# 8 S.C.R. 829 MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE & OTHERS v. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT, JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA

- **Citation:** [2011] 8 S.C.R. 829
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2011-05-10
- **Case number:** CIVIL Appeal No. 5094 of 2005
- **Bench:** Asok Kumar Ganguly, Swatanter Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/8-s-c-r-829-mahadev-govind-gharge-others-v-the-special-land-acquisition-officer-27874
- **Pages:** 45

## Headnote

A
B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XU, Rule 22 -
C
Interpretation of - Service of notice of hearing of appeal -
Filing of cross-objections -
Period of limitation -
Commencement of - Condonation of delay - Held: The
limitation of one month for filing cross-objection as provided
under Order XU Rule 22 commences from the date of service D
of notice on the respondent in the appeal or his pleader of
the day fixed for hearing the appeal - The cross-objections
are required to be filed within the period of one month from
the date of service of such notice or within such further time
as Appellate Court may see fit to allow depending upon the
E
facts and circumstances of the given case - Since Order XU
Rule 22 itself provide for extension of time, the Courts would
normally be inclined to condone the delay in the interest of
justice unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish
a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of the
F
Court to file cross-objections beyond the statutory period of
one month - In the instant case, the cross-objectors were
caveators before the High Court and they were heard not only
while passing of interim orders but the appeal itself was
admitted in their presence - In the circumstances, one month G
of prescribed period in terms of Order XL/ Rule 22
commenced from the date on which the High Court ordered
that the appeal may be listed for hearing - As the period for
filing the cross objection had long expired, application for
829
H
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A
condonation of delay was filed - High Court dismissed the
application without recording any specific reasons as to why
the averments of the cross-objector were disbelieved - In the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the crossobjectors were able to show sufficient/reasonable cause for
B
grant of further time to file the cross objections beyond the
period of one month in terms of Order XU Rule 22 - Delay
in filing the cross-objections thus condoned.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order XU, r.22- Crossobjections - Nature of - Held: Cross-objections within the
C
scheme of Order XU Rule 22 are to be treated as separate
appeal and must be disposed of on same principles in
accordance with the provisions of Order XU.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.148A - Rights of a
D
caveator - Held: The rights of a caveator are different from
that of cross-objectors per se - A caveator has a right to be
heard mandatorily for the purposes of passing of an
interlocutory order - A caveator is to be heard· by the court
before any interim order can be passed against him.
E
Procedural Law - Hearing of appeal - Stages of - Held:
Hearing of the appeal can be classified in two different stages;
one at the admission stage and the other at the final stage.
Procedural Law - Date of hearing - Held: Date of hearing
F
has normally been defined as the date on which the court
applies its mind to tf1e merits of the case - In a criminal
matter the hearing of the case is said to be commenced by
the Court only when it applie_s its mind to frame a charge etc.
- Similarly, under civil law it is only when the Court actually
G
applies its mind to averments made by party/parties, it can
be considered as hearing of the case - The date of hearing
must not be confused with the expression 'step in the
proceedings' - These are two different concepts of procedural
law and have different connotation and application - What
H
may be a 'step in the proceeding', essentially, may not mean
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
831
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
a 'hearing' by the. Court - Necessary ingredients of 'hearing'
A
thus are application of mind by the court and address by the
party to the suits.
Procedural law - Purpose and interpretation of - Held:
Justice between the parties to a case is the essence of 8
procedural law - Unless the statute expressly prohibits or put
an embargo, the Courts would interpret the procedural law so
as to achieve

## Text

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[2011) 8 S.C.R. 829
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE & OTHERS
v.
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, UPPER
KRISHNA PROJECT, JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
(CIVIL Appeal No. 5094 of 2005)
MAY 10, 2011
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND SWATANTER
KUMAR, JJ.]
A
B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XU, Rule 22 -
C
Interpretation of - Service of notice of hearing of appeal -
Filing of cross-objections -
Period of limitation -
Commencement of - Condonation of delay - Held: The
limitation of one month for filing cross-objection as provided
under Order XU Rule 22 commences from the date of service D
of notice on the respondent in the appeal or his pleader of
the day fixed for hearing the appeal - The cross-objections
are required to be filed within the period of one month from
the date of service of such notice or within such further time
as Appellate Court may see fit to allow depending upon the
E
facts and circumstances of the given case - Since Order XU
Rule 22 itself provide for extension of time, the Courts would
normally be inclined to condone the delay in the interest of
justice unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish
a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of the
F
Court to file cross-objections beyond the statutory period of
one month - In the instant case, the cross-objectors were
caveators before the High Court and they were heard not only
while passing of interim orders but the appeal itself was
admitted in their presence - In the circumstances, one month G
of prescribed period in terms of Order XL/ Rule 22
commenced from the date on which the High Court ordered
that the appeal may be listed for hearing - As the period for
filing the cross objection had long expired, application for
829
H
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A
condonation of delay was filed - High Court dismissed the
application without recording any specific reasons as to why
the averments of the cross-objector were disbelieved - In the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the crossobjectors were able to show sufficient/reasonable cause for
B
grant of further time to file the cross objections beyond the
period of one month in terms of Order XU Rule 22 - Delay
in filing the cross-objections thus condoned.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order XU, r.22- Crossobjections - Nature of - Held: Cross-objections within the
C
scheme of Order XU Rule 22 are to be treated as separate
appeal and must be disposed of on same principles in
accordance with the provisions of Order XU.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.148A - Rights of a
D
caveator - Held: The rights of a caveator are different from
that of cross-objectors per se - A caveator has a right to be
heard mandatorily for the purposes of passing of an
interlocutory order - A caveator is to be heard· by the court
before any interim order can be passed against him.
E
Procedural Law - Hearing of appeal - Stages of - Held:
Hearing of the appeal can be classified in two different stages;
one at the admission stage and the other at the final stage.
Procedural Law - Date of hearing - Held: Date of hearing
F
has normally been defined as the date on which the court
applies its mind to tf1e merits of the case - In a criminal
matter the hearing of the case is said to be commenced by
the Court only when it applie_s its mind to frame a charge etc.
- Similarly, under civil law it is only when the Court actually
G
applies its mind to averments made by party/parties, it can
be considered as hearing of the case - The date of hearing
must not be confused with the expression 'step in the
proceedings' - These are two different concepts of procedural
law and have different connotation and application - What
H
may be a 'step in the proceeding', essentially, may not mean
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
831
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
a 'hearing' by the. Court - Necessary ingredients of 'hearing'
A
thus are application of mind by the court and address by the
party to the suits.
Procedural law - Purpose and interpretation of - Held:
Justice between the parties to a case is the essence of 8
procedural law - Unless the statute expressly prohibits or put
an embargo, the Courts would interpret the procedural law so
as to achieve the ends of justice - Strict construction of a
procedural law is called for where there is complete
extinguishment of rights, as opposed to the cases where
C
discretion is vested in the courts to balance the equities
between the parties to meet the ends of justice which would
invite liberal construction - The provisions of procedural law
which do not provide for penal consequences in default of their
compliance should normally be construed as directory in
0
nature and should receive liberal construction.
A preliminary notification under section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued for acquisition of
land. Th~ Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded
compensation. Aggrieved, the claimants-landowners filed
E
references under section 18 of the Act. The Reference
Court enhanced compensation along with all statutory
benefits. The respondents filed appeal before the High
Court on 12.09.2001. The landowners were on a caveat.
The High Court admitted the appeal on the same day and
F
directed the office to post the same for hearing after the
LCR were received. The appellants filed cross-objections
before the High Court, under Order XLI, Rule 22 of CPC,
along with an application for condonation of delay of 404
days in filing the cross-objections.
G
The High Court dismissed the appeal of the State and
also held that the landowners were entitled to interest
with effect from the date of the award. Against the said
judgment, the State came up in appeal before this Court.
H
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
A
The High Court also dismissed the cross objections
filed by the landowners. The High Court held that it was
clear that on 12.9.2001 itself, the Court thought it
appropriate to hear the appeals out of turn and
accordingly directed the office to post the appeal for
B hearing immediately after the records are received and
that the cross objections were not filed either within one
month from the date of fixing the date of the appeal or
from the date the records of the lower court were received
hy the registry of the court and therefore, the cross
c objectors' contention based on the provisions of Order
XLI Rule 22(1) CPC was misconceived and untenable. The
High Court further held that the explanation offered by the
cross objectors for the delay of 404 days was vague and
did not amount to sufficient cause so as to condone the
0 delay. Against the dismissal of cross objections, the
landowners-cross objectors approached this court by
filing Civil Appeal.
The landowners contended before this court that (i)
the limitation period of one month, prescribe.d under
E Order XLI Rule 22, would not begin to run till an actual
date was fixed for hearing by the High Court and notice
of it was served on the cross objectors, i.e. landowners;
ii) that powers of an appellate Court are very wide under
Order XLI Rule 33 and relief could be granted to the
F landowners even under the said provision; iii) that the
landowners had shown sufficient cause for the delay and
iv) that land of the landowners was compulsorily acquired
and the court was duty bound to award just
compensation to the landowners.
G
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
is a law relating to procedure and procedural law is
always intended to facilitate the process of achieving the
H ends of justice. The Courts would normally favour the
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
833
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
interpretation which will achieve the said object. [Para 19]
A
[852-H; 853-A]
1.2. Order XLI of the CPC deals with appeals from
original decrees. The provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22
gives right to a respondent to file cross-objections to the
8
decree under appeal which he could have taken by way
of an appeal. This right is available to the respondent
provided he had filed such objections in the Appe!late
Court within one month from the date of service on him
or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the
C
appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court
may see fit to allow. [Para 21] [853-G; 854-G-H; 855-A]
1.3. Rule 22 do not provide for any consequences,
leave any adverse consequence, in the event the
respondent-cross objector defaults in filing the cross D
objections within the statutory period of one month. On
the contrary they provide that the cross objections can
be filed within such further time as the Court may see fit
to allow. The expression 'or within such further time as
the court may see fit to allow' clearly shows that wide
E
judicial _discretion is vested in the courts to permit the
filing of the cross-objections even after the expiry of 30
days or for that matter any period which, In the facts and
circumstances of the case, is found to be just and proper
by the Court. [Para 22] [855-8-C]
F
1.4. Rule 22 is not only silent on the consequences
flowing from such default from filing appeal within one
month, from the period fixed hereunder, but it even
clothes the Court with power to take on record the crossobjections even after the expiry of the said period. Thus,
G
right of the cross-objector is not taken away in absolute -
terms in case of such default. The Courts exercise this
power vested in them by virtue of specific language of
Rule 22 itself and thus, its provisions must receive a
liberal construction. [Para 23] [855-D-E]
H
834
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A
1.5. Such provisions should be construed on their
plain meaning and it may not be necessary for the Court
to bring into service other principles of statutory
interpretation. However, the maxim De minimis non curat
lex shall apply to such statutory provisions. [Para 25]
8 [856-B]
Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by LRs. v. Pramod
Gupta (Smt.) (dead) by LRs. and others 2003 (3) SCC 272:
2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 350 and The State of Punjab and
C another v. Sham/al Murari and another (1976) 1 sec 719:
1976 (2) SCR 82 - relied on.
Rashida Begum (since deceased now represented
through LRs) v. Union of India (2001) Delhi Law Times 664
(DB); Union of India v. Jhutter Singh 46 (1992) DLT 364;
D Union of India v. Shibu Ram Mittal 1999 (49) DRJ 166;
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. R. Sethuram
& Anr. AIR 1996 Karnataka 380 and The East India Hotels
Ltd. v. Smt. Mahendra Kumari and another AIR 2008 Raj. 131
- referred to.
E
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn., by
P. St. J. Langan and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 5th
Edn., 2008 - referred to.
2.1. The procedural laws are primarily intended to
F achieve the ends of justice and, normally, not to shut the
doors of justice for the parties at the very threshold.
There is no indefeasible divestment of right of the crossobjector in case of a delay and his rights to file crossobjections are protected even at a belated stage by the
G discretion vested in the Courts. But at the same time, the
Court cannot lose sight of the fact that meaning of 'ends
of justice' essentially refers to justice for all the parties
involved in the litigation. It will be unfair to give an
interpretation to a provision to vest a party with a right
H at the cost of the other, particularly, when statutory
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA 835
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
provisions do not so specifically or even impliedly A
provide for the same. The provisions of Order XLI Rule
22 of the Code are akin to the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963, i.e. when such provisions bar a remedy, by
efflux of time, to one party, it gives consequential benefit
to the opposite party. Before such vested benefit can be
B
taken away, the Court has to strike a balance between
respective rights of the parties on the plain reading of the
statutory provision to meet the ends of justice. If a crossobjector fails to file cross-objections within the stipulated
time, then his right to file cross-objections is taken away c
only in a limited sense. To that extent a benefit is granted
to the other party, i.e. the appellant, of having their appeal
heard without such cross-objections. Still, however, if the
Court is of the opinion that it is just and proper to permit
the filing of cross-objection even after the expiry of the
0
statutory limitation of one month, it is certainly vested
with power to grant the same, but of course, only after
hearing the other party. That is how the rights of the
parties are to be balanced in consonance with the
scheme of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code. [Para 28] [857E
C-H; 858-A]
2.2. The provisions of a statute are normally
construed to achieve the ends of justice, advance the
interest of public and to avoid multiplicity of litigation.
Strict construction of a procedural law is called for where
F
there is complete extinguishment of rights, as opposed
to the cases where discretion is vested in the courts to
balance the equities between the parties to meet the ends
of justice which would invite liberal construction. Under
Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code, cross objections can be G
filed at any subsequent time, even after expiry of statutory
period of one month, as may be allowed by the Court. It
is evidently clear that there is no complete or indefeasible
extinguishment of right to file cross objections after the
expiry of statutory period of limitation provided under the
H
836
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
IA said provision. Cross-objections within the scheme of
Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code are to be treated as
separate appeal and must be disposed of on same
principles in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI
B
of the Code. [Para 32) [858-G-H; 859-A-D]
2.3. The Court is required to give precedence to the
right of a party to put forward its case. Unnecessary and
avoidable technical impediments should not be
introduced by virtue of interpretative process. At the same
C time any irreparable loss should not be caused to a party
on whom the right might have vested as a result of
default of other party. Furthermore, the courts have to
keep in mind the realities of explosion of litigation
because of which the Court normally takes time to
0
dispose of appeals. It would be a travesty of justice, if
after passage of substantial time when the appeal is taken
up for final hearing a cross-objector who was heard and
participated in the hearing at the admission stage itself,
claims that the limitation period for. him to file his crossobjection will commence only from the date of service of
E a fresh notice on him or his pleader, in terms of Order XLI
Rule 22 of the Code. Such an interpretation would
jeopardize the very purpose and object of the statute and
prejudicially affect the administration of justice as the
appeal which has come up for final hearing and disposal
F would again be lost in the bundle of pending cases on
this pretext. It is trite that justice must not only be done
but must also appear to have been done to all the parties
to a /is before the Court. [Para 34] [860-C-F]
G
2.4. Procedural laws, like the Code, are intended to
control and regulate the procedure of judicial
proceedings to achieve the objects of justice and
expeditious disposal of cases. The provisions of
procedural law which do not provide for penal
H consequences in default of their compliance should
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
837
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
normally be construed as directory in nature and should
A
receive liberal construction. The Court should always
keep in mind the object of the statute and adopt an
interpretation which would further such cause in light of
attendant circumstances. To put it simply, the procedural
law must act as a linchpin to keep the wheel of B
expeditious and effective determination of dispute
moving in its place. The procedural checks must achieve
its end object of just, fair and expeditious justice to
parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any of
the·m. [Paras 35, 36] [860-G-H; 861-A-C]
c
Kai/ash v. Nanhku & others (2005) 4 SCC 480: 2005 (3)
SCR 289 and Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah
(1955) 2 SCR 1 - relied on.
Dondapati
Narayana
Reddy
v.
Duggireddy
D
Venkatanarayana Reddy & others 2001 (8) SCC 115 and
Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & others
[(1992) 1 sec 31] - referred to.
Justice G.P. Singh's ·Principles of Statutory E
Interpretation 11th Edn., 2008 and Crawford's Statutory
Construction - referred to.
3. The stipulated period of one month in Order XLI,
Rule 22 of CPC is to commence from the date of service,
on the concerned party or his pleader, of notice of the day
F
fixed for hearing the appeal. A cross-objection may also
be filed within such further time as the Appellate Court
may see fit to allow. [Para 37] [861-C-D]
Date of hearing:
G
4.1. Hearing of the appeal can be classified in two
different stages; one at the admission stage and the other
at the final stage. Date of hearing has normally been
defined as the date on which the court applies its mind
to the merits of the case. If the aooeal is heard er-nart""
H
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A for admission under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code, the
Court could dismiss it at that very stage or admit the
same for regular hearing. Such appeal could be heard in
the presence of the other party at the admission stage
itself, particularly, in cases where a caveat is lodged by
B the respondent to the appeal. [Para 38] [861-E-F]
4.2. The concept of 'hearing by the Court', in fact, has
common application both under Civil and Criminal
jurisprudence. Even in a criminal matter the hearing of the
case is said to be commenced by the Court only when it
C applies its mind to frame a charge etc. Similarly, under
civil law also it is only when the Court actually applies its
mind to averments made by party/parties, it can be
considered as hearing of the case. [Para 39] [861-G-H;
862-A]
D
4.3. The date of hearing must not be confused with
the expression 'step in the proceedings'. These are, two
different concepts of procedural law and have different
connotation and application. What may be a 'step in the
E proceeding', essentially, may not mean a 'hearing' by the
Court. Necessary ingredients of 'hearing' thus are
application of mind by the court and address by the party
to the suits. [Para 40] [862-E-F]
F
Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor1993 (4) SCC
406: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 254 - referred to.
5.1. The primary intention of giving one month's time
and notice to the respondent to file cross-objection is to
give him a reasonable opportunity to file cross-objections
G in the appeal filed by the other party. Filing of crossobjections is not an exclusive but, an alternate remedy
which a party can avail as alternative of filing a separate
appeal in its own right. [Para 41] [862-G-H]
H
5.2. The language of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code
't
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
839
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
fixes the period of limitation to be computed from the date
A
of service of notice of hearing of the appeal upon the
respondent/cross-objector and within one month of such
date he has to file cross objections. Thus, the crucial
point of time is the date on which the notice of hearing
of the appeal is served. This could be ·a notice for actual
B
date of hearing or otherwise. [Para 42) [863-A-BJ
5.3. There appears to be a dual purpose emerging
from the language of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.
Firstly, to grant time of one month or even such further C
time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow; and
secondly, to put the party or his pleader at notice that the
appeal has been admitted and is fixed for hearing and the
Court is going to pronounce upon the rights and
contention of the parties on the merits of the appeal.
Once such notice is served, the period of limitation under D
Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code will obviously start running
from that date. If both these purposes are achieved any
time prior to the service of a fresh notice then it would
be an exercise in futility to issue a separate notice which
is bound to result in inordinate delay in disposal of E
appeals which, in turn, would be prejudicial to the
appellants. A law of procedure should always be
construed to eliminate both these possibilities. [Para 43)
[863-C-E]
6.1. In the present case, the appellant appeared and
argued at the admission stage of the appeal which was
admitted in their presence and an order was also passed
for final hearing. The appellants had also filed caveat in
F
the appeal. In law, the rights of a caveator are different G
from that of cross-objectors per se. In terms of Section
148A of the Code, a caveator has a right to be heard
mandatorily for the purposes of passing of an
interlocutory order. The law contemplates that a caveator
is to be heard by the court before any interim order can
H
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A be passed against him. But in the present case when the
appeal was listed for hearing at the admissjon stage
itself, the appellants had appeared and argued the matter
not only in relation to grant of an interim order but also
on the merits of the appeal. As evident from order dated
B 12-9-2001 of the High Coul'.t, the records were required
to be called for from the lower courts and thereafter, the
appeal was to be heard finally. Though the court had not
actually fixed any particular date, it had directed the
appeal to be listed for hearing. Then again, vide a
c subsequent order, the High Court had directed the
appellant(s) to. move an application for early hearing of
the appeal. On all these occasions, the appellant(s), or his
pleader, was present and participated in the proceedings
before the Court. Thus, the appellant(s) not only had the
0
knowledge of pendency of the appeal but also had notice
of fixing of hearing of the appeal. Even on a further
subsequent date, the High Court took notice of the crossobjection and counsel for the appellant(s)/cross objector
was directed to furnish copies of the cross-objection
E within three weeks to the Additional Advocate General.
After the records from lower courts were received, the
matter was heard and judgment impugned in the present
appeal was pronounced by the High. Court in the year
2003. [Paras 45, 46 and 47] [865-B-H; 866-A-E]
F
6.2. In the circumstances, it is difficult for this Court
to hold that the period of 30 days, as contemplated under
Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code, never commenced even
till final disposal of the appeal. Such an interpretation will
frustrate the very purpose of the Code and would be
G contrary to the legislative intent. The appeal was finally
heard without fixing any particular date and in presence
of the appellant(s). Under such circumstances, the
requirement of fixing a final date separately must be
deemed to be waived by the parties. [Para 48] [866-F-G]
H
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
841
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
7.1. Justice between the parties to a case is the A
essence of procedural law and unless the statute
expressly prohibits or put an embargo, the Courts would
interpret the procedural law so as to achieve the ends of
justice. [Para 54] [869-D]
7.2. If the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the
B
Code are examined in the correct perspective and in light
of the above stated principle, then the period of limitation
of one month stated in Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code
would commence from the service of notice of the day
of hearing of appeal on the respondent in that appeal. The
C
hearing contemplated under Order XLI Rule 22 of the
Code normally is the final hearing of the appeal but this
rule is not without any exception. The exception could be
where a party respondent appears at the time of
admission of the appeal, as a caveator or otherwise and
D
argues the appeal on merits as well as while passing of
interim orders· and the Court has admitted the appeal in
the presence of that party and directs the appeal to be
heard finally on a future date actual or otherwise, then it
has to be taken as complete compliance of the provisions
E
of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code and thereafter, the
appellant who has appeared himself or through his
pleader cannot claim that period mentioned under the
said provision of the Code would commence only when
the respondent is served with a fresh notice of hearing
F
of the appeal in the required format. If this argument is
accepted it would amount to travesty of justice and
inevitably result in delay while causing serious prejudice
to the interest of the parties and administration of justice.
Such interpretation would run contra to the legislative G
intent behind the provisions of Order XLI Rule 11 of the
Code which explicitly contemplate that an appeal shall be
heard expeditiously and disposed of as far as possible
within 60 days at the admission stage. All the provisions
of Order XLI of the Code have to be read conjunctively H
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A to give Order XLI Rule 22 its true and purposive meaning.
[Para 55] [869-E-H; 870-A-C]
7.3. The principles for application of the provisions
of Order XLI Rule 22 are : (a) Respondent in an appeal is
8 entitled to receive a notice of hearing of the appeal as
contemplated under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code; (b)
The limitation of one month for filing the cross-objection
as provided under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code shall
commence from the date of service of notice on him or
C his pleader of the day fixed for hearing the appeal and
(c) Where a respondent in the appeal is a caveator or
otherwise puts in appearance himself and argues the
appeal on merits including for the purposes of interim
order and the appeal is ordered to be heard finally on a
date fixed subsequently or otherwise, in presence of the
D said respondent/caveator, it shall be deemed to be
service of notice within the meaning of Order XLI Rule 22.
In other words the limitation of one month shall start from
that date. [Para 55] [870-C-G]
E
7.4. The cross-objections are required to be filed
within the period of one month from the date of service
of such notice or within such further time as the
Appellate Court may see fit to allow depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the given case. Since the
F provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 Qf the Code itself provide
for extension of. time, the Courts would normally be
inclined to condone the delay in the interest of justice
unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish
a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of
G the Court to file cross-objections beyond the statutory
period of one month. [Paras 56, 57] (870-H; 871-A-B]
7.5. The· instant case falls squarely within the
principles formulated in clause (c). The appellant(s) herein
were caveators before the High Court and they were
H heard not only while passing of interim orders but the
MAHADEV GOVlND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
843
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
appeal itself was admitted in their presence. Further, the
A
Court directed that the records from lower court be called
and after receipt of such record the appeal was directed
to be listed for final disposal. Thus, the cross-objector
not merely had the knowledge of pendency of the appeal
and order of the High Court for its final disposal but he
B
actually participated at all the stages of the proceedings
before that Court, i.e. at the stage of admission of appeal,
passing of interim orders and variation thereof and at the
stage of consideration of application of the crossobjector, moved for early hearing of the appeal and, in c
fact, the appeal had been directed to be heard finally in
his presence. Thus, in these circumstances, one month
of prescribed period in terms of Order XLI Rule 22 of the
Code shall commence from 12th September, 2001, i.e. the
· date on which the High Cou.rt ordered that the appeal
0
may be listed for hearing. [Para 58] [871-C-F]
7.6. As the period for filing the cross objection had
long expired, the application for condonation of delay was
filed. The appellants in this Court themselves admitted
that they had received the notice of the appeal through
E
their counsel and the period of one month came to an
end on 12th October, 2001. This submission has been
made in the affidavit annexed to the application filed by
the cross-objector before the High Court under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, along with the crossF
objections, praying for condonation of delay and leave
of that Court to file their cross-objections beyond the
statutory period of one month as provided in Order XLI
Rule 22 of the Code. [Para 59] [871-G-H; 872-A-B]
7.7. Delay was sought to be condoned on the ground G
that the appellants have appeared before the Court and
despite receipt of the notice of final hearing they could
not file cross-objections within the prescribed time as
they were out of their native place and have gone H
844
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
A elsewhere to earn their livelihood and they could not
therefore receive the letter and that too within one month.
Later, the appellant fell down and his leg was twisted and
because of swelling and pain he was not able to drive and
consult his counsel. It is only after he got well, he met his
8 counsel and filed the cross-objections on 19th
November, 2002, i.e. after a delay of 404 days. The High
Court did not find any merit in the reasons shown for
condonation of delay and dismissed the said application.
Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code itself provides a discretion
c to the Appellate Court to grant further time to the crossobjector for the purposes of filing cross-objections
provided the cross-objector shows sufficient or
reasonable cause for his inability to file the crossobjections within the stipulated perio~ of one month
0
from the date of receipt of the notice of hearing of appeal.
No specific reasons have been recorded by the High
Court in the impugned judgment as to why the said
averments did not find favour and was disbelieved. There
is nothing on record to rebut these averments made by
E the cross-objector. [Para 60] [872-C-F]
7.8. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, to do complete justice between the parties, the
landowner's appeal is allowed by setting aside the order
of the High Court, limited to the extent that the appellants
F have been able to show sufficient/reasonable cause for
grant of further time to file the cross objections beyond
the period of one month in terms of Order XLI Rule 22 of
the Code. This approach could even be adopted without
the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which
G provisions may also find application to such matters. The
appellants were entitled to file cross-objections by grant
of further time be.fore the High Court. Delay in filing the
cross-objections is thus condoned. The High Court has
therefore to hear afresh the appeal of the State as also
H the cross objections of the landowners. In that view of
. MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
845
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA
the matter, there is no need of passing a separate order A
on the appeal filed by the State before this Court and the
same is thus disposed of. [Paras 61 and 62] [872-G-H;
873-A-C]
· The East India Hotels Limited v. Smt. Mahendra Kumari
8
AIR 2008 Raj. 131 - distinguished.
Pra/had & others v. State of Maharashtra and another
2010 (10) sec 458: 2010 (1"1) SCR 916 - relied on.
Sa/em Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union
of India (2003) 1 SCC 49: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 353; Sushi/
Kumar Sabharwal v. Gurpreet Singh & others 2002 (5) SCC
377: 2002 (3) SCR 352; Rashida Begum (since deceased
now represented through LRs) v. Union of India (2001) Delhi
Law Times 664 (DB); Union of India v. Jhutter Singh 46
(1992) DLT 364 and Mutyam Agaiah v. Special Deputy
Collector, (NTPC) L.A. Unit. 2002 (2) ALT 715 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(2001) Delhi Law
referred to Paras 15, 49
Times 664 (DB)
(1992) DLT 364
referred to Paras 15, 49
1999 (49) DRJ 166
referred to Para 15
AIR 1996 Karnataka 380
referred to Para 17
AIR 2008 Raj. 131
referred to Para 18
2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 350 relied on
Para 19
1976 (2) SCR 82
relied on
Para 20
2005 (3) SCR 289
relied on
Para 27 ·
(1955) 2 SCR 1
relied on
Para 30
(1992) 1 sec 31
referred to Para 31
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011) 8 S.C.R.
2001 (8) sec 115
referred to Para 32
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 254 referred to Para 39
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 353 referred to Para 44
2002 (3) SCR 352
referred to Para 45
AIR 2008 Raj. 131
distinguished Para 49
2002 (2) ALT 715
referred to Para 50
2010 (11) SCR 916
relied on
Para 53
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal NO.
5094 of 2005.
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.10.2003 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in MFA CROB No. 201 of
D 2002 in MFA No. 3279 of 2001.
WITH
C.A. No. 5113 of 2005.
Kiran Suri, S.J. Amith, Syed Tabinda, Sanjay R. Hegde,
E V.N. Raghupathy for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GANGULY, J. 1. Interesting questions involving
interpretation of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code
F (hereinafter "CPC") fall for decision in this case in which the
relevant facts are that a· preliminary notification under section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act') was issued on 24.4.1997, for acquisition of land
in Survey No. 616/1/1 measuring 2 acres 29 guntas and in
G Survey No. 616/18/1 measuring 1 acre 2 guntas. The award
was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on
13.04.1999; he considered the land acquired to be dry land and
fixed compensation amount at the rate of Rs.31,650/- per acre.
H
2. Aggrieved, the claimants (landowners) filed references
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
84 7
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
under section 18 of the Act. The Reference Court enhanced
A
compensation to Rs.3,50,000/- per acre, along with all statutory
benefits.
3. The respondents filed an appeal against the judgment
of the Reference Court to the High Court of Karnataka on
8
12.09.2001. The landowners were on a caveat. The High Court
admitted the appeal on the same day and directed the office
to post the same for hearing immediately after LCR were
received.
On 19.11.2002, the appellants filed cross-objections C
before the High Court, under Order XLI, Rule 22 of CPC, along
with an application for condonation of delay of 404 days in filing
the cross-objections.
·
4. On 22.10.2003, the High Court, vide the first impugned o
judgment, dismissed the appeal of the State holding that the
point for consideration in the appeal was squarely covered by
the judgment of that court dated 12.8.2003 in M.F.A. No. 3278
of 2001, as a result of which the appeal was liable to be
dismissed. The High Court also held that the landowners were
E
entitled to interest with effect from the date of the award, i.e.
from 13.4.1999. Against the said judgment, the State came up
in the present appeal before this court i.e. Civil Appeal No.
5113 of 2005.
5. On the same day, the High Court, vide the second
F
impugned judgment, also dismissed the cross objections filed
by the landowners. In the appeal dismissing the cross
objections, two points came up for consideration before the
High Court:
(i}
Whether the limitation period of one month
prescribed under Order XLI Rule 22 (1) of CPC
shall run from 12.9.2001 as contended by learned
government advocate or from the date of service
G
. of notice of date of hearing of appeal fixed by the
H
848
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2011) 8 S.C.R.
court, as contended by the learned advocate of the
landowner.
(ii)
If the limitation of one month prescribed under
Order XLI Rule 22(1) of CPC did not begin to run
B
with effect from 12.9.2001, whether the alternative
argument by way of explanation offered by the cross
objectors would constitute 'sufficient cause'
warranting condonation of delay in filing the cross
objection?
c
6. The High Court stated that the Division Bench had
admitted the appeal on 12.9.2001 and had also stayed the
operation of the impugned award subject to the land acquisition
officer depositing 50% of the enhanced compensation with
statutory benefits. On the same day, the Division Bench had
D directed the office to list the appeal for final hearing after the
records were· received. Accordingly, the office called for the
records and they were received by the office. Subsequently, on
25.1.2002, the Division Bench permitted the cross objectors
to move for an early hearing of the appeal. It held as follows:
E
F
G
H
"Therefore, it is quite clear that on 12.9.2001 itself, the
Division Bench thought it appropriate to hear the appeals
out of turn and accordingly directed the office to post the
appeal for hearing immediately after the records are
received. The submission of Sri Kalagi that since the
Division Bench did not fix ;:i particular date for final hearing
of the appeal, it would not satisfy the requirement of Order
XU Rule 22(1) CPC, is not acceptable to us. We can take
judicial notice of the fact that quite often courts direct the
final hearing of the matters out of turn or in regular course
without fixing a specific date for final hearing of cases.
Once an order is made by the court for final hearing, the
registry, in compliance with the direction and having regard
to the workload of the court concerned, would post cases
for final hearing. Therefore, it could not be said that the
MAHADEV GOVIND GHARGE v. SPL. LAO UPPER KRISHNA
849
PROJECT JAMKHANDI, KARNATAKA [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
Division Bench did not direct final hearing of the appeal
A ·
on 12.9.2001. The language implied by the Division Bench
would go to show that the High Court wanted the registry
to post the appeal for final hearing out of turn immediately
after the records were received. It is quite apparent from
the records that the cross objection was not filed either
B
within one month from the date of fixing the date of the
appeal or from the date the records of the lower court were
received by the registry of this court. Therefore, the cross
objectors' contention based on the provisions of Order XU
Rule 22(1) CPC is misconceived and untenable."
c
7. On the second point, the High Court was of the opinion
that the explanation offered by the cross objectors for the delay
of 404 days was vague and did not amount to sufficient cause
so as to condone the delay. Consequently, the cross objections
0
were dismissed.
8, Thus, the landowners (cross objectors) approached this
court by filing Civil Appeal No. 5094 of 2005 against the
impugned judgment of the High Court.
9. Both the appeals were heard together by this Court.
10. Before this court, the landowners in their appeal (Civil
Appeal No. 5094 of 2005), raised the following contentions:
E
a.
The limitation period of one month, prescribed
F
under Order XLI Rule 22, would not begin to run till
b.
an actual date was fixed for hearing by the High
Court and notice of it was served on the cross
objectors, i.e. landowners.
G
Powers of an Appellate Court are very wide under
Order XLI Rule 33 and relief could be granted to
the landowners even under the said provision.
c.
The landowners had shown sufficient cause for the
delay.
H
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2011] 8 S.C.R.
A
d.
Land of the landowners was compulsorily acquired
and the court was duty bound to award just
compensation to the landowners.
11. The State, in its appeal (Civil Appeal No. 5113 of
8 2005), contended as follows:
a.
The High Court wrongly dismissed the appeal by
relying on M.F.A. No.