# 8 gg MARUTI BALA RAUT v. DASHRATH BABU WATHARE & ORS

- **Citation:** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 899
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-08-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1941 and 1942 of 1967
- **Bench:** P. Jaganmohan Reddy, M. H. Beg, A. Alagiriswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/8-gg-maruti-bala-raut-v-dashrath-babu-wathare-ors-6266
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

·Co11stitution of India, 1950, Article 227-Powers of fligh Court to i11terfer!
on the C}Jltstions of fac1 or to reappreciate evidence.
Bombay Te1zancy and Agricultural Larki-1 Act, 1948--S. 76--Poirers of Land
Rtven.ue Tribunal Jo interfere with the questions of fact in exercise of rei·isionttl
power3.
In the year 1948 Miraj State was merged in the then Bombay Province and
from that date the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 became applicable to the lands
in qu~tion. The question arose whether the appellant was a tenant at the time
the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 was made applicable and would therefore be a
protected tenant or not. There were two proceedings in respect of two different
parts of the same land one between the appellant on the one hand and Yeshwa11.•
and Jinnappa on the other hand and the other between the appellant oM
tho one hand and Bhim Rao and Dasrath on the other hand raising the same
issue whether the appe11ant was a tenant at the relevant time.
In the proceedings by Bhim Rao and Dasrath, the Deputy Coffector held that the appellant
was a tenant at the releva11_t time. In the procoeedings initiated by Yeshwant and
Jin.appa the Mamlatdar also held the appellant to be a tenant. The Mamlatdar'9
order was, however, set aside by the Special Deputy Collector.
Two Revision
Applications were filed before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal; one by the
appellant and the other by Bhim Rao and Dasrath. The Tribunal dismissed the
application filed by Bhim Rao and Dasrath and allowed the application filett
by the appellant and set aside the order of the Specil Deputy Callee.tor. Two
Writ Petitions were filed in the High Court, under Article 227. The High c·ourt
allowed both the petitions.
HELD: (1) The powers of the ~1aharashtra Revenue Tribunal are to be
found in section 76 of the .Act.
The Tribunal clearly exceeded its power in reversing the order of the Special Deputy Collector. The Tribunal clearly acted
in complete disregard of its powers and proceeded a<; though it were either dealing with the matter as a court of first instanct: or an appellate Court.
[902
A-Bl
(2) The High Court was, however, plainly in error in interfering with the
.iudgment of the Tribunal which merely
upheld the Deputy Collector':; order.
The High Court has ignored the limitation within which it has to act ¥.:hile exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was not for ihe
High Court to di!icuss the evidence and come to the conclusion as to whether
the anpellant was or was not the tenant on 11-8-1948.
That wa<> a matter for
the Denuty Collector whose judgment has been upheld bv the Tribunal.· The
High Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 was not entitled to
discuss the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on the evidence as to who
was in possession of th'e land.
The High Court has plainly over-stepped the
limits of its power under Article 227. [903 E-904 A]

## Text

f
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
8 gg
MARUTI BALA RAUT
v.
DASHRATH BABU WATHARE & ORS.
August 27, 1974
[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, M. H. BEG AND A. ALAGIRISWAMI, JJ.]
·Co11stitution of India, 1950, Article 227-Powers of fligh Court to i11terfer!
on the C}Jltstions of fac1 or to reappreciate evidence.
Bombay Te1zancy and Agricultural Larki-1 Act, 1948--S. 76--Poirers of Land
Rtven.ue Tribunal Jo interfere with the questions of fact in exercise of rei·isionttl
power3.
In the year 1948 Miraj State was merged in the then Bombay Province and
from that date the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 became applicable to the lands
in qu~tion. The question arose whether the appellant was a tenant at the time
the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 was made applicable and would therefore be a
protected tenant or not. There were two proceedings in respect of two different
parts of the same land one between the appellant on the one hand and Yeshwa11.•
and Jinnappa on the other hand and the other between the appellant oM
tho one hand and Bhim Rao and Dasrath on the other hand raising the same
issue whether the appe11ant was a tenant at the relevant time.
In the proceedings by Bhim Rao and Dasrath, the Deputy Coffector held that the appellant
was a tenant at the releva11_t time. In the procoeedings initiated by Yeshwant and
Jin.appa the Mamlatdar also held the appellant to be a tenant. The Mamlatdar'9
order was, however, set aside by the Special Deputy Collector.
Two Revision
Applications were filed before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal; one by the
appellant and the other by Bhim Rao and Dasrath. The Tribunal dismissed the
application filed by Bhim Rao and Dasrath and allowed the application filett
by the appellant and set aside the order of the Specil Deputy Callee.tor. Two
Writ Petitions were filed in the High Court, under Article 227. The High c·ourt
allowed both the petitions.
HELD: (1) The powers of the ~1aharashtra Revenue Tribunal are to be
found in section 76 of the .Act.
The Tribunal clearly exceeded its power in reversing the order of the Special Deputy Collector. The Tribunal clearly acted
in complete disregard of its powers and proceeded a<; though it were either dealing with the matter as a court of first instanct: or an appellate Court.
[902
A-Bl
(2) The High Court was, however, plainly in error in interfering with the
.iudgment of the Tribunal which merely
upheld the Deputy Collector':; order.
The High Court has ignored the limitation within which it has to act ¥.:hile exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was not for ihe
High Court to di!icuss the evidence and come to the conclusion as to whether
the anpellant was or was not the tenant on 11-8-1948.
That wa<> a matter for
the Denuty Collector whose judgment has been upheld bv the Tribunal.· The
High Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 was not entitled to
discuss the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on the evidence as to who
was in possession of th'e land.
The High Court has plainly over-stepped the
limits of its power under Article 227. [903 E-904 A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1941 and 1942
of 1967.
(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated
the 13th/14th July 1967 and 10th August, 1967 of the Bombay High
H
Court in S.C.A. No. 73 of 65)
S. T. Desai, Ven/<atrao Pawar, Gadgil and Gopalakrishnan, for
the appellant.
900
SUrREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 1 s.C.K.
N.D. Karkfzanis, V.N. Ganpule, A .N. Karkfzanis and P.C. Kapur,
for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-In the year 1932 one Shantappa Watharec
father of respondents I and 2 in C.A. 1942, executed a document
(we are using the word 'document' because the character of the document was the subject matter of subsequent litigation) in respect of
the western I/3rd share of Survey No. 99 measuring 7 acres and 30
gunthas in the viJlage of Bamani in the State of Miraj in favour of
Nabisha Pirajde of Miraj. In 1936 he executed a similar document
in respect of middle I/3rd and in 1941 Dashrath and Bhima, belonging
to another branch of the family, executed a similar document in respect of the eastern I /3rd portion of the land in favour of the said
Nabisha Pirjade. On 11-8-1948 Miraj State merged in the then Bombay
Province and from that date the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 became
applicable to the lands in question. On 15-9-1948 the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 became applicable to the areas
of the former Miraj State and on 28-12-1948 the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 came into force in the same area.
In 1949 the two branches of Wathares started two separate sets of
proceedings under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act
contending that the documents of 1932, 1936 and 1941 were mortgages
and they were entitled to redeem them. They succeeded in their contention. To these proceedings the appellant Maruti Bala Raul was
not a party. The appe1Jant obstructed their attempt to take possession on the ground that he was a tenant of these lands even before
the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 became applicable to them and was
thus a protected tenant. There is no dispute that if on 11-8-1948
t.he appellant had been a tenant of these lands he was entitled to succeed.
As a result of the obstruction there were numerous proceedings
between Yeshwant and Jinappa, sons of Shantappa Wathare, on the
one hand and the appellant on the other, as also another set of proceedings between Bhimarao and Dashrath Wathare on the one hand and
the appellant on the other, the appellant claiming that he was a tenant
entitled to the benefits of Tenancy Act and the two sets of respondents
contending that he was not. Jn the proceedings by Yeshwant and
Jinappa the question whether the appellant was a tenant was referred
to the Mamlatdar under s. 70-B of the Bombay Tenancy Act. There
was a similar order in the proceedings between the appellant and
Bhimarao and Dashrath. In the proceedings by Bhimarao and Dashrath the Prant Officer (Deputy Collector) held that the appellant was
a tenant in possession on 11-8-1948. The Mamlatdar in the proceedings initiated by Yeshwant and Jinappa also came to a similar
conclusion. Against the Mamlatdar's order Yeshwant and Jinappa
filed an appeal before the Special Deputy Collector and succeeded.
There were two Revision Applications to the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, one by the appellant who had failed before the Special
Deputy ~ollector and the other by Bhimarao and Dashrath who had
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
f
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
M. B, RAUT v. D. B. WATHARE; (Alagiriswami, J.)
9() t
failed before the Prant Officer. Both these applications were heard
together and the
Tribunal dismissed the application filed
by
Bhimarao and Dashrath but allowed the application filed by the
appellant
and set aside the
order
of the Special Deputy
Collector
holding
that the appellant was a
tenant on the
land on 11-8-1948. There were two petitions under Article 227 of
the Constitution against the order of the Revenue Tribunal by the
two unsuccessful parties. They were heard together and allowed by
a learned Single-Judge of the Bombay High Court. The learned
Judge held that there was no justification for the ~ribunal to interfere
with the finding of fact recorded by the .Special Deputy Collector.
He also allowed the petition filed by Bhimarao and Dashrath. These
two appeals have been filed by Special Leave granted by this Court
against the orders in the two petitions.
At an earlier stage of the proceedings one question loomed larged
before the courts below and that was whether a tenant who had been
let into possession by a mortgagee in possession was entitled to continue in occupation under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act. This controversy has now been set at rest by the decision
of this Court in Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim (1963
3 SCR I). The only question for decision therefore was whether the
appellant was in posse5'ion on I 1-8-1948.
Let us first deal with the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.
The Tribunal's powers are found in s. 76 of the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act which reads as follows :
"76. (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, an application for revision
may be made to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal constituted
under the said Act against any order of the Collector on the
following grounds only :-
(a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law;
(b) that the Collector failed to determine some material
issue of law; or
(c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act, which has resulted in the
miscarriage of justice.
(2) In deciding applications under this section the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal shall follow the procedure which
may be prescribed by rules made under this Act after consultation with the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal."
There is no dispute that in these two cases the Prant Officer (Deputy
Collector) as well as the Special Deputy Collector is a Collector as
defined in cl. (2E) of s. 2 of the Act.
We have carefully gone through
the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and are of opinion
that in so far as it reversed the order of the Special Deputy Collector
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
the Tribunal clearly exceeded its powers. The order of the Tribunal
is a very clear and concise one and if it were an original order or an
order passed in exercise of appellate powers there is no doubt it would
be a proper order. The Tribunal clearly acted in complete disregard
of its powers and proceeded as though it were either d,aling with the
matter as a court of first instance or as an appellate court. It first
set out the main points which arose for decision in the two cases before
it, then examined the evidence relied upon by the Prant Officer and the
Mamlatdar and stated that it agreed with the view taken by both
of them. If the Revision Petitions before the Tribunal were against
the decision of the Prant Officer and the Mamlatdar there would have
been no need to say anything more and the decision of the Tribunal
would have been right. But the Tribunal had before it the order of
the Prant Officer and the order of the Special Deputy Collector 011
appeal against the order of the Mamlatdar. Therefore, the Tribunal
had to deal with the order of the Special Deputy Collector. After
mentioning that the Special Deputy Collector had held that the appellant
was not a tenant in possession under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939,
it went on to state that the Special Deputy Collector relied mainly
upon the decision of the Assistant Judge in the appeal under the Bombay
Agricultural Debtors Relief Act proceedings to hold that the appellant
was not a tenant. On the ground that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to decide questions of tenancy and therefore the Assistant
Judge's decision was a nullity, it held that it was unnecessary to discuss the grounds for that decision on which the Special Deputy Collector's decision was based. The Tribunal then went on to discuss the
evidence and held that it supports the case of the appellant that he was
all along in possession under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. The
Tribunal remarked that the Special Deputy Collector merely followed
the view of the Civil Court and held that the Kabulayats passed by the
mortgagors were nominal without considering the attestation of one
of the respondents herein. It then says that the Special Deputy
Collector relied mainly on three documents and states that all these
three documents have been considered by the Mamlatdar and as
pointed out by him they do show that they relate to the lands in suit.
It further remarks that the canclusion of the Special Deputy Collector
that the Kabulayats and Records of Rights entries are false is not
correct. It does not say why and then proi'eeds to say that the conclusions arrived at by the Special Deputy Collector are not correct
and cannot be accepted.
Before us also on behalf of the appellant it was' urged that what the
Special Deputy Collector had done was to incorporate the reasoning of
the Assistant Judge and that he had not applied his mind, and therefore
the Revenue Tribunal was justified in setting aside his order. But the
Special Deputy Collector had pointed out that prior to the
appellant the land was with Bala Sam Mahar and Khandu Maruti
Koli, that in the notice issued by the Village officers the entry of
Survey No. 99 did not appear to be genuine and that a similar notice
was produced by Yeshwant and Jinappa which shows the name of
Shantappa Raghu Wathare as a protected tenant. He has also pointed
out that the notice issued by the Talathi to the landlord Ahmedsha
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
f
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
M. B, RAUT v. D. B. WATHARlf(Alagiriswami, !.)
903
did not show S. No. 99 in the possession of the appellant. He also pointed
to the receipt dated 23-5-1947 passed by the landlord Usmimsha
Ahmedsha Inamdar in favour of Yeshwant Shantappa Wathare on
account of rent aud also that the letter dated l-~·1949 from Ahmedsha
Nabisha makes it quite clear that it was a demand for rent. It is further
shown that in the record of right entry the name of the appellant
has been shown as
protected tenant whereas
the
certified
copy of
Mutation entry shows th•
appellant
as protected
tenant of R.S.
No.
2/1
and
51/4
and not of the suit
land. He has therefore come to the conclusion that the ·entry in
the other rights column of the suit land that the appellant is the
protected tenant appears to be wrong and incorrect. In the face of
this elaborate discussion the rather infelcitious choice of words by the
Special Deputy Collector calling it the inventory of the documentary
evidence cannot take away the importance of the fact that he has in
fact discussed the evidence. It is thereafter that he refers to the Assistant Judge's conclusion. Even then the Special Deputy Collector goes
on to state that the entries in the record of right do not prove the tenancy
that there was a plan to create false record and to usurp the respondents of their legal rights, that the nominal rent notes and bogus entries
in record of right have been made with ulterior motive that the receipt
and the letter dated 1-5-1949 clearly establish that the suit land was
with the respondents for cultivation and that all these circumstances go
to prove that the rent note dated 23-5-1947 was bcgus and the possession in fact was with the respondent.
We are, therefore of opinion
that the Triubnal exceeded its powers in setting aside the order of the
Special Deputy Collector.
It is not merely the Tribunal that has been in error in exceeding
its jurisdiction. The High Court has similarly ignored the limitations
within which it has to act while exercising its powers under Art. 227
of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to discuss the reasons which
weighed with the High Court for setting aside the order of the Tribunal
in so far as the order of the Special Deputy Collector is concerned a. we
have also come to the same conclusion. But in so far as the High Conrt
interfered with the judgment of the Tribunal which merely upheld the
Prant Officer's order it was plainly in error. After the High Court,
for the purpose of setting aside the order of the Tribunal in so far as
the Special Deputy Collector's orders were concerned had elaborately
dicussed the evidence in the case and come to the conclusion that the
Tribunal was wrong and the Special Deputy Collector was right, it
wound up its discussion by saying that there was no justification whatsoever for the Tribunal to interfere with the finding of fact recorded
by the
Special Deputy Collector and even if the Tribunal's
judgment was to be considered on merits it was wholly unsupportable.
If it had been content with holding that there was no justification for the
Tribunal to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Special
Deputy Collector there would have been nothing more to say but
it discussed the whole evidence for coming to that conclusion and also
saying that even if the Tribunal's judgment was to be consideroo on
904
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
merits it was wholl~ uns~pportable. Even so, the High Court's,iudgment
has got to be sustained m regard to the order of the Tribunal m respect
of the Special Deputy Collector's order which, as we have shown earlier
suffers from the defect that the Tribunal overstepped its jurisdiction'.
But in dealing with the application filed by Bhimarao and Dashrath against the Tribunal's ordet in so far as it upheld the order of the
Prant Officer the High Court merely relied upon its discussion in the
earlier part of its judgment and has remarked that as it was now held
that Maruti Bala (appellant) was not the tenant of the petitioner
the petitioners would be entitled to possession. It was not for the
High Court to discuss the evidence and come to the conclusion as to
whether the appellant was or was not the tenant on 11-8-1948. That
was a matter for the Prant Officer. whose judgment has been upheld
by the Tribunal. The High Court while exercising its powers under
Art. 227 was not entit.led to discuss the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the evidence as to who was in possession of the land.
That was a matter for the revenue authorities and only within the scope
of Art. 227 could the High Court interfere. What we have discussed
earlier would show that the High Court has plainly overstepped the limits
of its powers under Art. 227. Its judgment in so far as this order
is concerned cannot be supported.
The result would be that the judgment of the High Court as far as
the order of the Prant Officer is concerned would have to be set aside
because the Tribuml merely uphold his orders. Civil Appeal No.
1941 of 1967 is therefore allowed. Even as far as the order of the
Special Deputy Collector is concerned, the judgment of the High
Court as well as the Tribunal would have to be set aside leaving it
open to the Tribunal to decide the question afresh. As the High
Court has taken a similar view of the Tribunal's order as we have taken
we con•ider that no useful purpose would be served by directing the
Tribunal to deal with the matter afresh. In the view we have taken
of the Special Deputy Collector's order it does not admit of being dealt
with under s. 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
We, therefore, consider that it would be a us6iess formality to send
the matter back to the Tribunal and it would be only prolonging the
agony as far as the parties are concerned. Therefore, Civil Appeal
No. 1942 of 1967 is dismissed.
The result is no doubt rather curious. In respect of the possession
over different parts of the same land the Mamlatdar and the Prant
Officer came to the same conclusion. The Mamlatdar's order was
however, set aside by the Snecial Deputy Collector with the result that
that there were two conflicting judgments in respect of different
parts of the same land. While the Special Deputy Collector dealt
with the Mamlatdar's order as an Appellate authority and was therefore, entitled to apprechte the evidence and come to his own ~onclu
sion, the Tribunal.while exercising its powers under s. 76 of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act had no such power. In dealing
with the order of the Prant Officer and upholding it the Tribunal had
not overstepped the limits of its powers. But in allowing the appeal
A
B
...
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
f
,.
B
c
M. B. RAUT v. D. B. WATHARE (Alagiriswami, /.)
905
against the Special Deputy Collector's order the Tribunal seems to
have been influenced by the feeling that there were two conflicting
orders before it and that it was its duty ito reconcile them. if possible.
This it proceeded to do by dealing with the question before it as though
it were the Appellate authority, which it was not. The High Court
was, therefore, right in setting aside the Tribunal's crde.r in so far as
the Special Deputy Colkctor's crder is concerned.
But the High Court fell into the same error as the Tribunal while
dealing with the order of the Prant Officer. It relied upon its discussion of the evidence in the other case for holding that the appellant
was not the tenant. That again was beyond the powers of the High
Court under Article 227. The conflict is inherent in the siutation and
unfortunately neither the Tribunal nor the High Courf had the power
to resolve it. But they have proceeded to do so by setting themselves
up, so to say, as Appellate authorities, There will be no crder as to
costs.
P.H.P.