# 48!> SHAM LAL & ORS. ETC v. AMAR NATH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 489
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-09-17
- **Bench:** V. Bhargava, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/48-sham-lal-ors-etc-v-amar-nath-ors-4851
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Stridhana-Hindu widow leaving property not shulka-·
Mar;lage in approved form~rder of succession to property.
The rules relating to succession to Stridhana, other than shulka, of a
Hindi.I woman who was married in an approvl.'d
form of marriage are·
stated in Yajnyawalkya's text as : 'her kinsmen take it, if she die without
issue·. The order of succession was elaborated in the Mitakshara, which·
was translated by Colebrooke as : (i) unmarried daughter, (ii) married'
daughter who is unprovided for, (iii) married daughter who is provided
for, (iv) daughter's daughter, (v) daughter's son, ~vi) son, (vii) son's son,.
and (viii) lf there be none of these the stridhana then !JOOS to her hlli--
band, and if he is dead, to the husband's heirs.
In the present case, a Hindu widow, who was married in an approved
form of marriage died leaving stridhana which was not .'\hufka.
She did
not leave behilid any of the heirs mentioned in items
(i) to (vii)
but
there was a pre-deceased son's daughtett.
On the question of preference·
between the son's daughters and her husband's brother''s son (who was;
the husband's nearest heir).
'
HELD : (i) Colebrooke's translation has been accepted by the Judicial
Committee and Hindu scholars as bringing out correctly the m""'1ing of
the relevant passages in the Mitakshara, and it is now weU .. ettled that the
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stridhana of a Hindu woman governed by Mitakshara passes in the order
mentioned in the. Mitakshara, [496 H; 497 A-Cl
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Blmacharya Bin
Venkappacharya v. Ramcharya Bin
Bhinracharya,.
I.LR.' '.33 Born. 452, referred to.
(2) The contention that the expression 'without issue' in Yajnywalkya
was elaborated as 'lea\ing no progeny' by the Mitakshara, and that therefore the heirs (i) to (vii) should be understood as only illustrations of the
expression 'progeny' and hence, son's daughters are not excluded
from
the expression 'progeny', is opposeJ to the commenta·ries of Narada,
Gautama and other commentators, and to the decisions of the Judicial
Commitlee and the High Courts rendered for over a century. [497 E-H)
(3) In the matter of succession to stridhana propinquity is neither the
scile nor a principal test as shown by the fact that daughter's daughter and
daughter's son succeed in preference to the son. [498 B-C]
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 2 S.C.R
( 4) The rule of interpretation that the masculine includes the feminine
and therefore 'son's son• includes 'son's
daughter', is inapplicable,
be·
cause, 'daughter"s daughter' is shown taking
prec~dence over 'daughter's
son'. [489 EJ
(5) The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, applies to the
separate property left by a Hindu male and not to the property of a Hindu
female. [500' C-D]
~Kuniar Raghava Sure1ulra Salli v. Babui La1.-'hn1i Kuer, (1939) 1. L.R.
18 Pat. 590 and Baj Kesserbai v. H1111s Raj Morarji & A11r. L.R. 33 I.A.
176, distinguished.
A1111ago11da Nathgouda Patil v. Co11rt of Wards, [1952] S.C.R.
208.
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## Text

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48!>
SHAM LAL & ORS. ETC.
v.
AMAR NATH & ORS.
September 17, 1969
[V. BHARGAVA AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Hindu Law-Stridhana-Hindu widow leaving property not shulka-·
Mar;lage in approved form~rder of succession to property.
The rules relating to succession to Stridhana, other than shulka, of a
Hindi.I woman who was married in an approvl.'d
form of marriage are·
stated in Yajnyawalkya's text as : 'her kinsmen take it, if she die without
issue·. The order of succession was elaborated in the Mitakshara, which·
was translated by Colebrooke as : (i) unmarried daughter, (ii) married'
daughter who is unprovided for, (iii) married daughter who is provided
for, (iv) daughter's daughter, (v) daughter's son, ~vi) son, (vii) son's son,.
and (viii) lf there be none of these the stridhana then !JOOS to her hlli--
band, and if he is dead, to the husband's heirs.
In the present case, a Hindu widow, who was married in an approved
form of marriage died leaving stridhana which was not .'\hufka.
She did
not leave behilid any of the heirs mentioned in items
(i) to (vii)
but
there was a pre-deceased son's daughtett.
On the question of preference·
between the son's daughters and her husband's brother''s son (who was;
the husband's nearest heir).
'
HELD : (i) Colebrooke's translation has been accepted by the Judicial
Committee and Hindu scholars as bringing out correctly the m""'1ing of
the relevant passages in the Mitakshara, and it is now weU .. ettled that the
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stridhana of a Hindu woman governed by Mitakshara passes in the order
mentioned in the. Mitakshara, [496 H; 497 A-Cl
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Blmacharya Bin
Venkappacharya v. Ramcharya Bin
Bhinracharya,.
I.LR.' '.33 Born. 452, referred to.
(2) The contention that the expression 'without issue' in Yajnywalkya
was elaborated as 'lea\ing no progeny' by the Mitakshara, and that therefore the heirs (i) to (vii) should be understood as only illustrations of the
expression 'progeny' and hence, son's daughters are not excluded
from
the expression 'progeny', is opposeJ to the commenta·ries of Narada,
Gautama and other commentators, and to the decisions of the Judicial
Commitlee and the High Courts rendered for over a century. [497 E-H)
(3) In the matter of succession to stridhana propinquity is neither the
scile nor a principal test as shown by the fact that daughter's daughter and
daughter's son succeed in preference to the son. [498 B-C]
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 2 S.C.R
( 4) The rule of interpretation that the masculine includes the feminine
and therefore 'son's son• includes 'son's
daughter', is inapplicable,
be·
cause, 'daughter"s daughter' is shown taking
prec~dence over 'daughter's
son'. [489 EJ
(5) The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, applies to the
separate property left by a Hindu male and not to the property of a Hindu
female. [500' C-D]
~Kuniar Raghava Sure1ulra Salli v. Babui La1.-'hn1i Kuer, (1939) 1. L.R.
18 Pat. 590 and Baj Kesserbai v. H1111s Raj Morarji & A11r. L.R. 33 I.A.
176, distinguished.
A1111ago11da Nathgouda Patil v. Co11rt of Wards, [1952] S.C.R.
208.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1954
:ind 1955 oi 1966.
Appeals from the judgment aind decree dated May 30, J 963
of the Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 105 of
1957.
A. K. Sen and R. K. Aggarwal, for the appellant (in C. A. No.
1954 of 1966) and respondents Nos. 5, 6, 8 and 9 (in C.A.
No. 1955 of 1966).
Bishan Narain, B. P. Maheshwari and R. K. Gupta, for the
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.appellants (\n C.A. No. 1955 of 1966) and respondents Nos. 2 to
·6 (in C.A. No. 1954 of 1966).
Sarjoo Prasad, Rameshwar Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for
respondent No. 1 (in both the appecls).
S. M. Jain, for respondents Nos. 13(i) to 13(iv) (in C.A.
No. 1954 oi 1966) and respondents Nos. 12(i) to 12(iv) (in C.A.
No. 1955 of 1966).
·
Hegde, J. The question of law that arises for decision in these
appeals by certificate is whether the daughters of a pre-deceased
son of a Hindu Woman are entitled to succeed to her stridhana ?
The trial court answered the question in the affirmative but the
High Court i;n appeal came to the conclusion that they are not
·entitled to succeed to the estate in question.
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The material facts of this case are few.
For a proper underH
standing of the facts of the case, it will be convenient to have
before us the admitted pedigree of the family.
It is as folfows :
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TwJRam
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Amar Nath
(Plaintiff)
JJgal Kishore
Mst. Bindri widow
dead.
pami.!.i Rai
Sri Kisiln
(defendant No. T)
widow Champiadevi
(defendant No. 8)
I
Roshan Lal (dead)
Shrl Bool Chand
I
Patu ~am
Mst. Batji
\
Beru.k Lal
1MooIChand
(died is.crue less
I
Mom.!, Lal
RamlSarup
(adopted son
defendant 10)
Radha~
Mst. Dakhan
(defendant 6)
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.ndra I
I
Bi
ban·
Nathu Ram
,(died issue less) I
Sham lat
(defendant 9
adopted)
Sheela /defendant Lila (Jfendant
Chambcl! (defendant Balwanti
No. 3 daughter) No.2 daughter)
No. 1 daughter)
daughter
~~~~~~~~~~~~ !
Sure~h Chand
Sardh~
(defendant 4)
(defendant 5)
. l~~~~~~-,1~~~~~~~~~~~~~1,.=-c-'--'-~~~_J_
Ktdar Nath
Ram Chander
Shoo Parshad
I .
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.
Murar1 Lal
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I
Nand Kishore
(defendant No. 11
Basant Lal
Rameshwar Dass Jag<tish (defen·
I
adopted)
I
(defendant
dant No. 17)
I
(adopted sen
Ragbbir·Singh
No. 16
1
{defendant
No. 15)
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I
MamanChand
(defendant No. 14)
Manpihul Singh
(defendant No.12
I .
Sher Singh
(defendant No. 13)
...
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4 92
SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS
tl970) 1 S.C.R.
The finding of the trial court that the suit properties are the
stridhana properlles of Barji was not contestea before the High
Court.
Jn llus Court at one stage a feeble allempt was made o,n
behalf of the appellants to contest that finding.
we did not permit that finding to be challenged as the same had not been cnallenged before Ule High Coun. Therefore we proceed on the
basis of that finding.
Barji died i;n September 1950. Her husband Palu Ram had preaeceased her. lt appears that he died
sometime in 1Y04.
l'atu Ram's father Boo1 chand as weil as
Palu Ram's brothers Tulsi Ram, Behari Lal and Hira Lal had
predeceasecj, Barji. Patu Ram and Barji had a son
by name
J ugaJ Kish ore wno had predeceased Pa tu Ram lea ng
behind
him his widow Bindri who died in 1931. They had no children.
Radha Kishan, the adopted sqn of Patu Ram and Barji died al :iut
20 years 'before the death of Barji leaving behmd him ljis widow,
defendant No. 6.
Radha Kishan had hve childr.en including
defendants Nos. 1 to 3. through another wife. His son Roshanlal
had died a few months before the death of Barji.
His daughter
Balwanti had predeceased Barji leavhtg behind her children defendants 4 and 5.
Tulsi Ram's son Prahlad Rai had also predeceased Barji leavipg behind his widow defendant No. 8 and
son defendant No. 7.
By the thne succession to the estate of
Barji opened all the chilaren of Behari Lal and Hiralal had died
but some of them had children and grand children, as seen from
the pedigree.
After the death of Barji; her properties came to
the possession of defendant No. 6.
De!endant No. 1 sued for the
possession of those properties on the ground that she and her
sisters are prefere,ntial heirs to the deceased Barji.
To that suit
she did not make Amar Nath, the plaintiff in the present suit, a
party.
Amar Nath's application for being impleaded as a party
in that suit was opposed by the 1st defendant and the said application was ultimately rejected by the court. The dispute in that suit
was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators upheld the claim of
defendants Nos. 1 to 3.
Thereafter the present suit was brought.
In the High Court as well as in the trial court there was a triangular
contest.
The plaintiff claimed that he was exclusively entitled to
the suit. properties, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 claimed that they are
the nearest heirs to Barji; some of the other defendants contended
that they succeeded to the suit properties as co-tenants with the
plaintiff. In this Court all the contesting defendants sail together.
As mentioned earli~r, the trial court accepted the claim of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 but the High Court held that the plaintiff was
exclusively entitled to the suit properties, he being the nearest
heir to the deceased.
That finding is contested both by defendants
Nos. 1 to 3 .as well as by the other contesting defendants.
That
is how the aforementioned two appeals came to be filed.
In arriving at its finding the High Court relied on the rules of
succession found in paragraph 147 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu
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SHAM LAL v. AMAR NATH (Hegde, J.)
493
Law (13fh Edn.). It came to the conclusion that those rules are
exhaustive.
On the basis of those rules, it ruled that defendants
Nos. 1 to 3 wery not entitled to succeed to the estate of Barji. So
far as the other defendants are concerned it rejected their claim
on the ground that as between the plaintiff and themselves the
former is a preferential heir as he is the nearest in degree to Barji.
It is the admitted case of the parties that the properties in
question are not shu/ka and that Barji was married in one of the
aoproved forms.
Therefore while pronouncing on the competing
claims made in this case, we must be guided by the order of
succession prescribed in paragraph 147, if the same is correct and
exhaustive. Paragraph 14 7 says :
"Stridhana other than shulka passes in the following order :
(1) unmarried daughter;
(2) married daughter who is unprovided for;
(3) married daughter who is provided for;
( 4) daughter's daughter;
(5) daughter's son;
(6) son;
(7) son's son.
I.f there be none of these, in other words, if the woman dies without leaving any issue, her stridhana, if she was married in an
approved form, goes to her husband, and after him, to the husband's heirs in order of their succession to him; on failure of the
husband's heirs, it goes to her blood relations in preference to the
Govecnment.
But if she was married in an unapproved form, it
goes to her mother, then to her father, and then· to the father's
heirs and then to the husband's heirs in preference to the Government". The legal position is stated in ident!cal terms in Mayne's
treatise on Hindu Law (Eleventh Eqn.-Paragrah 623, pages
744 to 746) as well as in the other text books on Hindu Law
referred to at the time of the hearing.
At this stage it may be
mentioned that the correctness of the order of succession mentioned in paragraph 147 till we come to item No. 7 (son's son) was
not challen~ed. The same is well settled by deciqed cases. It
is not necessary to refer to those cases. The only contention
advanced on behalf of some of the defendants is that after son's
sons come sons' daughters. Alternatively it was contended that
the expression "son's son" includes "son's daughter''.
We have
to see whether these contentions , are well founded.
The rules relating to· succession to stridhana enunciated in the
text books are based on Yainyawalcya's text "her kinsmen take it,
if she die without issue". This statement is elaborated by Vijnyaneswara in Mitakshara.
The relevant portions thereof as translated by RT. Colebrooke are found in placita 8, 9, 10 and 11
in Section XI of his book ''Mitacshilr.a''.
They read as follows :
494
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.R.
"8. A woman's property has been thus described.
The author next propounds the distribution of it : 'Her
kinsmen take it, if she die without issue'.
9. If a woman die 'without issue' that is leaving no
progeny; in other words, having no daughter nor daughter's daughter nor daughter's son, nor son, nor son's son;
the woman's property, as above described, shall be
taken by her kinsmen; namely her husband and the rest,
as will be (forthwith) explained.
I 0. The kinsmen have been declared generally to be
competent to succeed to a woman's property. The
author now distinguishes different heirs according to
the diversity of the marriage ceremonies.
The property of a childless woman, married in the form denominated Brahma, or in any of the four
( unblamed
modes of marriage), goes to her husband : but, if she
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!~ave progeny, it will go to her (daughter's) daughters:
nnd, in other forms of marriage (as the Asura & c.),
it goes to her father (and mother, on failure of her
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own issue).
11. Of a woman dying without issue
as
before
stated, and who had become a wife by any of the four
modes of marriage denominated Brahma, Daiva, Arsha
and Prajapatya, the (whole) property, as before described, belongs in the first place to her husband.
On
failure of him, it goes to his nearest kinsmen (sapindas)
allied by funeral oblations. But, in the other forms of
marriage called Asura, Gandharba, Racshasa and Pai-
~acha; the property of ·a childless woman goes to her
parents, that is, to her father and m·Jther. . The succession devolves first (and the reason has been be.fore
explained) on the mother, who is virtually( exhibited
(first) in the elliptical pitrigami implying 'goes (gachhati) to both parents (pitarau;), that is to the mother
and to the father'. On failure of them, their next of kin
take the succession."
These passages have received interpretation at the hands of
the Judicial Committee as well as the High Courts in India and
the law is now settled as to the mode of succession to stridhana
under Mitakshara until we reach soil's son. The controversy now
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is as to who should succeed to such an estate if none of the heirs
mentioned in items Nos. 1 to 7 in · paragraph 147 of MuUa's H
Hindu Law is in existence at the time of the death of the woman
concerned.
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SHAM LAL v. AMAR NATH (Hegde, /.)
495
Mr. A. K. Sen, learned Counsel for some of the defen·
dants contested the correctness of Colebrooke's translation
in certain respe&ts.
He wanted us to examine the original text
to find out whether the translation foood in placita 9 is
correct ?
The parties did not place before us either an
admitted translation of the original text or even an official transl?tion.
Colebrooke is a distinguished oriental scholar.
The
Judicial Committee as well as the various High Courts in this
country have relied on his translation of Mitakshara in dealing
with the question of inheritance.
Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya
in his commentary on Hindu Law (2nd Bin.) deals with the order
of succession under Mitakshzra to stridhana property in Chapter
VI of that book.
His translation of the relevant commentaries
accords with those made by Colebrooke.
To the same effect is
the opinion expressed by Justice Chandavarkar in Bhimacharya
Bin Venkappacharya v. Ramcharya Bin Bhimacharya('). Hence
we are unable to agree with Mr. Sen that Colebrooke's translation
does not bring out accurately the meaning of the relevant passages
in Mitakshara. Colebrooke in his book 'Mitakshara' published in
1869 sets out the order of succession
to a woman's
stridhana
properties at page 158 thus :
Maiden daughter
I
Unendowed married daughter
2
Endowed married daughter
3
Daughter's daughter
4
Daughter's son
5
Son
6
Grandson
7
Husband
8
If the contention of defendants is correct then son's daughter and
not husband should have come after the grandson.
But that is
not the case.
Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for defendants Nos. 1 ,
to 3 contended that the list given in Mitakshra is only illustrative
and not exhaustive. He urged that Yajnyawalcya had stated that "a
woman's property would devolve on her kinsmen if she died without issue" which means that it would devolve on her progeny
which expression includes son's daughter as well.
In this connection he also relied on Vijnyaneswara's commentary
statin~
that the expression 'without issue' found in
Yajnyawalcya text
means "leaving no progeny".
On the basis of these statements
he contended that even according to Vijnyaneswara, the deceased
woman's progeny would take her stridhana in preference to her
kinsmen including her husband. On the basis of this premise he
proceeded to argue that the othe1 words used iri placita 9 viz. :
(I) I.LR 33 Born. 452
496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.R.
"having no daughter nor daughter's daughter nor daughter's son
nor son nor son's son" should be understood as merely being illustrations of the word "progeny".
This contentiqp is opposed to
the commentaries by Narada, Gautaina and the later commentators. More than that it runs counter to the decisions rendered by
the Judicial Committee and the various Jligh Courts during the
last over a century. It is now well settled that stridhana of a
Hindu woman gove~ned by Mitakshra passes in the order mentioned in Mitakshra and the children of the deceased woman do
not take the same as a body either jointly or as tenants in common.
Only the heirs belonging to a class take the properties as
tenants in common.
Mr. Bishan Narain next contended that under Mitakshr· propinquity is the test of inheritance. Therefore there is no reason
why the deceased woman's husband's brother's son should take the
properties in preference to her son's daughters. We do not think
that m the matter of succession to stridhana propinquity · was
·considered by the law givers as the sole or even the principal test,
otherwise there is no justification for a daughter's daughter. or a
daughter's son to succeed to the estate of a woman in preference
to her son. lt is true that it is not easy to find out the reason
behind the rules relating to succession to stridhana.
But that is
equally true of many other branches of our family laws. These
contradictions are inevitable in .socio-religious matters particularly
when our social laws were controlled by our religious beliefs and
our law givers were our religious preceptors. It is for the legislature to step in and bring about harmony between the society
and the laws governing it. That is why our Parliament enacted
several statutes in ·1955 to amend the Hindu Law in· various
respects.
We are unablo to accept the contention of Mr. Bishan Narain
that the expression son's son includes son's daughter as according
to the rules of interpretation the masculille includes the feminine.
That rule of interpretation is inapplica~ in the present case as
daughter's daughter succeeds to the stridhana ln preference to
daughter's son.
The order of succession prescn'bed clearly rules
out the application of that rule of interpretation.
Mr. Sen in support of his contention that on a true interpretation of the relevant passages in 'Mitakshra', defendants Nos. 1 to
3 are preferential heirs to deceased Barji, relied on certain passages in some of the decided cases.
First he referred to the decision of the Patna High Court in Kumar Raghava Surendra Sahi v.
Babui Lachmi Kuer( 1 ). Therein the disp•1te related to the succession to the properties left by a maiden and not by a married
(IJ 1939I.L.R.18 Pat. Sqo
(I) L.R. 33 I.A. 176,
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SHAM LAL v. AMAR NAtH (Hegde, J.)
497
woman.
'J'he rules relating to the succession to the stridhana of
a deceased maiden are wholly different from those relating to succession to the stridhana of a married woman.
Therefore the
observations made in regard to those rules have no relevance for
our present purpose.
He next invited our attention to certain
passages in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bai Kesserbai
v. Hunsraj Morarji and ani'.( 1). Therein the dispute was between
Bai Kesserbai the surviving co-widow of the deceased Bachubai's
husband Koreji Haridass, Hunsraj Morarji the separated nephew
of Koreji, .being the son of his eldest brother, who predeceased
Bachubai and Bai Monghibai, the widow of a younger brother of
Koreji named Ranchordass Haridass. The question for consideration by the Judicial Committee was as to the true scope of the
latter part of the placitwn 9 in Colebrooke's Mitakshara which says
"if a woman die without issue, that is, leaving no progeny .... the.
woman's property ........... , shall be taken by her kinsmen
namely her husband and the rest as will be forthwith explained".
· Their Lordships observed that there can be no reasonable doubt
that accordiii.g to Mitakshara definition of sapinda, husband and
wife are sapindas to each other and the co-widow of the husband
of the deceased was the nearest sapinda of the deceased woman's
husband and hence entitled to succeed to the estate in question ..
This decision again does not bear on the point under considera-
.tion.
Lastly Mr. Sen contended that in view of the Hindu Woman's
Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937), it must be held that
defendants l to 3 are nearer heirs to the deceased than the plaintiff.
This contention was negatived by the High Court on the basis of
the .rule laid down by this Court in Annagouda Nathgouda Patil v;
Court of Wards and anr. (') wherein this Court dealing with Act Il
of 1929 observed :
·
"The question is whether the provisions of this Act
can at all be invoked to detennine the heirs of a Hindu
female in respect of her stridhan property. The objept
of the Act as stated in the preamble is to alter the order
in which certain heirs of a Hindu male dying inteState
'are entitled to succeed to· his estate; and section I ( 2)
expressly lays down that 'the Act applies only to persons
who but for the passing of . this Act would have been
subj~c! to the .Law of Mitakshara ~ respect of the
proV1S10ns herem enacted, and it applies to such persons
m respect only of the property of males not held in
coparcenary and not disposed of by will.'
Thus the
scope. of the Act is limited. It governs succession only
to the separate property 0f a Hindu male who "-dies .
intestate. It does not alter the law as regards th•
• (2) [19S21 S.C.R. 208.
~98
SUPREME COl'RT REPORTS
(1970] 2 s.C.it
devolution of any other kind of property owned by a
Hindu male and does not purport lo regulate succession
to the property of a Hindu female at all.
It is to be
noted that the Act does not make these .four relations
statutory heirs under the Mitakshara Law
under all
circumstances and for all purposes; it makes them heirs
only when the propositus is a male and the property \n
respect to which it is sought to be applied is his separate property."
Similar would be the position under the Hindu Woman's Right
to Property Act, 1937. Section 3(1) of tha•. Act which pr;ivides
for the devolution of the property reads thus :
"When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School
of Him.du Law dies intestate leaving any property and
when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu
law or by customary Jaw dies intestate leaving separate
property his widow or if there is more than one widow
all his widows togeth r shall, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3) be entitled \n re~pect of pr:perty in
respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as
a son ...... "
From this provision it is clear that Hindu Women's Right to
Property Act, 1937 applies only to the separate . •Jperty left by a
Hindu male: It does not apply e"ther to the coparcenary property
or to the property of a Hindu female.
For the reasons mentioned above these appeals fail and they
are dismissed with costs-advocates' fee one set.
V.P.S.
Appeals dismisud.
-L2Sup.CJ/70
A
B
c
D
E