# 7 94 JEHAN SINGH v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION

- **Citation:** [1974] 3 S.C.R. 794
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-03-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 1970
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, R. S. Sarkaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/7-94-jehan-singh-v-delhi-administration-6079
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Code of Crinzi11al Procedure, 1898, Sec. 561-A-lnherent powers of the H;gli
Court-Interference with i111·estigation by tile Po/ice-F.J.R. pri111a facie dis·
closes cognizable offence.
A bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi
Ram, the driver, and other servants. The bus was remove from the custody of
the said servants by the appellant and one Mr. Pathak. Munshi Ram filed F.I.R.
disclosing these facts.
Jn pursuance of the information the Police started
investigaiton, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant, and Pathak who were later
on released on bail.
The bus was seized by the Police.
The proceeding in
regard to Pathak was quashed by the High Court but not in respect of the
appellant.
The appellant contended before this Court that the F.I.R. did not
disclose any offence and therefore, the investigation by PoliCe should be quashed.
Disn1issing the appeal,
HELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr
Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have
settled lhe Jaw in regar~i to the High Court's power of interference at
th~
interlocutory stage. The statutory power of the pol.ice 'o investigate the cogniz·
able offences cannot be interferred with in exercise of the inherent power of
the Court u/s 561-A of the Cri1ninal Procedure Code.
Jn lhe present case.
no charge-sheet· or complaint had been filed in the Court and the matter
\Vas
o;lill at the stage- of investigation by the Police. {796]
(II) Held further, that the first information report pri111a facie discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence by the
appeJlant and his
companions.
Applying the decision of the Court in R. P. Kaiur's case held, the High Court
was right in not interfering with the police investigation. The interference is
justified only if the F .LR. does not disclose any offence. In exercise
of
it~
jurisdiction u/s. 561-A, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
whether evidence in a given case is reliable or not.
(79R A-797 D]
King E111peror v. K/iu•aja Nazir Alin1ed, 71 l.A. at 213, followed.
State of We</ Bengal v. S. N. Hasak [1963] 2 S.C.R. 54, applied.
R. P. Knp11r v. State of P1111it1b, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388, re1ied on.

## Text

7 94
JEHAN SINGH
v.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
March 27, 1974
[M. H. BEG AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ .]
Code of Crinzi11al Procedure, 1898, Sec. 561-A-lnherent powers of the H;gli
Court-Interference with i111·estigation by tile Po/ice-F.J.R. pri111a facie dis·
closes cognizable offence.
A bus belonging to one Indraj and Sukhlal was in the/ossession of Munshi
Ram, the driver, and other servants. The bus was remove from the custody of
the said servants by the appellant and one Mr. Pathak. Munshi Ram filed F.I.R.
disclosing these facts.
Jn pursuance of the information the Police started
investigaiton, arrested Jehan Singh, the appellant, and Pathak who were later
on released on bail.
The bus was seized by the Police.
The proceeding in
regard to Pathak was quashed by the High Court but not in respect of the
appellant.
The appellant contended before this Court that the F.I.R. did not
disclose any offence and therefore, the investigation by PoliCe should be quashed.
Disn1issing the appeal,
HELD :-(I) That the decision of the Privy Council in Kliwaza Nudr
Aluned':r case and the decision of the Supreme Court jn S. N. Basok's ca5e have
settled lhe Jaw in regar~i to the High Court's power of interference at
th~
interlocutory stage. The statutory power of the pol.ice 'o investigate the cogniz·
able offences cannot be interferred with in exercise of the inherent power of
the Court u/s 561-A of the Cri1ninal Procedure Code.
Jn lhe present case.
no charge-sheet· or complaint had been filed in the Court and the matter
\Vas
o;lill at the stage- of investigation by the Police. {796]
(II) Held further, that the first information report pri111a facie discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence by the
appeJlant and his
companions.
Applying the decision of the Court in R. P. Kaiur's case held, the High Court
was right in not interfering with the police investigation. The interference is
justified only if the F .LR. does not disclose any offence. In exercise
of
it~
jurisdiction u/s. 561-A, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
whether evidence in a given case is reliable or not.
(79R A-797 D]
King E111peror v. K/iu•aja Nazir Alin1ed, 71 l.A. at 213, followed.
State of We</ Bengal v. S. N. Hasak [1963] 2 S.C.R. 54, applied.
R. P. Knp11r v. State of P1111it1b, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388, re1ied on.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 201
of 1970.
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
3rd February, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. Mis. (M) No. 93
G
of 1969.
S. M. A 11a11d, for the Appellant.
S. N.-Prasad and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. I.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special !~ave. is directed a~ain~t .an
order of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court, . d!sm1ssmg
appellant's petition made under s. 561-A of the Code of Cnmmal Procedure.
The material facts are these :
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JEHAN SINGH v. DELHI ADMN. (Sarkaria, /.)
79 5
On June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak
Mark, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed
as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Jndraj Singh and Su1<h Lal
of Chirag Delhi.
On June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at
Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal.
Devi
Singh invited the informant and his companions, Mahinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh helper, to soft-drinks at a nearby shop.
Leavmg
the bus unattended, they proceeded to that shop.
In the meantime,
Jehan Singh appellant, Sharma, R. K. Pathak and another man of
'stout-build' got into the vehicle.
The stout man took the steering
wheel, and all the four drove away in the bus despite the protests of the
informant and his companions.
Munshi Ram then went to Chirag
Delhi to inform his employer Indraj Singh, but found the latter absent.
It was also mentioned in the report that Pathak and Sharma were employed in Scindia House.
The police started investigation and arrested Jehan Singh appellant,
and R. K. Pathak, Assistant Manager of the Industrial Credit Co. Ltd.,
Scindia House (hereinafter called the Company).
They were later
released on bail.
The bus was also seized by the police from the possession of the Company.
Pathak and the appellant filed two separate petitions under s. 561A, Cr. Procedure Code challenging the police proceedings in pursuance
of the First Information Report made by Munshi Ram.
The learned Judge by a common judgment allowed Pathak's petition and quashed the proceedings against him, but dismissed the appellant's petition with this observation :
"If Jehan Singh had transferred all his rights in the bus,
though against the stipulations in the hire-purchase agreement, it would be a matter for consideration of the trial court
whether he could be regarded guilty of the offence of theft if
the version contained in the first information report is
proved."
At the outset, we inquired from Shri Anand, learned Counsel for
the appellant, whether the proceedings sought to be quashed
were
pending in any court or before the police.
We are told that at the date
of the filing of the petitions under s. 561-A, Cr. Procedure Code, no
d.ar_ge-sheet or complaint had been laid in court. The matter was still
at the stage of investigation by the police.
. Shri Prasad, learned Counsel for the State contends that lhe petioons under s. 561-A to quash the proceedings which were being conducted in the course of policy investigation, were not competent. He
Jias referred to King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad(!) and State of
West Bengal v. S. N. Basak('). It is maintained that in these circumstances, the petitions of both Pathak and the appellant Jehan Singh
ought to have been dismissed as premature.
H
On the other hand Shri Anand maintains that his case falls within
one of the exceptions to the general rule enunciated in the cases cited
I I)
71 I.A. 203 at 213.
(2) (t963] 2 S.C.R. 54.
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 3 S.C.R.
by Shri Prasad.
Reliance has been placed on R. P. Kapur v. State of
A
Punjab(').
It appears to us that the preliminary objection raised by Shri Prasad
must prevail.
In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), their Lordship
-of the Privy Council pointed out that "the functions of the judiciary
.and the police arc complementary, not overlapping"
and that the
"court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not
until then". It was added that "it has sometimes been thought that
s. 561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not
·possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section
gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already
inherently possesses shall be preserved".
The principle enunciated in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed's case (supra)
·was applied by this Court in S. N. Basak's case
(supra).
Therein a
First Information Report was registered at the Police Station to the
.effect, that S. N. Basak along with three others had committed offences
under ss. 420, 120-B read withs. 420, Penal Code.
The police started
investigations on the basis of that report.
Basak accused surrendered
before the Judicial Magistrate and was enlarged on bail.
Subsequent1y, he moved the High Court by a petition under ss. 439 and 561-A of
the Code of Criminal Prncedure praying that the proceedings pending
.against him be quashed.
At the time he filed the petition them was
no case pending before any court. . The High Court quashed the police
investigation holding that "the statutory power of investigation given to
the police under Chapter XIV is not available in respect ol an offence
triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special
·Courts) Act,
1949 and that being so, the investigation concerned is
without jurisdiction".
Against that order, the State came in appeal
before this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art.
134(1) (c).
Allowing the appeal, this Court speaking through J. L.
Kapur J., observed :
"The powers of investigation into cognizable•offences arc
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and s. 156_ with investigation
into such offences and under these sections ·the police has the
statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any
alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the. exercise of power under s. 439
or under the inherent power of the court under s. 561-A of
Criminal Prncedure Code".
The basic facts in the instant case are similar.
Here also, no
-police challan or charge-sheet against the accused had been laid in
court, when the petitions under s. 561-A were filed.
The impugned
·proceedings were those which were being conducted in the course of
(1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388
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!!!!:t.
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JEHAN SINGH v. DELHI ADMN. (Sarkaria, J.)
791
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police investigation.
Prima facit, therefore, the rule in Basak's case
would be attracted.
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II
Jn R. P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab (supra), it was clarified that
the rule as to non-interference by the High Court, in the exercise of its
inherent powers, with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage, was not
an inflexible one, and there are some categories of cases where the
inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings.
Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, speaking for the Court
indicated one of such categories thus :
"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not
constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of
appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking
at the complaint or the First Informatin Report to decide
whether the offe11ce alleged is disclosed or not. In such
cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that
it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person."
It was held that since the allegations made in the First Information
Report against the appellant therein did constitute offences alleged,
there was no legal bar to the institution or continuance of the proceedings against him. It was further laid down that in exercise of its jurisdiction under s. 561-A, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry
as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not.
The question, therefore, to be considered is, whether in the instant
case, the allegations made in the First Information Report, did not, if
assumed to be correct, constitute the offence of theft or its abetment
against the appellant.
A plain reading of the First Information Report would show that
the answer to this question must be in the negative.
It is alleged therein that the bus (DLP-3867) belonged to Indraj and Sukhlal of Chirag
.Delhi and was at the material time in their possession through their servants, Munshi Ram Driver, Mohinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh
Helper, and that it was removed in the teeth of opposition from them,
without their consent, from their custody or possession by four persons
including Jehan Sin.~h and R. K. Pathak, who all entered into the
vehicle which was then driven by one of them, who was of stron~ build,
medium height, dark complexion .etc. to Scindia House. In substance
the allegation was that the wrongful removal of the bus was the concerted action of the appellant Jehan Singh and R. K. Pathak and their
un-named companions. Prima facie, the allegations in the First Information Report, if taken as correct, did disclose the commission of a
cognizable offenee by the appellant and his companions. May be, that
further evidence to be collected by the police in the course Vi i1i;-,;;tigation including thy hire-purchase agreement, partnership deed and the
receipt etc.
would confinn or falsify the allegations made in the First
Information Report.
But, the High Court, at this stage, as
was
pointed out by this Court in R. P. Kapur's case (supra), could not, in
. -;.{~ '..
'"· 798
.?fo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 3 s.C.R.
the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, appraise that evidence or
A
enquire as to whether it was reliable or not.
Might be, after collecting all the evidence, the police would itself
submit a cancellation report.
If, however, a charge-sheet is laid before
the Magistrate under s. 173, Criminal Procedure Code, then all these
matters will have to be considered by the Magistrate after taking cognizance of the case.
We cannot, at this stage, possibly indicate what
B
should be done in purely hypothetical situations which may or may not
arise in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we would hold that the petitions under
s. 561-A were liable to be dismissed as pre-mature and incompetent.
On this short ground, we would dismiss this appeal.
No observation unwittingly made with regard to the merits of the
C
case, in the above judgment shall be taken into account to the prejudice
of any of the parties.
S.B.W.
Appeal dismissed.