'the age of 14 years were employed by the
contractors in the construction work of the various projects;
(iv) There was viOlation of the· provisions of the Contract Labour
(Regulations. and Abolition) Act, 1970 which resulted in depriva·
tion and exploitation ~f the Workers ~nd denial of their right to
proper living condition and medical and other facilities un'der the
Act; and
(v) The provisions of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, though brought
into force as far back as 2nd Octobe~ 1980 in the Union Territory
of Delhi were not implemented by t~e Contractors.
AlloWing the petition, the Court.,
HBLD: 1:1. Public.interest litig'ation which is strategic arm of the legal
aid movement and which is int~nded to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses: who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different
- kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is essentially of an
adversary character where there is a dispute between two li1igating parties, one
making claim or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing
such claim or resisting

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'456
'PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS AND OTHERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
September 18, 1982
[P.N. BHAGWATI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]
•
Public Interest Litigation, scope and need for-Violation of various labour 4
laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work connected with the
\T_
Asian Games like Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 24, Minimum wages Act, 1948,
Equal Remuneration Act. The employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970, Interstate Migrant workman (Regulation of Employment and conditions of Service) Act,
1970 and contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970-Locus~standi-
•
Maintainability of the writ and remedial relief that could be granted-Duties of
Court regarding sentencing in cases of violation of Labour Laws-Constitution of ·
India Articles 14, 23, 24 and 32--Scope of Article 23 Meaning of''begar" Duty of
State when violation of Arts. 11, 23 and 24 is complained.
Petitioner No. 1,, is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting
democratic rights. It c'ommissioned three social scientists for the purpose of
investigating. and inquiring into the conditions under which"the workmen engaged
in the various Asiad Projects were working. Based on the report made by these
three social scientists after personal investigati~n and study the 1st petitioner addressed a letter to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati complaining of viola#on of
.... various labourlaws by the reSpondents' and/or their agents and seeking interfe--
rence by the Supreme Court to render social justice by means of appropriate
directions to thC affected workmen. The' Supreme Court 'treated the letter as a
writ petition on the judicial side and issued notice; to· the Union of India, Delhi
Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.
The allegations in the petition were :
(i) The various authorities to whom the execution of the different
projects was entrusted engaged contractors for the purpo~e of carrying out the construction work of the projects and they were
registered as principal emploYers under section 7 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and~AboJition) Act; 1970. These contractors
engaged workers through "Jamadars" who brought them from
different parts of India particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh and Orissa and paid to these Jamadars the minimum wage
of Rs. 9.25 per day pe·r worker and not to the workmen direct. The
Jamadars deducted Rupee one p~r day per worker as t~eir commis-
-
••
'
.(ii)
PEOPLE'~ UNION v. UNION OJ! INDIA:
. 457
sion with the result that there was a violation of the provisions Or
... the Minimum Wages Act;
.
Th~.,provisions of Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated as'
the women w~>rkcrs wei:e being paid RS. 7/- per day, the balance of
the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by . the
Jamadars:
(iii) There was violation of Article 24 of the Constitution and of the
prov.isions of the Employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970 in
asmuch 3.s children below 'the age of 14 years were employed by the
contractors in the construction work of the various projects;
(iv) There was viOlation of the· provisions of the Contract Labour
(Regulations. and Abolition) Act, 1970 which resulted in depriva·
tion and exploitation ~f the Workers ~nd denial of their right to
proper living condition and medical and other facilities un'der the
Act; and
(v) The provisions of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, though brought
into force as far back as 2nd Octobe~ 1980 in the Union Territory
of Delhi were not implemented by t~e Contractors.
AlloWing the petition, the Court.,
HBLD: 1:1. Public.interest litig'ation which is strategic arm of the legal
aid movement and which is int~nded to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses: who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different
- kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is essentially of an
adversary character where there is a dispute between two li1igating parties, one
making claim or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing
such claim or resisting such relief.
Public interest litigation-is brought before
the .court .not for the purpose of
enfo~ing the right of one individual '
against another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation. but it is intended to promote and indicate public intCrest which demands that violations of
constitutional or legal rights of Jarge number of people who are poor, ignorant or
'\.,.in a socially or ecoiiomically disadv3.ntaged Position should ~ot go unnoticed and
unredressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one
of the , essential elements of pubJiC interest i~ any democratic form of Government. [467 C-F)
l :2. The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection of the law must
,be available only to a fortunate ~few or that the law should be alJowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under
the guise of enforcement of their civil and political rights. The poor too have
civil ~nd political rights and the Rule of law is meant for them also, though today
· it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol
kings have the Fundamental rights to carry on their busin~ss and to fatten their
purses by exploiting the consuming public, ~rtainly the "chamaras" to belonging
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458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1[1983] i S.C.R.
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to the lowes\ strata of society have Fundamental Right to earn on honest living
through their sweat and toil. ·Large oUfubers of men, women and children who
constitute the bulk of an population are today living a sub human existence in
conditions of object poverty; utter grinding poverty has broken their back and.
sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and economic
system. ·Nor can these poor aitd deprived sections of humanity afford to enfotce
theifcivil and political rights. [467 F-H; 468 A-DJ
1 :3, The only solutiOn of t;naking civil .i~d politica_l rights meaningful to
these large sections of society would be to remake the material conditions and
restructure the social and economic order so that they may be able to realise the·
economic, social and cultural rights. Of course, the task of restructuring the
social and economic order so that the social and economic right.becOme a
meaningful reality for the poor and lo.;ly sections of the community is one which
legitimately be!Ongs to the legislature and the executive but mere initiation of.
social and economic rescue prograffimes by the executive arid the legislature would
, not"be eno~gh and.it is only through muiti~dimensional strategies including public
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interes't litigation that these social and economic rescue programmes can be made
effective. [468 G-Hi 469 B-D]
1:4. Public interest liii~ation, is essentia!Jy a cooperative or collaborative
e'ffort on the part .of the petitioner, the State or public authority and the Court to
secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privilegea
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social
justice -to them. The State or public authority against whom public interest litiga·
tion is brought should be as much interested·in ensurirtg basic human rights, cons·
titutional as well as legal, to those who are iq. a socially and econo~ically disadvantaged position, as the petitioner who brings the public interest litigation before
the court. The State or public authority which is arrayed as a respondent in
public interest litigation shculd, in fact, welcome it, as it would gjve it an oppor·
tunity to right a wrong or to redress an .injustice done to th~ p0or and weaker sections of the community whose welfare is and must be tlie prime coOcem of the
State or the public authority. [469 D-F]
1 :5. The legal ~id movement and public interest -litigation s~ek to bring
justice to these .forgotten specimens of humanity who constitute the bulk of the
citizens of India: and who are really and truly the "People of India wQo gave to _ ·'
theffiselves this magnificient Constitution. Pendency of large afrears in the courts
cannot be any reason for i;Ienying access of justice to the poor and weaker sections
of the community. [470 E-F]
'
1 :6. The time has now come when tbe courts must become the courts for
the poor and struggling masses of this country. _,.They must shed their character
as upholders of the established order and the stritus quo. They must be sensitised
to the need-of doing justice to the large masses of people to whom justice bas
, been denied by a cruel and heartless society for, generations. Th~ realisation must
come to them that social justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and
. it i~ their sole'mn duty under the
C~nstinition to enforce the baSic human rights
of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and actively help in the
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. PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)
459
realisation.of the constitutional goals. This new change has to come if the
judicial system is to become·an effective instrument of social justice for without'
it, it cannot survive for long. FortunatE~ly thi~ change is gradually taking place and
public interest litigation is playing a large part in bringin.g about this change. It
is through public interest litigation that the problems of_ the poor
ar~ now
coming to the forefront and the ~ntire theatre of the law is changing. It holds out
great possibilities for the futQ.re. This writ peiition is on~ su~h ins ta nee of public'
in~rest liti~otion .. [470 G-H; 471 A-CJ
2. It is true that construction industry does not find a· plai;e on the schedule to the Employment of Childfen Act, 1938 and the Prohibition enacted in
section 3 sub~section ( 3) 'Of that Act against the emploYment of a child who bas
not completed his fourteenth year cannot apply ·to em.ploymCnt in construction
industry. But, apart hltogether frOm the requirement of Convention No. S9'of\
the International Labour Organisation and ·ratified byrlndia, Article ~4 of the
Constitution provides that no child below the age of 14 shall bC employed to work
in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment. This is
a coristitutional prohibition which, even if not followed up by appropriate lcgis-
. lation, must ~p·erate prOpiro vi"gore and cori.struction work Deing ·plainly a:D.d.
indlibitably a hazardous employment, it is cle8r that by reason of tbi~ Constitutional pfohibition, no child beJOw the age of 14 years can be allowed tO be cnga ..
ged in construction ·work. Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of specification of constructio.~ industfy in the Schedμle to the Employffient of Children ~Act
1938, no child below the age of 14 years. cap be employed in construction work
and the Union of lndia as also every state Governme11l must ensure that this
const!tutional mandate is ll~t violated in any part of the CoUntry. [474 A-Fl, .
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3. Magistrates and Judges in the country must view violaVons of labour
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laws with strictness and wheneVer any violations of labour laws lire established
before them, they should punish the errant employers by , imposing· adequate
pu~ishment'. The labour laws are en:1;cted for improving the conditions of workers
and the emploYers cannot be allOwed tO buy off immunity against violations of
labour laws by paying a paltry fine which they' would not mind paying, because
\by violating the labour laws they would be making profit which would far exceed
the amount of. the fin~. If violations of labour laws _are to be~ puni~hed with
If'
meagre fines, it .. would be impossible {o enSure observance of the labour IawS and
the·labdur l:iws would be reduced. to nullity. They would remain merely paper
tigers without any .teeth or claws. [476 E-H]
•
4:1 ~ It is true that the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition
is in regard to the violations of the provisions of ·various labOur laws designed
for the wdfare of workmen, and therefore from a strictly traditional point of view
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it wollld be only the workmen whose legal rights are· violated who would be . ..-
entitled to approach the court for judicial redress .• But the traditional rule of
standing which confines access to the,judiCial process only to those to whom legal
iQ.Jury is caused or legal wrong is done has now been jeitisoned by the Supreme
Court and the narrow ·confines within which the rule of standing was imprisoned
for long years as a result af inheritance ·.bf the Anglo-sax on system of jurispruH
dence. have been broken a~~ : new
~imensi9n has beCn _given to the doctrine ?f (
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1963) I s.c.R.
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locus standi which has revoJutionised the whole concept of access to justice in a
way not known before to ~he Western System of jurisprudence. [477 F-H]
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4:2. Having regard to the peculiar socio-economic conditions prevailing
in .the country where there is considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance
obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would ~esult
in closing the doors of justice to the poor and deprived sections oft.he community if the traditional rule of standing evolved by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that
only a perSon wronged can sue for judicial redress were to be blindly adhered to
and followed, and it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by relaxing
this tr!tditional rule of standing in order that justice may become easily available
to the lowly and the lost. [478 A-C]
·
4:3. Where a person or class Of persons to whom legal injury is caused or
le8:al wrong is done is by reason of pov!']'ty, disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position Dot able to approach the Court for judicial redress, any
member of the public acting bonafide and not out of any extraneous motivation
may move the Court for judicial redress of the legal injury or wrong sufferred by
such person or class of persons and the judicial process may be set in motion by
any public spirited individual or institution even by addressing a letter to the
cOurt. Where judicial redress
is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong
suffered by a person or class of Qersons who by reason of poverty, disability or
socially o.r economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court
and the court is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by addressing a
letter drawing the attention of the court to such legal injury or legal Wrong, court
would ca.st aside all technical rules of procedure and entertain the Jetter as a
wfit petition on the judicial side and take ~ction upon it .. [478 C-F]
.
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Here, the workm'en whose rights are said to have been violated and to
whom a Jife of basic human dignity has been denied are poor, ign~rant, illiterate
humans who, by reason of their poverty and social and economic disability, arc
unable· to approach tbe courts for judicial redress and hence the petitiOI]ers have,
under the liberalised rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the pr~sent writ
petition espousing the cause of the workmen. The petitioners are not acting
ma/afidt or out of e1'traneous motives since the first petitioner is admittedly an
organisation dedicated to the protecting and cnfOrcement Or Fundamenta.J Rights
and making Directive Pi::inciples of State Policy enforceable and jus-ticiable.
There can be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public service that the present
litigation has been brought by the petitiOners and it is clearly maintainable.
{478 G-H; 479 A-BJ
4:4. The UniOn,..of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Dcve-.
Jopment Authority cannot escape their obligation to the workmen to ensure
observance of the provisions of various labour law by its contractors and
for non-compliance wit!! the laws by the contractors, the workmen would clearly
have a cause of actions against them as pri~cipal employers. So far as to Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolit_ion) Act, 1970 is conce[ned, section 20 is cJear
that if any amenity required to be provided u.nder sections 16 to-18 or 1!1 for the
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PEOPLE'S UNION V. UNION OF INDIA
461
benefit of- the workmeri employed in an establishment is not Provided by the conA
tractor, the· obligation to provide such amenity rests on the priticipal employer. [479 C-D]
Sections 17'and 18 of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of _Service) Act 1979 also make ·principal employer
_liable to make payment of_the wages to the wages to the migrant workmen emplo-
. yed bY, the contractor as also to pay the allowances provided) .under sectiOns 14
~
and 15 and _to provide the facilities specified in section 16 of such migrant workmen. [479 F-G]
'
Article 24 of the Constitution embodies a Fundamental Right which is
plainly and indubitably enforceable against every one and by reason of its compulsive mandate, no ·one can employ a child below the age of 14 years in a
hazardous . employment. Since, construction . work is a hazardous· employment, no child below the· age of 14 years can be employed in constructions work
and therefore, not only are the contractors under a constilutional mandate
not to em Ploy any child . below the. age of 14 years, but it is also the duty of the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority
to ensure that this constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors to whom
they have entrusted the construction work of the v3rioUs Asiad Projects. Similarly the respondents must ensuie compliance with by the contractors of the Provisions of the 'equal Remuneration Act, 1946 as they express.the principle of
equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. [479 G-H; 480 A-DJ
No doubt, the contractors are liable to pay the minimum wage to the
workmen employed by them under the Minimum Wage Act 1948 but the Union of
India. the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority who havo
entrusted the construction work to the con~ractors .would equaHy·be resPonsiblc
to ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the workmen by their contractors.
[480 G-H]
5:1. It is true thatlthe present writ petition cannot be maintained by the
petitioners unless they can sh'ow some violation of a Fundamental Right, for it
is only for enforcement right that a writ petition can be maintain~d in this Cou'rt
under Article 32. But, certainly the following comPlaints do legitimately form thC
subject matter of a writ petition under Article 32; namely, (i) the complaint of
.. violation of Article 24 based on the averm'ent that children below the age of 14
years are employed in the construction work of the Asiad Projects, (ii) allegation
of non-observance of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration )\.ct ~946, is in
effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle of equality before the
law enshrined in Article 14; and (iii) the complaint of non-observance of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 ancJ, the Interstate Migrant Workmen (Regulations of Employment and Conditions of Service),
Act 1979 as it is a complain't'relating to violation of Article 21. !'iow the rigbts'and
benefits conferred on the workmen employed by a contractor under the provisions
of the Contract· Labour (Regulation and
Ab~lltion Act 1970 and the Inter-St.ate
Migrant Workmen Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act ·
1979 which became enforceable w.e.f. 4-6-1982 are clearly intended to ensure basic
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SUPREME CoUilT REPORTS
[!983] I s.c.a.
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human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these
. rights and benefits to which they, are entitled under the provisions of these two pieces of social welfare legislation, that would clearly be a violation of Articl~ 21 by
the Union of India, the.Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority which, as principal employers, are n1ade statutorily responsibl~ for securing
suCh rights and benefits to tbe workmenj and' (iv) the complaint in regard to nonpayment'"ar minimum wage to the workmen under the Minimum Wages Act 1948,
8
is also one relating to breach of a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 23
which is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen.
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[481 D -H; 482 A-Fl
Maneka G,andhi v. Union_ of lndiq, [1978] 2 SCR 663; Francis Coralie Mullin
v. The Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi & Others, [1981] 2 SCR 516,
applied.
5:2. Many of the fu!-ldatnental rights enacted in Part III opei:ate as limitation~· on the power of the State and impose negative obligations on the State not
to encroach on individual liberty aod they are enforceable only against the State.
But there are Certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution which are
enforceable against the whole w~rld and they are to be found inter alia in Articles
17, 23 and 24. [483 C-D]
.
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,5:3.
Article 23 is clearly designed to protect the individual not only
against the State but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is nbt limited
in its application against the State but it prohibits ''traffic in human beings and
·begar and other similar forms of fofced Jabour" ptactised by anyone else. -:rbe
prohibition against "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of
forced labour" is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, total in its effect
a~d'an pervasive in its range and it is enforceable not only against the State but
also against any other person indulging in any such practice .. [ 484 G-H; 485 A]
.
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5:4. The word ''begar" in Article 23 is not~ word of common~Use in
English language, bllt a word of Indian origin which like many other words has
found its way·. in English vocabulary. It is a form of forced labour under which
3: person is compelled, to work without receiving any re?1uneration. Begar is thus
clearly a film of forced labour.· [ 485 E-G]
.,,
S. Vasudevan v. s.b. Mil/al AIR 1962 Born. 53 applied.
5:5. It is not merely 'begar• which is constitutionally prohibited by
A'rticle 23 but also all other similar forms, of forced labour.· Article 23 strikes
at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itsClf, becatse it is violative of ·
human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. To contend tbat exacting
le.hour by passing some remuneration, though it be inadequate will not attract
the provisions of Article ~3 is to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced Jabour enacted in Article 23. The contention is not only ill;:
founded, but does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that when interpreting the P{OVisions of the
Constiiution conferring·fundamental rights, the. attempt of the Court should be.
· to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental 'rights rather than to attenuate
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PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)
463
-theit meaning and content. The Constitutio~ makers did not intend to strike
only at certain for.ms of (orced labour leaving
it~ open to the socially or econonlically powerful sections of the commuri.ity to explpit the poor and weaker
Sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. There could be no logic or
reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another
Without receiving any remunercition at an', . it should be regarded 1,\5. a pernicious
practice sufficient to attract the-con.demnation of Artiele 23, but if some remuneration is paid for .it, then it should be outside the i,nhibition· of~tbat Article. To
intCrpret Article 23 as contended would be reducing Article 23 to a m~re rope of
sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a .person
.belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labour or service
frOm a person belongillg to the deprived and vulnerable sectioQ_.of the community
by paYing a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Art ..
23. It would not be right to place on·the language of ·Article 23 an interpretation which would emasculate its beneficient provisions aiid defeat the very purpose of.enacting them. Article 23 is'' intended to ·abolish every fofm o( forced
lobour. [486 E·H; 487 A.DJ
5:6. ' The words ''other similar forms of forced labour" are' used in
Article 23 riot with a view to importing the particular characteristic of 'beg·ar'
that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any rembneration
but with a view to bringing withii;l the scope and ambit o~ that Article alt other
forms of forced labour and since 'begar' is· one form of forced Jabour, the ConSti-\
tution makers 'used tbe words '"other similar forn1s of forced labour". If the
i-equire":'ent that labour or work should be exacted without any reo:i.un~ration ·
were imported in other foqns of force.:i labour. they would straight~away coine
·within the meaning of the word 'begar' ~nd in that event there would be no need
to have the additional words "otbe. similar forms of forced labour." These
words woUJd be rendered futile~and n1~:1ningiess and it is a well recognised rule of
intefpretation' that the court should :ivoid. ·a construction which has the effect of
rendering any words used by the leg;s a'ture superfluous redundant. [487 E~G]
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The object of adding these words was clearly to expand the· reach and
content of Article 23 by including, in addition to 'begaf', other forms of forced
labour within the prohibition of that Article. Every form 'of forced labou; -
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'begar', or o~herwise, is within ·the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no
diffeience whether the person who is f'orced to give his labour or servic~ to
another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paiCL labour supplied
by a persOn \1.:ould be hit by Article 2~ if it is forced labour, that is; labour supplied
hot willingly but as a result o·f force or' compuJsion. For example, where a
· person has entered into a contract of ser,vice with another for a period
J of thre¥ years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before the
· expifation of the- period of three years, if a IaW were to 'provide that in such a
case the cOntract s,hat'I be specifically enforc~d and he. shall be co~pelled to
serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour
and sU.ch a law would be void as offending. Article 23. That _is why specific
perfon;naace of a contr~ct of service 'cannot bC: enforced against an employee
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and the employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve
the employer. Of course, if there is a breach of the contract of service, the
employee would be liable to pay damages to the employer but he cannot be
forced to continue_ to serve the employer without breaching the injunction of
Article 23. (487 H; 488 A·D]
Baily v. A_alabama, 219 US 219:55 Law Ed. 191; quoted with approval,
5:7. Even if a person has contracted with another to perform strvice and
there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even
remuneration, he cannot be forced by compulsion of law or ·otherwise, to continue
to perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition of
A_rticle 23, .which strikes at every form of forced lab~ur even if it has its origin in
a contract voluntarily entered into by tbe person obligated to provide labour ,or
service, for tbe reasons, namely; (i) it offends against human dignity to compel a
pc:rson to provide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even
though it be breach of the contract entered into by him; (ii) there should be no
serfdom or involuntary setvitude in a free democratic India which respects the
dignity of the individual and the worth of the human per..son; (iii) in a country
like India
w~ere there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no
equality of bargaining power, a contract of service m3y appear on its face 'Volun~
tary but it.may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering into the contract
the employee by reason of his economically helpless condition, may have been
faced with Hobson's choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms
dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a traVesty of justice to hold
the employee in suCh a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to
serve the employCr even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggra~ ·
vate the inequality and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers
on account of his ecoliomically disadvantaged position and lend the authority of
law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the econoibically power~
fol employer. Article 23 therefore, provides ..... that no one shall be forced to provide
labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contractor of
service. [490 C-H]
Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4:88_ Lawyers Edn. 1095; referred to.
-5:8. Where a person provides labour or services to another for remuneration which is Jess tha~ ihe minimu~ wage, the labour or service provided bY him
clearly faJJs within the scooe and ambit. of the words "forced labour" under
Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement
of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment
of t,!le minimum wage to him so that the labour or service providel,1 by him ceases
to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied. [492 F-G]
5:9. Ordinar1ly no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimu~ wage, when he knows that under the law he is
entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. .Therefore when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remu~
neration which i~ lc::ss ·tb(\.n the ~inimu~ ·wa~e, b<i is acting under the force of
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PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA
465
some compulsion whi~h drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is
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entitled under Jaw to receive. What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour' that
is labour or service which a· person is forced to provide." [491 B-D]
5:10. 'Force' which would inake such labour Or service cforced labow'
may arise in seve;a.1 ways. It may be physical force which may-compel a Person
to- provide labour br service to another or it may be force exerted through a legill
provision such as ~ provisio~ for imprisonmeOt Or fine in case the empioyee fails
to provide Jabour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger
and poverty, want and destitution. Any · factof which deprives a person of a
choice of alternative and compels him to adopt one particular course Of actioD
may properly be regarded as 'force' and if labour or servic~ is compelled as a
result of such 'force', it would be 'forced labour'. Where a person is suffering
from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to
feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding
poverty has broken his back and reduced him to.a state Of htlpl<5~Dt:~5 and despair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his
poverty, he would. have no choice but to ·accept aD.y work that comes his, way,
even if the remuneration offered to hirr1 is Jess than the minimum wage. He
would be in no Position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept
what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent -
with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or ser'(ice provided by him would be clearly 'forced labour'.
The word 'forced' should not be read in a ~arrow and restricted manner so as to
be confined only. to physical .or legal 'force' particularly when the national
eharaCter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new soci~list republic where there will be -socio-economic justice for all and e'\'ery one shall have the
right tO work, to education and to adequate meariS of livelihood. The constitu-
.tion makers have given u.s one cf the most remarkable documents in ltistory for
ushering in a new socio-economic order and the ConstitutiOn which they have
forged for us has a·sociaJ purpose and an economic mission and, .therefore, every
word or phrase in the Constitution n1ust be interpreted in1a manner which would
3dvancc thi.;. socio-economic Objective of the ConstitutioD. It is a fact that in a
capitalist society economic circumstances e.xert much greater pressure on an individual in driging him to a particular .. course of action than phYsical comprilsio.n
or force of legislative provi.sion. The word 'force' must therefore be construed
to include not only physical or legal force but force arising from the compulsion
of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in
•want and compels him to provide labour or service even though.the remuneration
received for it is lesS than the minimum wage. Of course, if a person provides
labour or service to another agains't receipt of the minimum wage, it would not
be possible 'ro say that the labour or service provided by him is 'forced labour'
because he gets what he is entitled under Haw to receive. No inference can reasonably be drawn in sue:h a case that h.e iS forced to provide labour or serVice for the
simple reason that would be providing labour or sefvice against receipt of what
is lawfully payable to him just likC any ,other person who is not under. the force
of any compulsion.· [491 D-H; 492 A-El
6. Wherever any fundamentl\1 right which i~ ~nforceable against pri~ate
individual~ !JUCh a~~ for example, 4 fupd4mental
ri~ht enacted in Articl.e l7 or :?:3
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or 24 is being vio1ated. it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take
necessary steps for the putpose of interdicting such violatiOn and ensuring observance of th.e fundamental right b:Y the private individual who is transgreSsing the·
same. The fact that the. person whose fundamental right is violated can always
approach the court for the purp~se of Cnforcem'ent of bis fundamental ·right. cannot absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see ih-at there is no
violation of the fundamental right of such person, particularly when he belongs to
the weaker sectio.n of humanity and.is unable to wage a legal battle against a
strong.and powerful opponent who
1 is exploitin'g him. [493 A-DJ
ORIGINAL JurusmcTION: Writ Petition No. 8143 or'1981.
(Unde~ article 32 of the Constitution of India)
Govind
Mukhoty in
person and A.K. Ganguli for the
petitioner.
Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. I.
N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondents Nos. 5
and 6.
Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Respondent No. 7.
The Judgment of the Court was' delivered by
BHAGWATI, J. This is a writ petition brought by way of public'
interest litigation in order to ensure. observance of the provisions of
various Jabour· laws in relation to workmen. employed in the construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games.
The 111atter was . brought to the attention of the Court by the !st
petitioner which is an organisation formed for the purpose of pro•
tecting democratic rights by ;.,eans of a letter addressed to one of us
(Bhagwati, J .). The letter was based on a report made by a team of
three social scientists who were commissioned by the Jst petitioner
for the 'purpose of investigating and inquiring into the conditions
under which the workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects
were working. Since the Jetter, ·addressed by the. I st petitioner was
based on the report made by three social scientists after personal
investigation and study, it was treated as a writ petition on the judic
cial side and. notice was· issued upon it inter alia to the Union of
India, Delhi Development Authorityand Delhi Administration which
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PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)'
467
were arrayed as respondents to the writ petition. These respondents
filed their respective· affidavits in reply to the allegatio~s contained
-~
in the writ petition and_ an affidavit was filed on behalf of the peti·
tioner in rejoinder to the affidavits in reyly and the writ petiti~n was
argued before us on the basis of these pleadings.
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Before we proceed to deal with the facts giving rise to this writ
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petition, we may repeat what we have said earlier in various orders
made by us from time to time dealing with public interest litigation .
We wish to point out with all tlie emphasis at our command tllat
public interest litigatfon which is a strategic arm of the legal aid
movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach or
. the poor ~asses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity,
.is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional __
litigation which is essentially of an adversary character where there
. is a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or .seek·
ing reljef against the other. and that other opposing such claim or
resisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the
court not for the purpose of enforcing .the right of one individual
against another as happens in ti,e case of ordi;,ary litigation, but it
is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands_
that violations of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of
people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. That
would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one of the
essential elements of public interest in any democratic form of
government. The Rule of Law doe_s not mean that the protection
of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law
should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for. protecting and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement
of their civil and political· rights. The p9or too have civil and politi.
cal rights and the Rule of -Law is meant for them also, though today
it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and
the alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry on their business and to.fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public,
have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata of society nd
Fundamental Right to earn an honest liv.ing through their sweat ·and
toil ? The former can approach the courts ~with a formidable .army
of distinguished lawyers paid in four or five figures per day and if
t\leir right to exploit is upheld against the government under the
label of Fundamental Ri(lht, the courts are praised for their boldness
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and courage and their independence and fearlessness are applauded
and acclaimed. But, if the. Fundamental Right of the. poor and
helpless victims of injustice is sought to be enforced by public
interest litigat~on, the so called champions of human rights frown
upon it as waste of time of the highest court in the land, which,
according to them; should not engage itself in such small and trifling
matters.
Moreover, these self-styled hum.an fights activists rorget
that civil anil political rights, priceless and invaluable as they are for
freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast masses of
our people. Large numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk of our population are today living a sub-human
existence in conditions of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has
broken their back' and sapped tbeir ·moral fibre.
They have no faith
in.