# 99fi GORA v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 996
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-12-11
- **Case number:** Writ.Petitiqn No. 379 of 1974
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/99fi-gora-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-6380
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Maintenance of lllfernal Secmity Act., 1971, s. 3 (3 )-Delay between date
.of incident and date of order and delay between date of order and dare of
detention-Effect of-Public order, scope of-'Fort/11\'ith', meaning cf.
The peti!loner was directed to be detained by an order of the Dist.
Magistrate under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. with a view
to preventing him from <icting in a manner prejudicial t!) the maintenance of
public order. The order was made on December 29, 1973 •. and the fa::t of
making the <>rder was reported to the State Government on January 2, 1974.
He was arre$ted on Jan. 8, 1974. The ground8 of detention referred to only
one incident, namely, that on· the night of 25 /26-6·73, the petitioner along
with his associates being armed .with fire arms, raided a house, looted cash
and ornaments, brutally ll'>saulted some of the inmates and fired indiscriminately
as a result of which the houseown~r and his neighbour sustained
gric:vous
injurie; and subsequently died,
·
. The petitioner challen~ed the detention order in JI writ petition on the
following grounds :-(1) There Wills a time la11 of 6 months 1'~twcen the date
of the incid<mt and the date of order and hence the Dist.
Ma.~istrate •:ould
not have possibly aHived at his subjective satisfaction on the basis of that
inCident. (2) the fa:ident merely affected law and order ~nd not public order,
( 3) the District Magistrate had taken into account other material in the history
sheet which was not disclosed to the petitioner, in arriving at his subjc:ctive
satisfaction,
( 4)
there was a delay of 20 days in arres!ing the petitioner
pu.rsuant to the order of detention, and ( 5) there was a delay of 5 day·; in
.reporting the fact of making the order of detention to the State Government.
Dismissin,g the writ ~titian,
HELD·. (I) (a) There is no hard and fast rule that merely hccause there
is a time lag of about 6 months between the 'offending acts' and the date
of the order of detention the causal link must be taken to be broken and
the ·satisfaction claimed to have been •arrived M by the Dist. Magistrate must
be regarded as sham or unreal. Whether the
acts of the
detenu
forming
the basis of the subjective satisfaction are too remote in time must d•:pend
on the facts of each case. The test of· proximity is not a rigid or mechnnic&l
test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months be1:ween
the two dates. The test is evolved by the c·ourt for determining the main
question whether the past activity of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognmns can be m11de as to· the foture ,:onduct of the· detenu. The
prejudicial act :if the detenu may be of such a character as to sugirast that
it is a part of an organised operation. and in such a case, the detaininl! authority
may reasonably feel satisfied lhat the act which has come to light cannot be a
solitary or· is<rlated act but must be part of a course of conduct of similar
activities and that therefore. it is necessary to detain him with a view to
preventing him from indulging in such activities in the future. [999 C-G]
In the present case, .. t)J<l act was a daring act of dacoity in a village by
!he .Petitioner's gang, and judged in its correct setting, it could not be a stray
1sclated act bu.t must be tbi:, work of a habituated and hardened :riminal eh en
to commit dacoities. and therefore, the Dist. Magistrate could reasonably :i\ive
at a satisfa<:tion that with a view to p•eventinj! him from
carryin~ on such
activities, it was-necessary to detain him. [999 G-H]
(b) Further. it was stated in the counter-affidavit that a criminal case
was filed in the Magi,trates' court in connection ·with the identi:al inddent
on lllne 26, J 973 and the petitioner was arrested but it
was
found
that
witnesf.es wc~re unwilling to r,ive evidence against hin1.
The Dist. rv!agistrat·:!,
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GORA WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, /,)
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therefore, passed the order of detention in antic

## Text

99fi
GORA
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
December 11, 1974
[P. N. BHAGWATI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]
Maintenance of lllfernal Secmity Act., 1971, s. 3 (3 )-Delay between date
.of incident and date of order and delay between date of order and dare of
detention-Effect of-Public order, scope of-'Fort/11\'ith', meaning cf.
The peti!loner was directed to be detained by an order of the Dist.
Magistrate under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. with a view
to preventing him from <icting in a manner prejudicial t!) the maintenance of
public order. The order was made on December 29, 1973 •. and the fa::t of
making the <>rder was reported to the State Government on January 2, 1974.
He was arre$ted on Jan. 8, 1974. The ground8 of detention referred to only
one incident, namely, that on· the night of 25 /26-6·73, the petitioner along
with his associates being armed .with fire arms, raided a house, looted cash
and ornaments, brutally ll'>saulted some of the inmates and fired indiscriminately
as a result of which the houseown~r and his neighbour sustained
gric:vous
injurie; and subsequently died,
·
. The petitioner challen~ed the detention order in JI writ petition on the
following grounds :-(1) There Wills a time la11 of 6 months 1'~twcen the date
of the incid<mt and the date of order and hence the Dist.
Ma.~istrate •:ould
not have possibly aHived at his subjective satisfaction on the basis of that
inCident. (2) the fa:ident merely affected law and order ~nd not public order,
( 3) the District Magistrate had taken into account other material in the history
sheet which was not disclosed to the petitioner, in arriving at his subjc:ctive
satisfaction,
( 4)
there was a delay of 20 days in arres!ing the petitioner
pu.rsuant to the order of detention, and ( 5) there was a delay of 5 day·; in
.reporting the fact of making the order of detention to the State Government.
Dismissin,g the writ ~titian,
HELD·. (I) (a) There is no hard and fast rule that merely hccause there
is a time lag of about 6 months between the 'offending acts' and the date
of the order of detention the causal link must be taken to be broken and
the ·satisfaction claimed to have been •arrived M by the Dist. Magistrate must
be regarded as sham or unreal. Whether the
acts of the
detenu
forming
the basis of the subjective satisfaction are too remote in time must d•:pend
on the facts of each case. The test of· proximity is not a rigid or mechnnic&l
test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months be1:ween
the two dates. The test is evolved by the c·ourt for determining the main
question whether the past activity of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognmns can be m11de as to· the foture ,:onduct of the· detenu. The
prejudicial act :if the detenu may be of such a character as to sugirast that
it is a part of an organised operation. and in such a case, the detaininl! authority
may reasonably feel satisfied lhat the act which has come to light cannot be a
solitary or· is<rlated act but must be part of a course of conduct of similar
activities and that therefore. it is necessary to detain him with a view to
preventing him from indulging in such activities in the future. [999 C-G]
In the present case, .. t)J<l act was a daring act of dacoity in a village by
!he .Petitioner's gang, and judged in its correct setting, it could not be a stray
1sclated act bu.t must be tbi:, work of a habituated and hardened :riminal eh en
to commit dacoities. and therefore, the Dist. Magistrate could reasonably :i\ive
at a satisfa<:tion that with a view to p•eventinj! him from
carryin~ on such
activities, it was-necessary to detain him. [999 G-H]
(b) Further. it was stated in the counter-affidavit that a criminal case
was filed in the Magi,trates' court in connection ·with the identi:al inddent
on lllne 26, J 973 and the petitioner was arrested but it
was
found
that
witnesf.es wc~re unwilling to r,ive evidence against hin1.
The Dist. rv!agistrat·:!,
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GORA WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, /,)
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therefore, passed the order of detention in anticipation of the petitioner being·
released as a result of dropping the crimin11<l case against him. The petitioner
was discharged between January 3, 1974 and Jan, 18, 1974, and on the lntter
date he was once again arrested pursuant to the order of detention. (1000 A·DJ.
Go/am Hussai11 v. The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Ors. (1974] 4
S.C.C. 530 and Lakshma11 Khatik v. State of West Bengal, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 1
referred to.
(2) The a<:t alleged against the petitioner was calculated to disturb the
current of life of the .wmmunity in the village_ It was a serious act of dacoity
perpetrated at dead of night. It created panic in tlie locality and seriously
.disturbed the even tempo of life of the community in the village. It was
clearly disturbirnce of public order and the act of the petitioner had nexus.
with the object of maintenance of public order. [1001 E-G]
Aru11 Ghosh v. State of Bengal [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288, followed.
( 3) TI1ere was no factual basis ·fol the. contention that the Dist. Magistrate
had taken into account any other material not disclosed to the
petitioner.
[1002 A-BJ
( 4) (a) The delay of 20 days bet~en the date of the order ot detention·
and the date of .arrest cannot be regarded as unreasonable. [1002 C·D]
(b) The petitioner Wll5 in jail on Dec. 29, 1973 when the order of deten·
tion was made and was once again arrested only after he was released on:
some date between 'January 3, 1974 and Jan. 18, 1974 and hence the delay
was explained. [1002 D·EJ
'
(S) Section 3 (3) of the Act requires that the fact of the making of iheorder of detention niust be reported forthwith to the State Government. An
act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done whern
it is done with all reasonable despatch and without 'avoidable delay. It is
a very important requirement intended to . S\':cure that the State Government
shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides-and the decision
has to be made within 12 days of the making of the order of detentionwhether or not to approve the order and the Court. would, therefore, insist
on strict' compliance with it and not condone avoidable delay even if it be triviaf.
When there is an interval of time between the date of cirder and the date
of report what has to be c.onsidered is whether the delay in sending the report
rould have been avoided, or to put it differently, whether, in the present case.
in 'spite of all diligence, the Dist. Magistrate was not in a position to send
the report until Jan. 2, 1974. (1003 A-CJ
In the prc;sent case the facts stated by the Dist. Magistrate in his affidavit
show that lie acted wiih prompt despatch and was not guilty of any avoidable
delay. On Dec. 29, 1973 he had passed 9 orders of detention and the typing
of the material in connection with the 9 cases took time. Dec. 30 was a
Sunday and he could not send the reports on Dec. 31 as he was very busy
in connection with food procurement work. Jan. 1, 1974 was a public: holiday,
and hence, he could send the report only on Jan. 2. (1003 C·E]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ.Petitiqn No. 379 of 1974.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Govinda Mukhoty, for the petitioner.
P. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for [be respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byBHAGWATI, J.-The District Magistrate, 24-Parganas, bv an order
dated 29th December, 1973 made under sub-section (1) read with subsection (2) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.
1971 directed that the petitioner be detained as he was satisfied that
with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner pre-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
judicial to the maintenan~e of public order it was ne~essary to detain
·nim. The fact of the making of the order of deten!Jon was reported
by 1be District Magistrate to the State Government on 2nd January,
1974 and the State Government, by an order dated 8th January, 1974,
app1loved the order of detention. Pursuant to the order of detention,
the petitioner was arrested on 18th January, 1974 and immediately
on his arrest he was served with the grounds on which the order of
detention was made.
The grounds of detention referred only to the
incident as form'fog t.he basis of arriving at the subjective satisfaction
.as regards the necessity for detention of the petitioner and that inci-
,dcnt was in the following terms :
"On the night of 25/26-6-73 at about 00.Cl hrs. you
along with your associates being armed with lethal weapons
including fire .arms raided the house of Ananta Keya! of Naitala under Diamond Haroour P.S. and looted away cash,
ornaments etc.
At the time of operation you tixed from
your fire arms indiscriminately disregarding human lives and
their safety. As a result, the house owner A nan ta Kaya! and
his close door neighbour Ajit Kaya! sustained grievous gun
·shot injuries 9n their 11ersons, Subsequently both of them
.expired in Diamond Harbour Hospital.
You also brutally
.assulated some of the inmates of the hO'use of occurrence.
Your action created such panic in the locality and the local
people felt a sense of insecurity. · Thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."
'The petitioner made a representation against the order of detention
on 29th January, 197 4 but it was considered and rejected by the State
GoYernment on 31st January, 1974.
The State Government thereafter submitted the case of the petitioner to the Advisory Board along
with hi.s representation and the Advisory Board, after hearing the
petitioner .aild taking into account the repres-!ntation made by him,
made a report to the State Government on 6th March, 1974 stating
that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the
petitio11er. The State Government accordingly passed an order dated
14th March, 197 4 confirming the detention , 11 the petitioner. This
detention is challenged by the petitioner in th~ present petition which
has been submitted from jail.
·
The first contention urged Mr. Mukhoty, learned counsel appearing
amicus curiae on behalf .of the petitioner, was that the solitary incident
set out in the grounds of detention was so remote from the dat1~ of
the. order. of detention-in fact there was a time l~c; ab9ut six monthsthat the District Magistrate could not possibly have arrived. at his subjective satisfaction on the basis of that incident. The requirement of
proximity, said Mr. Mukhoty, was not satisfied and the subjective >.atisfaction said to have been reached by the District Magistrate could not
be regarded as real or genuine. Now it is true, as pointed out by this
Court in Go/am Hussain v. The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta &
Ors. ( ') that "there must be a live link between the ~rounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the
purpos.~ of
(1) (1974) 4 s.c c. 530.
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GORA v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwali, I:)
999
detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial
activi~y of the
species
specified in the statute.
This credible chain is snapped if there is too
long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the
order of detention. Such is _th·e ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik
v.State of West Bengal(').
No authority, acting rationally, can be
satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because
long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to
B · sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical
test by counting the months of the interval is sound.
It a!l depends
on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious
and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason
for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have:
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to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the
circumstances of each case". There is, therefore, no· hard and fast rule
that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between
the 'offending acts' and the date of the order of detention, the causal
link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have
been arrived at by the District Magistrate must be regarded as sham
or unreal. Whether the acts of the .detenu forming the basis for arriving
at ~ subjective satisfaction are too remote in point of time to induce any
reasonable P«rson to reach such subjective satisfaction must depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The test of proximity
is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting
the number of :rrionths between the 'offending acts' 'and the order of
detention. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the court for the purpose of
determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu
is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future
conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it
subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drown
it. The pr!'.judicial act of the detenu may in a given case ~ of such
a character as to suggest that it is a part of an organised operation ot
a comolex of agencies collaborating to clandestinely and secretly carry
on such activities and in such a case the detaining authority may
reasonably feel satisfied that :the prejudicial act of the detenu which
has come to light cannot be a solitary or isolated act, but must be
part of a course of conduct of such or similar activities clandestinely
or secretly carried on by the detenu and it is, therefore, necessary to
de'ain him with a view to preventing him from indulging in
such
activities in the future. Here in the present case, the act alleged
against the petitioner was a daring act of dacoity in a village by a
)?an~ consisting of the petitioner apd his associates and if this act is
judged io its correct settin!?, 11rave proportions and clear implications,
it would be clear tha't it ·cannot be a strav isolated act but inust be
tlie work of a habituate<! and hardened criminal given
to
commit
dacoities and the District Ma~strate could,
therefore,
reasonably
arrive at a satisfaction that with a view to preventing the petitioner
from carrying on such activities it was necessary to detain him. Moreover. the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the State Govcrnm()nt bv
the Secretary in the Department of Public Relations
and
Youth
(1) [1974) 4 s.c.c. 1.
1 doo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
Services, points out that in connection with the incident set out in the
grounds of detentiOn a criminal case was filed in the court of the Sub·
Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Diamond Harbour on 26th Juee, J 973
and he was arrested in connection with that ease, but it appeared durhig
investigation tbat witnesses were unwilling to give evidence in open
court against the petitioner iind his associates and it was, therefori~,
felt that it was futile to proceed with the criminal case and it was
decidi?d to drop it against the petitioner. . Now, if the criminal case
were dropped, the petitioner w-0uld have to be released and in that
·event he would be free to carry on his nefarious activities. The District
Magistrate, th¢refore, passed the order of detention on 29th December,
1973. The order of detention was in fact passed in anticipation of
the petitioner being released as a result of . clropping of the criminal
case against jli,m. The record of the case which was produced before
us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State showed that
the criminal case was actually pending against the petitioner on 3rd
January, 1974. That means that the criminal case must have been
dropped and the petitioner must have been diseharged sometime between 3rd January, 1974 and 18th January, 1974, the latter being the
date when he was once again arres~ed pursuant t9 the order of detention. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the District Magistrate
could not have arrived at a sμbjective satisfaction op the basis of the
Jncldent set out in the grounds of detention, or that the subjective sati!:-
faction reached by him was sham or unreal.
. Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner then urged that even ·if
the incident set out in the grounds of det,ention were true, it merely
affected maintenance of law and order and did not have any impact
on public order and hence there was no nexus between the act alleged
·against the petitioner and the subjective satisfaction reached by. the
District Magistrate. Now, there caμ be no doubt that the acts of the
detenu on which a subiectiv\l satisfaction is claimed to have been reached by the detaining authodty must have relevahi:e to the formation
of such subjective satisfaction. If the acts of the detenu relied on by
the detaining authority Are ifrelevant, no reasonable person could
possibly arrive at a subjective' satisfaction on tl1e basis of such irre··
levant acts and the subjective satisfaction said to have been reached
by ·the detaining authority would be a mere pretence. It is, therefore:
necessary to consider whether the act alleged ·against the petitioner
in the grounds of detentiCll,l could be said to be relevant to the formation
of a subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order .. What was the potency or radiation cf
the act alleged against the petitioner: did 'it affect maintenance of pub·
lie order or was its prejudicial effect confined merely to maiiltenanc':
of law and order? The distinction between law and order, on the om:
hand, and public. order, on the other; has been brought out admirably
by Hidayatulla. CJ., in a recent decision in Arw1 Ghosh v. SflJ/e n1'
W~st Bengal.( 1) The learned Chief Justice pointed out in that case:
the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disr.ir-·
bance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance in the
fo\Io"".i~.IL"'.~~~-: _·
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 288·
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GORA v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, J.)
1001
"Public order was said to embrace more of the
community than law and order: Public order is the even tempo of
the life of the community taking the country as a whole or
even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to
be distinguished from 1~cts directed against individuals which
do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general
disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon ~ life of the community in a
locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts
only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man
stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed,
but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo,
however much one may dislike the act. Take another case
of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a
member of the other community. This is an act of a very
different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects. the
even tempo life and public order is jeopardized because the
repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the com-·
munity and incite them to make further breaches of the law
and order and to subvert the public order. .... It means
therefore that the question whether a man has only committed
a breach of law and order or has acted jn a manner likely to
cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree
and the extent of the reach of the Act upon the society ....
The question to ask is:
Does it lead to disturbance of the ·
current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect mere!)" an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?"
If we ask this question in relation to the facts of the present cases,
it is obvious that the act alleged against the petitioner was calculated
to disturb "the current of life of the community" in the village. It was
a serious act of dacoity which was alleged against the petitioner and
it was perpetrated at dead of night <tnd the petitioner and his associates who participated were armed with lethal weapons including guns
and they used these lethal weapons recklessly and indiscriminately in
utter disregard of human life and actually caused grievous injuries to
at least two persons and beat up several others. This act of dacoity
cre~ted a panic in the locality and seriously disturbed the even tempo
of life of the community in the village. There was clearly disturbance
of public order and the act alleged against the petitioner had nexus
with the object of maintenance of public order. The subjective satisfaction reached by the District Magistrate could not, therefore, he said
to be based on an irrelevant ground.
Then it' was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the District
Ma2istrate had taken into account other matenal contained in
the
historv sheet of the petitioner in arriving at his subjective satisfaction
and since this material was not disclosed to the petitioner, he had no
opportunity of making an effective representation and that the order of
d~tention was, therefore, invalid.
Now, the proposition can no longer
be disputed that if any material which has not been disclosed to the
17-L346SupCl75
1002
~UPRHIE COURI' REPORrs
[1975] 2 S.C.lll.
p.:lil:\mcr il<is gone into tbe formation of tbe sublcctive satisfaction of
A
the detaining authority it would have an invalidating consequence on
the order of detention. But in the rpesent case it is not possible to
say that any material other than that that set out in the grounds of detention was taken into account by the District Magistrate in reaching his
subi~ctivc satisfaction.
We have looked at the history-sheet of the
petitioner which was Produced
before us by the learned
counsel
appearing on behalf of the State Government and we ct'o not find anv
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material prejudicial to the petitioner other than that set out in
the
11rounds of detention.
There .is. therefore. no factual basis for this
contention and it must be rejected.
Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner also tried to persuade us
to strike down the order of detention on the ground that though the
order of detention was made on 29th December, 1973, the petitioner
C
was not anestcd until 18th January, 1974 and there was thus a ,feJav
of twentv davs in arrestinJ? the petitioner pursuant ·to the order ·of
detention.
But this is eaual!y unsustainable and fer two very good
reasons.
In the first place. the delay of twenty da:ys between the dateof the order of detention and the date of arrest canrw~ be regarded as
unreasonable. Secondly, there is sufficient expianation for the delay.
The petitioner was actually in jail on 29th Decemhcr, 1973 when the
D
:irder of detention was made and it was onlv on some date betwe1:n
3rcl Januarv. 1974 and 18th Januarv. 1974 1h~t he was relem;cd and
ti:>en once agam arrested on 18th January, 1974.
Tlte lust contention urged by Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner \HS that though the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate on 29th December, 1973, he did not report the fact of
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the making of the order of detention to lhe ST.ate Gc•\icrnment until
2nd January, 19741 and there was thus a delay of about five days which
constitu!c'd a violation of'the statutory reauirement of section 3, subsection ( 3 ) that the fact of the making of the '.lrdcr of d~tention mnst
be reported forthwith to the State Government.
This contention
raises the auestion as to what is the true meaning and connotation of
the word 'forthwith· as used in section 3 sub-section ( 3). The quesF
lion is fortunately not res inteRra. It is concluded by a decision of this
Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police,
Greater Bombay.(!) The statutory provision which came up for consideration in that case was section 3, sub-section (3) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 which contained an identical provision as section
3. sub-section (3) of the present Act and the auestion which arose
was as to whether Commissioner who made the order of detention on
G
13th January, 1956 could be said to have reported that fact 'forthwith'
to the State Government under section 3. sub-section ( 3) when be
did so as late as 21st January, 1956. The
Court was, therefor::.
called uoon t~ construe the wor.d 'forthwith' in section 3, sub-~ection
(3) and after discussing various authorities, English as well as Indian,
bearing on the interpretation of this word. the Court, speaking through
VenkRtarama Ayyar. J. nointed out that : "On these authorities.
it
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may be taken. an act which is to be done forthwith must be held to
(1 . [1956) S. C.R. 653.
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H
GORA v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, /.)
1003
have so. done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay", and proceeded to add : "under section 3 (3) it
is whether the report has been sent at the earliest point of time possible, and when tnere is an interval of time between the date of the
order and the date of :the report, what has to be considered is whether
the delay in sending the report could have been avoided-the result
then is that the report sent by the Commissioner to the State on
21-1-1956 cou1d be held to have been sent 'forthwith' as required by
section 3(3), only if the authority could satisfy us that, in spite of all
diligence, it was not in a position to send the report during the period
from 13th to 21st January, 1956". The same test must be applied
in the present case and we must inquire whether the District Magistrate sent the report to the State Government "with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay", or, to put it differently, whether ·
in spite of all diligence· the District Magistrate was not in a position to
send the report until 2nd January, 1974. Now, the District Magistrate
has made an affidavit explaining the reason for the delay in sending
the report to the State Government.
He has pointed out that 29th
December, 1973, which was the date when the order of detention was
made, was a Saturday and on that day he had passed eight
other
orders of detention and the materials in connection with all these nine
cases had to be typed out by the typist whiCh could not possibly be
completed in one sinlde day.
30th December, 1973 was a Sunday
and, therefore, the earliest when the report could be submitted to the
State Government was 31st December, 1973. But the District Magistrate could not send the report on that day as he was very busy in
connection with food procurement work in the district and the next
day, namely, 1st January, 1974 being a public holiday, he could send
the report only on 2nd January, 1974. This explanation,given by the
District Magistrate is. in our opinion. sufficient to show that he sent
·the report to the State Government .with all reasonable despatch and
there was no avoidable delay on his 'part. Whilst taking this view on
facts, we do not wish to underscore the need for strict compliance
with this requirement of section 3, sub-section (3). It is a very important requirement intended to secure that the State Government
shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides-and
this decision has to be made within twelve days of the making of the
order of detention-whether or not to approve the order of detention.
and the Court. would, therefore, insist on strict compliance with it and ·
not condone avoidable delay, even if it be t:ivial But in the present
case the facts stated by the District Magistrate in his affidavit show
that he acted with prompt despatch and was not guilty of any avoidable delay.
The District Magistrate must, therefore, be held to have
sent the report 'forthwith' as requirexl by section 3, sub-section (3).
These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner
in support of the petition and since there is no substance in them, the
petition fails and the rule is discharged.
V.P.S.
Petition dismissed.