# 8 02 AFLATOON AND OTHERS v. LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 802
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-08-23
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 362 & 363 of 1972
- **Bench:** C.J.; K. K. Mathew, A. Alagduswami, P. K. Goswami, R. S. Sarkaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/8-02-aflatoon-and-others-v-lt-governor-of-delhi-others-6259
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Land _Acquisition Act, Section 4, suJ;-sections (1)
and
(2)-lnitiation of
proceedings under, a valid notification sine qua non- Delay in moving the
Court-Effect.
Ltind Acquisition Act, Section 23 and Co.nstilution of India, 1950, Articles
19(1)(f) 31(2) and 31(5)-Campensation with reference to valrw of property
on the date of ·notification under sec. 4-Adequacy of compensation, challenge
of-Challenge oonfined only to question of procedural reasonableness.
Delhi Development Act, sections 12 and 15-P/anned development of Delhi
to be in accordance with the Act--Ccntral Govt., if precluded from acquiring
land for planned development-Laches and acquiescence on the part of the
petitioners-£ fleet.
Land Acquisition Act, Section 3 (a) and Part Vil-Acquisition of land for
planned development of, Delhi..-Landi11g over a portion of tile acquired property
to co-operative housing societies-Provisions of Part VII of the Act, whether
attracted.
A notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on Nov.
13, 1959, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public
purpose, viz. the planned development of Delhi.
Between 1959 and 1961,
about six thousand objections were filed under sec. SA of the ·Act. The objec~
A
B
c
D
tions were ov·.::rruled.
On March 18, 1966, the declaration under sec. 6 of
E
•
the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area.
Therefore, in 1970,
notices were issued under sec. 9 ( l) of the Act requiring the appellants to
,.._
state their objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation. The appellants
thereupon challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before
the
High Cou.rt of Delhi. 'fhe High Court negatived _their contentions a·nd dismissed the writ petitions. In the writ p.~titions and civil appeals fil·:!d in the
Supreme Cou1t it was contended : (i) The public purpose specified in the
notification issued under sec. 4, nan1ely, the planned development of Delhi WM
F
vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in existence on the date
of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague,
the appellants and the petitioners were unable to exercisei effectively their right
under sec. SA of the Act; (ii) As there was inordinate delay in finalising- the
acquisition proceedings, they were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation
in the value of the property between the date of notification under sec. 4 and
the date of taking possession of the property.
(iii) The provisions of sec. 23
of the Act laying down that compensation should be determined with reference
-\
to the market value of the land as on the date of notification under sec. 4 was
G
an unreasonable restriCtion on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold
and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (b); (iv) As the acquisition of
the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only
authority competent to issue the notification under sec. 4 'vas the Central Govt.
~
under sec. 15 of Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings were initiated
by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were a}J initio invalid;
iand ( v) Thei acquisition was not for any public purpose, but for companie~
as the major portion of the land acquired was. allotted without any development
to co~operative housing "Societies which were companies within the definition of
H
the word ''company'• in the Act and as the provisions of part VII of the Act
were not complied with the proceedings for acquisition were bad.
Rejecting the contention and dis1nissing the appeals and the petitions,
AFLATOON ':v. LT, GOVERNOR (Mmhew; ],) .
8 03
'
.
.
.
.
.
A
HELD : . (i) A valid mtiJication under s~. 4 iS a sine qua non for lnitiatiolt
"of pro>eedings Jor acquisition of property, ·It is neccssazy to spe<:ify !he partic:ular public purpo<e in tho notiJication fot which tho land is needed or likely
to be needed as otherwise, the, matters specified in sub-see: (2) of sec. (4/
~anilo

## Text

8 02
AFLATOON AND OTHERS
V.
LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & OTHERS
August 23, 1974
[A. N. R,\Y, C.J.; K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGDUSWAMI, P. K. GOSWAMI
AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]
Land _Acquisition Act, Section 4, suJ;-sections (1)
and
(2)-lnitiation of
proceedings under, a valid notification sine qua non- Delay in moving the
Court-Effect.
Ltind Acquisition Act, Section 23 and Co.nstilution of India, 1950, Articles
19(1)(f) 31(2) and 31(5)-Campensation with reference to valrw of property
on the date of ·notification under sec. 4-Adequacy of compensation, challenge
of-Challenge oonfined only to question of procedural reasonableness.
Delhi Development Act, sections 12 and 15-P/anned development of Delhi
to be in accordance with the Act--Ccntral Govt., if precluded from acquiring
land for planned development-Laches and acquiescence on the part of the
petitioners-£ fleet.
Land Acquisition Act, Section 3 (a) and Part Vil-Acquisition of land for
planned development of, Delhi..-Landi11g over a portion of tile acquired property
to co-operative housing societies-Provisions of Part VII of the Act, whether
attracted.
A notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on Nov.
13, 1959, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public
purpose, viz. the planned development of Delhi.
Between 1959 and 1961,
about six thousand objections were filed under sec. SA of the ·Act. The objec~
A
B
c
D
tions were ov·.::rruled.
On March 18, 1966, the declaration under sec. 6 of
E
•
the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area.
Therefore, in 1970,
notices were issued under sec. 9 ( l) of the Act requiring the appellants to
,.._
state their objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation. The appellants
thereupon challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before
the
High Cou.rt of Delhi. 'fhe High Court negatived _their contentions a·nd dismissed the writ petitions. In the writ p.~titions and civil appeals fil·:!d in the
Supreme Cou1t it was contended : (i) The public purpose specified in the
notification issued under sec. 4, nan1ely, the planned development of Delhi WM
F
vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in existence on the date
of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague,
the appellants and the petitioners were unable to exercisei effectively their right
under sec. SA of the Act; (ii) As there was inordinate delay in finalising- the
acquisition proceedings, they were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation
in the value of the property between the date of notification under sec. 4 and
the date of taking possession of the property.
(iii) The provisions of sec. 23
of the Act laying down that compensation should be determined with reference
-\
to the market value of the land as on the date of notification under sec. 4 was
G
an unreasonable restriCtion on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold
and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (b); (iv) As the acquisition of
the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only
authority competent to issue the notification under sec. 4 'vas the Central Govt.
~
under sec. 15 of Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings were initiated
by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were a}J initio invalid;
iand ( v) Thei acquisition was not for any public purpose, but for companie~
as the major portion of the land acquired was. allotted without any development
to co~operative housing "Societies which were companies within the definition of
H
the word ''company'• in the Act and as the provisions of part VII of the Act
were not complied with the proceedings for acquisition were bad.
Rejecting the contention and dis1nissing the appeals and the petitions,
AFLATOON ':v. LT, GOVERNOR (Mmhew; ],) .
8 03
'
.
.
.
.
.
A
HELD : . (i) A valid mtiJication under s~. 4 iS a sine qua non for lnitiatiolt
"of pro>eedings Jor acquisition of property, ·It is neccssazy to spe<:ify !he partic:ular public purpo<e in tho notiJication fot which tho land is needed or likely
to be needed as otherwise, the, matters specified in sub-see: (2) of sec. (4/
~anilot be ·carried out. (807q
B
c'
D
F
.H
Munshi Singh and Others v. Union o/lndia; [191U 1 s.C.R.: 973 (975 and
984) fr/ied on.
·
Arnold RodriCks and A,,other v. · Siate of Maharashtra and others, [1966] 3
S.C.R. 88S referred to.
In the case of all a~ciuisition of· a large area of land comprising
-~Vera.I
pJots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can. only.
be with reference ·to the acquisi_tioii_ of the whole area.· - Unlike in. the case of
an acquisitiOn of a small area, it might be practically difficult -to specify the
particular purpose for which each and every- item of land comprised _in
the
area is. needed.
[807G]
·
Th~ appellants did nol move in the matter-even after ihe declaraticn 1n;1de1
sec. 6 was published in 1966. • They approached the High court with their
writ petitions only in· 1970- when the notices -under sec. 9 were issued to them.
That apart, the appellants did not contend- before the Hi&h'" Court that as the
particulars of. public purpose wefe not specified in the notification issued und~r
sec. 4, they were prejudiced_ "in that they -could not effectiv~y exercise their
right under sec. SA. As the plea was not raised by them before the
High
· Court~ thC appellants are not entitled to have the plea tonsidered in these
-appeaJs.. To have s<_1.t on the_ fence and allowed the Govt. to complete the
acqu~sition proceedings on the basis of the notification under sec .. 4 .and the
declatation under sec.· 6 were valid and tlien to attack the notification
on
grounds whii;h were available to the Writ petitioners at the _time when the no~i"".
fl.cation wa-3 _ published would 00 putldng a premium on dilatory ta,c!ics. The wnt
Petitions ·are ·liable to .. be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the
part of the petitio11<rs.
[808A-B; D & F-G] .
Tilok Chand 1\-loti Chand arzd othl"rs .v. H: B: Munlhi and Another, f1969]2
S.C.R. 824 and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India and other1
[1970] 2 S.C.R: 697 referred to.
·
· (ii) About 6,ooo· objec!ions ~ere filed -.:inde·r seC. SA by persons- interested
in the property. Several writ petitions wire also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the. validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Govt. had necessarily
to wait for the ·disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further
in -the matter. The High Court was of- the_ view that there was no inordinate
. delay on the p·art of the· Govt in Con1pletin_~-·-the acquisitioD. proceedings. The
· conc1usion of the High Coe.rt is corre:t. __ [809B-C]
·
.
.
; ' (iii) The Land Acquisitioii Act is a prC-:Constitution Act.
Its provision!
are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the ground that they ·are not in
conformity with the requirement of Articll! 31(2) of the Constitution. What
the appellants and writ petitioners
complain · is
that the.ir
properties· were
acquired by paying them compensation cpmputed with reference to the market!
value of thf!' land as on the date of the notification under sec. 4 ·and that sec. 23
is, therefore, bad. This, in substance is ·nothing but a· challenge to the ade-_
quacv 'of compensation. Such a challenge is precluded by reason of Art. 31(5)
- of the Constitution. [809F-G]
Although-. a Jaw for acquisitio~ of pfooenv. must pass the test of Article
19(5), the challenge to the law would ordinarily be limited to _the question· of
procedural unreasonab!eness. '[810D] ·
,
. -· .
.
. -
R: C. Cooper v. U;i.ic!n of India. [1970] 3 S.C.R. S30, (577) reli<d on.
It foIJows that altho~gh sec. ·23 of the Act -~ii -b~ challen!?~d O~ the gr~~d
th_at it violates the fundamental right of a citizen to hold and' dispose of property
under Article 19(l)(b), the challenge would practically be limited to tho
question of procedural reasonablertess.
Put- sec. Z3 does not deal '\\ith procedure
and cannot, the~efore, suffer from any proced1.1ra1- unreasonabJene,s. -.. l~lOE-F]
8 04
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 1 S.C.R.
(iv) The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Govt.
before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force·. It
is true that there· could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into
force but there \Vas no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development
of Delhi und.!r the Act before the l.Vlaster Plan was ready.
[812E]
Patna bnprovement Trust v. Snit. Lakslinii Devi and others [1963] Sur:-r.
2 S.C.R. 812 referred to.
In other words, the fact that actual development is pern1issible in an area
other than a development area with th:.:i approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the.. Central Govt. from acquiring the land fo·r planned
de·velopment under the Acts.
Se.ction 12 is concerned only with the planned
development.
It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition
generally precedes development.
For planned development in an area other
than a development area, iti is only necessary to obtain the, sanction or approval
of the local authori:y as provided in sec. 12 ( 3). The Centr:!l Govt. coulJ.
acquire any property under the Act and develop it after c•btaining the approval
of the local authority. As already held the appellant<> an<l the writ petitioner"
cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of notification under sec. 4 on the
ground of !aches and acquiescence.
The plea thati the Chief Commissioner of
Delhi had no authority to initiate the proceedings for acquisition by issuing
the notification under sec. 4 of the Act as sec. 15 of the De1hi Development Act
,gives that power only to the Centn\l Govt. relates primarily to the validity
of the notification.
Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner \¥'as not so
authorised, since the appellants and the writ petitioners are precluded by their
laches and acquiescence from questioning the notification, the plea must be
negatived.
[812F-H; 813A-B]
( v) The plea that the provisions o:f Patt VII Of the Act have not been
complied \vith has also to be rejected.
The High_ Court \Vas correct i.n giving
the finding thnt the acquisition \vas not for 'Company'.
The mere fact that
A
E
c
D
af~cr the acquisition the Govt. proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over,
a portion of the property acquired for development to the co-operative hou5ing
societies \V(iuld not make the acquisi\·ion one for 'company' and therefore, Part
E
VII of the Act was not attracted.
l813C-E]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos.
362 & 363
of
1972.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 968 to 971 and 1185 of 1972.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the
September 24, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.PsAs. Nc6. 172, 177,
151, 170, 171 and 152 of 1971 respectively.
Civil Appeal No. 1168 of 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and Order dated the
17th April, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 94 of 1971.
A. K. Sen, (in W.P. No. 362/72), L. M. Singhvi (in W.P. No.
363/72 & C.A. No. 968/72), S. K. Dhingra (in C.A. No. 968/72) and
B. Dutta, for the petiticjners (in W.Ps.) and appellants (in C.AB.)
L. N. Sinha, Sol. General of India, S. N. Prasad (in W.P. No.
363/72 and C.A. No. 968 of 1972 only) and R. N. Sachthey, for the
respondents Nos. 1-3 (in C.A. No. 968, 970, 107/72 and W.P. Nos.
362-363 elf 1972 and respondents in other appeals.
F
G
H
I
AFLATOON v. LT. GOVERNOR (Matl:e1r, !.)
8 05
A
Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya, for responB
c
D
E
F
G
H
dent No. 4 (in C.As. Nos. 107 & 968/72).
K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for respondent Nos. 5,
6, 8 (in C.A. No. 968/72).
Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent no. 4 (in C.A. "10. 970/72).
Ashok Grover, for respondent no. 5 (in C.A. No. 107 /72).
S. K. Dholakia, for respondent no. 6 (in C.A. No. 107 /72).
T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent no. 7 (in C.A. No. 107 /
72).
L. M. Singhvi and S. K. Dhingra, for the interveners.
The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by
MATHEW, J. These writ petitions and civil appeals raise commcln
questions and they are, therefore, disposed of by a ommon judgment.
The Civil Appeals arise out of the decision of High Court of Delhi dis·
missing the writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging the validity
cif the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question for "planned
development of Delhi". In the writ petitions, the validity of the same
proceediugs is being challenged on certain additional grounds also.
A notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was issued on November 13. 1950, stating that
an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public pnrpose, viz.,
the planned development of Delhi.
Between 1959 and 1961, about
six thousand objections were filed under s. SA of the Act. The objections were civerruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under s. 6
of the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area. Thereafter, in 1970, notices were issued under s. 9 ( !) of the Act requiring
the appellants to state their objections, if any, to the assessment of com·
pensation.
The appe!lants thereupw challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before the High Court of Delhi on the following grounds :
(I) that the acquisition was not for public purpose
but for companies and so the provisions of Part VII of the Act ought
to have been complied with, (2) since no part of the compensation
payable came from the public exchequer, the acquisition was not for a
public purpose and ( 3) that the proceedings for acquisition vic!ated
the fundamental right •of the appellants under Article 19(1) (f)
as
there was unreasonable delay between the publication of the notification under s. 4 and the issue of the notices under s. 9 of the Act with
the result that the appellants were deprived of the benefit of the appreciatim in value of the property after the date of the notification under
s. 4. The High Court negatived the contentions and dismissed the writ
petitions.
The main arguments addressed before us on behalf of the appellants and the writ petitioners were that the public purpose specified in
the notification issued under s. 4, namely, the 'planned development of
Delhi' was vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in
existence cl1. the date of the notification and as the purpose specified
a 06
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R.
in the notification was vague, the appellants were unable to qercisc
effectively their right under s. SA of the Act and that as the nc~ifica
tion under s. 4 was published in 1959, the compensation awarded was
wholly inadequate with reference to the market value of the property
on the date when the appellants are to be deprived of their possession
of the property.
In other words the content10n was that as there was
inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, the appel·
!ants were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation in the value c1!
the property between the date of the notification under s. 4 and the
date of taking possession of the property. Linked with .this contention
was the submission that the prcjvisions of s. 23 of the Act which Jay
down that compensation should be determined with reference to the
market value of the land as on the date of the notification under s. 4
was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the appellants tci hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (f). It was
further contended that as the acquisition of the property was for the
purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only authority compe·
tent to issue the notification under s. 4 was the Central GciVermnent
under s. 15 of'the Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings
were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings
were ab initio invalid. The argument was that, as the acquisition was
made for the planned development of Delhi, it cc1Uld be carried out
only in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act,
and that, under s. 15 of that Act, it was only the Central Government
which could have issued the notification under s. 4, after having fcirmed
the opinion that the acquisition of the land was necessary for the
planned development of Delhi and, since the notification was issued
by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the ncltification wai .. 7oid ab initio.
The last contention was that the acquisition was not for any public
purpose, but for companies, as the major portion of the land acquired
was allcl!ted without any development to cooperative housing societies
which were companies within the definition of the word 'Company' in
the Act and as the provisions of Part VII of the Act were not complied
with, the proceedings for acquisition were bad.
The influx of displaced persc1ns in 1947 from West Pakistan into
Delhi aggravated the problem of housing accommodation in Delhi.
With the extension of industrial and commercial activities and the set·
ting up of the foreign embassies, Delhi acquired enormous potential as
an emplc1Yment centre. The consequent increase in the population was
not accompanied by an adequate expansion of housing: facilities. There
was haphazard and unplanned growth of houses in different areas; land
also was not available at reasonable price as substantial portion of the
available land, suitable for develcipment, had passed into the hands of
private enterprisers. The Govermnent found it necessary to take effec·
tive steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent substandard construction. Therefore, the Government framed a scheme
for "planned development c~ Delhi". It was in order to implement the
scheme of planned development of Delhi that the Government decided
to acquire 34,070 acres of land in 1959 and published the notification
under s. 4 specifying the public purpose as "the planned development
of Delhi".
B
t
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
AFLATOON V. LT. GOVERNOR (Mathew,/.)
8 07
Section 4 of the Act says that whenever it appears tel the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to
be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be
published in the official Gazette and the Collector shali cause public
notice d the substance of such notification to be given at convenient
places in the said locality. According to the section, therefore, it is
only necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for a
public purpose. The wording of s. 5A would make it further clear that
all that is necessary tel be specified in a notification under s. 4 is that
the land is needed for a public purpose. One reason for specification
of the particular public purpose in the notification is to enable the
person whose land is sought to be acquired to file cibjection under s.
5A. Unless a person is told about the specific purpose of the acquisition, it may not be possible for him to file a meaningful cibjection
against the acquisition under s. 5A. This Court has laid down that it
is necessary to specify the particular public purpose in the notification
for which the land is needed or likely to be needed as, citherwise, the
matters specified in sub-section (2) of s. 4 cannot be carried out. In
Munshi Singh and Others v. Union of India, etc.( 1) the Court said:
"It is apparent from sub-section
(2) of s. 4 that the
public purpose which has to be stated in sub-secticro. ( 1) of
s. 4 has to be particularised because, unless that is done, the
various matters which were mentioned in sub-section
(2)
cannot be carried out and if the public purpoSe stated in s.
4 (I) is planned development, without anything more, it is
extremely difficnlt to comprehend hciw all the matters set out
in sub-section (2) can be carried out by the officer COJ1cerned."
We think that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification under s. 4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under
s. 5A would depend upcl:l the facts and circumstances of each case.
In Arnold Rodricks and Another v. State of Maharashtra and
F
Others('), this Court held that a notification under s. 4 of the Act
which stated that the land was needed for "Development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area" was sufficient
specification of public purpc6e.
In the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising
several plots belonging tci different persons, the specification of the
G
purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole
area.
Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be
practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which
each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.
Assuming for the moment that the public purpose was not sufficiently specrned in the notification, did the appellan~s make a grievance
H
of it at the appropriate time? If the appellants had really been pre·
judiced by the non-specification of the public purpose for which the
--·------
(I) [1973] I SCR 973, at 975 and 984.
(2) [19£6] 3 S.C.R. 885.
8 08
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R,
plots in which they were interested were needed they shonld have
taken steps t~ have the no.tification qnashed on 'that gronnd within
a reaso~able time.
They did not move in the matter even after the
dedaralion under s. 6 was. publis)led in 1966.
They approached the
High Court with .their wnt petit10ns only in 1970 when the notices
under s. 9 were 1ss.ued to them.
In the concluding portion of the
JUdgmcnt .m Munshi Smgh & Others v. Union ,1f India (supra)
it
was observed :
'
"In n1atters of this nature we would have
taken due
notice of !aches on the part of the appellants while granting the above relief but we are satisfied that so far as the
present appellants are concerned they have not been guilty
of !aches, delay or acquiescence at any stage."
We
do not think that the appellants were vigilant.
That apart, the appellants did not contend before the High Court
that as the particulars of the public purpose were not specified in the
notification issued under s. 4, they were prejudiced in that they could
not effectively exercise their right under s. SA.
As the plea was not
raised by the appellants in the writ petitions filed before the High
Court, we do not think that the appellants are entitled to have the
plea considered in these appeals.
Nor do we think that the petitioners in the wri,t petitions should
A
B
c
D
be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging
the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under s. 6 in 1966.
Of the two writ petitions, one is filed
E
by one of the appellants.
There was apparently no reason why the
writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court
for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the
ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified.
A valid notification under s. 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property.
To have sat on the fence and
allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on
F
the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under
s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which
were available to them at the time when the notification was published
would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics.
The writ petitions
•
are liable to he dismissed on the ground of !aches and delay on the
;
part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B.
Munshi and Another('); and Rabindra1wth Bose and Others v. Union
G
ni India & Others(').
From the count"r affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it
is clear that the Government have allotted a large portion of the land
after the acquisition proceedings were finalised to Cooperative housing
societies.
To quash the notification at this stage would disturb the
rights of third parties who are not before the Court.
(!) [1969) 2 S.C.R. 824.
(2) [1970] 2 S.C. R. 697.
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As regards the second contention that there was inordinate delay
in finalising the acquisition proceedings, and that the appellants and
writ petitioners were deprived of the appreciation in value of the land
in which they were interested, it may be noted that about 6,000 objections were filed under s. SA by persons interested in the property.
Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging
the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had
necessarily to wait for the disposal of tne objectlons and petitions
before proceeding further in the matter.
Both the learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view
that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the Government in
completing the acquisition proceedings.
We are not persuaded to
come to a different conclusion.
Linked with the above contention was the arugment that the provisions of s. 23 of the Act imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the
fundamental right of the appellants and writ petitioners to hold and
dispose of property under Article 19 (1 )(f) of
the Constitution as
compensation is awardable only with reference to the value of the
property on the date of notification under s. 4 however long the proceedings for acquisition may drag on ,and not with reference to the
market value of property when it is taken possession of. It was submitted that compensation should be paid with reference to the value
of the property as on the date when possession of the property is
taken and the section, as it lays down that compensation should be
fixed with reference to the market value as on the date of the notification under s. 4, abridges the fundamental right of a citizen under
Article 19 (I) (f). We find that the
argument is not
persuasive.
Article 31 ( 5) (a) provides :
·
"(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall alfoet--
(a) the provisions of any existing law other than a
law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply,"
The Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution Act.
Its provisions are not, therefore, liable DJ be challenged on the grwnd that they
are not in conformity with the requirement of article 31 ( 2).
What
the appellants and writ petitioners complain is that their properties
were acquired by paying them compensation computed with reference
to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification
under s. 4 and that s. 23 is. therefore, bad.
This, in substance, is
nothing but a challenge to ihe adequacy of compensation.
Such a
challenge is precluded by reason of Article 31(5). In other words,
the appeilants and the writ petitioners cannot challenge the validity
of s. 23 on the ground that compensation payable under its provisions
is in any way inadequate, because, such a challenge would fly in the
face of Article 31 ( 5).
It is noteworthy that s. 4 ( 3) of the Land Acquisition Amendment
and Validation Act, 1957 provides for payment of interest at 6 per
cent of the market value after the exoiry of 3 years from the date of
the !lotification under s. 4 to the date of payment of compensation.
Seet10n 24 of the Act provides that any outlay or improvements on,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R.
or disposal of, the land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication or
the notification under s. 4(1) shall not be taken into consideration by
the Court in awarding compensation. This provision means that any
outlay or improvement made with the sanction of the Collector after
the date of the notification will be taken into consideration in awarding
compensation.
In R. C. Cooper v. Union of India('), this Court has observed
that although a law for acquisition of property must pass the test of
Article 19(5), the challenge to the law would ordinarily be limited
to the question of procedural unreasonableness.
This is what the
Court said :
"
Where the law provides for compulsory acquisition
of property for a public purpose, it may be presumed that
the acquisition or the law relating thereto imposes a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. If there
is no public purpose to sustain compulsory acquisition, the
law violates Art. 31 (2). If the acquisition is for a public
purpose, substantive reasonableness of the restriction which
includes deprivation may, unless otherwise established, be
presumed, but enquiry into reasonableness of the procedural
provisions will not be excluded.
For instance, if a tribunal
is authorised by an Act to determine compensation for property compulsorily accquired, without hearing the owner of
the property, the Act would be liable to be struck down
under Art. 19(1)(f)."
It follows that although s. 23 of the Act can be challenged on
the ground that it violates the fundamental right 0£ a citizen to hold
and dispose of property under Article 19(1 )(f), the challenge would
practically be limited to the question of procedural reasonableness.
But section 23 does not deal with procedure and cannot, therefore,
suffer from any procedural unreasonableness.
When it is seen that
s. 23 is not liable to be challenged on the ground that the compensation provided by its provisions is inadequate in view of the provisions
of Art. 31 ( 5), there is no point in the contention that it can be challenged for that very reason on the basis that it imposes unreasonable
restriction upon a citizen's right to hold and dispose of property.
It was argued that there could be no planned development of
Delhi otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi
Development Act and, therefore, the notification under s. 4 of the
Act should have been issued by the Central Government in view of
s. 15 of that Act and not by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.
Section 12 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 provides:
"12(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of
this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the
!) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, at 577.
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official Gazette, declare any area in Delhi to be a development area for the purposes of this Act :
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Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless
, a proposal for such declaration has been referred by the
Central Government to the
Authority and the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi for expressing their views
thereon
within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the reference or within such further period as the Central Government may allow and the period so specified or allowed has
expired .
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Authority shall
not undertake or carry out any development of land in any area which
is not a development area.
(3) After the commencement of this Ac.t no development of land
shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by any person or body
(including a department of Government) unless,-
(i) where that area is a development arc•, permission
for such development has b~en obtained in writing
from the Authority in accordance with the provisions
of this Act;
(ii) where that area is an area other than a development
area, approval of, or sanction for, such development
bas been obtained in writing from the local authority concerned or any officer or authority thereof empowered or authorised in this behalf, in accordance
with the provisions made by or under the law governing such authority or until such provisions have been
made, in accordance with the provisions of the regu~
lations relating to the grant of permission for development made under the Delhi (Control of Building
Operations) Act, 1955, and in force immediately
before the commencement of this Act.
Provided that the local authority concerned may subject to the
provisions of s. 53A amend those regulations in their application to
such area.
( 4) After the coming into operation of any of the plans in any
area no development shall be undertaken or carried out in that area
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unless such development is also in accordance with such plans.
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(5) Nc~withstanding anything contained in sub-sections (3) and
( 4) development of any land begnn by any department of Government or any local authority before the commencement of this Act may
be completed by that department or local authority without compliance
with the requirements of those sub-sections.
,
Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 states :
"15(1) If in the opinion of the Central Government, any
land is required for the purpose of development, or for any
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R.
other purpose, under thi~ Act, the Central Government may
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acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(2) Where any land has been acquired by the Central
Government, that Government may, after it has taken possess10n of the fand, transfer the land .to .the Authority or any
local authority for the purpose for which the land has been
a.::quired on payment by the Authority or the local authority
of the compensation awarded under that Act and of thr,
charges incurred by the Government in connection with the
ncquisition. ''
Counsel contended that on the date when the notification und<r
s. 4 was published, the Government had not declared any area in Delhi
as a development area under s. 12(1) of the Delhi Development Act,
nor was there a master plan drawn up in accordance with s. 7 of that
Act and so the acquisition of the property for planned development of
Delhi was illegal.
Under s. 12(3) of the Delhi Development Act,
no development of land can be undertaken or carried out except as
provided in that' clause.
Section 2 ( d) states : "development" with
its grammatical variations means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the
making of any material change in any building or land includes redevelopment.
Section 2 ( e) states "developm'1llt area" means any
area declared to be a development area under sub-section (1) of s. 12.
The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by tl;e
Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development
Act came into force. It is true that there could be no, planned development of Delhi except in accoi:_dance with the provisions of Delhi
Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no
inhibition in acquiring Jana for planned development of Delhi under
the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna
Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi lJeri and Others(').
In other
words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other
than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local
authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring
the lnnd for planned development under the Act.
Section 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with
acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development.
For planned development in an area other than a development area
it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local
authority as provided in s. 12(3). The Central Government could
acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the
approval of the local authority.
We do not think it necessary to go
into the question whether the power to acquire the land under s. 15
was delegated by the Central Government to the Chief Commissioner
of Delhi.
We have already held that the appellants and the writ
petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the notification under s. 4 on the ground of !aches and acquiescence.
The plea
that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the
(I) [19631 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 812.
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proceeding for acquisition by issuing the notification under s. 4 of the
Act as s. 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power only to
the Central Government relates pnmarily to the validity of the nolHication.
Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not
authorized by the Central Government to issue the notification under
s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, since the appellants and the writ
petitioners are precluded by their !aches and acquiescence from questioning the notification, the contention must, in any event, be negatived
and we do so.
It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the acquisition was reolly
for the cooperative housjng societies which are compaines within the
definition of the word 'company' in s. 3 ( e) of the Act, and, therefore,
the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with.
Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court were of the view that the acquisition was not for 'company.
We sec no reason to differ from their view.
The mere fact that alter
the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact,
handed over, a portion of the property acquired for development to
the cooperative housing societies would not make the acquisition one
foe 'company'.
Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit in the
contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came
from the consideration paid by the cooperative societies. In the light
of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here,
it is diilicult to hold that it was cooperatives which provided the fund
for the acquisition.
Merely because the Government allotted a part
of the property to cooperative societies for development, it would not
follow that the acquisition was for cooperative societies, and therefore,
Part VU of the Act was attracted.
It may be noted that the validity of the notification under s. 4 am!
the declaration under s. 6 was
in issue in Udai Ram Sharma and
Others v. Unio!l uf India(!) anJ this Court upheld their validity.
We see no merit in the appeals and the writ petitions.
They arc,
thcrefo1e, dismissed with costs.
Petitiom dismissed.
(I) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41.