# '954 Srimati Ashalata Debi and Others v. Sri Jadu Nath Roy and Others

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 158
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1953-02-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1953
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/954-srimati-ashalata-debi-and-others-v-sri-jadu-nath-roy-and-others-364
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

'954
Srimati Ashalata
Debi and Others
v.
Sri Jadu Nath
Roy and Others.
BhagwatiJ.
1954
May 13
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
regard to the payment of the revenue and the cess as
also the second instalment under the new decree.
The contention which was therefore urged on behalf
of the appellants that there was no default committed
by the mortgagors also could not be sustained.
The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta was therefore rightly seized of the appeal . and it had jurisdiction
to
decide whether the mortgagors had
committed
default in carrying out the terms of the new decree.
The appeal being a mere rehearing the appellate Court
was entitled to review
the judgment of the trial Judge
and declare th~t it was wrong . and that the decreeholder. was
entitled to re-restoration. The
question
whether he would be able to obtain possession of the
immovable properties in fact was foreign to such an
enquiry.
By appropriate proceedings in another jurisdiction he may be able to do so ; but this difficulty
could not be a deterrent to the High Court passing the
necessary orders for re-restoration of the properties.
The appeal therefore fails and must stand . dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
TOLARAM RELUMAL AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERrEA,
VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWAn and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR JJ."I
"---· ,,
Bombay Rents, ·Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act~
1947, (Bombay Act LVII of 1947)-Section 18(1)-Words "in respect ·af"-Meaning of-Receipt of nioney 'by landlord 01· any person
on his behalf-On executory 'co'fitract-W hether punishable
under
-,-
the Act.
Section 18(1) of the Bombay Rents, .......... Control Act 1947
provides:-
"If any landlord either himself or through any person actin& " j
or r.urporting to act on his .behalf . ......... receives any fine,
pre·- /
mium Or other like sum or deposit or any cO~sideration, other tha,n
•
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
the standard rent. ....... in
respect
of
the
grant,
renewal
or
continuance of a lease of
any
premises ...... such
landlord or
person shall be punished .......... " in the manner indicated by the
section.
Held, that the
words "renewal or continuance
of a
lease"
dearly suggest that there must be a renewal or continuance of a
subsisting lease.
They would not cover an ex~cutory contract
to
grant a lease.
Giving the words "in respect of"
their widest meaning, viz.,
"relating to" or "with reference to"
it is plain that
this relationship must be predicate<! of the grant, renewal
or continuance of a
lease
and unless a lease
comes into existence· simultaneously
or
nearabout the time that the money is received
it cannot be said
that the receipt ·was "in respect of" the grant of a lease.
The
relationship of landlord and tenant does not . c0me into existence
till a lease
comes into existence, in other words, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant until there is a demise of the property which is capable of being taken possession of.
The section does
not 11:\ake the intention punishable, it makes
an act punishable which is related to the existence of a lease.
It
does
not
make
receipt
of
money
on
an executory
contract
punishable.
London· and North
Eastern
Railway Co. v. Berriman (1946
A.C. 278, 295) referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 18 of 1953.
Appeal under article 134 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution
of India from the
Judgment and Order dated the 18th
February, 1953, ·of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 592 of 1952 arising
out of the Judgment and Order dated the 21st May,
1952, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate,
19th
Court, Bombay, in Case No. 147/P/1951.
B. H. Lulla and
Rajinder Narain for the appellants.
Porus A. Mehta for the respondent.
1954. May 13. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN C.J.-The appellants were
charged under section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act,
1947, for receiving from Shankar Das
~

## Text

'954
Srimati Ashalata
Debi and Others
v.
Sri Jadu Nath
Roy and Others.
BhagwatiJ.
1954
May 13
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
regard to the payment of the revenue and the cess as
also the second instalment under the new decree.
The contention which was therefore urged on behalf
of the appellants that there was no default committed
by the mortgagors also could not be sustained.
The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta was therefore rightly seized of the appeal . and it had jurisdiction
to
decide whether the mortgagors had
committed
default in carrying out the terms of the new decree.
The appeal being a mere rehearing the appellate Court
was entitled to review
the judgment of the trial Judge
and declare th~t it was wrong . and that the decreeholder. was
entitled to re-restoration. The
question
whether he would be able to obtain possession of the
immovable properties in fact was foreign to such an
enquiry.
By appropriate proceedings in another jurisdiction he may be able to do so ; but this difficulty
could not be a deterrent to the High Court passing the
necessary orders for re-restoration of the properties.
The appeal therefore fails and must stand . dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
TOLARAM RELUMAL AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERrEA,
VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWAn and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR JJ."I
"---· ,,
Bombay Rents, ·Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act~
1947, (Bombay Act LVII of 1947)-Section 18(1)-Words "in respect ·af"-Meaning of-Receipt of nioney 'by landlord 01· any person
on his behalf-On executory 'co'fitract-W hether punishable
under
-,-
the Act.
Section 18(1) of the Bombay Rents, .......... Control Act 1947
provides:-
"If any landlord either himself or through any person actin& " j
or r.urporting to act on his .behalf . ......... receives any fine,
pre·- /
mium Or other like sum or deposit or any cO~sideration, other tha,n
•
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
the standard rent. ....... in
respect
of
the
grant,
renewal
or
continuance of a lease of
any
premises ...... such
landlord or
person shall be punished .......... " in the manner indicated by the
section.
Held, that the
words "renewal or continuance
of a
lease"
dearly suggest that there must be a renewal or continuance of a
subsisting lease.
They would not cover an ex~cutory contract
to
grant a lease.
Giving the words "in respect of"
their widest meaning, viz.,
"relating to" or "with reference to"
it is plain that
this relationship must be predicate<! of the grant, renewal
or continuance of a
lease
and unless a lease
comes into existence· simultaneously
or
nearabout the time that the money is received
it cannot be said
that the receipt ·was "in respect of" the grant of a lease.
The
relationship of landlord and tenant does not . c0me into existence
till a lease
comes into existence, in other words, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant until there is a demise of the property which is capable of being taken possession of.
The section does
not 11:\ake the intention punishable, it makes
an act punishable which is related to the existence of a lease.
It
does
not
make
receipt
of
money
on
an executory
contract
punishable.
London· and North
Eastern
Railway Co. v. Berriman (1946
A.C. 278, 295) referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 18 of 1953.
Appeal under article 134 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution
of India from the
Judgment and Order dated the 18th
February, 1953, ·of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 592 of 1952 arising
out of the Judgment and Order dated the 21st May,
1952, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate,
19th
Court, Bombay, in Case No. 147/P/1951.
B. H. Lulla and
Rajinder Narain for the appellants.
Porus A. Mehta for the respondent.
1954. May 13. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN C.J.-The appellants were
charged under section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act,
1947, for receiving from Shankar Das
~ 1- , Gupta through Mathra Das, accused No. 3, on .23rd
November, 1950, a sum of Rs. 2,400 as premium or
1954
T olaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
1954
T olaram Rtlumal
and Another
v.
The State Of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
pugree in respect of the grant of lease of Block No. 15
in a building under construction. The magistrate found
the appellants guilty of the charge and sentenced each
of them to two months' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1,200.
Mathra Das was convicted and sentenced to one day's
S.I. and a fine of Rs. 100.
The fourth accused, Roshanlal Kanjilal, was acquitted.
Mathra Das preferred no
appeal against his conviction and sentence. The appellants preferred an appeal to the High . Court against
their conviction. This was heard
by
Gajendragadkar
and Chainani JJ. on the 8th of October, 1952. It was
contended, inter alia, that even if it were held that the
appellants had accepted
the
sum of Rs. 2,400
they
could not be said to have committed an offence under
section 18(1) of the Act inasmuch as the amount could
not in law be held to be a premium in respect of the
grant of a lease. On this point the learned Judges said
as follows :-
"In the present case the work regarding the building which still remained to be done ' was so important
that both the parties agreed that the complainant
should get into possession after the said work was
completed. In such a case unless the building is completed the tenant has no right which can. be .enforced
in a Court of law. If the landlord finds it impossible
for any reason to complete the building, what is the
right which an intending
ten~nt can enforce against
him. Therefore, in our opinion, there is considerable
force in the contention urged by Mr. Lulla that in the
present case even if it be held that the accused had
received Rs.
2,400 in the
circumstances to which we
have already referred that would not bring them within
the mischief of section 18(1) because there has been no
grant of a lease ·at all. There. is only an agreement
that the landlord would lease to the complainant a
particular flat after the building has been fully and
properly completed. It does appear that section 18(1)
does not bring within its mischief executory agreements
of this kind."
A contrary view had been expressed in ·Criminal
Revision No. 1178 of 1949, by another Bench of the
High Court on the construction of section 18 ( 1 ). The
•
-
-
,
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
matter was therefore referred to the Full Bench. The
question framed for the consideration of the Full Bench
was in these terms :-
"If as owners of an incomplete building the appellants accepted Rs. 2,400 from
the complainant in respect of an agreement between them that the appellants
were bound to give and the complainant was entitled
to take possession of flat No. 15 in the said building as
soon as the said building was completed on the agreed
rent of Rs. 75 per month, did the acceptance of
Rs. 2,400 by the appellants fall within the mis.chief of
section 18 of Bombay Act L VII of 1947 ?"
This question, if answered in the negative by the Full
Bench, would have concluded the case.
The Full Bench answered the question referred in
the
affirmative.
It held that the
oral agreement did
not constitute a lease but it amounted to an agreement
to grant a lease in future, and that the receipt of
consideration for an executory
agreement was
within
the mischief of section 18(1) of the Act. The Full Bench
expressed its opinion in these terms :-
"What the Legislature has penalized is the receipt
of a premium by the landlord and the Legislature has
also required a nexus between the receipt by the landlord of a premium and the grant of a lease of any premises.
Therefore a receipt alone by a
landlord would
not constitute an offence, but that receipt must be connected with the grant of the lease of any premises.
Unless that connection is established no offence would
be committed. The contention of Mr. Lulla on behalf
of the accused is that the receipt of the premium must
be simultaneous with the grant of the lease.
If the
lease comes into existence at a future date, then the
receipt of a premium according to him is not "in respect of" the grant of a lease. Therefore the key words
according to us in this section are "in respect of." It is
relevant to observe that the Legislature
has advisedly
not used
the expression "for" or "in consideration of"
or "as a condition of" the grant of a lease. It has used
an expression which has the widest connotation and
the expression used is "in respect of." "In respect of"
1954
Tolaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C.
1954
T olaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
"Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
162
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
means m its plain meaning "connected with or attributable to," and therefore it is not necessary that there
must be simultaneous receipt by the landlord with the
grant of the lease. So long as some connection is established between the grant of the lease and the receipt
of the premium by the landlord, the provisions of the
section would be satisfied. In our opinion it is impossible to contend that in the present case there was no connection whatever
between ths landlord receiving
the
premium and his granting the lease of the premises. It
is true. that when he received the premium he did not
grant a lease. It is true that all that he did when he
received the premium was to enter into a contract with
his tenant to grant a lease in future. But the object of
the landlord in receiving the premium and the object of
the tenant in paying the premium was undoubtedly on
the part of the landlord the letting of the premises and
on the part of the tenant· the securing . of. the premises.
Therefore the object of both the landlord and the tenant
was the grant of the lease of the premises concerned
and that object was achieved partly and to start with
by an oral agreement being arrived at between the landlord and the tenant with regard to the granting of this
lease,
the lease being completed
when delivery of
possess.ion of the premises would be given. Therefore,
in our opinion, on the facts of this case it is not possible to contend that the payment of the premium received by the landlord was unconnected with the grant of
a lease of any
pr~mises. The fact that no grant was
made at the time when the premium was received, the
fact
that there was merely an agreement to
grant
a
lease, the fact that the lease would come into. existence
-only at a future date, are irrelevant facts so long as the
connection between the receiving of the
premium and
the granting of the lease is established."
·
On return from the Full Bench, the Division Bench
considered the other contentions raised on behalf of the
appellants and held that tht;re were no merits in any
one of those points and in the result the appeal was
dismissed.
It was certified that the
case
involved a
substantial question of law and was a fit . one for appeal
to this Court. This appeal is before us on that certificate.
•
-
•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
The principal question to decide in the appeal is
whether the answer given by the Full Bench to the
question referred to it is right, and whether receipt of
a sum of
money by a person who enters into an executory contract to grant a lease of a building under construction falls within the mischief of section 18 ( 1) of the
Act?
Section 1§(1) provides:
"If any landlord either himself or through any
person acting or purporting to act on his behalf ....... .
receives any fine, premium or other like sum or deposit
or any consideration, other than the standard rent ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . in respect of the grant, renewal or continuance
of a lease of any premises ...... such landlord or person
shall be punished .......... "
in the manner indicated by
the section.
Under the
section the· money must be received by the landlord in
respect of the grant of a lease. The section refers to
the "grant, renewal or
continuance of a lease."
Prima
f acie, it would not cover an executory agreement to
grant a lease. The words "renewal or continuance of
a lease" clearly suggest that there must be a renewal
or continuance of a subsisting lease.
In the context,
grant of tenancy means the grant of new or initial
tenancy ; renewal of tenancy means the grant of tenancy after its termination ; and continuance seems
to
contemplate continuance of a tenancy which is existing.
Whether or not an executory agreement for grant of a
lease comes within the ambit of the section by reason
of the use of the words "in respect of" would be examined hereinafter.
Before doing so it may be
stated
that an instrument is usually construed as a lease if it
contains words of present demise. It is
construed as
an executory agreement, notwithstanding that it contains words of present demise, where certain things
have to be done by the lessor before the lease is granted, such as the .completion or repair or improvement of
the premises, or by the lessee, such as the obtaining of
sureties.
(Vide Halsbury's
Laws
of England,
Second
Edition, Vol. 20, pp. 37-39). On the facts of this case
therefore the Full Bench very rightly held
that the
1954
Tolaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
1954
T o/aram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahjan C.j.
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
oral agreement made between the parties did not
constitute a lease but it amounted to an agreement to
grant a lease in future.
It may further be pointed out that, in fact, in this
case the lease
never
came into
existence.
Moreover,
in view of the provisions contained in the Bombay
Land Requisition Act XXXIII of
1948, as amended,
the appellants could not let out the building even after
its completion unless on a proper notice being given
the Controller of Accommodation did not exercise his
powers under that Act. It so happened that as soon
as the building was completed the Controller of Accommodation requisitioned it,
and thus no occasion arose
for giving effect to the executory contract.
The question that needs our determination in such a
situation is
whether section 18(1)
makes
punishable
receipt of money at a moment of time when the lease
had not come into existence, ,and when there was a
possibility that the
contemplated lease
might never
,come into existence. It may be here observed that the
provisions of section 18(1) are penal in nature. and it is
a well
settled rule
of construction of penal statutes
that if two possible and reasonable
constructions can
be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean
towards
that
construction which exempts the
subject
from
penalty rather
than the one which imposes
penalty. It is not competent to . the Court to stretch
the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature
in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature.
As pointed out by Lord Macmillan in London and North
Eastern Radway Co. v. Berriman('),
"where penalties
for infringement are imposed it
is
not
legitimate to
stretcl1 tl1e language of a rule, however beneficient
its
intention, beyond the fair and 'ordinary meaning of
its
language."
The High Court took the view that without stretching the language of section 18(1) beyond its fair
and
ordinary meaning, the very
comprehensive expression
"in respect of" nsed by the Legislature could lead to
only one conclusion, that the Legislature wanted the
(r) [1946] A.C. 278, 295.
-
,·•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
penal consequences of section 18(1)
to apply
to
any
nexus between the receipt by a landlord of a premium
and the grant of the lease. In our judgment, the High
Court laid undue emphasis on the words "in respect of"
in the context of the section. Giving the words "in
respect of" their widest meaning, viz., "relating to"
or "with reference to'', it is plain that this relationship
must be predicated of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease, and unless a lease comes into existence
simultaneously or nearabout the
time that
the money
is received, it cannot be said that the receipt was "in
respect of" the grant of a lease.
The relationship of
landlord arid tenant does not come into existence till a
lease comes into existence ; in other words, there is
no
relationship of landlord and tenant until there is a
demise of the property which is capable of being taken
possession of. If the Legislature intended
to make
receipts of money on executory
agreements
punishable,
the section would have read as follows : "receives
any
fine, premium or other like sum or deposit or any consideration other
than the standard rent in respect
of
the lease or an agreement of lease of the premises, such
landlord or person shall be punished" in the manner
indicated in the section. The section does not make
the intention punishable ; it makes
an act
punishable
which act is related to the existence of a lease. It does
not make receipt of money on an executory contract
punishable ; on the other hand it only makes receipt of
money on the grant, renewal or continuance of the lease
of any premises punishable and unless the lease comes
into existence no offence can be said to have been committed by the person receiving the money. It is
difficult to hold that any relationship of landlord and
tenant comes into existence on the execution of an
agreement executory in nature or that the expression
"premium" can be appositely used in connection with
the receipt of money on the occasion of the execution
of such an agreement. It may well be that if a lease
actually .comes into existence then any receipt of money
which has a nexus with that lease may fall within the
mischief of section 18 (I), but it is unnecessary to express any final opinion on the question as in the present
1954
T olaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
1954
·Tolaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
-Bombay.
Mehr Chand
Mahajan C. J.
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
case admittedly no lease ever came into existence and
the relationship of landlord and tenant was never
created between the parties. The landlord
never became entitled to receive the rent from the tenant and
the tenant never became liable to pay the rent. There
was no transfer of interest in the premises from the
landlord to the tenant. On its
plain,
natural, grammatic meaning, the language of the section does not
warrant the construction placed
upon it
by
the Full
Bench merely by laying emphasis on the words "in
respect of." In our opinion the language of the section·
"in respect of the grant, renewal or continuance of a
lease" envisages the existence of a lease
and the
payment of an amount in respect of that lease or with
reference to that
lease.
Without the
existence . of a
lease there can be no reference to it. If the Legislature intended to punish persons receiving . pugree on
merely
executory contracts
it should have made its
intention
clear
by
use
of
clear
and
unambiguous
language.
The construction we are placing on the section 1s
borne out by the circumstance that it occurs in Part II
of the Act.
Section 6 of this · Part provides
that "in
areas specified in Schedule I, this Part shall apply to
premises let for residence, education, business, trade or
storage." This Part relates to premises let, in other
words, premises demised or given on lease
and not to
premises that are promised to be given on lease and
of which the lease may or may not come iP.to being.
The definition of the expression "landlord"
also suggests the same construction. "Landlord" as
defined
in section 5 of the Act means any person who is for
the
time being receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in
respect of any premises whether on his own account or
on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit, of ·any other
person, or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any
other person or who would so receive the rent or be
entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to
a tenant .......... " It is obvious that on the basis
of an
executory agreement the appellants would not be
entitled to receive any rent. They would only be entitled
to receive rent after the lease is
executed and actual
. ..,.,.. ..
I
~
..
'
>
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
demise of the premises or their transfer is made in favour
of the complainant. The definition of the expression
"tenant" also suggests the same construction.
Mr. Mehta for the State, besides supporting the
emphasis placed by the High Court on the words "in
respect of," contended that that construction could
be
supported in view of the provisions of sub-section
(3)
of section 18 which is in these terms:
"18(3)-Nothing in this section shall apiy to .any
payment
made
under
any
agreement
entered
mto
before the first day of September, 1940, or to any payment made by any person to a landlord by way of a
loan, for the purpose of financing the erection of the
whole or part of a residential building or a residential
section of a building on the land held by him as an
owner, a lessee or in any other capacity, entitling him
to build on such land; under an agreement which shall
be in writing and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act, 1908, be registered.
Such agreement shall inter alia
include
the
following conditions, namely,
(1) that the landlord is to let to such person the
whole or part of the building when completed for the
use of such person or any member of his family ...... "
It was suggested that but for this exception the
executory agreement would
be
included within
the
mischief of section 18(1) and that unless such agreements were within the mischief of the section there
would have been no point in exempting them from its
provisions.
In our view,
this contention is not sound.
In the first place, the exception was added to the section by Act 42 of 1951, subsequent to the agreement
in question, and for the purposes of this
case
section
18(1) should ordinarily be read as it stood in the Act,
at the time the offence is alleged to have been commit•
ted.
Be that as it may, it appears that sub-section (3)
was added to the section by reason
of the fact that
some Courts construed section
18(1) in the manner in
which it has been construed by the Full Bench in this
case, and the Legislature by enacting clause (3)
made
it clear that agreements of the nature indicated in the
1954
T olaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bomba)'.
Mehr Chand
MajanC.J.
1954
T olaram Relumal
and Another
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Mehr Chand
/vfaha}an C. J.
1954
April 5.
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
sub-section Vl'ere
In our opinion,
much assistance
section 18(1).
never intended to be included therein.
the language of that section is not of
in construing the main provisions of
The result therefore is that in our view the receipt
of money by the appellants from the complainant at
the time of the oral executory
agreement of lease was
not made punishable under section 18(1) of the Act and
is outside its mischief, and the Presidency Magistrate
was in error in convicting the appellants and the High
Court was al>o in error in upholding their conviction.
We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellants and order that they be acquitted.
Appeals allowed.
M. K. GOPALAN AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
[MuKHERJEA,
SuDHI
RANJAN
DAs, BHAGWATI,
JAGANNADHADAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Constitutt°on of
India-Article
14-Criminal Procedure Code
(Act V of 1898), Section 14 and 197(1) and (2)-Section 14 whether
ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution-Scope of power under sec~
tion 197(2) and section 14-Whether the word "Court" in section 197
(2) means the same thing as ward "person" in section 14.
The petitioner,
an
officer
of
the
Madras Government, was
employed in Central Provinces and Berar for the purchase of grains
on behalf of the Madras Government. He along with many others,
was under prosecution before a Special Magistrate, Nagpur (Madhya
Pradesh), on charges for offences under section 420 of the Indian
Penal Code etc. for causing loss to the Madras Government.
The
Special Magistrate trying the case
was appointed by the Madhya
Pradesh
Government
under
section 14
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
and as the petitioner was a servant of the
Government
of Madras,
the
prosecution against him was
initiated with the
sanction given by
the Government of Madras under section 197(1)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Held, (i) that section 14 of the Criminal J>rocedure
Code in so
far as it authorises the Provincial Government to confer upo'n any
person all
or
any of
the
powers conferred or conferrable by or
under the Code on Magistrates of the first, second or third class in
"
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