# 5o6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL KHARDAH CO. LTD v. THEIR WORKMEN

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 506
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-09-19
- **Case number:** Civil ApI'eal No. 705 of 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/5o6-supreme-court-reports-1964-vol-khardah-co-ltd-v-their-workmen-3002
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Diami'8al of workman after domutic
enquiry-Failure of enquiry officer to· record finding-Power of
Induatrial Tribunal-If can discard the enquiry and deciik
on merit!.
·
The appellant dismissed one of its workmen on a domestic
enquiry held by its Manager who did not record any findings,
took some of the evidence in the absence of the workman and
found him guilty of misconduct under Rule 14 (c) (i) and
(Tiii) of the Standing Orders. The Industrial Tribunal held
that the dismissal was unjustified and directed the appellant
to reinstate the employee. The respondent Union's case was
that the dismissed workman, who was the Organising Secretary
of the union, was dismissed by the appellant mala fide with the
purpose of victimhing him for his trade union activities.
The
dispute centered round the question whether the strike which
the dismissed workman was charged as
having instigated was
really instigated by him or ·was the spontaneous result of the
treatment meted out by the appellant to another workman
who was sick and fainted on the day the strike started. The
case of the appellant was that this latter workman was not
present on that day at alJ.
This was belied by the record
and the Industrial Tribunal without attaching any importance
to the domestic enquiry held by the Manager dealt with the
merits of the dispute itself and found in favour of the
respondent, holding that the management was unjustified in
dis.missing the workman on tl1e report of the Manager which
was neither fair nor honest. On bellalf of the appellant reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in Indian Iron &
St•el Oo. Ltd. v, Their Workmen and it was contended that the
Industrial Tribunal was in error
in
interfering with the
decision of the management.
H•M the Industrial Tribunal was right in discarding the
domestic enquiry. Although
this Court
has consistently
a s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
refrained from interfering with
the cmnclusions of domestic
enquiries in industrial matters unless one of the four tests laid
down in Indian Iron & Steel Co.
Ltd. v. Their Workmen
was satisfied, the essential ba,i< on which this view is founded
is that the domestic enquiry
must be
conducted fairly
and properly in conformity with the principles of natural
justice. The evidence on which the charges are sought to be
proved against the workman must normally be led
in his
presence. The procedure of recording statements of witnesses
ex parte and thereafter producing the witne3Ses for cross-examination, unless there are compelling reasons to do so, must be
discouraged.
Departmental enqmnes under Art. 311 of the Constitution where the question of motive i' hardly relevant do not
stand on the same footing as those in industrial enquiries
where the question of bona fol.•• or mua fides of the employee
is tJftcn in issue.
Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Their
Workmen, (1958) 1
LiL.J. 260, explained.
State of My•are v. S. S. Makapur, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943;
M/•. Kuaram Cauan Mills Lid. v. Gangadhar, [196~] Vol.
2 S.C.R. 809,
and Union Territory of Tripura v. Gopal
Ohandtr Dutla
Ohoudhri, [1963]
Supp. 1 S.C.R. 266,
referred to.
The failure of the Manager to record any findings after
holding the enquiry was a serious infirmity in the enquiry and
it is not for this Court to go into the evidence to decide
whether the dismissal was justified.
It is the duty of the eltquiry officer in an industrial
enquiry
to
record
clearly
and
precisely
his
conclusions and to indicate briefly the reasons therefor so
that the Industrial Tribunal can judge whether they are
basically erroneous or perverse.
Although the Industrial Tribunal should not as a normal
procedure allow evidence to be led by one party in absence of
the other or admit evidence after the case has been fully
argued unless both the parties agree, the mere calling for the
authenticated recorcl to see whether the workman was the
Organisiag Secretary could not amount to a breach of the
rule.
1911
~hcrdcli C•. Lia.
...
Tlu

## Text

1961
5o6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL ..
KHARDAH CO. LTD.
v.
THEIR WORKMEN
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Diami'8al of workman after domutic
enquiry-Failure of enquiry officer to· record finding-Power of
Induatrial Tribunal-If can discard the enquiry and deciik
on merit!.
·
The appellant dismissed one of its workmen on a domestic
enquiry held by its Manager who did not record any findings,
took some of the evidence in the absence of the workman and
found him guilty of misconduct under Rule 14 (c) (i) and
(Tiii) of the Standing Orders. The Industrial Tribunal held
that the dismissal was unjustified and directed the appellant
to reinstate the employee. The respondent Union's case was
that the dismissed workman, who was the Organising Secretary
of the union, was dismissed by the appellant mala fide with the
purpose of victimhing him for his trade union activities.
The
dispute centered round the question whether the strike which
the dismissed workman was charged as
having instigated was
really instigated by him or ·was the spontaneous result of the
treatment meted out by the appellant to another workman
who was sick and fainted on the day the strike started. The
case of the appellant was that this latter workman was not
present on that day at alJ.
This was belied by the record
and the Industrial Tribunal without attaching any importance
to the domestic enquiry held by the Manager dealt with the
merits of the dispute itself and found in favour of the
respondent, holding that the management was unjustified in
dis.missing the workman on tl1e report of the Manager which
was neither fair nor honest. On bellalf of the appellant reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in Indian Iron &
St•el Oo. Ltd. v, Their Workmen and it was contended that the
Industrial Tribunal was in error
in
interfering with the
decision of the management.
H•M the Industrial Tribunal was right in discarding the
domestic enquiry. Although
this Court
has consistently
a s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
refrained from interfering with
the cmnclusions of domestic
enquiries in industrial matters unless one of the four tests laid
down in Indian Iron & Steel Co.
Ltd. v. Their Workmen
was satisfied, the essential ba,i< on which this view is founded
is that the domestic enquiry
must be
conducted fairly
and properly in conformity with the principles of natural
justice. The evidence on which the charges are sought to be
proved against the workman must normally be led
in his
presence. The procedure of recording statements of witnesses
ex parte and thereafter producing the witne3Ses for cross-examination, unless there are compelling reasons to do so, must be
discouraged.
Departmental enqmnes under Art. 311 of the Constitution where the question of motive i' hardly relevant do not
stand on the same footing as those in industrial enquiries
where the question of bona fol.•• or mua fides of the employee
is tJftcn in issue.
Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Their
Workmen, (1958) 1
LiL.J. 260, explained.
State of My•are v. S. S. Makapur, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943;
M/•. Kuaram Cauan Mills Lid. v. Gangadhar, [196~] Vol.
2 S.C.R. 809,
and Union Territory of Tripura v. Gopal
Ohandtr Dutla
Ohoudhri, [1963]
Supp. 1 S.C.R. 266,
referred to.
The failure of the Manager to record any findings after
holding the enquiry was a serious infirmity in the enquiry and
it is not for this Court to go into the evidence to decide
whether the dismissal was justified.
It is the duty of the eltquiry officer in an industrial
enquiry
to
record
clearly
and
precisely
his
conclusions and to indicate briefly the reasons therefor so
that the Industrial Tribunal can judge whether they are
basically erroneous or perverse.
Although the Industrial Tribunal should not as a normal
procedure allow evidence to be led by one party in absence of
the other or admit evidence after the case has been fully
argued unless both the parties agree, the mere calling for the
authenticated recorcl to see whether the workman was the
Organisiag Secretary could not amount to a breach of the
rule.
1911
~hcrdcli C•. Lia.
...
Tlui• w .. 4,.,.
, K"4riti.1r:Ci: Lid,
,, ' "v·.1..:.
·rll1ir Wl1km1n
,.,,_>-<!· !'<
"."~!°·'
~01~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l964]VOL.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil ApI'eal
No. 705 of 1962. ·
· ' · ' ·
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated
September 19, 1961 of the
Fourth
Industrial
Tribunal, West
Bengal
in
Case No. V111·42
of 1961.
H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor·General of India and
P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
,
D. L. Sen and Janardhan Sharma, for the
respondents.
1963. May 2.
The Judgment of the Court was
deli,vered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-This appeal arises out
of. an industrial dispute between the appellant,
Khardah Co. Ltd., and the respondents, its workmen,
The dispute . was in regard to the dismissal of the
appellant's employee, Samiran Jadav. The respondents alleged tbat the said dismissal was unjustified,
whereas, according to the appellant, the said employee had been properly and validly dismissed. The
dispute which was referred to the 4th Industrial
Tribunal, Wesf Bengal, for its adjudicatiOn was
whether the said dismissal was justified, and to what
relief, if any, was ,the workman entitled? The, Tribunal has held that the dismissal was unjustified ai;id
so, it has directed the appellant to reinstate the said
employee to his old post within a month from the
date of the publication of the award. It has ·also
ordered that the period starting from the date of the
dis'missal till the date of reinstatement should be .
tre<t,ted. as leave without pay and as such, should be .
counted towards the length of service. It is against.
this award that the appellant has come to this Coiirt
bfspecialleave.
·
··
··
a's.c.R..
SUPREME COURT ~PORTs 5'09
The respondent's case was that Jadav had been
dismissed by the appellant mala fide with the rnotive
of victimising him for his trade union activities.
Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union
and since he supported the Union's demands very
strongly, the appellant wanted to get rid of him. It
appears that J adav had been working as a weaver
for
some years past.
He was confirmed in
service with effect from
April 12, 1954.
On
September 19, 1960, he went on a week's leave. When
he
returned on September 26, 1960, he was
asked to work
on
machine
producing twill,
though, normally, he was assigned work on a plain
machine. Jadav was not accustomed to work on the
complicated machine which produces twill and so,
· he requested the management that he should be asked
to do his usual work on a plain machine. This request
was. however, turned down. Being unaccustomed to
work on the machine producing twill, Jadav met
with an accident
on
September 27, 1960, and
was granted medical leave for a week ending on
Saturday;
October 1,
1960.
On
October, . 3
1960, when he resumed duty, he again requested the
management that he should be permitted to work on
the plain machine, but when his request was turned
down, he told the management that he would work
on the twill machine in the second shift which starts
from l P.M.
On that day, another employee
Mahboob. who was ailing a.nd had been on leave,
asked for further leave which was refused and he
fell unconscious while he was going to operate his
machine. As a result, 700 weavers of the appellant
stopped work and the weaving section could not
resume work at 1 P. M. The management then
declared a lock-out on
October 5, 1960 which
continued until October 29, 1960.
On
October 3,
1960, the
management
1crved a charge-sheet on J adav in which it was
.illeged thatJadav had wilfully disobeyed the lawful
1965
Kh.<liah Co. Ltd.
...
Th1ir W <irkmen
Gaj1ndr.i1aJk• J.
1963
K/10rfch Co, Ltd.
v.
Tluir Workman
l.ilO
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
aud reasonable order of his superior and had acted
in a manner subversive of discipline. The case against
him was that he had moved from
one place to
another in the weaving Department and incited
workers of the said department to go on strike. The
management alleged that by his conduct, Jadav had
committed misconduct under Rule 14(c) (i) and (viii)
of the Standing Orders. Jadav was called upon to
offer his explanation within 24 hours after receipt of
the charge-sheet ..
After Jadav gave his explanation, an enquiry
was held. At the initial Stf\ges of the enquiry, Jadav
appeared, but, later, he did not take part in the
proceedings. The appellant
contends that Jadav
deliberately refrained from
taking part in
~he
proceedings, whereas according to the respondents,
the enquiry was conducted unfairly, and so, it became
impossible for Jadav to participate in it. This enquiry
was conducted by the Manager himself. After the
enquiry was over, the Manager decided that J ad av
was guilty of the charge, and so, dismissed. him on
November 21, 1960.
The respondents' case was
that the dismissal was purely vindictive and was not
justified at all.
On the other hand, the appellant's case was
that Jadav had been working in the weaving depart·
ment both on plain looms and on looms that produce
twill. When he returned to duty on October 3,
1960, the departmental Overseer, Mr. Jha asked
Jadav to go to his loom, but he refused to obey his
orders. The appellant further alleged that Jadav
moved inside the weaving department and incited
the workers to stop work. The appellant also pleaded
that a proper enquiry had been held against Jadav
and it was as a result of the said enquiry that he was
dismissed for misconduct under Rule 14 (c)(i) & (viii)
of the Company's Standing Orders. Regarding the
incident of Mahboob, the appellant alleged tha(
'
. 3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
Mahboob was ab5ent on
October 3, 1960 and,
therefore, no question of his working on any machine
arose on that day. In other words, the appellant's
contention was that the Union's version that the
strike was .spontaneous because Mahboob fainted,
was untrue and the strike was in substance, the result
of the instigation of Jadav.
Before the Tribunal, some oral evidence was led
by the parties and reliance was placed by the
appellant on the proceedings of the enquiry itself.
The Tribunal held that the management had deliberately suppressed the fact that Mahboob had gone to
the mill on October 3, and prayed for extension
of leave which was refused, and so, the Tribunal
came to the conclusion that the strike could not have
been instigated by Jadav.
The Tribunal further
commented on the fact that after the enquiry was
held, no finding was recorded by the Manager who
held the eoquiry, and it appeared to the Tribunal
that the conclusions on which the management
prest1mably acted in dismissing Jadav were of such a
. character that "no person acting fairly and honestly
could have reached them". The Tribunal also held
that Jadav was not used to work on a twill loom,
and so, his request that he should be allowed to work
on a plain loom was not unjustified.
Its conclusion,
therefore, was that a grave charge had been unjustly
framed againstJadav and that showed want of good
faith and vindictiveness. On these findings,
the
Tribunal answered the question in favour of the
respondents and directed reinstatement of Jadav.
On behalf of the appellant, the learned Solicitor
General has strenuously urged before us that the appellant has held a proper domestic enquiry and has dismissed Jadav because the management thought that
the enquiry disclosed the fact that the charges framed
against Jadav had been established. He contends
that it is firmly established by decisions of this Court
J:hva.Ji Ca. Ltd
v.
Tluir W111k11n1
Gaj111drag«ik.,- J.
llff
Kh4rdah C.. Ltd.
••
Their Workmen
Caj1111liilt•dkar . J.
ll12 SUPREME COURT'MPORTS (1964) Vdt.
that an Industrial Tribunal will not' interfere 'with
the . action of the management in dismissing iis emp·
loyee after holding an enquiry into. his alleged mis·
conduct unless it is shown that the lnanagemenfl1as
not acted in good faith, or that the dismissal amounts
to victimisation or unfair labour practice, or wliere
the management has been guilty of a bask error, or
violation of a principle of natural justice, or when on
the materials, the finding is completely baseless .or
perverse, vide Indian Iron &> Steel 0(ff1'piJ'T!!J Lid. v.
Their Workmen. (').
There is no doubt that'this
Court has consistently refrained from interfering ,with
the conclusions reached by the enquiry.officer who
Conducts domestic enquiries against industHal emp·
loyees unless one of the four tests·laid, down'in the
· case of the Indian Iron ih Steel
Co. 'Ltd •. (1)
is satisfied, because we have· generally accepted' the
view that if the enquiry is fairly held and.leads'to
the conclusion that the charge 'framed against tlii:
employee is proved, the Industrial Tribunal'shou~
not sit in appeal over . the finaing re~orded. 'at the
said enquiry and should not interfere with the .Ina·
na~ement's right to dismiss a workman who is founCi
guilty of misconduct.
It would be noticed that the essentiarbasi1 ;on
which this view is founaed is that the enquiry ,con·
ducted by the management before a domestic tribu·
nal must be a fair and just enquiry and 'in btirigfog
home to the workman the charge framed against ·
him, principles of natural justice must be observeCi.
Normally, evidence on which the charges are sought
to be proved must be led at such an enquiry, in the
presence of the workman himself. It is true that in
the case of departmental enquires held against 'public
servants, this Court has observed in the State of 'M !J·
sore v. S.S. Makapur ('),that if the deposition ofa
witness has been recorded by the enquiry offic;:er in
the absence of the public servant and a copy there<>f
is given to him, and an opportunity is given to him
(I) (1958) I L.L.J, 260.
(2) (1963) 2 LC. R. Sf!,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
to cross examine the witness after he affirms in a
general way the truth of his statement already recorded, that would conform to the requirements of natural justice; but as has been emphasised by this
Court in M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar (' ), these observations must be applied with caution to enquiries held by domestic Tribunals against
the industrial employees. In such enquiries, it is
desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the
management relies in support of its charge against
the workman should be examined in his presence.
Recording evidence in the presence of the workman
concerned serves a very important purpose. The
· witness knows that he is giving evidence against a
particular individual who is present before him, and
therefore, he, is cautious in making his statement.
Besides, when evidence is recorded in the presence
-of the accused person, there is no room for persuading
the witness to make convenient statements, and it is
always easier for an accused person to cross-examine
the witness if his evidence is recorded in his presence.
, Therefore, we would discourage the idea of recording
statements of witnesses ex parte and then producing
the witnesses before the employee concerned for
cross-examination after serving him with such previously recorded statements even though the witnesses
concerned make a general statement on the latter
occasion that their statements already recorded correctly represent what they stated. In our opinion,
unless there are compelling reasons to do so, the normal procedure should be followed and all evidence
should be recorded in the presence of the workman
who stands charged with the commission of acts constituting misconduct.
In this connection, it is necessary to point out
that unlike domestic enquiries against public servants
. to which Art. 311 of the Constitution applies, in
industrial enquiries, the question of the bona fides
or mala fides of the employer is often at issue. If it
(I) [1964] Vol. 2 S. C. R. 809.
1961
Khord4A Co. Lli.
v.
Their W".bnm
Gajmi<ogU.k., I.
IHJ
n..t.AC..W.
v.
n,;, Worilmm
\
514 SUPRENIE COURT REPOR. TS (1964] vor..
l"
is shown that the employer was actuated by a de1ire
to victimise a workman for his trade union activities,
that itself may, in some cases, introduce an infirmity
in the order of dismissal passed against such a
workman.
The question of motive is
hardly
relevant in enquiries held against public servants,
vide Union Territory of Tripura v. Gopal Chandra
Dutta Ohoudhuri (1). That is another reason why
domestic en4uiries in industrial matters should be
held with scrupulous regard for the requirements of
natural justice. Care must always be taken to
see that these enquiries are not reduced to an empty
formality. .
/
Take the present case where, after the enquiry
was held, the Manager who held th,e enquiry has
not recorded any findings, and so, we do not know
what reasons weighed in his mind and how he
appreciated the evidence led before him. The
learned Solicitor-General contends that there was
hardly any need to record any findings or to make a
foinial report in the present case, because the Manager who held the enquiry was himself competent
to dismiss the employee. We are not impressed by
this argument. The whole object of holding an
enquiry is to enable the enquiry officer to decide
upon the merits of the dispute before him, and so,
it would be idle to conterid that once evidence is
recorded, all that the employer is expected to do is ,,
to pass an order of dismissal which impliedly indicates
that the employer accepted the view that the charges
. framed against the employee had been proved.
One
of the tests which the Industrial Tribunal is entitled
to apply in dealing with industrial disputes of thi~
character is whether the conclusion of the enquiry
officer was perverse or whether there was any basic
error in the approach adopted by him.
Now, such
an enquiry would be impossible in the present case
because we do not know how the enquiry officer·
approached the question and what conclusions he
(I) [1963J Supp. IS, C.R. 266.
". ·
:l S.C.il.
SUPREME COURT R,EPORTS
515
reached before he decided to dismiss J adav. In our J
opinion, therefore, the failure of the Manager to
record any findings after holding the enquiry constitutes a serious infirmity in.the enquiry itself., The
learned Solicitor-General suggested that we might
consider the evidence ourselves and decide whether
the dismissal of J adav is justified or not. We are
not prepared to adopt such a course. If industrial
adjudication attaches importance to domestic enquiries and the conclusions reached at the end of
such enquiries, that necessarily postulates that the
enquiry would be followed by a statement containing
the conclusions of the enquiry officer. It may be
that the enquiry officer need not write a very long
or elaborate report ; but since his findings are likely
to lead to the dismissal of the employee, it is his
duty to record clearly and precisely his conclusions
and to indicate briefi y his reasons for reaching the
said conclusions. /Unless such a course is adopted,
it would be difficult for the Industrial Tribunal to
decide whether thf' approach adopted by the enquiry
officer was basically erroneous or whether his .conclusions were perverse. Indeed, if the argument
urged before us by the learned Solicitor-General is
accepted, it is
likely to . impair substantially the
value of such domestic enquiries. As we have
already observed, we must insist on a proper enquiry
being held, and that means that nothing should
happen in the enquiry either when it is held or after
it 1s concluded and before the order of dismissal is
passed, which would expose the enquiry to the
criticism that it was undertaken as an empty formality. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Industrial
Tribunal was right.- in not attaching any importance
to the enquiry held by the Manager in dealing with
the merits of the dispute itself on the evidence
adduced before it.
It is well settled that if the enquiry is held to
be unfair 1 the employer can lead evidence before the
l!Jf3
Khardah Co. Ltd.
••
Tluir W' or km1n
Gaj1ndrazadkar J.
jgs
Klwbh C.. Lid.
••
TiNWotkmm
G~lldkor J.
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Tribunal and justify his action, but in such a case,
the question as to whether the dismissal of the
employee is justified or not, would be open before the
Tribunal and the Tribunal will consider the merits
of the dispute and come· to its own conclusion without
having any regard for the view taken by the management in dismissing the employee. If the enquiry
is good and the conduct of the management is not
mala fide or vindictive, then, of course, the Tribunal
would not try to examine the merits of the findings
as though it was sitting in appeal over the conclusions
of the enquiry officer. I In the present case, the
Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the dismissal of Jadav was not effected in good faith and
has been actuated by a desire to victimise him for
his trade union activities. That is a conclusion of
fact which cannot be said to be perverse, and so, it is
not open to the appellant to challenge its correctness
of the merits before us.
There is one point to which we ought to refer
before we part with this appeal. It appears that the
main dispute between the partic::s was whether the
strike on October 3, 1960, was spontaneous, or
had been instigated by· Jadav. The respondents
contended that the treatment given by the management to Mahboob caused this strike and 700 weavers
struck work spontaneously,. whereas the appellant
urged that Mahboob was not present on the said
date,,,and so, the story that his request for leave was
not acceded to and he had to work is altogether false
and the strike had really been instigated by Jaclav.
On this point, the Tribunal has made a categorical
finding against the appellant and in doing so, it has
relied upon the minutes of the Emergency Works
Committee meeting held on
October 3, 1960,
at 3 P.M. with the Manager himself in the chair.
These minutes show that when an enquiry was made
as to why the strike had commenced, it was definitely
reported to the Committee that Mahboob, who had
3 S.C.R.
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
517
gone on leave, had extended his leave and after the
expiry of the extended leave, he reported on
October 3, and pleaded that he was still unwell and ~
should be given still further lf~ave, but "nobody paid
any heed to his prayer", and so, presumably he had
to resume duty. The minutes further show that the
Labour Officer informed the members of the Committee that Mahboob had produced a certificate of
fitness on
September, 22, 1960 and after discussion, it was unanimously decided to refer his case
to the Mill's Medical Officer on whose recommendation the leave should be considered. These minutes,
therefore, clearly prove that Mahboob had gone to
the
Milt on October 3, had asked for further
leave, and his request for further leave was not
granted. We ought to add that these minutes have
been signed by the.Joint Secretary on the employer's
side and the Joint Secretary on the employees' side,
and their correctness cannot be impeached. It is in
the light of these statements that the plea made by
,the appellant before the Tribunal had to be considered by it.
The plea specifically made was that Mahboob
was absent on· October 3, and, therefore, there
was no question of his working on any machine.
This plea would seem to suggest that Mahboob was
absent from the Mill and that undoubtedly is not
true. The learned Solicitor-General invited us to
consider this plea in the light of the statement made
by one of the witnesses in the domestic enquiry.
This statement was that Mahboob and the witness had
gone to the Labour Officer for extension of leave to
Mahboob and the Labour Officer had granted
leave.
This statement would show that leave had
been
gra~ted to Mahboob in the morning of
October 3, but as we have already seen, the Labour
Officer himself told the members of the Works Committee at 3 P.M. on the same day that leave had not
been ~ranted to Mahboob because he had produced
,...,.,. Co. I.Ii.
y,
Thllir W eriwlm
1963
KlumlAh Co. Ltd.
v.
Their WMkmm
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
a certificate of fitness dated September 22, and
the Works Committee had resolved that Mahboob's
case should be referred to the Mill's Medical Officer
on whose recommendation action should be taken.
Thus, there can be not doubt that even if the plea
made by the appellant is liberally construed and is
read in the light of the statement made by one of
the witnesses at the domestic enquiry, the Industrial
Tribunal was right in holding that the stand taken
by the appellant was wholly untrue and that Mahboob
had not been given leave on October 3. That
being so, if the Industrial Tribunal took the view
that the refusal of the management to give leave to
Mahboob exasperated the workmen, we cannot hold
that its conclusion -is erroneous or that its propriety
can be successfully challenged
before us.
The
incident in regard
to Mahboob forms the main
background of the strike and the anxiety of the
appellant was to show that Mahboob was not present
on that date. Therefore, once the Industrial Tribunal
came to the conclusion that the version given by
t~e
appellant was untrue, it naturally changed the com.
plexion of tllle whole of the charge-sheet framed by
the appellant against Jadav. That is why the
Industrial Tribunal came to the concluiion that the
conduct of the appellant in dismissing J adav showed
lack of good faith and appeared to have been inspired by the desire to victimise Jadav for his trade
union activities.
The learned Solicitor-General commented on
the fact that the Tribunal had allowed the respondents to call for the register of trade unions after the
arguments had been heard before it. It appl'ars that
both the parties appeared before the Tribunal on
January 19, 1961, when arguments were heard and
the award was reserved. The Union then filed an
application praying that the trade union record may
be called for, and the Tribunal ordered that the
n:cord be called for.
The grievance made by ·the
>-
3 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS-.419--
.
\~ .
.
leam~d Solicitor-General· is that ·it is improper to
·· have· allowed additional evidence ·to be called for ·
after the arguments had been heard. We do not
think there is any force in this argument, because the
only· purpose for which the record was called for by
the Union was to show that Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the ,Union. Since that fact was
presumably disputed by·· the appellant in arguing the·
case before the Tribunal, the Union urged that the
• record kept by the Registrar of Trade Unions would
show that the appellant's plea was not well founded.
· If, in such circumstances, the Tribunal sent for the
record to satisfy itself lhat the record showed that
Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union,
we do not think any serious grievance can bi made by _
the appellant about the conduct of the Tribunal.
It is perfectly true that in dealing with industrial
matters, the Tribunal cannot allow evidence to be
led by one party in the absence of the other, and
should not accept the request of either party to admit
· evidence after the case has been fully argued unless.
both the parties agree. In the present case, however,
what the Tribunal has done, is merely to send for
authen.ticated record to see whether Jadav was the
Organising .Secretary of the Union or not.
The result is, the appeal fails and is disml~sea
· with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
196$