# 9 S.C.R. 1012 RA.llV SARIN & ANR v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND & ORS - **Citation:** [2011] 9 S.C.R. 1012 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2011-08-09 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4772 of 1998 - **Bench:** S.H. Kapadia, Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, K. S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar, Anil R. Dave - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/9-s-c-r-1012-ra-llv-sarin-anr-v-state-of-utiarakhand-ors-27885 - **Pages:** 50 ## Headnote C KUMAUN AND UTTARAKHAND ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT, 1960: Sections 4, 4-A(as amended by U.P. Act 15 of 1978), 8, 18(1) and 19(1)(b) - Forest land- Vesting of, in the State - ' of Held: By virtue of s. 4-A of the Act, the rights, title and interest ~ D of every hissedar in respect of forest land situated in the specified areas ceased with effect from 1.1.1978 and the same were vested in the State Government - Rule 41 of KUZALR Rules provides that forests belonging to State shall be managed by "Gaon Sabha or any other local authority, E established" upon a notification issued by the State - So, where the land acquired by the State is to be transferred to a Gaon SabhaNillage Panchayat for its management and use of land leading to betterment of village economy, the ' legislation is in the nature of agrarian reforms - It is settled • F /aw that agrarian reforms fall within Entry 18 of List-II read with Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Validity of KUZALF~ Act and, particularly, ss. 4-A, 18(1) and 19(1)(b)thereof is upheld- Constitution of India, 1950-Article 254, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 18 read with Entry 42 of G List Ill - Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Rules, 1965 - r.41. CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Article 254 (2), Seventh Schedule, List II Entry 18 read H 1012 ... RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1013 ..--., ' _. with List Ill Entry 42 - KUZALR Act providing for vesting of A forest land in State Government - Held: KUZALR Act is an enactment for agrarian reforms and principally relatable to Entry 18 (land) of List II read with Entry 42 in List Ill and only -( incidentally trenches upon "forest" i.e. Entry 17-A of list Ill - ' Indian Forest Act, 1927 is relatable to Entry 17-A read with B Entry 42, both of List Ill and is in pith and substance relatable to Entry 17-A, as it deals with 'forests' and not with land and only incidentally spills over in the field of Entry 42 as it deals with "control over forest land and not property of the Government"-lndian Forest Act, 1927 does not deal with c agrarian reforms, but deals with forest policy and management and, therefore, is in a different field - Consequently, in the instant matter, no case of repugnancy f is made out and Article 254 (2) has no application - Accordingly, both the Acts are legally valid and constitutional D - Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960- Rule of repugnancy- Doctrine of pith and substance - Doctrine of occupied field. Article 300-A, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 18 and List Ill, Entry 42 --Acquisition and requisitioning of property - E Compensation - Private forests - Vesting of forest land in State by virtue of s. 4-A of KUZALR Act - Held: When State '> exercises the power of acquisition of a private property, ., provision is ge~erally made in the statute to pay· compensation to be determined according to the criteria laid F down in the statute itself - In the instant case, acquisition of property by State in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the community - It does not require payment of market value or indemnification to the owner of the property expropriated - G ~ The acquisition and payment of amount are part of the same scheme and they cannot be separated - Though adequacy of compensation cannot be questioned in a court of law, but at the same time the compensation cannot be illusory. H' 1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 9 S.C.R. .~ A Article 300-A read with Article 226 - Private forests - ,_ , Vesting of fomst land in StatE1 - Compensation - Revenue authorities denying compensation stating that the KUZALR Act did not provide for a method to compute compensation in cases whern no income was derived from the forests - Held: g Awarding no compensation attracts the vice of illegal deprivation of property even in the light of the provisions of the Act and, there ## Text _Characters 0–39,900 of 98,960. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39900 for what follows._ A B [20'11] 9 S.C.R. 1012 RA.llV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 4772 of 1998) AUGUST 9, 2011. [S.H. KAPADIA, C.11, DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, SWATANTER KUMAR AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.] C KUMAUN AND UTTARAKHAND ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT, 1960: Sections 4, 4-A(as amended by U.P. Act 15 of 1978), 8, 18(1) and 19(1)(b) - Forest land- Vesting of, in the State - ' of Held: By virtue of s. 4-A of the Act, the rights, title and interest ~ D of every hissedar in respect of forest land situated in the specified areas ceased with effect from 1.1.1978 and the same were vested in the State Government - Rule 41 of KUZALR Rules provides that forests belonging to State shall be managed by "Gaon Sabha or any other local authority, E established" upon a notification issued by the State - So, where the land acquired by the State is to be transferred to a Gaon SabhaNillage Panchayat for its management and use of land leading to betterment of village economy, the ' legislation is in the nature of agrarian reforms - It is settled • F /aw that agrarian reforms fall within Entry 18 of List-II read with Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Validity of KUZALF~ Act and, particularly, ss. 4-A, 18(1) and 19(1)(b)thereof is upheld- Constitution of India, 1950-Article 254, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 18 read with Entry 42 of G List Ill - Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Rules, 1965 - r.41. CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Article 254 (2), Seventh Schedule, List II Entry 18 read H 1012 ... RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1013 ..--., ' _. with List Ill Entry 42 - KUZALR Act providing for vesting of A forest land in State Government - Held: KUZALR Act is an enactment for agrarian reforms and principally relatable to Entry 18 (land) of List II read with Entry 42 in List Ill and only -( incidentally trenches upon "forest" i.e. Entry 17-A of list Ill - ' Indian Forest Act, 1927 is relatable to Entry 17-A read with B Entry 42, both of List Ill and is in pith and substance relatable to Entry 17-A, as it deals with 'forests' and not with land and only incidentally spills over in the field of Entry 42 as it deals with "control over forest land and not property of the Government"-lndian Forest Act, 1927 does not deal with c agrarian reforms, but deals with forest policy and management and, therefore, is in a different field - Consequently, in the instant matter, no case of repugnancy f is made out and Article 254 (2) has no application - Accordingly, both the Acts are legally valid and constitutional D - Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960- Rule of repugnancy- Doctrine of pith and substance - Doctrine of occupied field. Article 300-A, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 18 and List Ill, Entry 42 --Acquisition and requisitioning of property - E Compensation - Private forests - Vesting of forest land in State by virtue of s. 4-A of KUZALR Act - Held: When State '> exercises the power of acquisition of a private property, ., provision is ge~erally made in the statute to pay· compensation to be determined according to the criteria laid F down in the statute itself - In the instant case, acquisition of property by State in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the community - It does not require payment of market value or indemnification to the owner of the property expropriated - G ~ The acquisition and payment of amount are part of the same scheme and they cannot be separated - Though adequacy of compensation cannot be questioned in a court of law, but at the same time the compensation cannot be illusory. H' 1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 9 S.C.R. .~ A Article 300-A read with Article 226 - Private forests - ,_ , Vesting of fomst land in StatE1 - Compensation - Revenue authorities denying compensation stating that the KUZALR Act did not provide for a method to compute compensation in cases whern no income was derived from the forests - Held: g Awarding no compensation attracts the vice of illegal deprivation of property even in the light of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction - The intention of the legislature to pay compensation is abundantly clear from the fact that s. 19 itself prescribes that c compensation payable to a hissedar uls 12 shall, in the case of private forest, be eight times the amount of average annual income from such forest - In the instant case, income also includes possible income in case of persons who have not exploited the forest and have rather preserved it - In fact, the • D persons who are maintaining the forest and preserving it for future and posterity cannot be penalised by giving nil compensation - The Assistant Collector is directed to determine and award compensation to the owners of the property by following a reasonable and intelligible criterion E evolved on the guidelines provided and in the light of the law enunciated in the judgment-· The owners will also be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum on the compensation amount from the date of handover/physical possession of the State till the date of payment - Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 - ss. 18 and 19 - ~ F Judicial review. INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTION: Entries in the three lists of Seventh Schedule to the G Constitution of India - HELD: The entries being the filed of legislation must receive liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit. The appellants were served with a notice under Rule 2 of the ~:umaun and Ut:tarakhand Zamindari Abolition H and Land Reform Rules, 1965 intimating them that RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1015 effective from 1.1.1978, the rights, title and interest of A hissedar in respect of 1600 acres of their forest land (property in question) had vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The objections filed by the appellants challenging the vires of the . Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land B Reform Act, 1960 (KUZALR Act) and stating that no profit was being made from the property in question, were rejected by the Assistant Collector holding that he had no jurisdiction to consider the validity of the Act and that since the Act did not provide for a method to compute c compensation in cases where no income was derived form the forests, the appellants were not entitled to any compensation. The landowners filed a writ petition before the High Court questioning the legality and validity of the order of the Assistant Collector and also challenging the 0 constitutional validity of ss.4-A, 18(1 )(cc) and 19(1 )(b) of KUZALR Act. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The land owners filed the instant appeal contending that the provisions of s. 18(1)(cc) and s.19(1)(b) of KUZALR Act as amended by the UP Amendment Act, E 1978 were repugnant to ss.37 and 84 of the Indian Forest Act 1927, in so far as no compensation was provided under the U.P. Amendment Act, 1978 for private forests which were preserved and protected through prudent. management, while a private forest to which s. 36 of the F Indian Forest Act, 1927 applied and which was neglected or mismanaged, could be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by paying market value and solatium. The question for consideration before the Court G was: whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appellants were not entitled to any compensation even when their forest land was acquired by the government, merely because the appellants had not derived any income from the said forest. H 1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 By a Gazette Notification dated 21.12.1977 u/s 4-A of the Kumaun arid Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 as amended by the 8 U.P. Act No. 15 of 1978, the' rights, title and interest of every hissedar in respect o1f forest land situated in the specified areas ceased with effect from 1.1.1978 and the same were vested in the State Government. [para 2) [1027-C-D] C 1.2 It is settled law that agrarian reforms fall within Entry 18 of List-II read witlh Entry 42 of List-Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules, 1965 declarEis that the forests belonging to the State shall be managed by "Goan Sabha or any D other local a.uthority established" upon a notification issued by the State Government. This being so, it clearly brings out that the vestin!9 of forest land under the KUZALR Act is directly linke'd with the agrarian reforms, as the land as also the fore:;t are managed by the Goan E Sabha or any local authority dealing with the rights of villagers for betterment of village economy. So, where the land acquired by the State is; to be transferred to a Goan Sabha I Village Panchayat f'or its management and use of land leading to betterm1rnt of village economy, the F legislation is in the nature of agrarian reforms. [paras 17, 20 and 21] [1032-G; 1033-E-F; 1034-F·G] Ranjit Singh and Others \Is. State of Punjab and Others [1965) 1 SCR 82 - relied on. G 1.3 It is true that s.4A. of KUZALR Act, 1960, as amended by the UP Amendment Act 1978, provides that Chapter II and Chapter V of !the KUZALR Act would apply mutatis mutandls and Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules is relatable to Chapter IV of th1e KUZALR Act. However, the H necessary consequence of s.4A of the KUZALR Act is RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1017 ~ that the forest land vests in the State and all that Rule 41 A of the KUZALR Rules does is to provide how the lands vested in the State including forest and non-forest land . is to be dealt with. Thus, Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules clearly applies to forest lands as well, which are vested i in the State u/s 4A of the KUZALR Act and, therefore, B • have become the land/property of the State, which would be managed by the Goan Sabha. [para 23] [1035-E-H] Re12ugnanc~ and Article 254 of the Constitution 2.1 It is trite law that the plea of repugnancy would c be attracted only if both the legislations i.e. one made by Parliament and the other by the State Legislature, fall - " under the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Repugnancy between the two statutes would arise if there is a direct conflict between the two D provisions and the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same fie\d. Therefore, whenever the issue of repugnancy between the law passed by Parliament and of State legislature are raised, it becomes quite necessary to examine as to E whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject matter or different. [Para 28) [1037-C-G] ' " 2.2 It is by now a well-established rule of interpretation that the entries in the three lists of the F Seventh Schedule being fields of legislation, must receive liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not a narrow or pedantic approach. [para 29] [1037-G-H; 1038-A] Navinchandra Mafat/al v. C/T1955 SCR 829=AIR1955 G SC 58 and State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah 2008 (12) SCR 1083 = (2008) 13 sec 5 - relied on. 2.3 For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement, which is to be H 1018 SUPREME COURT Rf:PORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R. A fulfilled: firstly, there has to /be a "repugnancy" between the Central and the State Acts; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent. The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of the both legislations B and whether· such dominamt intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. [para 38] [1041-D-F] 2.4 A provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered b:v the provision of the ·other C legislation, but such partial 1or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. Thus, in order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations must be substantially on the same D subject. While considering the issue of repugnancy what is required to be considered is the legislation in question as a whole and its main object and purpose, and while doing so incidental encroa1::hment is to be ignored and E disregarded. [para 35 and ~18] [1040-G; 1041-E-F] 2.5 Repugnancy in the context of Article 254 of the Constitution is understo.od as. requiring the .fulfillment of a "Triple test", reiterated by the Constitution Bench in Karunanidhi's case, namel3r, (i) that there is a clear and F direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act; (ii) that such an inconsistency is absolutely Irreconcilable; and (iii) that 'the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such nature as to bring the two Acts into direct cc111ision with each other and a G situation js reached wherE1 it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. The two legislations .must cover the same field. This has to be examined by a reference to the doctrine 1r.if pith and substance. [Paras 39-40] [1041-G; 1042-A-D] H ., • RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1019 . ·- _,\ M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, 1979 ( 3 ) SCR 254 = A (1979) 3 sec 431 - relied on 2.6 As and when there is a challenge to the legislative competence, the courts will try to ascertain the pith and i substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the Act in B ·~ question. In this process, it would also be necessary for the courts to examine the true nature and character of the enactment, its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the enactment in question is genuinely referable to a field of the legislation allotted to the respective c legislature under the constitutional scheme. Thus, whether on account of the exhaustive code doctrine or whether on account of irreconcilable conflict concept, the , " real test is that would there be a room or possibility for both the Acts to apply. Repugnancy would follow only if there is no such room or possibility. [para 30 and 50) D [1035-C-E; 1048-B] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 589; Hoechst harmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1983 (3) seR 130 = (1983) 4 sec 45; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti E Lal Shah, 2008 (12) SCR 1083 = (2008) 13 SCC 5; and Govt. of A.P. v. J.B. Educational Society, 2005 (2 ) seR 302 = ,. (2005) 3 sec 212 - referred to. 2.7 KUZALR Act is a law principally relatable to Entry F 18 (land) of List II read with Entry 42 in List Ill of the Seventh Schedule and only incidentally trenches upon "forest" i.e. Entry 17 A/List-Ill of the Seventh Schedule. This is so because it is an enactment for agrarian reforms and so the basic subject matter is "land". Since the land happens to be forest land, it spills over and incidentally G ; encroaches on Entry 17A i.e. "forest" as well. On the other hand, the Central Act i.e. the Indian Forests Act 1927 is relatable to Entry 17A read with entry 42, both of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule. It is in pith and substance relatable to Entry 17A, as it deals with "forests" and not H 1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C;R. . - '- A with "land" or any other subject. It only incidentally spills over in the field of Entry 42, as it deals with "control over forest land and not property of the Government" and in that context s.37, as an alternative to management of forests u/s. 36 of the Indian Forest Act 1927, deals with B the grant of power to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. [para 32) [1039-8-E] Glanrock Estate Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 2010 (12) SC:R 597 = (2010) 10 SCC 96 - referred to. c 2.8 It is quite clear that the KUZALR Act relates to agrarian reforms and, there1fore, it deals with the "land"; however, the Indian Forests Act 1927 deal with "forests" and its management, pres~~rvation and levy of royalty/ ~ ' fees on forest produce. KU~~LR Act further provides for D statutory vesting, i.e., statutory taking over of property of hissedar, which happens to be 1st January 1978, i.e. the statutorily fixed date. Therefore, this forest land becomes the property of the State Government and is dealt with like land, which is acquired u/s 4A of KUZALR Act. This E emerges from a reading o1f r. 41 of the KUZALR Rules itself. Further, the acquisiticm under the KUZALR Act is a case of "tak.ing" upon payment of an amount, which is not intended to be the mark1et price of the rights acquired. On the other hand, the power of acquisition u/s 37 of the F Indian Forests Act 1927 Ac:t is an acquisition based on the principles of public f)Urpose and compensation. Thus, not only do the two Acts relate to different subject matters, but the acquisitions mentioned therein are conceptually different. [paras 34 and 35) [1040-8-E] G 2.9 In fact, it is the UP Private Forest Act, 1948, which Is an enactment relatable to Entry 17 A of List Ill, i.e., ~ 'forests', read with Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, i.e., acquisition to the extent of "vested" forests. It is this Act which covers a field H similar to that of the Central Act and, therefore, sought RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1021 . - J and obtained the permission of the President u/s. 76 of A the Government of India Act Thus, in the State, there are two Acts, which are applica le viz. the UP Private Forests Act, 1948, which is in the same field as the Indian Forest ~ Act 1927 and the KUZALR Act, which is in respect of a different subject matter. [para 36~7] [1040-H; 1041-A-C] B 2.10 KUZALR Act deals with agrarian reforms and in the context deals with the private forests and vests the same with the State and such private forests would, therefore, be managed by the Goan Sabha. The Indian c Forest Act, 1927 has nothing to do with agrarian reforms but deals with forest policy and management, and, therefore, is in a different field. Further, there is no direct ~ conflict or collision, as the Indian Forest Act, 1927 only \ gives an enabling power to the government to acquire forests in accordance with the provisions of the Land D Acquisition Act 1894, whereas KUZALR Act results in vesting of forests from the dates specified in s. 4A of the KUZALR Act. Consequently, it could be deduced that none of the three conditions is attracted to the facts of the instant case. [para 40) [1042-D-G] E 2.11 It is, thus, crystal clear that in the instant matter, ) no case of repugnancy is made out, as both the Indian .. Forest Act, 1927 and the KUZALR Act operate in two different and distinct fields. Accordingly, both the Acts are F legally valid and constitutional. That being so, there was no requirement of obtaining any Presidential assent. Consequently, Article 254(2) of the Constitution has also no application in the instant case. [para 51] [1048-C-D] .. Gram Panchayat Jamalpur v. Ma/winder Singh 1985 (2) G i Suppl. SCR 28 = (1985) 3 SCC 661; P.N. Krishna Pal v. State of Kera/a, 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 526 = (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 187; and Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North), (2002) 8 SCC 182 - H referred to. - 1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A Article 300-A of the Constitution and Compensation: 3.1 The incident of deprivcltion of property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution normally occurred mostly in the context of public purpose. Any law 8 which deprives a pe_rson of his private property for private interest, will be amenable to judicial review. With regard to claiming compensation, all modern constitutions which are invariably of democratic character provide for payment of comp1ensation as the condition to exercise the right of expropriation. Under Indian C Constitution, the field of legislation covering claim for compensation on deprivation of one's property can be traced to Entry 42 List Ill of the Seventh Schedule. The Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 deleted Entry 33 - List I, Entry 36 List II and rewc>rded Entry 42 List Ill relating D to "acquisition and requisiticining of property". The right to property being no more a fundamental right, a legislation enacted under the authority of law as provided in Article 300A of the Constitution is not amenable to judicial review merely for alleged violation of Part Ill of the E Constitution. [paras 61-63] ['1055-B-G] I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu 2007 (1) SCR 706 = (2007) 2 SCC 1 - referred to . . 3.2 The Government is empowered to acquire land F by exercising its various statutory powers. Acquisition of land and thereby deprivation1 of property is possible and permissible in accordance with the statutory framework enacted. Artic:le 31 (2) of the Constitution has since been repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act 1978. G It is to be noted that Articl1e 300A was inserted by the Constitution (44th Amendm1ent) Act, 1978 by practically reinserting Article 31 (1) of the Constitution. Therefore, right to property is no long1er a fundamental right but a right envisaged and conferred by the Constitution. [paras H 67-68] [1057-E-H; 1058-A-B] \ RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1023 ....I 3.3 When the State exercises the power of acquisition A of a private property thereby depriving the private person of the property, provision is generally made in the statute to pay compensation to be fixed or determined according to the criteria laid down in the statute itself. It must be· • understood in this context that the acquisition of the •' -· B property by the State in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the community including acquisition and taking possession of private property for public purpose. It does not require payment of market value or c indemnification to the owner of the property expropriated. Payment of market value in lieu of acquired property is " not a condition precedent or sine qua non for acquisition. It must be clearly understood that the acquisition and .. payment of amount are part of the same scheme and they D cannot be separated. It is true that the adequacy of compensation cannot be questioned in a court of law, but at the same time the compensation cannot be illusory. [para 68] [1058-C-G] 3.4 Section 12 of the KUZALR Act, 1960 states that E every hissedar whose rights, title or interest are acquired u/s. 4, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation. Further, s. 4A of the KUZALR Act makes ~ it clear that the provisions of Chapter II {Acquisition and Modifications of existing rights in Land), including s.12, F shall apply mutatis mutandis to a forest land as they apply to a khaikhari land. Further, the intention of the legislature to pay compensation is abundantly clear from the fact that s. 19 itself prescribes that the compensation payable to a hissedar u/s. 12 shall, in the case of private G } forest, be eight times the amount of average annual ·income from such forest. In the instant case, income also includes possible income in case of persons who have not exploited the forest and have rather preserved it. Otherwise, it would amount to giving a licence to owners/ H ', 1024 SUPREME COURT R:EPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A persons to exploit forests and get huge return of income and not to maintain and pre!serve it. The same cannot be said to be the intention of the legislature in enacting the KUZALR Act. In fact, the per!sons who are maintaining the forest and preserving it for future and posterity cannot 8 be penalised by giving nil c<>mpensation only because of the reason that they in fact chose to maintain the forest instead of exploiting it. [para 69] [1058-H; 1059-A-E] c Ganga Devi v. State of UP. 1972 (3) SCR 431 = (1972) 3 sec 126 - held inapplicable. 3.5 As mandated by Article 300A, a person can be deprived of his property but in a just, fair and reasonable manner. In an appropriate 1case the court may find 'nil compensation' also justified and fair if it is found that the o State has undertaken to ta••e over the liability and also has assured to compensate in a just and fair manner. But the situation would be totally different if it is a case of 'no compensation' at all. [para "70] [1059-H; 1060-A-B] 3.6 A law seeking to a1cquire private property for E public purpose cannot say tlhat 'no compensation' would be paid. The instant case is a case of payment of 'no compensation' at all. In the 1case at hand, the forest land which was vested on the State by operation of law cannot be said to be non-productive or unproductive by F any stretch of imagination. 1'he property in question was definitely a productive asset. That being so, the criteria to determine possible incc1me on the date of vesting would be to ascertain such compensation paid to similarly situated owners of neighbouring forests on the G date of vesting. Even otherwise, revenue authority can always make an estimation of possible income on the date of vesting, if the property in question had been exploited by the appellants and then calculate compensation on the basis thereof in terms of ss. 18(1) H (cc) and 19(1) (b) of KUZAL.~~ Act. [para 70] [1060-B-E] RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1025 3.7 Awarding no compensation attracts the vice of A illegal deprivation of property even in the light of the . provisions of the Act and, therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction. [para 70] [1060-E] 4.1 The validity of the KUZALR Act and particularly 8 of ss. 4A, 18(1) (cc) and 19 (1) (b) thereof is upheld. The Assistant Collector is directed to determine and award compensation to the appellants by following a reasonable and intelligible criterion evolved on the guidelines provided and in light of the law enunciated by this Court C in the instant judgment. The appellants will also be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum on the compensation amount from the date of dispossession till the date of ~ payment provided the possession of the forest was handed and taken over formally by the respondent physically and provided the appellant was totally D deprived of physical possession of the forest. However, it is clarified that in case the physical/actual j>ossession has not been handed over by the appellants to the State government or has been handed over at some subsequent date i.e. after the date of vesting, the interest E on the compensation amount would be payable only from the date of actual handover/physical possession of the property in question and not from the date of vesting. ' [para 72] [1060-G-H; 1061-A-D] j Case Law Reference: [1965] 1 SCR 82 1955 SCR 829 2008 (12) SCR 1083 2010 (12) SCR 597 1979 (3) SCR 254 1983 (3) SCR 130 relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on referred to para 22 para 29 para 29 para 33 para 39 para 42 F G H A B c 1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 3 sec 589 2005 (2) SCR 302 referred to referred to 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 28 referred to 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 52Ei referred to (2002) 8 sec 182 referred to referred to [2011) 9 S.C.R. para 43 para 44 para 52 para 52 para 55 para 63 2007 (1) SCR 706 1972 (3) SCR 431 held inapplicable para 66 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4772 of 1998. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.1997 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 8927 D of 1988. E F K.K. Venugopal, E.C. Agrawala, Rishi Agrawala, Mahesh Agarwal, Shyam Mohan, Neha Agarwal, Sunil Murarka, Radhika Gautam for the Appellants. Parag P. Tripathi, ASG, S.R. Singh, Rachna Srivastava, Kunal Bahri, Avneesh Arputhaim, Mahima Gupta, Manoj K. Dwivedi and Gunnam Venkateswara Rao for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. MUKlJNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. The present Civil Appeal emanates from the judgment and order dated 12th August 1997 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in VVrit Petition No. 8927 of 1988, whereby the G Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants. Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appellants were not entitled to any compensation even when their forest land is acquired by the government, merely because the appellants had not derived any H income from the said forest, is one of the several important L • \ RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1027 [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.] ;..,,j questions of law which has arisen for consideration in the A present appeal. 2. The appellant's father Shri P. N. Sarin had in the year 1945 acquired proprietary right in an Estate known as Beni Tai ~ Fee Simple Estate situated in Pargana Chandpur, Tehsil Karan B f Prayag, District Chamoli, Uttarakhand (hereinafter referred to as "the property in question") which comprised of large tracts of forest spanning in and around 1600 acres. On the death of Shri P.N. Sarin in the year 1976 appellants succeeded to the property in question. By a Gazette Notification dated 21st c December, 1977 under Section 4-A of the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "KUZALR Act") as amended by the ) U.P. Act No. 15 of 1978, the rights, title and interest of every hissedar in respect of forest land situated in the specified areas D ceased with effect from 01st January, 1978 and the same were vested in the State Government. A notice issued by the Assistant Collector, Karan Prayag, District Chamoli, under Rule 2 of the Kumaun and Uttrakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the KUZALR Rules") framed under the KUZALR Act was served upon the E appellants intimating them that effective from 1st January, 1978, ,) the rights, title and interest of hissedar in respect of the property in question had vested in the State Government free from all _,. encumbrances and it invited objections and statement, if any, relating to the compensation qua the property in question. F 3. Assailing the aforesaid notice issued by the Assistant Collector, the appellants preferred a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court. On 13th December 1978 while disposing the aforesaid writ petition, this Court G •I ; passed the following order "We are of the opinion that it will be better if the Petitioner files a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court. This Petition is therefore allowed to be withdrawn." H 1028 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A 4. Subsequently, on 02ncl April 1979 the appellants filed objections to the notice issued by the Assistant Collector challenging the vires of the KLJZALR Act and also stating that no profit was being made from the property in question. By an order dated 1 ·1th April 1988, the Assistant Collector dismissed B the objections of the appellants by observing that that he had no jurisdiction to consider the legal validity of the KUZALR Act. With regard to the issue of compensation, the Assistant Collector held that since the KUZALR Act does not provide for a method to compute compem;ation in cases where no income c has been derived from the forests, the appellants were not entitled to any compensation. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad questioning the legality and validity of the order of the Assistant Collector D and also challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 4A, 18(1)(cc) and 19(1)(b) of the KUZALR Act. By impugned judgment dated 12th August ·t997, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. E 6. Not satisfied with the judgment rendered by the High Court, the appellants preferned a Special Leave Petition in which leave was granted by this Court by order dated 11th September 1B98. By an order passed on 11th August, 2010, this appeal was directed to be listed before the Constitution F Bench. This matter was thereafter listed before the Constitution Bench alongwith other connE!cted matters wherein also the issue of scope and extent of right under Article 300A of the Constitution c1f India was one of the issues to be considered. 7. We heard the learned i>enior counsel appearing for the G parties in respect of all the contentions raised before us. Before addressing the rival contentions advanced by the parties, it will be useful to throw some light on the relevant legal position which is intrinsically complex and requires closer examination. H 8. The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land . - RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1029 ~ --~ [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.] Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred as "UPZALR A Act") was enacted in the year 1950 and the UPZALR Act was made applicable to the whole of the State of U.P. except interalia the areas of Kumaon, Uttarakhand. The object of the ~ UPZALR Act as quite evident from its statements and objects • are to provide for the abolition of the Zamindari System which B involves intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters connected therewith. c 9. Subsequently, on 02nd August 1960 Kumaun and ) Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 was enacted. The object of the KUZALR Act is to provide for the acquisition of the rights, title and interests of persons D between the State and the tiller of the soil in certain areas of the Kumaun and Garhwal Divisions and for the introduction of land reforms therein. It is important to notice that the original KUZALR Act did not provide for vesting of private forests, and the definition of the word "land" in Section 3(10) thereof excluded forest. Section 3(10) of the KUZALR Act reads as E follows:- ) ... "3(10). "land" means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming but shall not F include a forest;" 10. However, after the commencement of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 which came into effect from 03rd } :January 1977 wherein inter-alia the subject "forests" was included in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the G Constitution as Entry 17 A; the U. P. Zamindari Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978 (U.P. Act 15of1978) was passed on 30th November 1977 whereby KUZALR Act was amended. In the preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons H necessitating the amendment, it is stated that the amendment 1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A act amends lf hissedar in the forest land - With effect from January 1, 1978 the rights, title and interest of every hissedar in resped of forest land shall cease and shall vest in the Sta1te Government free from all E encumbrances, and th13 provisions of this Chapter and Chapter V shall mutatis mutandis apply to a forest land as they apply to a khaikari land." F G "18 (1) (cc) in the case~ of a private forest, the average annual income from such forest for a period of twenty agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting;" XX>OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO "19(1) (b) - in the case of a private forest, eight times of the amount of average annual income from such forest." 11. Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and H Land Refonns Act, 1960, which is a State legislation received ' . RAJIV SARIN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1031 [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.] ·:< the assent of the President of India on 1 Oth September, 1960. A The amendment brought in 1978 through UP Act 15 of 1978 to the said Act also received the assent of the President on . 26th April, 1978. ~ 12. At the outset we would like to mention that there is no B ~ specific whisper of defence raised under Articles 31A, 31 Band 31C of the Constitution in the Counter-Affidavit/Reply filed by the State of Uttarakhand to the writ petition filed by the appellants in the High Court nor even before this Court but ari attempt was made to argue the case on those grounds on c behalf of the respondents. As there is no mention of any of the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution in the arguments or specific pleadings by the respondents in the writ petition, the f question of deciding the applicability of those provisions of the Constitution and consequent protection of the Act, therefore, D does not arise. 13. It was contended by Shri K.K. Venug,opal, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that the original KUZALR Act, 1960 excluded private forests [Section 6(1) (4)], since the vesting of private forests in the State would not be E by way of agrarian reform. It was further contended that the provision for agrarian reforms, therefore, should be a part of the Act, but, in the present case, the private forests so acquired -+ under Section 4A of the KUZALR Act becomes the property of the State which is untenable. F 14. It was further argued that in any event, under Section 4A of the KUZALR Act, it is only the provisions of Chapter-II and Chapter-V which shall apply to forests land while Rule 41 occurs in Chapter IV and has no application to the forests G covered by Section 4A, and hence Rule 41 will not apply to forests acquired under Section 4A of the KUZALR Act. Further, if Article 31A of the Constitution has no application, then the law has to be tested against the Constitution as it stood on the date of its enactment, i.e. the U.P. Amendment Act, 1978 bringing forth amendment to KUZALR Act has to stand the test H 1032 SUPREME COURT f;~EPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It was further contended that the said Amendment Act would be invalid since the mere transfer of the private forests to the State would by itself not be a public purpose and, furthermore, non-grant /total absence of compensation to thte appellants, while granting full B compensation to other owners of private forests who have mismanaged the forests or clE~ar-felled the forests, would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 15. Per contra Shri Parag P. Tripathi, Ld. Additional Solicitor General strenuously argued that that the entry C "Acquisition and Requisitionin~1 of property" which was earlier in the form of Entry 36/List-ll of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution [which was subject to Entry 42/List-111 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution] and Entry 33/List-I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution provided only the field of legislative D power and did not extend to providing or requiring compensation. The requirement of compensation in the event of "taking" flows only from Article 31(2) of the Constitution, which was repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, E with effect from 26th Septemb«~r. 1979. 16.