# 53L SHRI KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1955] 2 S.C.R. 531
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955
- **Bench:** S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J, Bhagwati, Venkatarama Ayya, )Afer Imam, CttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/53l-shri-kishan-singh-and-others-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-and-others-1509
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Fundamental Rights, lnfringment of-Act settling
fair and
equitable rent restricted to a part of the State-Settlement of rent of
diffe1·ent localities on different dates on decennial average-Possibility
of variatio11 in rates of rent-If amount to denial of equality before
laru-Deprivation of landlo1·d'.c right to realise 1"C11ts freely and without hindrance, if invasion of right to property-Retrospective enfcrcement of rates of rent, if amoU.'lts to violation of right to property and
acquisition ruit/10ut compensation-Such power conferred on Settlement Officer, if arbitrm·y-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(l)(f),
31(2)-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), ss. 81, 82, 83, 84,
85, 86.
The petitioners, who arc jagirdars of Marwar, sought to impugn
the constitutional validity of ss. 81 to
86 of the Marwar Land
Revenue Act which embody a scheme for fixing fair and equitable
rents payable
by
cultivating tenants
on
the ground that they
infringed their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2)
of the Constitution.
Their contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in thi:-
State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatorv as it applie<l
only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to the entire body of jagir·
dars of the State of Rajasthan, that settlement of rents made with
reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous ten years' average of collections might result in different rates
of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by Art. 14, that
the Act deprived the landlords of their right to realise rents from the
tenants freely and without hindrance and invaded their right· to
hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution, that
the power conferred on the Scttlem.ent Officer by s. 86 of the Act to
enforce the rates of rent retrospectively is an invasion of their right
to hold property and amounts tci acquisition of property
without
compensation and that it confers absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Otlicer and is an encroachment on the right
to hold property.
Held, repelling these contentions, that Art. 14 only prohibits
unequal treatment of persons similarly situated and a classification
might properly" be made on territorial basis, if that was germane to
the purposes of the enactment and no tenancy legislation
can be
held to contravene the article solely on the ground that it does not
apply to the entire State. Before the petitioners could succeed it was
1955
September 2 7
1955
.Shi KUM,. Singh
andol/ra's
"·
Tiit Slat1 of
Rqjulhan and
•liur<
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
incumbent on them to show that conditions obtaining in other parts
of the
State were similac. to those in Marwar and this they had
failed to do.
Bowman v. Lewis [1879] IOI U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989, referred
to.
That the provision in the
Act for assessment of rents with ref·
erence to a portion of the area to which the
Act applies is not a
contravention of Art.' 14. To hold otherwise would be to make it
impossible for any State to carry on its settlement operations.
Biswa~ Singh v. The State of Orissa and others, [1954]
S.C.R. 842, and- Tfiak.ur_ Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955]
2 S.C.R. 303, applied.
-
That the fundamental right
to hold property in the ease of a
landlord in respect of his tenanted lands is no more than the right
to receive reasonable rents and no legislation which has for its object
the settlement of fair and equitable' rents can contravene Art. 19
(i)(f) of the Constitution even though it may give such rents retros·
pcctive operation.
That the provision in s. 86 of the Act empowering the Settle·
1nent Officer to give retrospective operation to the rates of rent docs
not contravene Art. 19(1)(f) and, therefore, no question as to whc~
ther such a provision is not of a regulatory character and as •Such
prohibited by Art. 19(5) can at all arise.
That it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of
a landlord with his tenant is not one w

## Text

2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53L
SHRI KISHAN SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS.
[S. R. DAs, AcTING C. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA
AYYA&; )AFER IMAM and CttANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]
Fundamental Rights, lnfringment of-Act settling
fair and
equitable rent restricted to a part of the State-Settlement of rent of
diffe1·ent localities on different dates on decennial average-Possibility
of variatio11 in rates of rent-If amount to denial of equality before
laru-Deprivation of landlo1·d'.c right to realise 1"C11ts freely and without hindrance, if invasion of right to property-Retrospective enfcrcement of rates of rent, if amoU.'lts to violation of right to property and
acquisition ruit/10ut compensation-Such power conferred on Settlement Officer, if arbitrm·y-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(l)(f),
31(2)-Marwar Land Revenue Act (XL of 1949), ss. 81, 82, 83, 84,
85, 86.
The petitioners, who arc jagirdars of Marwar, sought to impugn
the constitutional validity of ss. 81 to
86 of the Marwar Land
Revenue Act which embody a scheme for fixing fair and equitable
rents payable
by
cultivating tenants
on
the ground that they
infringed their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(2)
of the Constitution.
Their contentions were that after the merger of Marwar in thi:-
State of Rajasthan the Act had become discriminatorv as it applie<l
only to the jagirdars of Marwar and not to the entire body of jagir·
dars of the State of Rajasthan, that settlement of rents made with
reference to different areas on different dates on the basis of previous ten years' average of collections might result in different rates
of rent and lead to inequality such as is prohibited by Art. 14, that
the Act deprived the landlords of their right to realise rents from the
tenants freely and without hindrance and invaded their right· to
hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution, that
the power conferred on the Scttlem.ent Officer by s. 86 of the Act to
enforce the rates of rent retrospectively is an invasion of their right
to hold property and amounts tci acquisition of property
without
compensation and that it confers absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Otlicer and is an encroachment on the right
to hold property.
Held, repelling these contentions, that Art. 14 only prohibits
unequal treatment of persons similarly situated and a classification
might properly" be made on territorial basis, if that was germane to
the purposes of the enactment and no tenancy legislation
can be
held to contravene the article solely on the ground that it does not
apply to the entire State. Before the petitioners could succeed it was
1955
September 2 7
1955
.Shi KUM,. Singh
andol/ra's
"·
Tiit Slat1 of
Rqjulhan and
•liur<
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
incumbent on them to show that conditions obtaining in other parts
of the
State were similac. to those in Marwar and this they had
failed to do.
Bowman v. Lewis [1879] IOI U.S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989, referred
to.
That the provision in the
Act for assessment of rents with ref·
erence to a portion of the area to which the
Act applies is not a
contravention of Art.' 14. To hold otherwise would be to make it
impossible for any State to carry on its settlement operations.
Biswa~ Singh v. The State of Orissa and others, [1954]
S.C.R. 842, and- Tfiak.ur_ Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955]
2 S.C.R. 303, applied.
-
That the fundamental right
to hold property in the ease of a
landlord in respect of his tenanted lands is no more than the right
to receive reasonable rents and no legislation which has for its object
the settlement of fair and equitable' rents can contravene Art. 19
(i)(f) of the Constitution even though it may give such rents retros·
pcctive operation.
That the provision in s. 86 of the Act empowering the Settle·
1nent Officer to give retrospective operation to the rates of rent docs
not contravene Art. 19(1)(f) and, therefore, no question as to whc~
ther such a provision is not of a regulatory character and as •Such
prohibited by Art. 19(5) can at all arise.
That it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of
a landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within
the meaning of Art. 31 (2) even though it has the effect of reducing
his rights. Consequently, there is nq contravention of Art. 31(2} of
the Constitution.
Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, [1943] 6
F.L.J. 55: A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29 and Thakur
Jagannath
Buksh v.
United Provinces, L.R. 73 I.A. 123, relied on.
That s. 86 of the Act does not confer an absolute and uncontrolled discretion on the Settlement Officer and such power as it gives
does not constitute an encroachment on the right to hold property
within the meaning of Art. 19(i)(f) of the Constitution.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards. Ajm<r and another,
f1953] S.C.R. 1049, explained and distinguished.
ORIGINAL
JurusmCTION : Petitions Nos. 621, 655
and 678 of 1955.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
N. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kaptir and Ganpat Rai,
with him) for the petitioners.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for
India
(Kan
Singh and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
respondent
No. 1.
K. R. Chowdhury, for Goma, Ghisa and Rama,
respondents in Petition No. 655
and Dhira, respondent in petition No. 678.
1955. September
27.
The
Judgment
of
the
Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMA
AYYAR
J.-These are
ap~lic~tio~s
under article 32 of
the
Constitution by certam pg1rdars of Marwar, challenging the constitutionality of
sections 81 to
86
of the Marwar
Land Revenue Act
No. XL of 1949
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) on
the ground that
they infringe the fundamental rights
of the petitioners under article 14, article 19(1) (f) and
article 31 (2)
of
the Constitution.
These
sections
provide for fixing fair and equitable rent payable by
the tenants and prescribe the procedure to be followed
therefor.
Section 81 of the Act provides that when
any local area has been brought under
settlement
operations by
a notification under s·ection 64, the
Settlement
Officer or
an Assistant Settlement Officer
shall
inspect every village in the local area, divide it
into
soil-classes and assessment circles, select rent
rates for the area and publish them in such mann~r
as may be prescribed.
If objections to these proposais
are received, he has to consider them, and submit his
report to the Board of Revenue.
The Board has the
power to sanction the proposals with or without any
modifications, and it has also the power to direct
further enquiry into
the matters. With a view to
arriving at fair and equitable rates,
the Settlement
Officer is required under
section 82 to have regard to·
the collection of rent and cesses in the nature of rent
during the ten years p1eceding the settlement excluding such years as the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be abnormal,
the
average
of
the prices
of
agricultural produce
during the same period, the nature of the crops grown
and the quantity of the produce and their value. Section 82(2)
provides that the rent rates shall not
!955
Shri Kishan Singh
and others
v.
Tiu Slate of
Rajasthan a,.J
ollurs
1955
Shri K.Uhatt Singh
and others
v.
The State of
Raja.st/um and
others
V enkalarama
.4.ua: J.
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
exceed one-third of the value of the produce of unirrigated lands
and one-fourth of the value of the produce of irrigated lands.
Under section 84, the Settlement
Officer shall determine rents whether by way of
abatement, enhancement or commutation payable for
all holdings in the occupation of tenants on the
basis
of the rates sanctioned by the Board of Revenue. Section 86 enacts that any rent fixed by order of
the
Settlement Officer shall be payable from the hrst day
of July next following the date of such order, "unless
the
Settlement
Officer
thinks fit for any reasons to
direct that it shall be
payable from
some earlier
date".
Acting under section 81 of the Act, the Settlement
Officer formulated certain proposals with reference to
the rent
rates
in the villages comprised in the jagirs
of the petitioners and they were
published in the
Gazette
on 12th December 1953.
Objections to those
rate$ were filed
by the petitioners on the 12th January,
1954. On 13th October 1954 the
Additional
Settlement Commissioner submitted his final
proposals to the Settlement Officer, who forwarded the
same to the Board of Revenue for sanction.
After
making further enquiry, the Board passed an order
on 4-12-1954 determining
the rent rates payable. Subsequent to this, an order was also passed under section 86 of the Act bringing the sanctioned rate into
operation from 1-7-1954.
This order is not itself the
subject of attack in these proceedings, and it cannot
be, seeing that Petition
No. 621 of 1954 was filed on
24th November
1954 before that order was, ~passed,
and Petitions Nos. 655 and 678 of 1954 merely repeat
verbatim the allegations in Petition No. 621 of 1954.
Before us, the petitioners conceded that they were not
impugning the correctness of the order ' passed under
section 86 in
so
far as it gave operation to the rates
of rent from 1st
July, on its merits, but that they
were
attacking
the section :is bad only as a step in
establishing that
the scheme
of the Act, of which
section 86 is an integral
part
is, taken as a whole. an
infringement of their fundamental rights under articles 14, 19 and 31 (2).
We have now to consider
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
whether sections 81
to 86 of
the Act are bad
as
mfringing
the
above prov1s10ns
of the Constitution.
Ti1e contention that sections 81 to 86 of the Act are
void
as being repugnant to article 14 is sought to be
made out on
two grounds It is stated firstly that the
Act applies only to what was prior to its merger the
State of Marwar, that the present State of Ra1asthan
comprises
Marwar and
17
other States which have
merged in it, and that as
the Act, as it stands, is
dir~cted against the jagirdars in one area of the State
and not the whole of it, it has become discriminatory
and void.
This contention is clearly untenable. What
article 14 prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons
similarly situated, and therefore before the petitioners
can claim the protection of that article, it is incumbent on them to establish that the conditiom which
prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are
similar to those which obtain in Marwar. But of this,
there has been neither allegation nor proof. On the
contrary, it is stated by the respondents in para
10
of their statement that the tenants in the jagirs of
Marwar were paying much more by way of rent and
cesses
than those in the Khalsa area of the
State,
that with a view to remove the inequality between
the two classes of tenants within the State, a law was
passed
in 1943 providing for settlement of rent, and
that
again
on
1~1-1947
another law was passed
abolishing all cesses
(lags) and fixing the maximum
share of rent payable in kind. These special features,
it is argued, form sufficient justification for a ~eparate
legislation· for this area.
It is also stated that the
other States had their own rent laws suited to their
conditions.
There are no materials on which we could
hold
that
the impugned
Act is discriminatory
in
character, and we cannot strike it down merely on the
ground that it does not apply to the whole of the
State of Rajasthan.
A si.milar question arose for decision in Bowman v.
Lcrvis(1 ).
There, some of the areas in the State of
Missouri were governed by a judicial procedure diff-
(1) [1879) IOI U. S. 22: 25 Law. Ed. 989.
1955
Shri Kishan Singh
and others
v.
The State of
Rajaslhan anti
others
V enkalarama
A»ar ].
'955
Shri Kishan Singh
and others
v.
Tl1' Stai. of
Rajasthan and
others
Venkalaram,
Al7a' j.
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
erent from that which prevailed in others. Repelling
the contention
that
this differentiation offended the
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed :
"Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for m'unicipal purposes, and
to regulate, their
local
government. As respects the
administration of justice, it may establish one
system
of courts for cities and another for rural districts;
one system for one portion of its territory and another system for
another portion. Convenience, if not
necessity,
often requires this to be done, and it would
seriously interfere with the power of a State to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it this right ......... .
If a Mexican State should be acquired by a treaty
and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in
the United States, and
the two should be erected into
a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State
might allow the Mexican laws
and judicature · to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common
law and its corresponding judicature in the other
portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited
in any fair construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would not
be based on any respect of persons
or classes,. but on municipal considerations alone and
regard to the welfare of all classes
within the particular territory or jurisdiction".
This Court has also repeatedly held that classifiotion
might properly be made on
territorial basis if tbot
was germane to the purposes of
the
enactment.
Having regard to the fact that the conditions
of
tenants vary from locality to locality, we have
no
hesitation in holding that ·a tenancy legislation restricted to a portion of a Sate cannot
be held on this
ground alone to contravene article 14.
The second ground urged in support of the contention that article 14 has been
infringed is that discrimination
must result from the settlement of rent
being taken up only with reference to portions of the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'5'51
area to which the Act applies and not to the whole of
it, because the rent rate is to be fixed on the basis of
the average of the ten years preceding the settlement;
and if the proceedings arc started for different areas
on different dates, that might results in different rates
being fixed, and that would make for inequality such
as is prohibited by article 14.
We are unable to agree
with
this
contention.
Settlement operations can be
conducted only by a specialised staff having technical
knowledge
and
administrative experience,
and
it
might be beyond the capacity of the State to undertake them for the whole area at one and the same
time.
To accede to the contention of the petitioners
would, in effect, be to prevent the States from carrying
on settlement operations·
It was held by this Court
in Bi'swambhar Singh v.
The State of Orissa and
others(1) and in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Raiasthan(2) that a provision authorising the taking over
of estates on different dates was not repugnant to article 14, ,md the principle of those decisions would apply
to the present case as well.
The contention that the
impugned provisions are in contravention of article
14 must, therefore, be rejected.
It is then contended that the provisions in question
are repugnant to article 19 ( 1) ( f)
of the Constitution,
because they deprive landlords of their right to realise
rents from the tenants freely and without hindrance,
and are an encroachment on their right to hold property.
The
provision in
section 82 that the Settlement Officer should, in determining the average collection
for the previous
ten years, exclude from
consideration abnormal years
as notified by the Government
was
particularly attacked
as a device
to
reduce the rent payable to the landlord and an invasion of his rights to the property.
We are unable to
agree with this contention.
The fundamental right
which a citizen has to hold and enjoy property imports only a right to recover reasonable rent when
the lands are cultivated by a tenant, and therefore, :i
legislation whose object is to fix fair and equitable
(I) [195+] S.C.R. 842, 845.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303.
16--83 S. C. India/59.
1955
Slwi Killla Siat/t
..totltas
v.
TltlSlllU of
~"""
ollwt
1955
Shri Kishan Singh
and olkns
v.
The Stal< of
Rajasthan and
others
f' lnkalarama
,War].
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
rent cannot be said to invade that
right.
The contention that the provision in section 82(1)(a)
that
abnoxmal years as notified in the Gazette should be
excluded in determining average
collections
is calculated to reduce the rent, and is therefore unreasonable is unfounded, because a declaration that a year is
abnormal is made not only when there are bumper
crops but also when the yield is very low, and the provision is intended equally for the benefit of the tenant
and of the landlord. A provision of this kind is usual
in all tenancy legislation, and
there
is
nothing
unreasonable or unfair about it.
It was next contended-and this was
the contention most pressed on us-that section 86 is bad as it
confers on the Settlement Officer a power to bring the
rent rates into operation from a date earlier than the
succeeding
year and even retrospectively from a date
prior to the settlement, and that such a power was
repugnant to both article 19(1) (f) and aricle 31(2).
The argument with reference to Article 19(1)(f) is
that section 86 is an encroachment on the rights of a
person to hold property, and can be valid only if it
falls
within article 19(5), that it is only a law of a
regulatory character
that is protected
by
article
19
(5), that there could be regulation only with reference
to rights to be exercised in future, and that a law
giving retrospective operation
is consequently outside
article 19(5).
This contention rests on an assumption
for
which there is no basis.
The question whether a
law is valid under article 19(5) can arise only when
there is a viobtion of the fundamental right declared
in article 19(1) (f), and if the right to hold property
imports, as
we have held it does, only a right to recover reasonable rent from cultivating tenants, that
right cannot be held
to have been invaded by a law
fixing
reasonable
rent, even
when it is retrospective
in operation.
If the rent
fixed
is reasonable with
.reference to a period subsequent to the settlement, it
must be reas0!lable for the period prior to it as
well,
and if the settlement
is not an encroachment on the
rights of the holder as regards the future-and th1t
is conceded-it cannot be an encroa.chment as regards
1
'
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
the past.
A consideration, therefore, of the question
whether a law under article 19(5) should be regulatory, and whether a law with retrospective operation
could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controversy.
The argument in support of the contention that
section 86
is repugnant to article 31(2) is that to the
extent
that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives
the landlord of the right to rent which had
accrued prior to the settlement, and that
is taking
property without payment of compensation.
But it
is well settled that a law which regulates the relation
of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes
property within article 31(2), even though it has the
effect of reducing his rights.
In Thak.ur Jagannath
Baksh Singh v. United Provinces( 1 ), the question 3rose
for decision whether the provisions of Act XVII of
1939, United Provinces, under which the rent payable
to a landlord became diminished were obnoxious to
section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
It was held by the Federal Court that they were not
and in affirming this decision on appeal, the Privy
Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United
Provinces(2) observed:
"The appellant relies
on c_ertain
express
provisions of the Government of India Act. Thus he relies
on section 299 of the Act which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property in British India
save by authority of law, and that neither the Federal
nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make
any law
authorising the compulsory acquisition of
land for public
purposes save on the basis of providing for
the payment of
compensation.
But in the
present case there is no question of confiscatory legislation.
To regulate the relations of landlord and
tenant and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised
.:
by the landlord in connection with his land, is different
from compulsory acquisition of the land".
It was finally urged that section 86 in so far as it
(I) (1943] 6 IU.J. 55; A.LR. 1943 F.C. 29.
(2) [19-!6] L.R. 73 I.A. 123.
1955
Shri Kishan Sinzh
and others
v.
TM State of
Rqjasthan snd
others
Vmkatarama
A»arJ.
!9S5
Slrl Eislui~ Sifl(h
"""Oihlit
v.
Thi Stole ef
Rqjasl/um """
olh<n
vw.iardJ11•~ :,:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
conferred authority on the Settlement Officer to give
retrospective operation to the rent rates was bad, because l:/le !!Xercise of il!at authority was left to his
arbitrary
and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act
laid down
no rules and prescribed no conditions under
which the discretion had to be exercised, and that the
power conferred in those terms must be held to be unconstitutional.
The
decision in Thakur
Raghubir
Singh v. Court of Wards, Aimer and another( 1 ) was
relied on, in support of
this contention.
There, the
question was as to the validity of a power conferred
on the Court of Wards to take over the management
of ;m estate "if a landlord habitually infringes the
right of a tenant".
Under the Act, the decision
whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended
on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner, apd that was final and not liable to be questioned in civil courts.
It was held that a power which
could be exercised at the absolute discretion of the
authority was an encro:ichment on the rights of a
citizen to hold property under article 19(1) (f)
and
that it was not saved by article 19(5).
But, in the
present case, section 86 of the Act expressly lays down
that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into
operation from a date earlier than the
following 1st
of July, it must be for reasons. There is no force in
the contention
that section 86
does not lay down
under what circumstances such an order could be
passed, because the very nature of
the thing requires
that a large discretion should be left to the authority.
Discretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary.
It was said that under section 233 of the Act the civil
courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under section
62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional
jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with
settlement.
We think that the power conferred on
the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid,
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049.
•
2S,C.lt
SUPREME COUllT REPOR'I'S
541
and that it invades no fundamental rights of the
landlord.
For the reasons
given above, we must hold that the
scheme embodied in sections 81 to 86 of the Act docs
not transgress any of the Constitutional limit:rtions,
and is valid.
In the result, the petitions are dismissed but in the
circumstances, without costs.
STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER
v.
K. M. RAJAGOPALAN
[VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS,
B. P. SINHA and }AFAR IMAM JJ·]
Indian Independence Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. VI, C. 30)-
s. 10(2) (a)-The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947Article 7(1)-Inde.pendence, Conferral of-Automatic and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts in India-Previous to
Independence-Whether deemed to have been appointed and continue
in service after Independence-Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240
(2) and 247.
The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil Service by
open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the Province of Madras
in October 1937. Since then he was serving under the Government
of Madras in various capacities, his last office being Sub-Collector of
Dindigal. He went on leave in June 1947. While on leave he received
a letter from the
Government of India asking him whether he was
willing to continue in the service of the Government after the then
contemplated transfer ot power from the British Government to the
Dominion of India on the 15th August, 1947.
He sent a reply expressing his willingness to continue in service.
On 9th August, 1947
he received a letter from the Government of Madras dated 7th August,
194 7 signed by the Chief Secretary thereof stating that it w.as decided not to retaip his services from and after the 15th August, 1947,
and that his services would be terminated with effect from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947.
The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras and the
Union of India for a declaration that the order issued by the Chief
Secretary to the Government of· Madras on the 7th August, 1947
purporting to terminate his services was null, void and inoperative
and that he should be deemed to continue in service. The High Court
granted the declaration prayed for
accepting the respondent's contention that the order terminating his service was in violation of the
1!155
Shri Klihan Singli
/llUl lllltds
v.
TM Stille ef
ilJJJflltltan °"'
others
V enkalarama
..tyyar J.
1955
S1pumber27