# 8 S.C.R. 520 TRISHALA JAIN AND Al\IR v. STATE OF UTIARANCHAL AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2011] 8 S.C.R. 520
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2011-05-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos.7496-7497 of 2005
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/8-s-c-r-520-trishala-jain-and-al-ir-v-state-of-utiaranchal-and-anr-27849
- **Pages:** 49

## Headnote

A
8
c
[2011) 8 S.C.R. 520
TRISHALA JAIN AND Al\IR.
v.
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 etc.)
MAY 05, 2011
. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND
SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.23 and 24:
Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
of - Land Acquisition Officer applied the belting system and
categorizing the land into three different categories awarded
the compensation accordingly - However, Reference Court
D held that the land as a whole was similarly placed and was to
be used for one purpose, thus there was no question of
applying the belting system and accordingly awarded uniform
compensation to all the claimants - This finding of Reference
Court upheld by the High Court -
Correctness of this
E concurrent view not questioned by any of the parties before
the Supreme Court - Held: The concurrent· finding recorded
by the Courts below having remained unchallenged before the
Supreme Court need not be interfered with.
Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
F of - Sale instances (exemplars) - Claimants placed reliance
upon two sale instances and sought compensation on that
basis - Reference Court declined to consider the two sale
instances produced by the claimants - Justification of- Held:
Justified - Both the seller and the purchaser in the sale
G instances relied upon by the claimants were either claimants
in different claim petitions or belonged to the same family -
The claimants had full knowledge of acquisition of/and as well
as the purpose for which the said land was sought to be
acquired - Circumstances and evidence clearly indicate that
~
520
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
521
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
there was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to execute
A
sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land price just before
acquisition to get more compensation -
The said two sale
instances were sham, collusive, lacked bona fides and were
executed with the intention to raise the price of the land in
question with the pretence of it being actual market value -
B
Decision of Reference Court rightly upheld by the High Court.
Determination of market value of acquired land -
Principle of deduction inland value covered by a comparable
sale instance - Applicability of -Deduction on account of C
expenses of development of the site - Held: Normally
deduction is to be applied on account of carrying out
development activities like providing roads or civic amenities
such as electricity, water etc. when the land has been acquired
for construction of residential, commercial or institutional
projects - It shall also be applied where the sale instances
D
(exemplars) relate· to smaller pieces of land and in
comparison the acquisition relates to a large tract of land -
In addition thereto, deduction can also be applied on account
of wastage of/and - The cases where the acquired land itself
is fully developed and has all essential amenities, before
E
acquisition, for the purpose .for which it is acquired requiring
no additional expenditure for its development, falls under the
purview of cases of 'no deduction' - Furthermore, where the
evidence led by the parties is of such instances where the
compensation paid is comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have
F
all the features comparable to the proposed acquired land,
including that of size, is another category of cases where
.principle of 'no deduction' may be applied - In the instant
~case, there is evidence on record to show that plotting was
1done only on part of the acquired land and the land is G
·Surrounded by colonies like ITBP etc. but, there is no
evidence to show that the acquired land itself is developed
.:;ind is having all the required facilities and amenities - It may
'Je a case where less deduction may be applied but certainly
't is not a case of 'no deduction' - It also cannot be believed,
H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A in the absence of specific documentary evidence, that no
further development i

## Text

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A
8
c
[2011) 8 S.C.R. 520
TRISHALA JAIN AND Al\IR.
v.
STATE OF UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 etc.)
MAY 05, 2011
. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND
SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.23 and 24:
Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
of - Land Acquisition Officer applied the belting system and
categorizing the land into three different categories awarded
the compensation accordingly - However, Reference Court
D held that the land as a whole was similarly placed and was to
be used for one purpose, thus there was no question of
applying the belting system and accordingly awarded uniform
compensation to all the claimants - This finding of Reference
Court upheld by the High Court -
Correctness of this
E concurrent view not questioned by any of the parties before
the Supreme Court - Held: The concurrent· finding recorded
by the Courts below having remained unchallenged before the
Supreme Court need not be interfered with.
Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
F of - Sale instances (exemplars) - Claimants placed reliance
upon two sale instances and sought compensation on that
basis - Reference Court declined to consider the two sale
instances produced by the claimants - Justification of- Held:
Justified - Both the seller and the purchaser in the sale
G instances relied upon by the claimants were either claimants
in different claim petitions or belonged to the same family -
The claimants had full knowledge of acquisition of/and as well
as the purpose for which the said land was sought to be
acquired - Circumstances and evidence clearly indicate that
~
520
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
521
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
there was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to execute
A
sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land price just before
acquisition to get more compensation -
The said two sale
instances were sham, collusive, lacked bona fides and were
executed with the intention to raise the price of the land in
question with the pretence of it being actual market value -
B
Decision of Reference Court rightly upheld by the High Court.
Determination of market value of acquired land -
Principle of deduction inland value covered by a comparable
sale instance - Applicability of -Deduction on account of C
expenses of development of the site - Held: Normally
deduction is to be applied on account of carrying out
development activities like providing roads or civic amenities
such as electricity, water etc. when the land has been acquired
for construction of residential, commercial or institutional
projects - It shall also be applied where the sale instances
D
(exemplars) relate· to smaller pieces of land and in
comparison the acquisition relates to a large tract of land -
In addition thereto, deduction can also be applied on account
of wastage of/and - The cases where the acquired land itself
is fully developed and has all essential amenities, before
E
acquisition, for the purpose .for which it is acquired requiring
no additional expenditure for its development, falls under the
purview of cases of 'no deduction' - Furthermore, where the
evidence led by the parties is of such instances where the
compensation paid is comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have
F
all the features comparable to the proposed acquired land,
including that of size, is another category of cases where
.principle of 'no deduction' may be applied - In the instant
~case, there is evidence on record to show that plotting was
1done only on part of the acquired land and the land is G
·Surrounded by colonies like ITBP etc. but, there is no
evidence to show that the acquired land itself is developed
.:;ind is having all the required facilities and amenities - It may
'Je a case where less deduction may be applied but certainly
't is not a case of 'no deduction' - It also cannot be believed,
H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A in the absence of specific documentary evidence, that no
further development is required on the acquired land - Under
the circumstances, no infirmity in the approach of tf]e High
Court in applying the principle of deduction - In the faCts and
circumstances of the present case, deduction of 10% from the
B market value on account of development charges an_d other
possible expenditures was justifiable and ca/led for ... ·
Determination of Compensation - Application of principle
of guesstimate for determining the amount of compensation
- Held: More often than not, it is not possible to fix the
C compensation with exactitude or arithmetic accuracy -
Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court may have to take recourse to some guesswork while
determining the fair market value of the land and the
consequential amount of compensation that is required to be
D paid to the persons interested in the acquired land - 'Guess'
as understood in its common parlance is an estimate without
any specific information while 'calculations' are always made
with reference to specific data - 'Guesstimate' is an estimate
based on a mixture of guesswork and calculations and it is a
E process in itself - 'Guesstimate' is with higher certainty than
mere 'guess' or a 'conjecture' per se - However, principle of
some guesswork would have hardly any application in a case
of no evidence - Discretion of the court in applying guesswork
to the facts of a given case is not unfettered but has to be
F reasonable and should have a connection to the data on
record produced by the parties by way of evidence - Further,
this entire exercise has to be within the limitations specified
under ss. 23 and 24 of the Act and cannot be made in
detninent thereto - On facts, it is a case of acquisition of land
G which is situated on a reasonably good location surrounded
by developed areas having civic amenities and facilities and
further development activity was going on in nearby areas -
The land acquired had the potential of being developed for
residential or institutional purposes and the same was
H acquired for construction of a Government Polytechnic
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
523
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR
Institute',;.. Therefore, it is a case where the Court should apply • A
minimal deduction·which will meet the ends ofjustice and
would help in determining just and fair compensation for the
land in question - 10% deduction from the market vafue of
the acquired land would meefthe erids of justice.
The instant appeals came up before this Court as a
result of a common Notification issued under Section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The following common
questions arose for consideration:
B
I.
Whether or not the belting system ought to C
hav.e :been applied. for determination of fair
market value of the acquired Ian<;!?
II.
What should be the just and fair market,value
of the acquired land on the date ofissuance D
of notification under Section 4 of the Act?
Ill.
Whether there oughLto have been any
. deduction after determining the fair market
value of the land?
'·
IV.
What compensation and benefits are the·
claimants entitled to?
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD:
Question No. 1.
E
F
1. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO); while
.giving its award had applied the belting system and
G
.categorizing the land into three different categories had
.awarded the compensation accordingly. Howev~.r. the
!Reference Court had held that the land as a V(hole'was
isimilarly placed and was surrounded by develoRed ai:.eas
and it was to be used for one purpose, i.e. construction
H
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2011] 8 S.C.R.
A of Government Polytechnic Institute, thus there was no
question of applying the belting system. Keeping in view
the documentary and oral evidence. on record, the
Reference Court set aside the belting system and
awarded uniform compensation to all the claimants. This
a finding of the Reference Court was upheld by the High
Court in the impugned judgments. The correctness of
this concurrent view has also not been questioned by
any of the parties in the present appeals. Therefore,
concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below which
c remained unchallenged before this Court need not be
disturbed by this Court. [Para 10] [543-F-H;. 544-A-B]
Question No. II
2.1. The principal evidence relied upon by the
D claimants in all these cases are the two sale instances
shown at serial Nos. 109 and 110. According to the
claimants, they were entitled to compensation on the
basis of these two sale instances. From the fac;tual matrix
the question that requires consideration of this Court is
E whether the Reference Court was justified in law with
reference to the facts on record in declining to consider
the two sale instances produced by the claimants at
serial Nos. 109 and 110 or in other words, was it justified
on part of the Reference Court to keep them outside the
F zone of consideration while determining the market value
of the acquired land. It cannot be disputed that both the
seller and the purchaser in sale instances at s.erial Nos.
109 and 110 are either claimants in different claim
petitions or belong to the same family. The claimants had
G full knowledge of acquisition of land and as well as the
purpose for which the said land was sought to be
acquired. [Paras 11, 12 and 13] [544 -C-D; 546-E-G; 547B]
2.2. A fraudulent move or design is not capable of
H
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR v. STATE OF
525
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
direct proof in most cases; it can only be inferred. Under A
such circumstances, the Court has to take a general view
keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case
with particular reference to the intent of parties, their
action in furtherance thereto and the object sought to be
achieved by them. In the instant case, it is not in dispute
8
that these sale deeds have been executed in favour of
the family members or persons known to the claimants.
These are circumstances and evidence which clearly
indicate that the sale instances relied upon by the
claimants are result of collusion between these parties. c
There was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to
execute sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land
price just before acquisition to get more compensation.
These two sale instances which have been executed just
about two months prior to the issuance of the notification
D
under Section 4(1) stand out as transactions which are
sham, collusive, lack bona fide and have been executed
with the intention to raise the price of the land in question
with the pretence of it being actual market value. There
is no infirmity in this view of the Reference Court which
E
was rightly upheld by the High Court. [Paras 13 and 14]
[547-C-G]
Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand
Kothari (1950) 1 SCR 852 - relied on.
A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad.v. P.
F
Venkaiah (1997) 10 SCC 128: 1997 (3) SCR 1054; Cement
Corporation of India v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270; Chimanlal
Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona
(1988) 3 sec 751: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531 and State of G
Haryana v. Ram Singh (2001) 6 SCC 254: 2001 (3) SCR
1178 - referred to.
Question No. Ill
3.1. The law with regard to applying the principle of H
'
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
\
A ,deductipn to the determined market value of the acquired
land 4" quite consistent, though, of course, the extent of
dedu~tion has varied very widely depending on the facts
and circumstances of a given case. It is not possible to
state precisely the exact deduction which could be made
B uniformly applicable to all the cases. Normally the rule is
that deduction is to be applied en account of carrying out
development activities like providing roads or civic
amenities such as electricity, water etc. when the land
has been acquired for construction of residential,
c commercial or institutional projects. It shall also be
applied where the sale instances (exemplars) relate to
smaller pieces of land and in comparison the acquisition
relates to a large tract of land. In addition thereto,
deduction can also be applied on account of wastage of
D land. [Pa~~ 18) [549-H; 550-A-C]
3.2. It is also neither possible nor appropriate to
stricto,sensu define a class of cases where the Court
would not apply any deduction. This again would be
dependant upon the facts and circumstances of a given
E case. The cases where the acquired land itself is fully
developed and has all essential amenities, be.fore
acquisition, for the purpose for which it is acquired
requiring no additional expenditure for its development,
falls under the purview of cases of 'no deduction'.
F Furthermore, where the evidence led by the parties is of
such instances where the compensation paid is
comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have all the features
comparable to the proposed acquired land, including that
of size, is another category of cases where principle of
G 'no deduction' may be applied. These may be the cases
where least or no deduction could be made. Such cases
are exceptional and/or rare as normally the lands which
are proposed to be acquired for development purposes
would be agricultural lands and/or semi or haphazardly
H developed lands at the time of issuance of notification
'
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
· UTTARANCHAI.. AND ANR.
.
.
527
·. under Section4(1) of ·the Act~ which is the relevant time
A
~o be taken into consideration for all purposes and
j.htents for determining the market value of the land in
question. [Para 19) [550-E-H; 551-A-B]
3.3. It is evident that the acquired land h'as to be more
8
or le~s developed land as its developed surrounding
areas', with all amenities and facilities and is fifto be used
for the purpose for which it is acquired without any
further expend-iture, before such land could be
considered for no deduction. Similarly the sale instances C
even of smaller plots could be considered for
determining the market value of a larger chun.k of land
with some deduction unless, there was compa·rability in
potential, utilisation, amenities and. infrastructure with
hardly any distinction. On such principles each case
would have to be considered on its own merits. This D
Court, d'epending. on the facts and circum~tances of each
given case, has taken the view that deduction on account
of expenses of development of the ·sites could_ vary from
10% to'..86.33% depending on the nature of the land, Its
: situation, the purpose. and stage of development [Paras
E
. 20, 21) [552-H; 553~A-D]
· : 3.4. In the present case, .. there is evidence on record
to show that plotting has been done only on part of the
acquired land and the land is surrounded by colonies like
F
ITBP etc. but, there is no evidence to show that the
acquired land itself is developed and is having all the
required facilities and amenities. It may be a c.ase where
less deduction may be applied but certainly it is not a case
of 'no deduction'. It also cannot be believed, in the G
absence of specific documentary evidence, that no
further development is required on the acquired land. The
claimants, on whom the onus lies to prove inadequacy
of compensation have not even stated that whether
under the relevant laws they are ·expected to leave any
H
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
A i:>art of their land open when they are permitted to raise
construction on the land in question. Under these
circumstances, there is no infirmity in the approach of the
High Court in applying the principle of deduction. A
deduction of 10% from the market value on account of
s development charges and other possible expenditures
would be justifiable and called for in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. [Para 25] [556-C-F]
Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village v.
Nookala Rajamallu (2003) 12 SCC 334: 2003 (6) Suppl.
C SCR 67; Bhagwathula Samanna & Ors v. Special Tahsildar
& Land Acquisition Officer (1991) 4 SCC 506: 1991(1) Suppl.
SCR 172; K.S. Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commissioner·
and Land Acqusition Officer (1996) 2 SCC 62: 1995(6) Suppl.
SCR 364; Ram Piari v. Land Acquisition Collector, Solan
D (1996) 8 SCC 338: 1996 (3) SCR 307; Hasanali Walimchand
(Dead) by L v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 388: 1998
(1) SCR 1; Chim an/a! Hargovinddas v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Poona (1988) 3 SCC 751: 1988 (1) Suppl.
SCR 531; V. Hanumantha Reddy (Deceased) by L v. Land
E Acquisition Officer & Manda/ R. Officer (2003) 12 SCC 642;
Atma Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568: 2007 (12)
SCR 1120 and Charan Dass v. Himacha/ Pradesh Housing
& Urban Development Authority (2010) 13 SCC 398: 2009
(14) SCR 163 - referred to.
F Question No. IV:
Determination of Compensation - Application of
principle ·of guesstimate for determining the amount of
compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under
G the Act
4.1. Acquisition of land is an act falling in the purview
of eminent domain of the State. It essentially relates to the
concept of compulsory acquisition as opposed to
H voluntary sale. It is trite that no person can be deprived
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
529
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
of his· property save by authority of law in terms of Article
A
300A of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the
Act provide a complete mechanism for 'deprivation of
property in accordance with the. law' as stated under the
Act. Justifiability and fairness of such compensation is
subject to judicial review within the confines of the four
B
corners of the Act. Once the lands are acquired under theAct, the persons interested therein are entitled to
compensation as per the provisions of the Act. Thus, in
the present case the land in question has been acquired
under the provisions of a law which specifically provide c
that acquisition can only be for a public purpose and
upon payment of compensation to the claimants in
accordance with law. The compensation payable to the
claimants has to be computed in terms of Sections -23
and 24 of the Act. The market value of the land has to be
0
determined at the date of the publication of the
notification- under Section 4(1) of the Act, after taking into
consideration what is stated under Sections 23(1), 23(1A),
23(2) and excluding the considerations stated under
Section 24 of the Act. More often than not, it is not
possibl_e to fix the compensation with exactitude or E
arithmetic accuracy. Depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may have to take
recourse to some guesswork while determining the fair
market value of the land and the consequential amount
F
of compensation that is required to be paid to the
persons interested in the acquired land. [Para 26] [557A-F]
4.2. 'Guess' as understood in its common parlance
ls an estimate without any specific information while
G
'calculations' are always made with reference to specific
data. 'Guesstimate' is an estimate based on a mixture of
guesswork and calculations and it is a process in itself.
At the same time 'guess' cannot be treated synonymous
to 'conjecture''. 'Guess' by itself may be a statement or H
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A result based on unknown factors while 'conjecture' is
made with a very slight amount of knowledge, which is
just sufficient to incline the scale of probability.
'Guesstimate' is with higher certainty than mere 'guess'
or a 'conjecture' per se. The concept of 'guesswork' is
B r:iot unknown to various fields of law. It has been applied
in cases relating to insurance, taxation, compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the Labour
Laws. All that is required from a Court is that such
guesswork has to be used with greater element of
c caution and within the determinants of law declared by
the Legislature or by the Courts from time to time. [Paras
27, 28) [557-G-H; 558-A-C]
· 4.3. Under the Act, as settled by various judgments
of this Court, there are different methods of computation
D of compensation payable to the claimants, for example it
can be based upon comparable sale instances, awards
and judgments relating to the similar or comparable
lands, method of averages, yearly yields with reference
to the revenue earned by the land etc. Whatever method
E of determining the compensation is applied by the court,
its result should always be reasonable, just and fair as
that is the purpose sought to be achieved under the·
scheme of the Act. For attaining that purpose, application
of some guesswork may be necessary but this principle
F would have hardly any application in a case of no
evidence. In other words, where the parties have not
brought on record any evidence, then the court will not
be in a position to award compensation merely on the
basis of imagination, conjecture etc. [Para 32] [561-C-F]
G
H
4.4. The Court may apply some guesswork before it
could arrive at a final determination, which is in
consonance with the statutory law as well as the
principles stated in the judicial pronouncements. The
guesswork has to be used for determination of
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
531
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
compensation with greater element of caution and the
/:
principle of guesstimation will have no application to the
case of 'no evidence'. This principle is only intended to
bridge the gap between the calculated compensation and
the actual compensation that the claimants may be
entitled to receive as per the facts of a given case to meet
B
the ends of justice. It will be appropriate to state certain
principles controlling the application of 'guesstimate: (a)
Wherever the evidence produced by the parties is not
sufficient to determine the compensation with exactitude,
this principle can be resorted to and b) Discretion of the c
court in applying guesswork to the facts of a given case
is not unfettered but has to be reasonable and should
have a connection to the data on record produced by the
parties by way of evidence. Further, this entire exercise
has to be within the limitations specified under Sections
0
23 and 24 of the Act and cannot be made in detriment
thereto. Applying these principles to the facts of the
present case, this· Court has to take recourse to the
'principle of guesstimation' inasmuch as it is essential for
fixation of fair market value of the land which shall be the
basis for determining the compensation payable to the
claimants. [Paras 33, 34) [561-F-H; 562-A-E]
E
F
4.5. All the claimants in the present appeals have
primarily relied upon the sale instances shown at serial
Nos. 109 and 110. These sale instances have rightly been
ignored by the Courts below. Besides the fact that these
sale deeds are executed between the members of the
family, the claimants had full knowledge of the
Government's intention to acquire these lands, for the
purpose specified, even prior to issuan~e of notification
G
under Section 4(1) of the Act These are reasons enough
to doubt the consideration paid in these sale deeds. The
SLAO, in his Award, has taken note of 140 sale instances
:mmediately preceding the issuance of Notification under
3ection 4(1) of the Act. The Reference Court specifically
H
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R
A recorded that the highest value reflected in these 140 sale
instances is Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre, except in sale
instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 produced by the
claimants. The claimants did not produce any other
evidence except these two sale instances which had
B been executed between the memt:Jers of the family and
contained unreasonably high price of the land. There is
tremendous gap between the prices of the land fetched
in all other sale deeds on one hand, the highest being Rs.
12,55,550.50 per acre and that in sale deeds executed by
c the claimants between themselves on the other hand
which is Rs. 34,87,648 per acre, for sales effected within
a span of 2-3 days for similarly situated lands in the same
village. It certainly arouses suspicion in the mind of the
Court as to the intention behind execution of these sale
0 deeds. Ex facie they appear to have been executed to
hike up the price of the land just before the issuance of
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. If considered
from the point of view of a reasonable man, all these
circumstances clearly fall beyond the ambit of
coincidence and appear to have been 'managed' to
E achieve the end of receiving higher compensation. The
sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 11 O produced by the
claimants are liable to be ignored for the purposes of
fixation of market value of the acquired land as these
transactions are sham and lack bona fide. The two
F exhibits produced by the claimants offend the very
essence of the parameters stated under Section 23 of the
Act. Thus, the view taken by the Reference Court and the
High Court, rejecting these instances as collusive and
sham is liable to be sustained. The sale instance shown
G at serial No. 10Q is certainly an exemplar which can be
taken into consideration. This is a sale deed executed on
29th November, 1991 where a land admeasuring 0.90
acres has been sold at a rate of Rs.12,55,550.50 per acre.
As far as the location and potential of this land is
H concerned, it is situated at a distance of 1Yz furlong of the
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
533
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
acquired land in the same village. It is the case of the
A
claimants in all these appeals that the acquired land is
surrounded by developed areas like ITBP Colony on the
North and there was a 20 feet wide passage ending on
the acquired land. Facilities of post office, electricity,
hospital, schools etc. were available in those colonies
B
which ar~ very close to the acquired land. The Reference
Courts, in their respective awards, also noticed that
heavy construction activity was going on nearby Shimla
Road and the value of this land is continuously rising.
Another relevant piece of evidence with reference to c
potential and location of the land is the statement of PW4, an Architect by profession. He claims to have visited
the site and made plans to divide the land in question into
plots after making provision for civic amenities, children
park etc. In these circumstances, it is difficult to doubt that D
the land i,n question has substantial potential and is
located, adjacent to developed areas. According to this
witness, there has been a decreasing trend in the value
of the land in that area. The declaration under Section 6
was issued in April, 1992 itself at a time when the prices
E
had started falling. The cumulative effect of the
documentary and oral evidence on record is that it is a
case of acquisitfon of land which is situated on a
reasonably good location surrounded by developed
areas having civic amenities and facilities and further
development activity was going on in nearby areas. It was
F
a\so submitted by the claimants that plotting has already
been done on the acquired land and some plots of land
have been sold immediately prior to the issuance of the
Notification under Se~tion 4(1) of the Act. It is evident that
the land acquired had the potential of being developed G
for residential or institutional purposes and the same was
acquired for construction of a Government Polytechnic
Institute. Therefore, it is a case where the Court should
apply minimal deduction which will meet the ends of
justice and would help in determining just and fair
H.
534
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R
A
compensation for the land in question. This Court is of
the considered view that 10% deduction from the market
value of the acquired land would meet the ends of justice.
The sale instance at serial No. 108 falls in the Revenue
B
Estate of the same Village and is situated at a distance
of 1 % furlong from the acquired land. The acquired land
belonging to the claimants forms part of Khasra No.39/2
while, in the same Reveue Estate, the sale ins'tance at
serial No. 108 is part of Khasra No. 410. Thus a sale deed
related to a land in such proximity of time and distance
c cannot be said to be incomparable sale instance, i.e. it has
to be taken as a comparable sale instance. Though it
relates to the sale of a smaller plot of land but is certainly
bigger than the land sold by the claimants between
themselves. Its location and potential, if not identical in
0
absolute terms, is certainly comparable for the purposes
of determining market value of the land in. question. It is
a well established principle that the value of sale of small
pieces of land can be taken into consideration for
determining even the value of a large tract of land but with
E
a rider that the Court while taking such instances into
consideration has to make some deduction keeping in
view other attendant circumstances and facts of that
particular case. Keeping in view the surrounding
developed areas and location and potential of the land it
F
will meet the ends of justice if 10% deduction is made
from the estimated market value of the acquired land. The
comparable sale instance under serial No. 108 depicted
the fair value of land in that area at the time of issuance
of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which is
Rs.12,55,550.50 per acre. The time gap between this sale
G
instance and issuance of said Notification is merely two
months· which would hardly call for any increase in the
said value but to balance the equities between the parties
we would round off the figure to Rs. 13,00,000 per acre.
By applying the principle of guesstimate, thus, the market
H
value of the acquired land is determined at Rs. 13,00,000
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
535
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
per acre as on the date of the issuance of the Notification
A
under Section 4(1) of the Act. Deducting 10% therefrom,
it would come to Rs.11,70,000 per acre which will be the
compensation payable to the claimants with statutory
benefits and interests thereupon in accordance with law.
[Paras 35 to 44) [562-F; 563-A-H; 564-A, F-G; 565-C-H;
B
566-A-H; 567-A-H]
Charan Dass v. Himachal Pradesh Housing & Urban
Development Authority (2010) 13 SCC 398: 2009 (14) SCR
163; Thakur Kamta Prasad Singh (Dead) through LRs v.
State of Bihar (1976) 3 SCC 772: 1976 (3) SCR 585; Special C
Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda (2010) 5 SCC 708:
2010 (5) SCR 164 and Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jaipur v. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 2007
(12) SCR 703 - referred to.
D
Case Law Reference:
(1950) 1 SCR 852
relied on
Para 13
1997 (3) SCR 1054
referred to Para 16
(2004) 8 sec 210
referred to Para 16
E
2001 (3) SCR 1178
referred to Para 17, 38
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 67
referred to Para 18, 21
1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 172
referred to Para 20, 23
F
___ _1_9,95 (6) Suppl. SCR 364
referred to Para 21
1996 (3) SCR 307
referred to Para 21
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531
referred to Para 21
1998 (1) SCR 1
referred to Para 21
G
(2003) 12 sec 642
referred to Para 22
2007 (12) SCR 1120
referred to Para 24
2009 (14) SCR 163
referred to Para 24, 28
H
A
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
1976 (3) SCR 585
201 O (5) SCR 164
2007 (12) SCR 703
referred to Para 29
referred to Para 30
referred to Para 31
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURtSDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7 496-7 497 of 2005 etc.
c
From the Judgment & Order dated 20.07.2005 of the High
Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in First Appeal No. 920 & 921
of 2001.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 7498-7499 of 2005, 1122 of 2011 & 3613 of 2008.
R.S. Hegde, Girish Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh, Braj
0
Kishore Mishra, Aparna Jha, Abhishek Yadav, Vikram
Patralekh, Satyajit A. Desai, Som Nath Padhan for the
Appellants.
E
Rachna Srivastava, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Vijay K. Jain
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. By this common judgment,
we propose to dispose of the afore-noticed six Civil Appeals
as they arise from different judgments of the High Court of
F Uttaranchal but are result of a common Notification issued
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in shortthe 'Act') and thus are based upon similar facts and
documentary and oral evidence.
G FACTS:
H
C. A. Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 and 7498-7499 of 2005
2. On 30th January, 1992, the Government of Uttar
Pradesh (now the State of Uttaranchal) issued a Notification
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
537
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring some land for a
A
public purpose, namely the construction of Government
Polytechnic Institute in the District of Dehradun. This
Notification came to be published in the Official Gazette on
22nd February, 1992. On 18th April 1992, declaration under
Section 6(1) of the Act was issued which was published in
B
the Official Gazette on 12th May, 1992 identifying the land
admeasuring 12.85 acres for acquisition for the said purpose
in village Sewala Kalan, Pargana Kendriya Doon, District
Dehradun, out of which lands admeasuring 4.58 acres and
3.031 acres belonged to the first and the second claimant c
respectively. In furtherance to this Notification, possession of
the acquired land was taken on 7th July, 1992. The Special
Land Acquisition Officer (in short the 'SLAO') pronounced his
award on 8th June, 1993 .. While determining compensation,
the SLAO applied belting system to the acquired land and
0
assessed the market value of the first belt admeasuring 0.56 .
acres at the rate of Rs. 9, 78,223.40 per acre, second belt
admeasuring 1.38 acres at the rate of Rs. 6,52,482.27 per
acre and for the third belt admeasuring 10.91 acres at the rate
of Rs. 4,39,362.70 per acre. However, the claimants, being
dissatisfied with the award of the SLAO, filed applications
E
under Section 18 of the Act which in turn came to be referred
to the Court of competent jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Reference Court').
3. The Reference Court, in LA Case No. 386 of 1993,
F
considered the list of 140 sale instances attached with the
award of the SLAO. It noticed that the SLAO had relied on
sale instance at serial no. 43 related to land admeasuring
0.094 acre for a total consideration of Rs. 92,000 and
assessed the market value of acquired land at the rate of Rs.
G
9,78,723 per acre before applying the belting system. This
sale deed was executed on 10th June, 1991 and the land was
from the revenue estate of the same village but at some
1distance from the acquired land. The Reference Court also
•noticed the evidence of OW 1, Ram Singh, who had stated
H
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A that ITBP quarters are located to the north of the acquired
land; and to the east of ITBP Colony, is a 20 feet wide
passage which ends on the acquired land. A high tension line
of 1100 K.V. also runs near the acquired land. This witness
admitted that the land in question was full of residential
B potentialities. Reliance was also placed upon the statements
of PW7 and PW8 in regard to the urbanization of the
surrounding areas and the potential of the land in question for
building construction and residential purposes.
C
4. Out of those 140 sale instances, sale instance at serial
Nos. 109 and 110 are stated to be the sale deeds executed
on 26th November, 1991 and 27th November, 1991, which
were heavily relied upon by the Reference Court. The
Reference Court vide its judgment-cum-award dated 12th May,
1995 held application of belting system improper as entire
D land was acquired for one purpose, i.e. construction of
Government Polytechnic Institute. It determined the market
value of the land at the rate of Rs. 6,40,000 per bigha and
after applying 20% deduction, enhanced compensation to flat
rate of Rs. 5, 12,000 per bigha along with other statutory
E benefits.
5. The State, aggrieved by the enhancement of
compensation awarded to the claimants by the Reference
Court, preferred appeals being First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of
F 2001, before the concerned High Court. The High Court vide
its judgment dated 20th July, 2005, primarily accepted the
findings recorded by the Reference Court on merits and
merely raised the deduction from 20% to 33.33% thus
awarding the compensation at the rate of • 4,26,667 per
G bigha. The High Court recorded a definite finding that the
Reference Court was fully justified in setting aside the order
of the SLAO applying belting system for determination of
compensation in relation to the acquired land. It also did not
consider it appropriate to rely upon the sale instances placed
on record by the State and practically affirmed the findings of
'H
TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF
539
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Reference Court including finding based upon sale
A
instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 for determining the
market value of the acquired land. The High Court modified
the order of the Reference Court only by raising the deduction
on account of development charges and fixing of the final
amount of compensation as afore-indicated.
B
6. Against the above judgment of the High Court, Civil
Appeal Nos.7498-7499 of 2005 have been preferred by the
State of Uttaranchal while Civil Appeal Nos. 7496-7497 of
2005 have been preferred by the claimants.
C.A. No. 1122 OF 2011
c
7. Civil Appeal No. 1122 of 2011 has been preferred by
the State of Uttaranchal against the judgment of the
Uttaranchal High Court dated 9th March, 2006 passed in First D
Appeal Nos. 918 and 919 of 2001. Vide that order the Court
had primarily relied upon another judgment of the Division
Bench of that Court passed in First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of
2001 (in the case of State of U.P. through Collector,
Dehradun v. Smt. Trish/a Jain) and awarded compensation
E
at the rate of Rs. 4,26,667 per bigha reducing the
· compensation of Rs. 5, 12,000 per bigha as awarded by the
i Reference Court. The High Court in this case had echoed in
entirety the reasoning and compensation awarded by the
other Bench in the case of Trisha/a Jain (supra). This judgment
F
of the High Court, impugned in Civil Appeal No. 1122 of
2011, therefore has to be treated at parity for all intents and
purposes with the impugned judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.
7496-7497 of 2005 and Civil Appeal Nos. 7498-7499 of
2005.
G
C.A. No. 3613 of 2008
8. Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2008 is directed against the
judgment of the Uttaranchal High Court dated 11th May, 2006
passed in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001. It is necessary
H
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A for us to notice the facts giving rise to this appeal separately
because there are certain distinguishing features with regard
to factual matrix as well as evidence of this case. The land in
question in this case also forms part of the 1and admeasuring
12.85 acres sought to be acquired by the Notification dated
B 30th January, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and
is covered by the common award passed by the SLAO on
8th June, 1993 awarding the compensation at the same rate
as in other cases. The claimants herein made a separate
reference under Section 18 of the Act and the Reference
c Court, in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, awarded compensation
at the rate of Rs. 12,50,000 per acre (i.e. Rs. 2,38,095.24 per
bigha approximately) in addition to granting other statutory
benefits and interests. It needs to be noticed that the two sale
instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110, which were the
0
foundation of the judgment pronounced by the Reference
Court in other cases, i.e. sale deeds dated 26th November,
1991, and 27th November, 1991, had been rejected on the
ground that they were not admissible in evidence as neither
the vendor nor the vendee had been produced to prove the
sale instances in Court. The Reference Court also noticed the
E contention raised on behalf of the State, i.e. these sale
instances were collusive. It will be useful to refer to the relevant
part of the judgment of the Reference Court which reads as
under:
F
"The respondent No.2 have (sic) taken a special
stand in his written statement that the sale deed executed
by Sri Viresh Jain was forged and fictitious and collusive .
and no reliance can be placed on such a sale deed. He
has further argued that the judgment passed in L.A. Case
G
No. 386 of 1993 Smt. Trish/a Jain vs.