# 6 S.C.R. 589 B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2010] 6 S.C.R. 589
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-05-07
- **Bench:** K.G.Balakrishnan, S.H. Kapadia, R.V. · Raveendran, B. Sudershan Reddy, P. Sathasivam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/6-s-c-r-589-b-p-singhal-v-union-of-india-and-anr-26883
- **Pages:** 68

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950:
A
B
c
Article 156 - Removal of Governor on withdrawal of
President's pleasure - Judicial review -
Scop~ - Limitations
upon power ofremoval of Governors under Article 156(1) -
Held: The President can remove the Governor from office at
any time without assigning any reason and without giving any D
opportunity to show cause - However, power .under Article
156(1) to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances
for valid and compelling reasons ·- What would be compelling .
reasons would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case - A Governor cannot be removed on the ground
E
that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of the
U(lion Government or the party in power at the Centre -
Change in government at Centre is not a ground for removal
of Governors holding office - As there is no need to assign
reasons,· any removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the
F
pleasure will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only
a limited judicial review - If the aggrieved person is able to
d~monstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary,
malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will call upon the ·
Union Government to disclose to the court, the material upon
G
,which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the .
pleasure - If the Union Government does not disclose any
reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant,
arbitrary, whimsical, or malafide, the court will interfere -
589
H
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A However, the court will not interfere mersly on the ground that
a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are
insufficient.
B
c
Articles 154 and 155 - Position of Governor under the
Constitution - Discussed.
Article 32 - Writ petition by way of PIL, to secure relief
for Governors who had been removed from office -
Maintainability of the writ petition - Locus of the Petitioner -
Public Interest Litigation.
Doctrines - Doctrine of "pleasure" - Origin, scope and
applicability of - Discussed - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 310 rlw Article 311.
The Governors of the States of Uttar Pradesh,
D Gujarat, Haryana and Goa on 2-7-2004 were removed by
the President of India on the advice of the Union Council
of Ministers.
In the wake of removal of the Governors, writ petition
E was filed before this Court, raising a question of public
importance involving the interpretation of Article 156 of
the Constitution.
The petitioner submitted that to ensure the
independence and effective functioning of Governors,
F certain safeguards have to be read as limitations upon
the power of removal of Governors under Article 156(1)
[which provides that a Governor shall hold office during
the pleasure of the President]; that there should be some
certainty of tenure so that the Governor can discharge
G the duties and functions of his constitutional office
effectively and independently; that certainty of tenure will
be achieved by fixing the norms for removal, while
recognizing an unfettered discretion will subject a
Governor to a constant threat of removal and make him
H subservient to the Union Government, apart from
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
591
demoralizing him, and therefore, the removal should
A
conform to the constitutional norms viz. i) removal of the
Governor to be in rare and exceptional circumstances, for
compelling reasons which make him unfit to continue in
office; ii) the Governor to be apprised of the reasons for
removal; and iii) the order of removal to be subject to
B
judicial review.
The Attorney General appearing on behalf of the
respondents raised a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that if the
four Governors who were removed, do not wish to seek C
. any relief and have accepted their removal without
'"Protest, no member of the public can bring a public
irrterest litigation for grant of relief to them.
On merits, the Attorney General submitted that t

## Text

_Characters 0–39,905 of 131,804. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39905 for what follows._

[2.010] 6 S.C.R. 589
B.P. SINGHAL
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 296 of 2004)
MAY 7, 2010
[K.G.BALAKRISHNAN, CJI, S.H. KAPADIA, R.V. ·
RAVEENDRAN, B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND P.
SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950:
A
B
c
Article 156 - Removal of Governor on withdrawal of
President's pleasure - Judicial review -
Scop~ - Limitations
upon power ofremoval of Governors under Article 156(1) -
Held: The President can remove the Governor from office at
any time without assigning any reason and without giving any D
opportunity to show cause - However, power .under Article
156(1) to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances
for valid and compelling reasons ·- What would be compelling .
reasons would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case - A Governor cannot be removed on the ground
E
that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of the
U(lion Government or the party in power at the Centre -
Change in government at Centre is not a ground for removal
of Governors holding office - As there is no need to assign
reasons,· any removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the
F
pleasure will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only
a limited judicial review - If the aggrieved person is able to
d~monstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary,
malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will call upon the ·
Union Government to disclose to the court, the material upon
G
,which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the .
pleasure - If the Union Government does not disclose any
reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant,
arbitrary, whimsical, or malafide, the court will interfere -
589
H
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A However, the court will not interfere mersly on the ground that
a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are
insufficient.
B
c
Articles 154 and 155 - Position of Governor under the
Constitution - Discussed.
Article 32 - Writ petition by way of PIL, to secure relief
for Governors who had been removed from office -
Maintainability of the writ petition - Locus of the Petitioner -
Public Interest Litigation.
Doctrines - Doctrine of "pleasure" - Origin, scope and
applicability of - Discussed - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 310 rlw Article 311.
The Governors of the States of Uttar Pradesh,
D Gujarat, Haryana and Goa on 2-7-2004 were removed by
the President of India on the advice of the Union Council
of Ministers.
In the wake of removal of the Governors, writ petition
E was filed before this Court, raising a question of public
importance involving the interpretation of Article 156 of
the Constitution.
The petitioner submitted that to ensure the
independence and effective functioning of Governors,
F certain safeguards have to be read as limitations upon
the power of removal of Governors under Article 156(1)
[which provides that a Governor shall hold office during
the pleasure of the President]; that there should be some
certainty of tenure so that the Governor can discharge
G the duties and functions of his constitutional office
effectively and independently; that certainty of tenure will
be achieved by fixing the norms for removal, while
recognizing an unfettered discretion will subject a
Governor to a constant threat of removal and make him
H subservient to the Union Government, apart from
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
591
demoralizing him, and therefore, the removal should
A
conform to the constitutional norms viz. i) removal of the
Governor to be in rare and exceptional circumstances, for
compelling reasons which make him unfit to continue in
office; ii) the Governor to be apprised of the reasons for
removal; and iii) the order of removal to be subject to
B
judicial review.
The Attorney General appearing on behalf of the
respondents raised a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that if the
four Governors who were removed, do not wish to seek C
. any relief and have accepted their removal without
'"Protest, no member of the public can bring a public
irrterest litigation for grant of relief to them.
On merits, the Attorney General submitted that the o
remoyal should be for a reason, but such reason need
not ,Oe communicated and also that removal by applying
the doctrine of pleasure need not necessarily relate to
any act or omission or fault on the part of the Governor.
He submitted that in essence, the object of providing that
the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the
President was that if the President lost faith in .the
Governor or found him unfit for whatever reason, he can
withdraw the presidential pleasure resulting in removal;
that the pleasure doctrine cannot be denuded of its width,
by restricting its applications to specific instances of fault
E
F
or misbehaviour on the part of the Governor, or by
implying an obligation to assign or communicate any
reason. for the removal. The Attorney General submitted
that in a democracy, political parties are formed on
shared beliefs and they contest election with a declared
G
agenda; and if a party which comes to power with a
particular social and economic agenda, finds that a
Governor is out of sync with its policies, then it should
be able to remove such a Governor. The Attorney
General submitted that the Union Government has the
H
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.CR.
A right to remove a Governor without attributing any fault
to him, if the President loses confidence in a Governor or
finds that the Governor is out of sync with democratic and
electoral mandate.
The questions which thus arose for consideration
were i) whether the writ petition was maintainable; ii) what
is the scope of "doctrine of pleasure" ; iii) what is the
position of a Governor under the Constitution; iv) whether
there are any express or implied limitations/restrictions
upon the power under Article 156(1) of the Constitution
C and v) whether the removal of Governors in exercise of
the doctrine of pleasure is open to judicial review.
D
Disposing of the writ petition and the transfer petition,
the Court
HELD: i) Maintainability of the writ petition
1. The petitioner has no locus to maintain the petition
in regard to the prayers claiming relief for the benefit of
the individual Governors. At all events, such prayers no
E longer survive on account of passage of time. However,
with regard to the general question of public importance
referred to the Constitution Bench, touching upon the
scope of Article 156 (1) and the limitations upon the
doctrine of pleasure, the petitioner has necessary locus.
F [Para 11] (617-D]
Ranji Thomas v. Union of India - 2000 (2) SCC 81, relied
on.
S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India - 1981 (Supp) SCC 87,
G referred to.
(ii) Scope of doctrine of pleasure
2.1. The Pleasure Doctrine has its origin in English
law, with reference to the tenure of public servants under
H the Crown. [Para 12) (617-F]
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
. 593
2.2. There is a distinction between the doctrine of A
pleasure as it existed in a feudal set-up and the doctrine
of pleasure in a democracy governed by rule of law. In a
democracy governed by Rule of Law, where arbitrariness
in any form is eschewed, no Government or Authority has
the right to do what it pleases. The doctrine of pleasure
19
does not mean a licence to act arbitrarily, capriciously or
whimsically. It is presumed that discretionary powers
conferred in absolute and unfettered terms on any public
authority will necessarily and obviously be exercised
reasonably and for public good. [Para 13] [620-D-F]
C
2.3. The 'Doctrine of Pleasure' in its absolute
unrestricted application does not exist in India. The said
doctrine is severely curtailed in the case of government
employment, as evident from clause (2) of Article 310 and
clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. Even in regard to cases
D
falling within the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, the
application of the doctrine is not unrestricted, but
moderately restricted in the sense that the circumstances·
mentioned therein should exist for its operation. Article
310 read with Article 311 provide an example of the
E
application of 'at pleasure' doctrine subject to restrictions.
Clause (1) of Article 310 relates to tenure of office of
persons serving the Union or a State, being subject to
doctrine of pleasure. However, clause (2) of Article 310
and Article 311 restricts the oper;;ition of the 'at pleasure'
F
doctrine contained in Article 310(1). [Paras 15 and 19)
I
[621-G; 623-D]
.
2.4. The Constitution of India provides for three
different types of tenure: (i) Those who hold office during
the pleasure of the President (or Governor); (ii) Those
G
who hold office during the pleasure of the President (or
Governor), subject to restrictions; (iii) Those who hold
office for specified terms with immunity against removal,
exc:ept by impeachment, who are not ·subject to the
doctrine of pleasure. Constitutional Assembly debates
H
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201 O] 6. S.C.R.
A
clearly show that after elaborate discussions, varying
levels of protection against removal were adopted in
relation to different kinds of offices viz. (i) Offices to which
the doctrine of pleasure applied absolutely without any
restrictions (Ministers, Governors, Attorney General and
B Advocate General); (ii) Offices to which doctrine of
pleasure applied with restrictions (Members of defence
service, Members of civil service of the Union, Member
of All-India service, holders of posts connected with
defence or any civil post under the Union, Member of a
C civil service of a State and holders of civil posts under
the State); and (iii) Offices to which the doctrine of
pleasure does not apply at all (President, Judges of
Supreme Court, Comptroller & Auditor General of India,
Judges of the High Court, and Election Commissioners).
0
Having regard to the constitutional scheme, it is not
possible to mix up or extend the type of protection
against removal, granted to one category of offices, to
another category. [Para 21] [625-D-H; 626-A]
2.5. The doctrine of pleasure as originally envisaged
E in England was a prerogative power which was
unfettered. It meant that the holder of an office under
pleasure could be removed at any time, without notice,
without assigning cause, and without there being a need
for any cause. But where rule of law prevails, there is
F
nothing like unfettered discretion or unaccountable
action. The degree of need for reason may vary. The
degree of scrutiny during judicial review may vary. But
the need for reason exists. As a result when the
Constitution of India provides that some offices will be
G held during the pleasure of the President, without any
express limitations or restrictions, it should however
necessarily be read as being subject to the
"fundamentals of constitutionalism". Therefore in a
constitutional set up, when an office is held during the
H pleasure of any Authority, and if no limitations or
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
595
restrictions are placed on the "at pleasure" doctrine, it A
means that the holder of the office can be removed by
the authority at whose pleasure he holds office, at any
time, without notice and without assigning any cause.
The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act
with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically,
B
or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a
cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words, "at
pleasure" doctrine enables the removal of a person
holding office at the pleasure of an Authority, summarily,
without any obligation to give any notice or hearing to c
the person removed, and without any obligation to assign
any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or
withdrawal of pleasure. However, the withdrawal of
pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of
the Authority, but can only be for valid reasons. [Para 22]
0
[626-B-G]
/
State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, 1954 SCR 786; P.L.
Dhingra v. Union of India - AIR 1958 SC 36 and Moti Ram
v. N.E. Frontier Railway AIR 1964 SC 600, relied on.
· Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398,
. referred to.
Dunn v. Queen - 1896 (1) QB 116; Shenton v.
Smith, 1895 AC 229 and Well v. Newfound land [1999 (177)
DL (4th) 73(SCC)], referred to.
·
'Constitutional law of India' (4th
1
Ed., Vol. 3, pp.2989-90)
by H.M. Seervai; Black's Dictionary and Administrative Law
by HWR Wade & CF Forsyth (9th Ed.; pp.354-355),
referred to.
(iii) Position of a Governor under the Constitution
E
F
G
3.1. The Governor constitutes an integral part of !he
legislature of a State. He is vested with the legil?lative
power to promulgate ordinances while the Houses of the
H
596
SUPREME COURT·REPORTS
(2010] 6 S.C.R.
A legislature are not in session. The executive power of the
State is vested in him and every executive action of the
Government is taken in his name. He exercises the
sovereign power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or
remissions of punishment. He is vested with the power
B to summon each House of the Legislature or to prorogue
either House or to dissolve the legislative assembly. No
Bill passed by the Houses of the Legislature can become
law unless it is assented to by him. He has to make a
report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which
c the Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the Constitution. He thus occupies a
high constitutional office with important constitutional
functions and duties. [Para 23] (626-H; 627-A-C]
3.2. It is evident that a Governor has a dual role. The
D first is that of a constitutional Head of the State, bound
by the advice of his Council of Ministers. The second is
to function as a vital link between the Union Government
and the State Government. In certain special/emergent
situations, he may also act as a special representative of
E the Union Government. He is required to discharge the
functions related to his different roles harmoniously,
assessing the scope and ambit of each role properly. He
is not an employee of the Union Government, nor the
agent of the party in power nor required to act under the
F dictates of political parties. There may be occasions when
he may have to be an impartial or neutral Umpire where
the views of the Union Government and State
Governments are in conflict. His peculiar position arises
from the fact that the Indian Constitution is quasi-federal
G in character. [Para 25] [630-F-H; 631-A]
3.3. In the early days of Indian democracy, the same
political party was in power both at the Centre and the
States. The position has changed with passage of time.
Now different political parties, some national and some
H regional, are in power in the States. Further one single
B..P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
597
party may not be in power either in the Centre or in the
A
State. Different parties with distinct (deologies may
constitute a front, to form a Government. On account. of
emergence of coalition politics, many regional parties
have started sharing power in the Centre. Many a time
there may not even be a common programme, manifesto
B
or agenda among the parties sharing power. As a result,
the· agenda or ideology of a political party in power in the
State may not be in sync with the agenda or ideology of
the political partie$ \in the ruling coalition at the Centre,
or may not be in sync with the agenda or ideology of C
some of the political parties in the ruling coalition at the
Centre, but may be in sync with some other political
parties forming part of the ruling coalition at the Centre.
Further the compulsions of coalition politics may require
the parties sharing power, to frequently change their 0
policies and agendas. In such a scenario of myriad
policies, ideologies, agendas in the shifting sands of
political coalitions, there is no question of the Union
Government having Governors who are in sync with its
mandate and policies. Governors are not expected or
required to implement the policies bf the government or
popular mandates. Their constitutional role is clearly
defined and bears very limited political overtones. The
Governor is not the agent or the employee of the Union
Government. As the constitutional head of the State,
many a time he may be expressing views of the State
Government, which may be neither his own nor that of
the Centre (for example, when he delivers the special
address under Article'176 of the Constitution). Reputed
elder sta~esmen, able administrators and eminent
personalities, with maturity and experience are expected
G
to be appointed as Governors. While some of them may
come from a political background, once they are
appointed as Governors, they owe their allegiance and
loyalty to the Constitution and not to any political party
and are required to preserve, protect and defend the
E
F
H
598SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Constitution (reference may be made to the terms of oath
or affirmation by the Governor, under Article 159 of the
Constitution). Like the President, Governors are expected
to be apolitical, discharging purely constitutional
functions, irrespective of their earlier political
8
background. Governors cannot be politically active. This
Court therefore rejects the contention of the respondents
that Governors should be in "sync" with the policies of
the Union Government or should subscribe to the
ideology of the party in power at the Centre. As the
C Governor is neither the employee nor the agent of the
Union Government, this Court also rejects the contention
that a Governor can be removed if the Union Government
or party in power loses 'confidence' in him. [Para 26) (631E-H; 632-A-G]
D
State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India, 1977 (3) SCC 592;
State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1977 (4) SCC 608 and
Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak (Dr.), 1979 (3) SCC 458,
followed.
E
Rameshwar Prasad (VI) vs. Union of India, 2006 (2) SCC
1, relied on.
F
'Constitutional Law of India' [4th Ed., Vol.II, at p.2065) by
H. M. Seervai and Constituent Assembly Debates, (Volume
Ill pages 455 and 469) - referred to.
-
(iv) Limitations/restrictions upon the power under Article
156(1) of the Constitution
4.1. A plain reading of Article 156 shows that when a.
Governor is appointed, he· holds the office during the'.
G pleasure of the President, which means that the Governor
can be removed from office at any time without notice and
without assigning any cause. It is also open to the
Governor to resign from offic'tl at any time. If the President
does not remove him from office and if the Governor does
H not resign, the term of the Governor will come to an end .
B.P. SINGHAL v. ·UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
599
on the expiry of five years from the date on which he
A
enters office. Clause (3) of Article 156 is not intended to
be a restriction or limitation upon the power to remove
the Governor at any time, under clause (1) of Article 156.
Clause (3) of Article 156 only indicates the tenure which
is subjected to the President's pleasure. In contrast, in
B
case of Articles 310 and 311 the doctrine of pleasure is
clearly and indisputably subjected to restriction. Clause
(1) of Article 310 provides that a person serving the Union
Government holds office during the pleasure of the
"
President and a person serving a state government holds
C
office during the pleasure of the Governor. The 'doctrine
of pleasure' is subjected to a restriction in Article 310(2)
and the restrictions in Article 311 (1) and (2). The most
significant restriction is contained in clause (2) of Article
311 which provides that no such employee shall be
0
dismissed or removed from service except after an
inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges
levelled against him and given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard in respect of those charges. Clause (1) of
Article 310 begins with the words "Except as expressly
provided by the Constitution". Therefore, Article 310 itself
E
makes it clear that though a person serves the Union or
a State during the pleasure of the President/Governor, the
power of removal at pleasure is subject to the other
express provisions of the Constitution; and Article 311
contains such express provision which places limitations
F
upon the power of removal at pleasure. By contrast,
clause (1) of Article 156 is not made subject to any other
provision of the Constitution nor subjected to any
exception. Clause (3) prescribing a tenure of five years
for the office of a Governor, is made subject to clause (1)
G
which provides that the Governor shall hold office during
the pleasure of the President. Therefore, it is not possible
to accept the contention that clause (1) of Article 156 is
subj~'cted to an express restriction or limitation under
Clause (3) of Article 156. [Para 30] [634-E-H; 635-A-E]
H
600
SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.·
A
4.2. The petitioner relied upon the Report of the
Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations and the
Report of the National Commission to Review the working
of the Constitution in support of his contention that
removal of a Governor should be by an order disclosing
B reasons, that the Governor should be given an
opportunity to explain his position and that the removal
should be only for compelling reasons, thereby stressing
the need to provide security of tenure for the Governors.
In this regard the Petitioner also placed reliance upon the
C Consultation Paper on "Institution of Governor under the
Constitution" published by the National Commission to
Review the Working of the Constitution. The
recommendations made in the said Reports/Consultation
Paper, howsoever logical, or deserving consideration and
0 acceptance, remain recommendations. They cannot
override the express provisions of the Constitution as
they stand. Nor can they assist in interpreting Article 156.
The very fact that such recommendations are made,
shows that the position under the existing Constitutional
provisions is otherwise. They are suggestions to be
E considered by those who can amend the Constitution.
They do not assist in interpreting the existing provisions
of the Constitution. [Para 31, 33 and 34] [635-F-G; 639-A;
640-F-H]
F
4.3. The Constituent Assembly Debates show that
several alternatives were considered and ultimately
Article 156 in its present form was adopted. The debates
disclose that (i) the intention of the founding fathers was
to adopt the route of Doctrine of Pleasure, instead of
G impeachment or enquiry, with regard to removal of
Governors; and that (ii) it was assumed that withdrawal
of pleasure resulting in removal of the Governor will be
on valid grounds but there was no need to enumerate
them in the Article. [Para 37] [645-D-G]
H
B.P. SING HAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
601
4.4. The provision for removal at the pleasure of an
A
authority without any restriction applies to Ministers as
also the Attorney General apart from Governors. Persons
of calibre, experience, and distinction are chosen to fill
these posts. Such persons are chosen not to enable
them to earn their livelihood but to serve the society. It is
B
wrong to assume that such persons having been chosen
on account of their stature, maturity and experience will
be demoralized or be in constant fear of removal, unless
there is security of tenure. They know when they accept
these offices that they will be holding the office during c
the pleasure of the President. [Para 39] [646-E-G]
4.5. There is a consensus between the petitioner and
the respondent to the extent that a Governor can be
removed only for a valid reason, and that physical and
mental incapacity, corruption and behaviour unbecoming
D
· of a Governor are valid grounds for removal. There is
however disagreement as to what else can be grounds
for removal. This Court is of the view that there can be
other grounds also. It is not possible to put the reasons
under any specific heads. The only limitation on the
E
exercise of the power is that it should be for valid
reasons. What constitute valid reasons would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [Para 40]
[647-0, E]
F
4.6. A Governor cannot be removed on the ground
that he is not sync or refuses to act as an agent of the
party in power at the Centre. Though the Governors,
Ministers and Attorney General, all hold office during the
pleasure of the President, there is an intrinsic difference G
between the office of a Governor and the offices of
Ministers and Attorney General. Governor is the
Constitutional Head of the State. He is not an employee
or an agent of the Union Government nor a part of any
political team. On the other hand, a Minister is handH
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A picked member of the Prime Minister's team. The
relationship between the Prime Minister and a Minister is
purely political. Though the Attorney General holds a
public office, there is an element of lawyer-client
relationship between the Union Government and the
B Attorney General. Loss of confidence will therefore be
very relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure, in the
case of a Minister or the Attorney General, but not a
relevant ground in the case of a Governor. [Para 41) [647F-H; 648-A]
c
Gompers vs. United States, 23~ US 603, referred to.
Constitutional Law of India (4th Ed.,Vol.2, page 2066) by
H.M. Seervai; Report of the Sarkaria Commission on CentreState Relations; Report of the National Commission to Review
D the working of the Constitution; Consultation Paper on
"Institution of Governor under the Constitution'', by the
National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution and Constituent Assembly Debates, referred to.
E (v) Judicial review of withdrawal of President's pleasure
5.1. When a Governor holds office during the
pleasure of the Government and the power to remove at
the pleasure of the President is not circumscribed by any
conditions or restrictions, it follows that the power is
F exercisable at any time, without assigning any cause.
However, there is a distinction between the need for a
cause for the removal, and the need to disclose the cause
for removal. While the President need not disclose or
inform the cause for his removal to the Governor, it is
G imperative that a cause must exist. If one does not
proceed on that premise, it would mean that the President
on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may make any
order which may be manifestly arbitrary or whimsical or
malafide. Therefore, while no cause or reason be
H disclosed or assigned for removal by exercise of such
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
. 603
prerogative power, some valid cause should exist for the
A
removal. Therefore, while the contention that an order
under Article 156 is not justiciable cannot be accepted,
the contention that no reason need be assigned and no
cause need be shown and no notice need be issued to
the Governor before removing a Governor is acceptable.
B
[Para 42] [648-C-E]
5.2. Exercise of power under Article 156(1) is an
executive power exercised on the advice tendered by the
Council of Ministers. Though clause (2) of Article 74
provides that the question whether any, and if so what,
C
advice was tendered, shall not be enquired into by any
court; the bar contained in Article 74(2)1will not come in
the way of the court inquiring whether there was any
material on the basis of which such advjce was given,
whether such material was relevant for such advice and
D
whether the material was such that a reasonable man
could have come to the conclusion which was under
challenge. Therefore, though the sufficiency of the
material could not be questioned, legitimacy of the
inference drawn from such material was open to judicial
E
review. [Para 47] [653-E-H; 654-A-B]
5.3. The extent and depth of judicial review will
depend upon and vary with reference to the matter under
review. In law, context is everything, and intensity of
review will depend on the subject-matter of review. For
example, judicial review is permissible in regard to
administrative ~ction, legislations and constitutional
F
1 amendments. But the extent or scope of judicial review
for one will be different from the scope of judicial review
for other. Malafides may be a ground for judicial review
G
of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial
review of legislations or constitutional amendments. For
withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an
Attorney General, loss of confidence may be a relevant
H
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201 OJ 6· S.C.R.
A ground. The ideology of the Minister or Attorney General
being out of sync with the policies or ideologies of the
Government may also be a ground. On the other hand,
for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Governor, loss
of confidence or the Governor's views being out of sync
s with that the Union Government will not be grounds for
withdrawal of the pleasure. The rt:iasons for withdrawal
are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney-General,
when compared to Governors. As a result, the judicial
review of withdrawal of pleasure, is limited in the case of
c a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister
or an Attorney General. [Para 48] [654-C-G]
5.4. Even though under Article 156(1), the removal is
at the pleasure of the President, the exercise of such
pleasure is restricted by the requirement that it should be
D on the advice of the Council of Ministers. What Article
156(1) dispenses with is the need to assign reasons or
the need to give notice but the need to act fairly and
reasonably cannot be dispensed with by Article 156(1 ).
The President in exercising power under Article 156(1)
E should act in a manner which is not arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. In the event of challenge of withdrawal
of the pleasure, the court will necessarily assume that it
is for compelling reasons. Consequently, where the
aggrieved person is not able to establish a prima facie
F instance of arbitrariness or malafides, in his removal, the
court will refuse to interfere. However, where a prima facie
case of arbitrariness or ma/afides is made out, the Court
can require the Union Government to produce records/
materials to satisfy itself that the withdrawal of pleasure
G was for good and compelling reasons. What will
constitute good and compelling reasons would depend
upon the facts of the case. The position, therefore, is that
the decision is open to judicial review but in a very limited
extent. [Para 49] [654-H; 655-A-E]
H
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
605
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India [1994 (3) SCC 1], relied
A
on.
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India 1977 (3) SCC 592;
Kihota Hollohon v. Zachi/hu 1992 [Supp. (2) SCC 651]; R.C.
Poudyal v. Union. of India [1994 Supp (1) SCC 324]; Maru
Ram v. Union of India [1981 (1) SCC 107]; Kehar Singh v.
B
Union of India [1989 (1) SCC 204] etc.] and Epuru Sudhakar
v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [2006 (8) SCC 161],
referred to.
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil c
Service - 1985 AC 374; R (Bancoult) vs. Foreign Secretary
- 2009 (1) AC 453); Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186; Powell v.
McCormack, 395 US 486 and Ex parte Daly, 2001 (3) All ER
433 - referred to.
De Smith's Judicial Review (6th Ed. 2007 Page 15),
D
referred to.
vi) Conclusions
6.1. Under Article 156(1 ), the Governor holds office
E
during the pleasure of the President. Th-erefore, the
President can remove the Governor from office at any
time without assigning any reason and without giving
any opportunity to show cause. [Para 50] [655-F]
6.2. Though no reason need be assigned for
F
discontinuance of the pleasure resulting in removal, the
power under Article 156(1) cannot be exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. The power
will have to be exercised in rare and exceptional
circumstances for valid and compelling reasons. The
G
compelling reasons are not restricted to those
enumerated by the petitioner (that is physical/mental
disability, corruption and behaviour unbecoming of a
Governor) but are of a wider amplitude. What would be
compelling reasons would depend upon the facts and
H
606
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A circumstances of each case. [Para 50] [655-H; 656-A]
6.3. A Governor cannot be removed on the ground
that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of
the Union Government or the party in power at the CentrP..
Nor can he be removed on the ground that the Union
8 Government has lost confidence in him. It follows
therefore that change in government at Centre is not a
ground for removal of Governors holding office to make
way for others favoured by the new government. [Para
C 50] [656-B, C]
6.4. As there is no need to assign reasons, any
removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the pleasure
will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only a
limited judicial review. If the aggrieved person is able to
o demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either
arbitrary, malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will
call upon the Union Government to disclose to the court,
the material upon which the President had taken the
decision to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union
E Government does not disclose any reason, or if the
reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant, arbitrary,
whimsical, or malafide, the court will interfere. However,
the court will not interfere merely on the ground that a
different view is possible or that the material or reasons
F are insufficient. [Para 50] [656-D-F]
Case Law Reference:
1981 (Supp) sec 87
referred to
Para 10
2000 (2) sec 81
relied on
Para 10
G
1896 (1) QB 116
referred to
Para 12
1895 AC 229
referred to
Para 12.1
(1985) 3 sec 398
referred to
Para 12.2
H
B.P. SINGHAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
607
1954 SCR 786
relied on
Para 12.3 A
1999 (177) DL (4th) 73(SCC) referred to:
Para 15
AIR 1958 SC 36
relied on
Para 19
AIR 1964 SC 600
relied on
Para 19
B
1911 (3) sec 592
followed
Para 24
1977 (4) sec 608
followed
Para 24
1979 (3) sec 458
followed
Para 24
c
2006 (2) sec 1
relied on
Para 24
233 us 603
referred to
Para 28
1985 AC 374
referred to
Para 43
2009 (1) AC 453
referred to
Para 43
D
1977 (3) sec 592
referred to
Para 44
1992 [Supp. (2) sec 651
referred to
Para 44
1994 Supp (1) sec 324
referred to
Para 45
E
I
369 us 186
referred to
Para 45
395 us 486
referred to
Para 45
1981 (1) sec 101
referred to
Para 46
F
1989 (1) sec 204
referred to
Para 46
2006 (8) sec 161
referred to
Para 46
1994 (3) sec 1
relied on
Para 47
2001 (3) All ER 433
referred to
Para 48
G
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
296 of 2004.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
H
608.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R
A
WITH
T.P. (C) No. 663 of 2004
G.E. Vahanvati, AG, Indira Jaisingh, ASG, Soli J.
Sorabjee, K.V. Viswanathan, H.P. Sharma, Vivek Bhati,
B Ranjeet V. Sangle (for K.S. Rana), Devdatt Kamat, Chinmoy
Pradip Sharma. T.A. Khan, Rohit Sharma, Mihir Chatterji,
Nishant Patil (for Sushma Suri, Anil Katiyar, P. Parmeswaran),
B. Raghunath, Abhishek K. (for K.V. Venkataraman) for the
appearing parties
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. This writ petition under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, raising a question of public
importance involving the interpretation of Article 156 of the
D Constitution, has been referred to the Constitution Bench, by a
two Judge Bench of this Court on 24.1.2005.
2. The writ petition is filed as a public interest litigation in
the wake of the removal of the Governors of the States of Uttar
E Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa on 2.7.2004 by the
President of India on the advice of the Union Council of
Ministers. The petitioner sought : (a) a direction to the Union
of India to produce the entire files, documents and facts which
formed the basis of the order dated 2.7.2004 of the President
F of India; (b) a writ of certiorari, quashing the removal of the four
Governors; and (c) a writ of mandamus to respondents to allow
the said four Governors to complete their remaining term of five
years.
G The relevant constitutional provisions
H
3. Article 153 of the Constitution provides that there shall
be a Governor for each State. Article 154 vests the executive
power of the state in the Governor. Article 155 provides that
the Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President,
'!'
B.P. SINGHAL v .. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
609
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
by warrant under his hand and seal. Article 156 relates to term
A
of office of Governor and is extracted below:
"156. Term of office of Governor.-(1) The Governor shall
hold office during the pleasure of the President.
(2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand
B
addressed to the President, resign his office.
(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a
Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from
the date on which he enters upon his office:
c
Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the
expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his
successor enters upon his office."
(emphasis supplied) D
Submissions of Petitioner
4. The petitioner submits that a Governor, as the Head of
the State, holds a high constitutional office which carries with ·
it important constitutional functions and duties; that the fact that
E
the Governor is appointed by the President and that he holds
office during the pleasure of the President does not make the
Governor an employee or a servant or agent of the Union
Government; and that his independent constitutional office is
not subordinate or subservient to the Union Government and
F
he is not accountable to them for the manner in which he carries
out his functions and duties as Governor. It is contended that a
Governor should ordinarily be permitted to continue in office for
the full term of five years; and though he holds office during the
pleasure of the President, he could be removed before the G
expiry of the term of five years, only in rare and exceptional
circumstances, by observing the following constitutional norms
and requirements :
(a) The withdrawal of presidential pleasure under Article
H
610
A
B
c
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
156, cannot be an unfettered discretion, nor can it be
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or malafide. The power
of removal should be used only if there is material to
demonstrate misbehaviour, impropriety or incapacity. In
other words, that removal should be only on existence of
grounds which are similar to those prescribed for
impeachment in the case of other constitutional
functionaries.
(b) Before a Governor is removed in exercise of power
under clause (1) of Article 156, principles of natural justice
will have to be followed. He should be issued a show
cause notice setting out the reasons for the proposed
removal and be given an opportunity of being heard in
respect of those reasons.
D
(c) The removal should be by a speaking order so as to
apprise him and the public, of the reasons for considering
him unfit to be continued as a Governor.
It is also contended that the withdrawal of presidential pleasure
E
resulting in removal of a Governor is justiciable, by way of
judicial review.
5. During the hearing, the petitioner slightly shifted his
stand. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that to ensure the
F
independence and effective functioning of Governors, certain
safeguards will have to be read as limitations upon the power
of removal of Governors under Article 156(1) having regard to
the basic structure of the Constitution. He clarified that the
petitioner's submission is not that a Governor has a fixed
G irremovable tenure of five years, but that there should be some
certainty of tenure so that he can discharge the duties and
functions of his constitutional office effectively and
independently. Certainty of tenure will be achieved by fixing the
norms for removal.