# '959 Shrinivasrt Reddy ' v. The State of Mysore Kapur]. x959 Nov~mber 6 - **Citation:** [1960] 2 S.C.R. 146 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1958-03-31 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/959-shrinivasrt-reddy-v-the-state-of-mysore-kapur-x959-nov-mber-6-1852 - **Pages:** 27 ## Headnote Motor vehicles-Stage carriage per1nit-Period of renrwalDuty of Transport Authority-Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (IV of I939), as amended by Act IOO of I956, s. 58. Suh-section (r)(a) of s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provides,- " A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under s. 62 shall be effective without rene\\1al for such period not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. " Sub-section (2) provides,- " A permit may be renewed on an application made and dis· posed of as if it were an application for a permit." Provided that ......................... " ~ The stage carriage permits of the petitioners were ending on March 31, 1958. and they applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore. for a renewal of them. The Tran,port Department of the Mysore State Government opposed such renewal and applied that fresh permits for the routes in question might be granted to it as the State Government int:ended to nationalise the transport services. The Authority, however, dismissed the applications of both the contending parties, but, on appeal, its orders were set aside and the ma1ter was remanded for a fresh decision. A scheme under s. 68C of Ch. IVA of the Act was in the meantime published and approved by the State Government, which was later on quashed qy the High Court. at the instance of the petitiJners. The Authority passed orders renewil)g the permits of the petitioners for a period of one year from April I, 1958, to March 31, 1959· Appeals against the said orders having proved abortive the petitioners appiicd to the ' • .. • S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 147 High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and x959 those applications were summarily dismissed and certificates to appeal to this Court refused. The petitioners thereupon applied Mahaboob Sheriff to this Court under Art. 32 of the S::onstitution. The question v. for determination was whether on a proper construction of Mysore State • sub-s. (1)(a) and, sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act, read together, the Transport Authority period of renewal was to be the same as provided for the grant of permits under the former and the Authority in renewing a permit was bound to specify the period of such renewal. It was contended on behalf of the Department that; even supposing that a renewal must be for the same period as provided for the original grant, this Court by writ could do no more than quash the order made by the Authority, leaving it to decide the question of renewal in accordance with the law as laid down by it. Held (per Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.), that under s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, properly· construed, the period for which a permit could be renewed under sub-s. (2) of that section must be not less than three years and ' not more than five years as provided for the grant of a permit under sub-s. (1)(a) thereof and the Regional Transport Authority, in eisercising its discretion to grant a renewal where it chose to do so, must specify the. r;eriod of renewal accordingly. The words "without renewal" occurring in sub-s. (1)(a) do not signify a contrary intention. V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished. Since, in the instant case, the intention of the Authority to grant renewal was clear, but in doing so it had, under a misapprehension of the law, limited the renewal to one year only, it was open to this Court to sever the legal part of its order from the illegal and quash the latter. R. M. D. Chamarbaughwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930 and Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd v. The Collector of Customs, [1959] S.C.R. 821, referred to . Since this Court was not bound by the technical rules relating to issue of writs by English Courts, a direction in the nature of ma1idamus must issue requiring the Authority to specify the peri ## Text _Characters 0–39,874 of 61,165. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39874 for what follows._ '959 Shrinivasrt Reddy ' v. The State of Mysore Kapur]. x959 Nov~mber 6 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)1 to the Department. We order parties to bear their own costs of this petition taking into account that Petition No. 117 of 1959 filed by the petitioners with respect to the validity of the scheme has been withdrawn by them at a late stage and we have directed parties to bear their own costs of that petition also. Y. MAHABOOB SHERIFF AND OTHERS v. MYSORE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, C.J., JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Motor vehicles-Stage carriage per1nit-Period of renrwalDuty of Transport Authority-Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (IV of I939), as amended by Act IOO of I956, s. 58. Suh-section (r)(a) of s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provides,- " A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under s. 62 shall be effective without rene\\1al for such period not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. " Sub-section (2) provides,- " A permit may be renewed on an application made and dis· posed of as if it were an application for a permit." Provided that ......................... " ~ The stage carriage permits of the petitioners were ending on March 31, 1958. and they applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore. for a renewal of them. The Tran,port Department of the Mysore State Government opposed such renewal and applied that fresh permits for the routes in question might be granted to it as the State Government int:ended to nationalise the transport services. The Authority, however, dismissed the applications of both the contending parties, but, on appeal, its orders were set aside and the ma1ter was remanded for a fresh decision. A scheme under s. 68C of Ch. IVA of the Act was in the meantime published and approved by the State Government, which was later on quashed qy the High Court. at the instance of the petitiJners. The Authority passed orders renewil)g the permits of the petitioners for a period of one year from April I, 1958, to March 31, 1959· Appeals against the said orders having proved abortive the petitioners appiicd to the ' • .. • S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 147 High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and x959 those applications were summarily dismissed and certificates to appeal to this Court refused. The petitioners thereupon applied Mahaboob Sheriff to this Court under Art. 32 of the S::onstitution. The question v. for determination was whether on a proper construction of Mysore State • sub-s. (1)(a) and, sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act, read together, the Transport Authority period of renewal was to be the same as provided for the grant of permits under the former and the Authority in renewing a permit was bound to specify the period of such renewal. It was contended on behalf of the Department that; even supposing that a renewal must be for the same period as provided for the original grant, this Court by writ could do no more than quash the order made by the Authority, leaving it to decide the question of renewal in accordance with the law as laid down by it. Held (per Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.), that under s. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, properly· construed, the period for which a permit could be renewed under sub-s. (2) of that section must be not less than three years and ' not more than five years as provided for the grant of a permit under sub-s. (1)(a) thereof and the Regional Transport Authority, in eisercising its discretion to grant a renewal where it chose to do so, must specify the. r;eriod of renewal accordingly. The words "without renewal" occurring in sub-s. (1)(a) do not signify a contrary intention. V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore, [1957] S.C.R. 663, distinguished. Since, in the instant case, the intention of the Authority to grant renewal was clear, but in doing so it had, under a misapprehension of the law, limited the renewal to one year only, it was open to this Court to sever the legal part of its order from the illegal and quash the latter. R. M. D. Chamarbaughwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930 and Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd v. The Collector of Customs, [1959] S.C.R. 821, referred to . Since this Court was not bound by the technical rules relating to issue of writs by English Courts, a direction in the nature of ma1idamus must issue requiring the Authority to specify the period of renewal in accordance with the law as laid down J:>y this Court. T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 250, relied on Per Kapur, J.-In cases such as the one under review, the• power of judicial review possessed by this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution extends to quashing and not substituting an order in place of what an Administrative tribunal has done or to direct what it should do. All that the Court can do is to quash the order ard leave it to the tribunal to reconsider the matter and to e> ercise its 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)] r959 jurisdiction keeping in view the law laid down by the Court. In issuing such orders the courts would act in consonance with the Mahaboob Sheriff broad and fundamental principles governing the granting of writs v. in English Law. · Myso" Stats C I · ti · · · h T p tA th .t onsequent y, even assuming iat in renewing a permit t e rans or u ori Y Regional Authority had to do so for a period of not less than three and not more than five years, this Court would only quash the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority in the present case, and leave it to that Authority to reconsider the Wanchoo J. • matter in the light of the decision of this Court. - Associated Provincial Pictur< Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) l K.B. 223, Tlte King v. Willesden Justices, Ex Parle Utley, (1948) l K.B. 397, Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., [1952) S.C.R. 584 and Basappa v. Nagappa, [r95'5) I S. C.R. 250, referred to. Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs, [r959) S.C.R. 821, explained and distinguished. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1959] S.C.R. 930, held inapplicable. Kochunni v. State of Madras, A.LR. t959 S.C. 725 and United Motors Transport Co. v. Sree Laltshmi Motor Transport Co Ltd. A.LR. 1945 Cal. 260 distinguished. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 54, 75 and 76 of 1959. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of ]'undamental Rights. G. ](. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India, and B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioners. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 3 in Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959. 1959. November 6. The judgments of Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by Wanchoo, J. Kapur, J., delivered a separate judgment. Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 of 1959 . WANCHOO J.-These are two connected petitions ' nnder Act. 32 of the Constitution and raise similar points and will be disposed of by this judgment. The brief facts necessary for their disposal are these: The petitioners are transport operators in what is known as the Anekal pocket of the State of Mysore. - - S.O.R. SUPREME- COURT· REPORTS 149 They held stage carriage permits for various routes, I959 · which were expiring·on March 31, 1958 .. They there- . fore applied for the renewal of the permits on various Mahaboob Shmff dates in January 1958, as required under the law.. M v. 51 1 N · I" · h Id h b d · d ysore a e ormally, their app 10at10nss ou ave een ispose TransportAuthority of before March 31, 1958. However, on February 1, - the.Mysore Government Road Transport Departme!).t Wanchoof. (hereinafter called the Department) made applications under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939, (hereinafter called the Act) for grant of permits on the same routes for which renewal applications were pending. The Department followed ~his up by a letter dated February 25, 1958, to the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, (hereinafter called the Authority). In this letter, the Authority was informed that the Department had already submitted applications for grant of permits for operation of transport vehicles in the Anekal pocket and it was proposed to take over these routes with effect from April, I, 1958. It was also pointed out that the Government of Mysore had been pursuing the policy of nationalisation of road transport services with a view to rationalise and co-ordinate the various forms of transport and that the Department was operating 1,200 vehicles on 700 routes. The letter went on to point out the advantages of granting permits to the Department resulting in rationalisation of the routes in the Anekal pocket in which at that time there werCl. 20 routes and 58 operators. It was therefore requested that the permits of the petitioners should not be renewed and fresh permits granted to the Department. The Authority met a number of times from March to July 1958 but passed no orders on the applications of the petitioners nor on those of the Department. Eventually, on August 11, 1958, the Authority dismissed the petitioners' applications for renewal as well as the Department's for grant of fresh permits. We must say that this appea.rs to be a curious order, for the result of this order strictly would be that no stage carriages would be able to ply on these routes. However, both parties appealed on September 91 1958, against the orders of August 11. In the meantime, a 150 SUPREME·COUB.T ·REPORTS [1960 (2)] r959 scheme under s. 680 of Chapter IV-A of the Act was Mahaboob Sheriff publishe~. This scheme was appr?ved on October 24, . v. 1958, while the appeals were pendmg. On October 30, M_"o" State ·the appeals of both parties were allowed and the Transport Authority mn,tter wn,s remanded to the Authority for fresh - disposn,l. In the meantime, however, the petitioners Wanchoo ]. had applied to the High Court for quashing the scheme and it was quashed by the High Court on December 3, 1958. Thereafter the Authority met again and passed orders renewing the permits of the petitioners for a period of one year from April 1, 1958 to March 31,.1959. The petitionem went up in appeal against the orders granting them renewal only for one year on the ground that they were entitled to renewal for three years at least under s. 58 of the Act. Their appeals were dismissed as not maintainable. They also applied to the High Court of Mysore under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution but their petition was dismissed in limine and a certificate to enable them to appeal to this Court wn,s refused on March 30, 1959. Thereafter the present petitions were filed in this Court. In the meantime, however, a fresh scheme was published on January 22, 1959, and after necessary formalities was approved on April 15, 1959, and finally published as an approved scheme on April 23, 1959. What happened thereafter is not really mn,terial for purposes of these petitions but we may as well mention it to complete the narrative. The Department applied for permits under s. 68]' of the Act on April 24, 1959. On April 30, 1959, the petitioners challenged the new scheme before tho High Court of Mysore by a writ petition. That petition was however dismissed on June 1, 1959. Thereafter they ea me to this Court for special leave and prayed for ex parte stay, which was refused. Notice was however issued _on the stay application which was served in June 18, 1959. It may be mentioned here that in order to avoid inconvenience to .the public temporary permits had been granted to the petitioners on the expiry of the renewal upto March 31, 1959, for a period of four months or upto the time the Department was granted permits under s. 68.l!', whichever was earlier. Consequently on June 23, • -- \ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 151 1959, the Authority met and granted permits to the r959 Department under s. 68F and rejected the renewal - " . 1. · f h t't' h' ·h ·d t h Mahaboob S e•iff app ICat10ns o t e pe 1 10ners w 10 were sa1 .o ave v. been filed under protest. On June 24, 1959, the Mysnre State transport services in pursuance of the scheme were Tran;portAuthority inaugurated by the Chief Minister. On the same day - the petitioners 'applied to the High Court by a writ Wanchoo f. petition challenging the order of June 23, 1959. On July 14, 1959, the High Court held that the grant of permits to the Department was invalid and the rejection of the renewal applications was incorrect. But it did not pass any order in favour of the petitioners on the ground that the relief granted would be short-lived and dismissed the writ petition. The petitioners then applied for a certificate to enable them to appeal to this Court and that application is still pending. Thereaft.er the Department applied for temporary permits which were granted on July 16, 1959. Another writ petition was filed on July 24, 1959, by the petitioners challenging the grant of temporary permits to the Department which is still pending. In the meantime, the petitioners filed two other writ petitions in this Court which were admitted and will be dealt with separately. Finally, the special leave petition against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition against the approved scheme was dismissed by this Court· on Sep~ember 7, 1959. _ The main contention of the petitioners in these cases is that they are entitled to carry on the business of transport of passengers as a fundamental right ' guaranteed to them under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution, and that this right can only be restricted in the manner provided by the Act which is a regulatory measure dealing with motor vehicles. They contend that they were entitled under s. 58 of the Act to renewal of their permits for three years in case the Authority decided to renew them on the applications which they had made in January 1958 and in so far as the Authority gave them renewal only for one year it was acting in contravention of the Act and was thus · committing a breach of ttleir fundamental right. They 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)] 1959 therefore pray that this Court should come to their Mahaboob Sheriff aid and. protect their fun_damental right _to carry on v. the busmess of transport m accordance with the Act. My'°" state The prayer which they actually made is somewhat Transport A1ther hand, it is contended for the Department that sub-s. (2) only refers to the procedure for gral!ting permits and the duration provided for sub-s. (l)(a)being not a matter of procedure will not apply to a renewal. It is conceded that there is no other provision in the Act which lays. down the period for which a renewal should be made. But it is urged that this means that it is open to the Authority to fix any reasonable period for renewal. Reliance in this connection was placed in particular on the words " without renewal " appearing in s. 58(1) and also on a decision of this Court in V. 0. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore (1). That case however did not deal with the question before us but with a different question altogether. The question there was whether (1) [19~7) 1 S.C.R. 66J . . . - - - • --- " S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 155 a renewal amounted to a grant of a fresh permit or r959 was merely a continuation of the original permit. Mahaboob Sheriff This Court held that the renewal was a continuation v. of the original permit. It had no occasion then to Mysore State deal with the question specifically before us, namely, Transport Authority whether a renewal should also be for the same period Wanchoo /. as provided in s. 58 (l)(a). Let us therefore turn to the contention based on the words "without renewal" appearing in s. 58 (l)(a). \ It is urged that these words clearly indicate that s. 58(l)(a) applies only to the first grant of the permit and cannot in any circumstances apply to a renewal of the permit. As we have already said, s. 58(l)(a) specifically deals only with the grant of a permit and not with a renewal. The words "without renewal" ' appearing in that sub-section only signify that . in counting the pe!iod of a permit renewals should be disregarded. It was necessary to put in these words to meet a possible contention arising out of the fact that a renewal only amounts to a continuation of the original permit. The effect of these words is that in considering the period of a permit the period of the renewal should not be added to the period of the permit, thus making the total period which may be more than five years invalid under s. 58(l)(a). For example, a permit may be granted for five years. It is then -renewed for another five years. Now the permit is the same and the renewal is only endorsed upon it. If the words " without 'renewal " were not in the sub-section it might be contended that the permit being the same its period was ten years and therefore it contravened s. 5S (l)(a). These words therefore were necessary to meet ·this contention and · are no indicatioa that the period mentioned in s. 58(l)(a) does not apply to renewals. We may in this connection refer to the language of s. IO where· also the same two words occur, i.e. : " A driving licence issued or renewed under this Act shall, subject to the provisions contained in this Act as to the cancellation of driving licences and disqualification of holders of driving licences for holding or obtaining driving licences, be effective 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960 (2)] z959 without renewal for a period of three years only, from the date of the issue of the licence or, as the Maflabo~b Sheriff case may be, from the date with effect from which Mywe state the licence is renewed under s. 11." Transport Autho>ity Thus, though the earlier part of s. 10 specifically deals with issue and qmewal of driving licences, the words Wanchoo f. •· without renewal" are to be found in the latter part and that clearly indicates that these words were necessary to be put in to meet the contention that the licence remaining the same even after renewal its period could not in any case exceed three years in all. It was however submitted that s. 10 specifically provides for renewals also for three years and that is not provided in s. 58(l)(a). That is undoubtedly so. But the reason why s. 58(l)(a) does not provide specifically for renewals is to be found in the fact that there is s. 58(2) specifically providing that an application for renewal shall be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit. Section 11 which deals with renewal of licences has no comparable words, for it merely says that any licensing authority may on application made to it, renew a licence issued under the provisions of this Act from the date of its expiry. Different language used in sub-s. (2) of s. 58 therefore must have a different effect and the contention on behalf of the petitioners is that s. 58(2) when it says that an application for renewal shall be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit must mean that all incidents which apply to a permit shall also apply to a renewal application. One of the incidents which applies to a permit is that the Authority is enjoined by sub-s. (l)(a) of s. 58 to indicate a period of not less than three years and not more than five years in the permit, so far as its duration is concerned. The same must apply to a renewal and the Authority must indicate when granting a renewal a period of not less than three years and not more than five years as the duration. We are of opinion that the contention of the petitioners as to the effect of s. 58(2) is correct. There is no ~ other provision in the Act which fixes the duration of a renewal. 1 t could hardly be the intention of the ,.. ' - ... • ' ... I. I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RmPOR'.t'S 157 legislature that the duration of the renewal should be x959 left entirely to the discretion of the Regional Trans- M h b--;Sh 'ff port Authority, particularly when the legislature took a a 0 ~. eri care to fix the duration- for the permit itself. It is Mysore Stitte urged that the legislature intended that the duration Transport Authority of the renewal should be left to the Authority which ' would prescribe a reasonable period, which may even Wanchoo J. be less than three years. If that was so, it would be equally open to the Authority to specify a period for more than five years which it may consider reasonable. We do not think that this was the intention of the legislature and the reason why no other prQvision • was made for the duration of a renewal was that the legislature intended by these words in s. 58(2) that the renewal would be for such period as was prescribed in s. (l)(a) for a fresh permit. It is not disputed that the effect of s. 58(2) is that the considerations for renewal would be the same as for the grant of the permit and the procedure would also be the same. But it is said that the legislature did not intend to go further and prescribe the same duration for a renewal as for a permit. We are of opinion that there is no reason why we should stop short at s. 57 and should not take ·into account s. 58(l)(a) as applying to a renewal along with all other considerations that apply to the grant of a permit. S. 58(2) lays down that a renewal application ~ shall be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit and we think that all that applies to the grant of a permit would also apply to the grant of a renewal. One of the provisions which apply to the grant of a permit is s. 58(l)(a) relating to the duration of a permit and that must in our opinion on the words of s. 58(2) apply to the duration of a renewal. , It may also be mentioned that there were amendments of s. 58 by various State legislatures by which the duration of a permit could be fixed at less than three years. When, however, the Central legislature made amendments in the Act by the Amending Act No. 109 of 1956, the amendments made by the State legislatures earlier fell througli and the Central 158 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [1960(2)] r959 legislature did not think it fit to give power to the State -- . legislatures to i·educe the period below three years in Mahaboob Shedff the case of a permit. If it were intended that a Myso;; State permit may be granted for less than three years and Transport Authority a renewal may be made also for less than three years, we would have expected some provision to that effect Wanchoo J. in the Amending Act of 1956, for the Central legislature could not be unware of the amendments made by the various State legislatures. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the duration of a permit under s. 58( 1 )(a) being not less than three years and • more than five years, the same a pp lies to a renewal. 'Ve,' therefore, hold that reading ss. 58(1)(a) and 58(2) together, a renewal must also be governed by the same provision which governs the duration of a permit. This brings us to the question of relief to be granted to the petitioners. It is contended on behalf of the Department that all that this Court can do is to quash the order of December 15, 1958, and send the case back to the Authoritv for consideration of the question of renewal afresh." On the other hand, the petitioners contend that this Court should quash the illegal condition limiting the duration of the renewal to one year and direct the Authority to specify a period of not less than three years and not more than five years in conformity with s. 58(1)(a) in the order of renewal. This raises the question of severability of a part of the order passed by the Authority. The principles on which any unconstitutional provision can be severed and struck down leaving other parts of a statute untouched were laid down by this Court in R. M. D. Charnarbaugwalla v. The Union of India (1), and the first principle is whether the legislature would have enacted tho valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. This principle relating to statutes was extended by this Court to orders in Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. 'l'he Collector of Custorns and Others (2), where a part of the order of the Collector of Customs was quashed. The question therefore resolves into this: l'\'ould the Authority have ordered renewal if it knew that it could not reduce (1) [1957] S.C.R. 930. (2) [1959] S.C.R, 821. ' • - - - S.O.R.. SUPREME COURT REPOR,TS 159 the period of a permit to below three years? ·Lookr959 ing at the facts of these cases wlfich we have set out b h h A h Mahaboob Sheriff earlier, it is to our mind o vious t at t e ut ority v. would have granted renewal in the circumstances of Mysore stats these cases when it did so in December 1958. The pre- Transport Authority vious permits in these cases had expired on March 31, 1958, and the petitioners had been plying their stage Wanchoo I carriages right up to the time when the order was passed. on December 15, 1958; they could not do so . without a permit in view of s. 42 of the Act. Therefore, renewal in these cases was certain when the order was passed on December 15, 1958. In the circumstances it is open to us to sever the illegal part of the order from the part which is legal, namely, the grant of the renewal. The next question is what order should be passed in the circumstances. This depends on the exigencies of each case, for this Court is not confined by the technical rules relating to issue of writs by the English Courts. In T. 0. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another (1), this Court observed as follows at p. 256 : " The language used in articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manrlamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the • express provision in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference· or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate" cases and in appro_priate manner, so long as we keep to the broaq and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." · . \1) [19,?~] 1 S.C.R, 2,:;o. 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] r959 It is therefore upon to us to issue a direction in the Mahaboo; Sheriff nature of mandamus requiring the Authority to follow v. · the law as laid down by this Court in respect to the Mysore State order of renewal granted by it in accordance with Transport Authority s. 58 (1) (a). It is true that where it is a case of discretion of an authority, this Court will only quash the Wamhoo f. order and ask the authority to reconsider the matter if the discretion has not been properly exercised. But in this .case, the discretion is not absolute; it is circumscribed by the provision of s. 58(l)(a), which lays down a duty on the Authority which grants a renewal to specify a period which is not less than three years and not more than five years. The duty being laid on the Authority which has in this case decided to grant a renewal to specify a period not less than three and not more than five years as the duration of the renewal, it is in our opinion open to this Court to direct the Authority to carry out the duty laid on it by s. 58 (1) (a) read with s. 58 (2), when it has granted the renewal. We therefore allow the petitions and quash that part of the order complained against which specified the renewal of the permits upto March 31, Hl59, and direct the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58 (1) (a) read withs. 58 (2) in the order of renewal made by it in favour of the petitioners on December 15, 1958. The petitioners will; get one set of costs from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has contested these petitions. Petition No. 76 of 1959. W ANCHOO ;J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution by certain transport operators in the State of Mysore and raises a question as to the interpretation of s. 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939 (hereinafter ca'lled the Act.) The brief facts which are necessary for our purpose are these : . The petitioners were operating on the basis of stage carriage permits on certain routes which are under the control of the Regional Transport Authorities, Bangalore and Kolar (hereinafter called the Authorities). The routes • - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 161 being inter-district routes, the permits are issued. by 1959 the Regional Transport' Authority, Bangalore, and are countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority, Mahabo~~ Sheriff Kolar. That is why both have been made parties to Mysore State the petition. The permits of the petitioners were Transport 4uthority expiring on-December 31, 1957, and were renewed upto - March 31, 1958. Applications for renewal were invited Wanchoo .f. thereafter for three years from April 1, 1958. Consequently the petitioner inade applications for renewal of their permits .. It appears that the Mysore Government Road Transport Department (hereinafter called the Department) also applied for permits for the same routes. The Department also wrote a letter each to th~ two Authorities in which it pointed out that the Government of Mysore was pursuing a policy of ·nationalisation of road transport services in the State and that it would be in a better position to run the services on these routes and would be able to rationalise and co-ordinate the various forms of transport and offer better service to the public. It therefore requested that the permits of the petitioners should not be renewed and that the Department was prepared to take over the services from April 1, 1958. Though meetings were held from May to December 1958, the Authorities did not pass any orders on the applications for renewal. It appears, however, that the applications of the Department for grant of permits were dismissed in September 1958. The Department wei;it up in appeal against this order which was allowed in March 1959 and the Authorities were directed to reconsider the applications. In the meantime the Regional Transport Authority, Bangali:>re, ordered in January 1959 that the applications for renewal should be renotified and this was done. Upon this, the Depart. ment wrote again to the Bangalore Authority on February 20, 1!)59, not to renew the permits of the petitioners. Eventually, the Regional Transport Au tho· rity, Bangalore, met on March 29, 1959, and renewed permits relating to certain other routes for three years while the applications of the· present petitioners were postponed. There was another meeting on April·30, 1959, when the permits of the petitioners were renewed 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] '959 till September 30, 1959; It is this order which is being Mahab:-;; Sh"iff challenged by the present petition. The petitioners v. case is that they are entitled to carry on the business Mysore State of transport of passengers as a fundamental right TransportAuthority guaranteed to them under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and that this right can only be restricted in Wanchoo l · the manner provided by the Act which is a regulatory measure dealing with motor vehicles. They contend that they were entitled under s. 58 of the Act to renewal of their permits for at least three years in case the Authorities decided to grant renewal on the applications which they had made in January 1958 and in so far as the Authorities gave them renewal only upto September 30, 1958, they were acting in contravention of the Act and were thus committing a breach of their fundamental right. They therefore pray that this Court should come to their aid and protect their fundamental right to carry on the business of transport in accordance with the Act. The prayer which they actually made is somewhat inartistic but in effect they want that the Authorities be directed to renew their permits in accordance with the Act, which requires that the renewal must be for a period of not less than three years and not more than five years so far as stage carriage permits are concerned. The petition has been opposed by the Department and the main contention on its behalf is that on a correct interpretation of s. 58 of the Act it is open to a Regional Transport Authority to renew a permit for any period it chooses to fix and therefore the Authorities in this case were acting in accordance with the law when they renewed the permits of the petitioners upto September 30, 1959. It is further contended that even if the Regional Transport Authority must fix a period of not less than three years and not more than five years, the only order that this Cotirt should pass is to quash the order dated April 30, 1959, renewing the permits upto September 30, 1959, and direct the Authorities to decide the renewal applications in accordance with the law to be laid down by this Court. T S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 163 This case is similar to Writ Petitions Nos. 54 and 75 r959 of 1959, in which judgment has been just delivered . . . . · h" h h Mahaboob Sheriff today and raises the same two quest10ns w ic ave . v. been raised there. The only difference is that there is Mysore State no scheme prepared under Chapter IV-A in connection TransportAutkority with the routes with which we are concerned here. We have considered the interpretation of s. 58(2) read with s. 58(1)(a) in Writ Petitions Nos. 75 and 54 of 1959 and the form of the order to be passed. For reasons given in those petitions, we are of opinion that this petition should be allowed. We therefore allow the petition and quash that part of the order complained against which specified the i;enewal of the permits upto September 30, 1959, and direct the Authorities to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down ins. 58(l)(a) read with s.