# A.C. 20, Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala v. Surat Electricity Co

- **Citation:** [1964] 8 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-10-28
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-c-20-manchharam-ghelabhai-pittalwala-v-surat-electricity-co-3251
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 19'47,
s. 13(1) (g). (hh).-Premis" required bonafide for occupation aft<r
carrying out repairs-Sub-section if applicable.
1be appellant was a tenant of the ground lloor of a house owned
by responQent. The respondent sued for ejectment of the appellant on
the groun'd that he required the entire house including the portion occupied by •PPellaot, for his residential purpose. The defence of the appellant was that respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the
premises for his occupation and for carrying out repairs. The trial court
decreed the suit of the respondent on the ground that respondent bona
fide required the premises for his occupation. The appelll of the appellant was dismissed. His revision petition was also dismissed. by Higli
Court. The appellant came to this Court by special leave. The only
question for decision before this Court was whether the case . of respon·
\lent came within the provisions of s. 13(l)(g) ors. 13(1) (bh), Dismi•
ing the appeal,
HELD:-The case of respondent fell under cl. (g) as be required tho
premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he i.~tendcd to
make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or
on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, did
not affect the question of his requiring the ho~e bona fide and reasonably
for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying tho
home. There was no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g)
or in any other provision of the Act lo the etFect that the landlord must
occupy the house for resitlence without making any alteration in
it.
There could be no logical ieaso~ for such a prohibition. The provisions
of •· 13 are for the benefit of/the landlord and the various grounds for
ejectment mentioned in th~t/~ection are ·such which reasonably justify the
ejectment of the tenant in the ·exercise of the landlord's general right lo
eject his tenant. There fs no reason why restrictions not mentioned in
the grounds be read into them. The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to a case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires
the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the
premises and erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh)
apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his
own occupation but requires them for erectins a """ buildinc whicll it
lo be let out lo tenants.
JI S. C.-4
1964
April, It ..
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
Krishanlal lshwarlal Desai v. Bai Viikor [1964] l S.C.R. 553, Krishna
~
...,,, ·ki""' l"t
Das v. Bidhan Chandra, A.l.R. 1959 Cal. 181. McKenna •· Porter Moton
"'ba~da•
1 am- Ltd. [1956] A.C. 688, Betty's Cates Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd.
v.
(1959] A.C. 20, Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala v. Surat Electricity Co.
lndrad11man
Ltd. Civil Revision Application No. 204/56 dated !st February, 1957 by
Amratlal
the Bombay High Court and Allarkha Fakirmahomed v. Surat Electricity
Co. Ltd., Civil Revision Application No. 164/57, claled 8th October, 1957
by the Bombay High Court, referrett to.
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; CIVIL APPEAL
No. 61 OJ!I 1964
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree
dated October 28, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil
Revision Application No. 697 of 1962.
Purshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for
the appellant.
S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.
April 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
h b
D
I
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is
"l.ag u ar
UJ• J. directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and
raises the question of the true construction of sub-els. (g)
and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1.) of s. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act LVII of
194 7), hereinafter called the Act.
The facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the
appe

## Text

--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAMNIKAL PITAMBARDAS MEHTA
y,
INDRADAMAN AMRATLAL SHETH
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND
RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 19'47,
s. 13(1) (g). (hh).-Premis" required bonafide for occupation aft<r
carrying out repairs-Sub-section if applicable.
1be appellant was a tenant of the ground lloor of a house owned
by responQent. The respondent sued for ejectment of the appellant on
the groun'd that he required the entire house including the portion occupied by •PPellaot, for his residential purpose. The defence of the appellant was that respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the
premises for his occupation and for carrying out repairs. The trial court
decreed the suit of the respondent on the ground that respondent bona
fide required the premises for his occupation. The appelll of the appellant was dismissed. His revision petition was also dismissed. by Higli
Court. The appellant came to this Court by special leave. The only
question for decision before this Court was whether the case . of respon·
\lent came within the provisions of s. 13(l)(g) ors. 13(1) (bh), Dismi•
ing the appeal,
HELD:-The case of respondent fell under cl. (g) as be required tho
premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he i.~tendcd to
make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or
on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, did
not affect the question of his requiring the ho~e bona fide and reasonably
for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying tho
home. There was no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g)
or in any other provision of the Act lo the etFect that the landlord must
occupy the house for resitlence without making any alteration in
it.
There could be no logical ieaso~ for such a prohibition. The provisions
of •· 13 are for the benefit of/the landlord and the various grounds for
ejectment mentioned in th~t/~ection are ·such which reasonably justify the
ejectment of the tenant in the ·exercise of the landlord's general right lo
eject his tenant. There fs no reason why restrictions not mentioned in
the grounds be read into them. The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to a case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires
the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the
premises and erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh)
apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his
own occupation but requires them for erectins a """ buildinc whicll it
lo be let out lo tenants.
JI S. C.-4
1964
April, It ..
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
Krishanlal lshwarlal Desai v. Bai Viikor [1964] l S.C.R. 553, Krishna
~
...,,, ·ki""' l"t
Das v. Bidhan Chandra, A.l.R. 1959 Cal. 181. McKenna •· Porter Moton
"'ba~da•
1 am- Ltd. [1956] A.C. 688, Betty's Cates Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd.
v.
(1959] A.C. 20, Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala v. Surat Electricity Co.
lndrad11man
Ltd. Civil Revision Application No. 204/56 dated !st February, 1957 by
Amratlal
the Bombay High Court and Allarkha Fakirmahomed v. Surat Electricity
Co. Ltd., Civil Revision Application No. 164/57, claled 8th October, 1957
by the Bombay High Court, referrett to.
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; CIVIL APPEAL
No. 61 OJ!I 1964
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree
dated October 28, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil
Revision Application No. 697 of 1962.
Purshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for
the appellant.
S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.
April 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
h b
D
I
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is
"l.ag u ar
UJ• J. directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and
raises the question of the true construction of sub-els. (g)
and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1.) of s. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act LVII of
194 7), hereinafter called the Act.
The facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the
appellant is a tenant of the ground-floor of a house owned
by the respondent..
The respondent sued for the ejectment
of the appellant on the ground that he required the entire
house, including the portion occupied by the appellant, for
his residential purpose.
He further stated in the plaint:
"The whole suit bungalow is very old-built about
75 years ago and at present its different parts
are likely to give way and collapse.
Before
sometime, a little portion of an upper balcony
had collapsed.
In the circumstances, on find·
in& it unsafe to stay in it without making addio
tions, Iii.rations and necessary chan,., I, tho
plainti!, 11D obliged to wait till I &et po119lion of thl whole bwlaatow.
--.
-
--
--
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said
1964
suit bungalow vacated at present and only after Ramnlhl Pil ..
the whole bungalow is got overhauled as stated
bardu
in para above. I, the plaintiff can utilize it for
1nJr:J-.
my personal use."
.ifmratlal
The appellant contested the suit on various grounds Raghub.,. Dr/•
including the ones that the respondent did not reasonably
and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and
that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises
for carrying out repairs.
The trial Court found that the respondent bona fide required the premises for his occupation. It repelled the contention of the appellant that the provisions of s. 13 (1 )(g)
would not be applicable when the landlord did not wish to
occupy the premises as such but intended to occupy it after
carrying out major repairs. and decreed the respondent''
suit for ejectment.
The defendant went up in appeal.
It was dismissed.
The appellate Court, agreed with the views of the trial
Court.
The defendant then presented a revision petition
to the High Court. It was rejected. 1t is against this order
that he has filed this appeal.
A preliminary objection has been taken that the revision
to the High Court was incompetent as no question of jurisdiction was involved.
For the appellant it is urged that on
the facts found. the trial Court assumed jurisdiction which
it did not have and that therefore the revision was competent.
We uphold the preliminary objection and hold that
the revision was incompetent.
The question raised was whether a decree in ejectment
should be passed on the ground of personal requirement
under s. 13 (l )(g) of the Act where it was proved that the
landlord wanted to pull down the premises and build another and then occupy it.
It was said that in such a case
he had to proceed under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1). It is clear
that the question so raised is one of interpretation of these
two clauses.
Section 28 of the Act gives jurisdiction to
the Court specified in it, to try a suit or proceeding between
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1g64]
196'
a landlord and tenant relating to possession of the premises.
~
Pllam- Th.at section expressely provides that no other Court, subbardtll
ject to the provisions of sub-s. ( 2) which do not apply to
.,~,,_ this case, has jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
It is clear
A.mrat/al
from this section that the trial Court had full jurisdiction to
;,,,1r.,,;;;;D111a1 J. entertain the suit for ejectment.
That being so, it had
jurisdiction to interpret whether cl. (g) of s. 13 (1) would
apply to the present case. The appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The High Court could not,
therefore, interfere in revision with the decision of the appellate Court, even if it had gone wrong, on facts or law, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that the revision
application had to be dismissed by the High Court and that
this appeal too must fail.
Since the merits of the case have been argued fully
before us, we express our opinion on the law point urged
before us.
The sole question to determine in this appeal is whether the respondent's case came within the provfaions of
s. 13 (1 )(g) of the Act or fell within the provisions
of
s.13(l)(hh). We may now set out these provisions:
"13 ( 1) NothwithstandinB anything contained in thi.i
Act but subject to the provisions of section 15,
a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied ...
(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide
required by the landlord for occupation by
himself or by any person for whose benefit the
premises are held or where the landlord is a
trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; or
(hh) that the premises consist of not more than two
floors and are reasonably and bona fide required
by the landlord for the immediate puxposc
of demolishing them and such demolition is to
be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished."
-
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
s
A landlord can sue for the ejectment of his tenant in
19U
view of s. 13 ( 1) for various reasons including the one that Ratnihl PIJ
he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for occu·
bardt11
pation by himself.
The respondent alleged, and the Ccurts
J~a
below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in
AmratlaJ
the suit for occupation by himself.
The respondent stated Ratllubar Da;
in the plaint that he would take up residence in the premises after overhauling it.
It is on this account that the
appellant submits that the case falls under s. 13(1)(hh),
as the respondent wants the premises for the immediate
purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building.
It is further contended for the appellant that the two
grounds for ejectment under els. (g) and (hh) are mutu·11Iy
exclusive and therefore a landlord cannot take advantage
of cl. (g) when his case falls under cl. (hh) in view of the
immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of
the premises.
We need not express an opinion on this
point, as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls
under cl. ( g) and not under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) of the Act.
We agree with the Courts below that the respondent's
case falls~under cl. (g) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends
to make alterations in the house either on account of his_
sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of
the condition of the house, does not affect the question of
his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his oc·
cupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the
house. There is no such prohibition either in the language
of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect
that the landlord must occupy the house for residence with·
out making any alterations in it.
There could ot 'Je any
logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary faw,
the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes,
after following certain procedure except in case' where he
has contracted not to eject him before the happening of a
certain event.
The Act restricts that general right of the
landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard
to the availability of accommodation and the incidental
abuse of those circumstances by landlords in dcmandmg
unjustifiably high rents.
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
The Act has provided sufficient protection to the teuants
-nikal l'itlllfl· against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they
ba~~iu
are unable to satisfy landlords' demands. ' Various restric·
IndraJa,,..,.
tions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject
A.~lal
the tenant.
Section 12 O) provides that the landlora shall
01hubar D1qal J. not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises
so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the
amount of the standard rent and permitted i!_!creases, if any,
and observes
and performs the other conditions of ~e
tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions
of the Act. Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which
the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been
paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent.
The provisions of s. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that
section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of
the tenant in the e~rcise of the landlord's general right to
eject his tenant.
There is therefore no reason why restric·
tions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We
do not therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will
apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the
premises without making
any alteration in them, i.e., to
occupy the identical building which 'the tenant occupies.
There is no justification to give such a narrow construction
either to the word 'premises' or to the word 'occupies' which
have been construed by this Court in Krishamal lshwar/al
Desai v. Bai Vijkor(') referred to later.
There are provisions in the Act which ensure that the
provisions of cl. (g) are not abused. Section 17 provides
that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one
month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the
premises are re-let within a period of one year of the said
date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court
may order the landlord, on the application of the original
tenant, within the time prescribed, to place him in occupa·
tion of the premises on the original terms and conditions,
This tends to ensure that a landlord does not eject a tenant
unless he really requires the premises for occupation by
himsell.
(1) [1964] 1, S.C.R. 553.
·-
'
8 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7
We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord estal964
blishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occu- RllmnlM Pl
pation. he is entitled to recover possession of it from the
barda1
tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) of s. 13(1)
Indt~1M
irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the preA.mratlal
mises without making, any alterations to them or after mak- Raihub,;D.
ing the necessary altetations.
I
The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the
case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the
premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish
the premises and /to erect a new building on them.
The
provisions of cl. '(hh) apply to cases where the landlord
does not require the premises for his own occupation but
requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let
out to tenants.
This is clear from the provisions of sul:>-
s. (3A) which provide that a landlord has to give certain
undertaking before a decree for eviction can be passed on
the ground specified in cl. (hh). He has to undertake that
the new building will have not less than two times the number of residential tenements and not less than two times the
fioor area contained in the premises sought to be demolished, that the work of demolishing the premises shall be commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed not later than three months from the date he recovers
posession of the entire premises and that the work of erection of the new building shall be completed by him not
later than fifteen months from the said date.
These undertakings thus provide for a time schedule for the new building to come up into existence and ensures atleast the doubling of the residential tenements, i.e., rooms or groups of
rooms rented or offered for rent as a unit: vide s. 5(12) of
the Act.
·
Such undertakings would be unnecessary if the landlord
seeks to eject the tenant from the premises in order to occupy
the premises himself after making the necessary alterations
to suit his conveniences. Further, s. 17 A provides for the
ejected tenant's re-occupying the premises in case the landlord does not start the work of demolition within the period
specified in sub-s. (3A).
Section 17B provides for the
ejected tenant to notify to the landlord within six months
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1914
from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the
~
1'.itam- premises of his intention to occupy a tenement in the new
bardtu
building on its completion on the conditions specified in the
J~an section. Section 17C provides that the landlord. would inti-
.4.mrotlal
mate to the tenant the date when the new building would be
•gltub-;;;Dayal J. complete and that the tenant would be entitled to occupy
the tenement on that date. These provisions clearly establish
that the provisions of cl. (hh) apply when the landlord
desires to demolish the premises for the purpqse of erecting
a new building on the premises for being let to tepants.
We may mention that the provisions of clauses similar to
els. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 13 of the Act have been
construed in this way in Krishna Das v. Bidhan Chandra('),
McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd. (2), and Betty's Cafes Ltd.
v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd. (3 ).
The appellant has referred us to two cases of the Bombay
High Court which tend to support him in so far as it is held
in them that in circumstances similar to the present one, the
case would come under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) and not under
cl. (g).
They are: Manchharam Ghe/abhai Pittalwala v.
The Surat Electricity Co. Ltdt.(') and A/larkha Fakirmahomed v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltd.(•). The latter
case followed the previous one. In the former case the High
Court said:
"Indeed the expression 'occupation' occurring in
clause (g) means 'possession followed by actual
occupation', while for the purpose of clause (hh)
what is necessary is 'possession for the purpose
of demolition'.
'Occupation' within clause (g)
would include 'possession', as it is obvious that
one cannot occupy unless one is able to possess.
but in the case of clause (hh) it is clear that.
it is not necessary to occupy for the purpose of'
demolition.
What is necessary is that the l.and-
(1) A.LR. 1959, Cal. 181 ;
(2) [1956] A. c. 688;
(3) f1959] A. C. 20 ;
(4)-Civil
Revisio~ /lpplication No. 204/56 decided on I-2-57 by the
Bomb•!' High Court.
(5) Civil Revision Appu<:lltion No. 164/57 decided on s-10-57 by the
l!ombay Hiah Cuurt.
-
8 S.<.;.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
lord must possess in order to enable him to
1961
demolish and erect a new building."
Rmltnikal PIW
Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec-
~
lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order
lndr~
Amratlal
to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord;
In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal
oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:
"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that
when the possession is obtained in execution it
must be followed by an act of occupation which
must inevitably consist of some overt act in that
behalf .•••.• ,,
'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ( g) does not necessarily
refer to occupation as residence.
The owner can occupy a
place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the
present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work
of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have
occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their .
occupation.
We therefore hold that the respondent's case came within
cl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act and therefore dismiss
the appeal with costs. Three months allowed for vac.atmg
· the premises on the defendant tenant undertaking to vacate
the premises himself during this period.
Appeal dismissed.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS
v.
THE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS
,
(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SU;RI, JJ.)
Income Tax-Object and scope of s. 23-A-"Company in
which
tht!
pu1,lic are substantially interested''-Mt:aning of-Indian Income T~
Ac1, 1922 (11 of 1922), 1. 23-A.
The Income-tax
Officer found that the respondent company
had
declare.I during the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948·
(I) (1964] r S.C.R. 553.
1961
April, 2/t..