# A.·C. SHARMA v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION

- **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 477
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 1973
- **Bench:** A. Alagiriswam~, I. D. ~Ua, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-c-sharma-v-delhi-administration-5832
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

11 . Special Pobce Estc.bbsllment Act 25
of
1946--Notification
B
De "3 of Act, being notification No. 7 /5155-A.V.D. dated Nol'emunde(, 5i966 conferring jurisdiction Oil Delhi Special
Police
Establislzbtr 'to inl';stigate inter alia offences under 161, 165 1B5A Indian Penal
mtdl!t nd o{}ences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 19~7Co e 0
A · C
t'
D
I .
·
J . d·ction o/ the
1111- orrup zon
epartment o
De/lu Administration
~ft~~lt~r completely disp!aced-Sclte'!u;s o~ Ac_r 25 of 19~6 and Act 2
C of 1947-Pasuast~a v~lue f!l ~dmrrllstrllltve tnsfru~llons m interpreting
sroJure-Defect
Ill
znve.rllgatton.
effect
of-!~ ord
'elsewhere' ' in
r.SA(l)(d) of Act 2 of 1947, meaning of.
The appellant was the dealing clerk in the labour office Delhi
in
April 1965. He v.-as tried and convicted by the Special Judge
D~!lhi
under s. 5(2) of Prevention of Corruptio.ll Act and section 161 of the
Indian Penal Code. His appeal to the High Court of Delhi was disD mis>ed by the Single Judge.
In appeal by sp.ccial leave to this Cotrrt
it was contended that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 19-U>,
;u amended, prescribes spcciul powers and procedure for inn:stigation
of ofT~nccs of bribery and co'rruptio.r; and as the appellant was an emploree of the Central Puhlic Work Department offences
against
him
rould only he inv~tigat~d by the Special Police
Establishment. His
P~-ution based on investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of the
[ Anu-corruptio.r, Department of the Delhi Administration was therefore,
acwrding to the appell:wt, illegal. This contention, raised
for
the
~~~ tunc in this Court. was allowed to be urged in view of the di!ciSIO!J of this court in Allllluwalia's case.
•
! F
l~ELD : (i) Statement of object~ and reasons for
introducing . a
!ill 1n the leghlature is not admissibl<!
;1~ a;ll uiJ to the C?nstrucllon
. the statute as enacted· far )es<; can it control the meanmg of the
~ctll',,.lwords used in the Act: Jt can only be referred to for the limited
~~tse of ascertaining the circumstances which actuateJ the spons..'t
(
1
B11J to introduce H nnd the purpose for doin!! so. [4840-H}
to fii) The preamble ~f n statute, which is ofte-n de~crib~d ns a key
amhile. undmtanding ~f it, may Jcgitimatc.ly be consult~J t~. solve nn
llh. S0'1Y or to a~rtam nnd fix the mcamng of word~ 10 thctr cookxt
',·
~,)c othcrwhe hc:ir more mc·min"~ than one. It mav alford useful
''
.,Ita nee ll t
•
"
B
if th • nactruent
i• ,1··
s o Wh;1t the ~tatutc inknJs to reach.
ut
':' e '
.
Wt ·lc<~r ~a!J unambiguous in itself th~n fhl pn:mbl<! can yary Its mean mg.
u e con~t ·
·
· J th • presnmplin0 th·
nJJn~:t a statute one has aho to hear 10 mm
" .
1 a·
tio~ in ~t thi! .le~i\lature dol'~ m)t inhmd to m:1kc nnv sut>st:t!l1'_31 a te~e
1fllmcui·';e ext~tlng law hcvond v.h:lt it expresslv !!ed11re$ or be)ond
,
"e \Cope unJ object of the statute. [485:\-Bl
f
(iii) Th
.
hi' h ent Act does
11
!ll)f fither e Kheme or the Ddhi Special ~olt:e Esta. '!t mIre
r~!!lllar
lklli~ aulh e~~re~sly or by necr<;~:!'rv imnl•cntlon
(hv;_tcnce to invP.~ti·
~!e ;1110 C>ffrthet of their iurisdiction. rc-wer nod com A~
i!POI"rnl r11te
II Would ro '-'~ces under nnv other comne•en• Ia~. fvPT/ exclude "• a
llli<tter of ~~~litre clear anti e1Ct'lfe~• 1:'""~ 1" 1!"" 10 e, P.C ~!fence~ m~r>tinncd
aw the JX>Wer of investtgat1on for t ~£
,,
~~;
i \:
.,. ...
.
1
;·,
!. ..
?
•'
' ft .
L
'·
.,
r .
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973) 3 S.C.R.
in the notification dated ·November 6, 1956, under s. 3 of
the
Act,
from the jurisdiction and competence of-the regular police authorities
conferred on them by the Cr. P.C. and other laws and to
vest
this
power exclusively in the D. S. P. E.
The D. S. P ~E. Act seems to be
only pern;lissive or empowering, intended merely to enable the D.S.P.E.
also to investigate into the offences specified as -contemplated by section 3 without impairing any other law empowering police authorities
to 'investigate offences. · [486B-F]
(iv) The plain meaning of sub-section (

## Text

_Characters 0–39,933 of 42,683. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39933 for what follows._

I
. ~
477
A.·C. SHARMA
v.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
February .5, 1973
[A. ALAGIRISWAM~, I. D. ~UA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
11 . Special Pobce Estc.bbsllment Act 25
of
1946--Notification
B
De "3 of Act, being notification No. 7 /5155-A.V.D. dated Nol'emunde(, 5i966 conferring jurisdiction Oil Delhi Special
Police
Establislzbtr 'to inl';stigate inter alia offences under 161, 165 1B5A Indian Penal
mtdl!t nd o{}ences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 19~7Co e 0
A · C
t'
D
I .
·
J . d·ction o/ the
1111- orrup zon
epartment o
De/lu Administration
~ft~~lt~r completely disp!aced-Sclte'!u;s o~ Ac_r 25 of 19~6 and Act 2
C of 1947-Pasuast~a v~lue f!l ~dmrrllstrllltve tnsfru~llons m interpreting
sroJure-Defect
Ill
znve.rllgatton.
effect
of-!~ ord
'elsewhere' ' in
r.SA(l)(d) of Act 2 of 1947, meaning of.
The appellant was the dealing clerk in the labour office Delhi
in
April 1965. He v.-as tried and convicted by the Special Judge
D~!lhi
under s. 5(2) of Prevention of Corruptio.ll Act and section 161 of the
Indian Penal Code. His appeal to the High Court of Delhi was disD mis>ed by the Single Judge.
In appeal by sp.ccial leave to this Cotrrt
it was contended that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 19-U>,
;u amended, prescribes spcciul powers and procedure for inn:stigation
of ofT~nccs of bribery and co'rruptio.r; and as the appellant was an emploree of the Central Puhlic Work Department offences
against
him
rould only he inv~tigat~d by the Special Police
Establishment. His
P~-ution based on investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of the
[ Anu-corruptio.r, Department of the Delhi Administration was therefore,
acwrding to the appell:wt, illegal. This contention, raised
for
the
~~~ tunc in this Court. was allowed to be urged in view of the di!ciSIO!J of this court in Allllluwalia's case.
•
! F
l~ELD : (i) Statement of object~ and reasons for
introducing . a
!ill 1n the leghlature is not admissibl<!
;1~ a;ll uiJ to the C?nstrucllon
. the statute as enacted· far )es<; can it control the meanmg of the
~ctll',,.lwords used in the Act: Jt can only be referred to for the limited
~~tse of ascertaining the circumstances which actuateJ the spons..'t
(
1
B11J to introduce H nnd the purpose for doin!! so. [4840-H}
to fii) The preamble ~f n statute, which is ofte-n de~crib~d ns a key
amhile. undmtanding ~f it, may Jcgitimatc.ly be consult~J t~. solve nn
llh. S0'1Y or to a~rtam nnd fix the mcamng of word~ 10 thctr cookxt
',·
~,)c othcrwhe hc:ir more mc·min"~ than one. It mav alford useful
''
.,Ita nee ll t
•
"
B
if th • nactruent
i• ,1··
s o Wh;1t the ~tatutc inknJs to reach.
ut
':' e '
.
Wt ·lc<~r ~a!J unambiguous in itself th~n fhl pn:mbl<! can yary Its mean mg.
u e con~t ·
·
· J th • presnmplin0 th·
nJJn~:t a statute one has aho to hear 10 mm
" .
1 a·
tio~ in ~t thi! .le~i\lature dol'~ m)t inhmd to m:1kc nnv sut>st:t!l1'_31 a te~e
1fllmcui·';e ext~tlng law hcvond v.h:lt it expresslv !!ed11re$ or be)ond
,
"e \Cope unJ object of the statute. [485:\-Bl
f
(iii) Th
.
hi' h ent Act does
11
!ll)f fither e Kheme or the Ddhi Special ~olt:e Esta. '!t mIre
r~!!lllar
lklli~ aulh e~~re~sly or by necr<;~:!'rv imnl•cntlon
(hv;_tcnce to invP.~ti·
~!e ;1110 C>ffrthet of their iurisdiction. rc-wer nod com A~
i!POI"rnl r11te
II Would ro '-'~ces under nnv other comne•en• Ia~. fvPT/ exclude "• a
llli<tter of ~~~litre clear anti e1Ct'lfe~• 1:'""~ 1" 1!"" 10 e, P.C ~!fence~ m~r>tinncd
aw the JX>Wer of investtgat1on for t ~£
,,
~~;
i \:
.,. ...
.
1
;·,
!. ..
?
•'
' ft .
L
'·
.,
r .
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973) 3 S.C.R.
in the notification dated ·November 6, 1956, under s. 3 of
the
Act,
from the jurisdiction and competence of-the regular police authorities
conferred on them by the Cr. P.C. and other laws and to
vest
this
power exclusively in the D. S. P. E.
The D. S. P ~E. Act seems to be
only pern;lissive or empowering, intended merely to enable the D.S.P.E.
also to investigate into the offences specified as -contemplated by section 3 without impairing any other law empowering police authorities
to 'investigate offences. · [486B-F]
(iv) The plain meaning of sub-section (1) of _'S. 5A of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1947 appears to be that I.nspectors
of Police of
D. S. P. E. in all places, Assistant Commissioners of Police
i;n
t~e
Presidency towns of Calcutta and Madras, Superintendent_ of
Police
in the. Presidency town of Bombay, and Deputy
Superintendents
of
Police in all places other tha;n Prtsidency towns of Calcutta, .· Madras
and Bombay are authorised to investigate into the
offences
mentioned
therein. The word 'elsewhere' in cl.{d) does not indicate that a Deputy
Superintendent of Police in debarred from investigating offe.nces m.en·
tioned in . this clause even when so ordered by a Magistrate First Class
in the areas in which D. S. P. E. is also ,empowered to function. The
word 'elsewhere' in clause (d) appears to refer only to the three Presidency tow,ns mentioned in cl_auses (b) and (c). This sub-section th,ei'efore does not confer sole power on D.S.P.E. to investigate into the
offences mentioned therein to the complete exclusion
of the
regular
police force . . It is merely concerned with the object of making provision for safeguarding against arbitrary use of power of investigation by
officers · bdow certain ranks so that public servants concerned are ~aved
from frivolous harassment at the hands of disgruntled persons. It is
also noteworthy that apart from the restrictions in s. SA( 1) the appli~
cability of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. to the proceediniS in relation
to the offences mentioned. in that sub-sections, is, subject to
certain
· modifications contained in s. 7A, expressly recognised.
[488IJ-:G]
(v) The schemes of the two enactments, namely, the D.S.P .E. Act,
1946 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 suggest that they
are
intended to serve as supplementary provisions of law designed to !unction harmoniously in aid of each other and of the existing regular police
im·estigating agencies for effectively achieving ·the object of successful
investigatio!l into the serious offences mentioned in s. SA without unreasonably exposing the public servant concerned
to frivolou'
and
vexatious proceedings. [488<;J-H; 489A]
· (vi) The above interpretation is supported by D.O. No. 21(8)63GD dated October S, 1963 addressed by the Central Bureau of Investi·
gation, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, to the llll5pectors
General of Police. No doubt the Jetter contains
only
administrative
instructions but it clearly show the construction pl1l.ced during all these_
years by the administrative officers concerned. If the view stated in
this letter is not clearly ·against the language and scheme of the Act
in question then it is entitled to due consideration and has some persuasive value. Reference to th~ State Police in the
D.O.
includes
the
police force of the Union Territory of Delhi. [489F-H; 490A]
{vii_) In the present case the investigati<YJ by the Deputy Suj,erintendent
of Pohce could not be considered to be in any way unauthorised or
co?trary to law. The function of investigation is merely
to
collect
evtdence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection
of e~i.dence can scarce!y be considered by itself to affect the legality of
the tnal by an otherwtse competent court of the offence so investigated.
.
[490A-CJ
A .• 1~{.
•
B ~··
c
D
•
•
E
F )
G
•
H
A
B
A. C. SHARMA v. DELHI ADMN. (Dua, J.)
479
(viii) It was toot possible to find any infirmity in judgment of the
High Court upholding the prosecution story and convicting the appellant
and there was no cogent ground for reappraising the evidence.
~re
was absolutely no extraordinary reason for departing from the nor;ffial
rule of practice accordi:ng t0 which this Court accepts the conclusions
of facts arrived at by the High Court t() ~ final. There was no grave
injustice as a result of any irregularity or other infirmity either in the
trial or in the judgments of the trial court and the High Court. [491D-F]
H. N. Bishabud & lnder Singh v. Stc.te of Delhi, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
1150, Munna Lal v. The State of U.P. Crl. A. Nos. 102-104 of 1961
d/April 17, 1963, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali, A.J.R.
1959 S.C. 707, State of Andhra Pradesh v.
M.
Venugopal,
[1964]
3 S. C. R. 743 and Khandu Sonu Dhabi v, State of Maharashtra, Crl.
A. No. 105 of 1969 d'IFebruary 15, 1972, applied.
C .
R. J. Singh Ahuluwalia v':-The State of Delhi, [1970] ~ S.C.R. 451,
Abdul Halim v. State of
West
Bengal,
A.l.R.
1961
Cal.
257,
Om Prakash
y, State, A.I.R. 1964 Punjab 407, Labh Shankar v.
Stc.:te of Saurashtra, A.I.R. 1955 Saurashtra 42 Kharati Lal v. State,
1965, D.L .. T 362 and Kartar Singh v. State, Crl. A. No. 42 of 1971
decided on October 13, 1971, referred to.
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
28 of 1973.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
29th October 1969 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Cr.
A. No. 1 of 1966.
I.
Frank Anthony and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant.
r
G
H
Gobind Das and R. N_. Sachthey, for the respondent.
F. S. Narimanf Additional Solicitor-General of India, and
B. D. Sharma, for the Attorney-General for India.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DuA, J.-The appellant was the dealing clerk in the Labour
Office, Delhi, in April, 1965. He was convicted by the Special
Judge, Delhi under s. 5~2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of
Rs. 200/- with two months further rigorous imprisonment in case
of default. He was also found guilty and convicted of an offence
under s. 161, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year. The two--su~antive sentences were directed to be concurrent. His appeal to the High Court of Delhi was dismissed by
a learned single Judge. He appeals to this Court by special leave.
His application for leave is dated December 20; 1969. In that'
application one of the grounds taken by him questioned the legality
of the investigation into the offences against him by the Deputy
Superintendent of the Anti-Corruption Department of the Delhi
Administration. According to this ground the Delhi Special
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
Police Establishment Act as amended prescribes special powers
A
and procedure for investigation of offences of bribery and corrup·
tion in the departments of the Central Government and as the
appellant was an employee of the Central Public Works Department, offences against him could only be investigated by the
Special Police Establishment. The investigation_ having not been
done by 'the D.S.P.E., according to the appellant,
his trial is
B
vltiated. In support of this ground the appellant presented in this
Court an application dated January 13, 1970 seeking permission
to place on the record a letrter dated February 10, 1966 purporting
to have been written by the S.P. Anti·Corruption Branch, Delhi
and addressed to the appellant stating rthat the · anti-corruption
branch of Delhi Administration was not competent to make an c
enquiry into the allegations levelled against C.P.W.D. employee
being a Central Government employee. This Court, while grant·
ing special leave, also permitted the appellant to urge additional
grounds.
We now turn to the facts giving rise to this case. One Bakht
Ram, a labour supplier had to get about Rs. 3,500/- from one
D
Umrao Singh, a contractor,
who was evading this payment.
Bakht Ram moved the Labour Officer for relief.
The Labour
Officer stopped payment to the contractor to the extent of the
amount claimed by Bakht Ram but as the case was not being
d~alt with as expeditiously as Bakht Ram ex]Jected or desired,
he approached 1the appellant who was the dealing clerk for expeE
ditious disposal of the case. The appellant demanded Rs. 100/-
by way of bribe for using his good offices. The matter was ultimately settled at Rs. 50/- and the amount was to be paid on April
27, 1965 at 1the Labour Office or at the house:of the appellant.
Bakht Ram thereupon reported the matter to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Anti-Corruption Branch) and produced three
currency notes of the denomination of Rs. 10/- each which he
F ·
proposed to pay to the appellant. The numbers of these currency
notes were nofed by !(:be Deputy Superintendent of Police in the
pre,sence of two witnesses and Bakht Ram was instructed to make
the payment in the presence of those witnesses. Bakht Ram then
proceeded to the office of the Labour Officer along with the said
two witnesses followed by the police party headed by the Deputy
G
Supe'rintendent of Police.
A~ the appellant was not present in
the office of the Labour Officer the party proceeded to his house.
Bakht Ram called the appellant out from his house 'and they both
went to a tea shop nearby. The two witnesses followed 'them.
Within their hearing Bakht Ram told the appellant that he had
brought Rs. 30/- with him and that he would pay the balance
H
later. He requested the appellant to see that the Labour Officer
passed requisite orders on Bakht Ram's application claiming
Rs .. 3,500/-. The appellant agreed to see that the Labour Officer
A
B
c
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A. C. SHARMA V. DELHI ADMN. (Dua. }. )
481
passed the necessary orders. He received Rs. 30/- from Hakht
Ram and put the currency notes in his pocket. One of the two
witnesses at this stage gave a signal and the D.S.P. came to the
spot. The currency notes in question were recovered from the
appellant's possession. They bore the same numbers as had been
noted by the D.S.P.
At the trial the appellant's plea was that Bakht Ram had
borrowed from him Rs. 40/- on April 1, 1965 and the amount
recovered from him by the D.S.P. was the amount paid by Bakht
Ram towards the discharge of that loan. He also produced four
witnesses in support of his version. The learned Special Judge
considered the prosecution evidence and held that the receipt of
money having been admitted by the appellant, the onus lay on
him to rebut the presumption raised by s. 4 oi the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
After considering the
appellant's plea and
appraisin~ the evidence produced by him in support thereof, the
learned Special Judge concluded that the burden had not been
discharged. In his view, the defence witnesses were interested in
the appellant and one of them, being the General Secretary of
the Congress Mandai,
Lajpatnagar,
New Delhi and in that
capacity wielding some infouence, had also tried to help the appellant. The testimony of these witnesses did not impress the Special
Judge. Holding the appellant guilty he convicted him and imposed
the sentence, as already noticed.
On appeal the High Court agreed with the view taken by the
trial court. According to the High Court also the appellant having
admitted receipt of a sum of Rs. 30/- from P.W. 1 Bakht Ram
on the date of the offence, under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the burden lay upon him to prove that this amount had
been received otherwise than by way of illegal gratification. The
testimony of the defl?pce witnesses was not considered acceptable
and the order of the trial court was affirmed.
In this Court Mr .. Anthony _questioned the legality of the in~
vestigation by submitting that the only police agency having jurisdiction to investigate into the allegations against the appellant
wa~ the Delhi Special Police Establishment. The investigation by
t.he anti-corruption branch, Delhi, being !thus. without jurisdiction,
it '.Vas contended that the appe11ant's trial lind conviction were,
en this ground alone, wholly illegal. Mr. Anthony relied on
R. I. Singh Ahuluwalia y. The State of DelhW) in sustaining his
right to raise this point for the first time in this appeal, as according
to his submission, it goes to the root of the validity of the investigation.
If the investigation is unauthorised the trial springing
from it cannot be considered lawful, said the counsel. The app.el·
. (1) (1970) 3 S.C.R. 451.
482
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C,ll.
lant having been permi(ted to urge additional ground and there · A
being no objection by the other side, iii the interest of justice we
heard the parties on the new objection. As the point raised related
to the validity of central laws we directed notice to the Attorney
General and pursuant to that notice heard Mr. Nariman, Additional
Solicitor General on the point.
The-short but important question·with far-reaching effect, if the
appellant's contention were to prevail, requirin~ our decision is,
whether with the setting up of the Delhi Special Pol.ice Establishment, the anti-corruption QI'anch of the Delhi Police had been completely deprived of its power to investigate into the offences. like
the present or whether both the S.P.E. and the ·anti-corruption
branch had power to investigate, it being a matter of internal administrative arrangement for ,the appropriate authorities to regulate
the assignment of investigation of cases according to the exigencies
of 1he situation.
Mr. Anthony relied on the pre·amble of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment AC't, 25 of 1946. Mr. Nariman produced befor~ us
a copy of its objects and reasons for showing the background in
which this Act was enacted. Both sides referred to the background
of this enactment for the purpose of supporting their rival contentions about its scope and effect. The objects and reasons for its
enactment show that in 1943 the Government of India had set up
a police staff called the Delhi Police Establishment (War Department) under the Special Police Establishment (War Department)
Ordina·nce No. XXII of 1943 for the purpose of investigating
offences of bribery and corruption connected with the Departments
of Central Government. As this organisation proved useful it was
decided to retain its police staff on permanent basis by means of:
legislation. Ordinance No. XXII of 19431apsed on September 30,
1946. In order to avoid a break in continuity, Ordinance No. XXII
of 1946 was promulgated on September 25, 1946 to remain ill
force till March 25, 194 7. The object ·of this Aot is to retain
the said special police staff as a permanent organisation to en 4
able it to conduct investigation in all provinces of India with
their consent, Its preamble reads :
"An Act to make provision for the constitution of
a special police force in Delhi for the investigation of
certain offences in the Union territories for the superintendence and administration of the said force and for
the extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdic
4
tion of members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences.''
Section 3 of the Act on which principal reliance was placed by
Mr. Anthony reads :
B
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A. C. SHARMA V. DELHI ADMN. (Dua, J.)
483
A
"3. Offences to be investigated by special police
es-tablishment : The Central Government may, by noti·
fication in the Official Gazette, specify the offences or
classes of offences which are to be investigated by the
Delhi Special Police Establishment."
Reference to s. 3 of both the Ordinances of 1943 and 1946
B
would show that apart from lthe category of offences, the power
of the establishment to investigate into the offences mentioned
therein is expressed in language similar to that used in the two
Acts Section 3 of the 1943 Ordinance reads :
c
D.
E
F
G
H
"3. Offences 1o be investigated by ~necial Police
Establishment: The .Central Government may by
general or special order c,.,~cify the offences or class~
o.f offences committed in connection with Departments
of the Central Government which are to be investigated
by the Special Police Establishment (War Department)
or may direct any particular offence .committed in con·
nectio.s. wnh a Department of the Central Government
to Qe so investhrated."
Section 3 of the 1946 Ordinance reads :
"3. Offences. to be investigated by special police
establishment :
The Central Government may, by notification in the
official
gazette,
specify the . offences or classes of
offences committed in connection with ·matters concerning Departments of rthe Central Government which are
to be investigated by the Delhi special police establishment."
It was
contended that section 3 of this Act•- confers on
D.S.P;E. exclusive jurisdiotion for
investigating d1e
offences
specified by the
Central
Government b!Y
notification in the
Gazette. Stress in this connection was laid on the words "which
are to be investigated'' as dfsclosing the mandatory character of
the legislative intention.
Our attention was also drawn to the
notification no. 7/5/55-AVD dated November 6, 1956 in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 in which offences, inter alia,
under s. 161, 165, 165A, I.P.C. and offences punishable under
the Preveirt:ion of Corruption Act ( 2 of 194 7) are specified.
According to the learned Advocate the Special Establishment is
a very efficient investigating agency and it utilises officers and
not clerks for assistance in its investigation. IUs apparently for
this reason, said the learned counsel, that cases of
corruption
against employees of Central Government are entrusted to it.
Mr. Anthony in the course of arguments conceded that if in s.
3 instead of the word "are" the legislature had used the words
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[197 3] 3 S.C.R.
"may" or "can" then the section would noa prima facze convey
a mandatory direction clothing the D.S.P.E. alone with the power
of investigation 'to the
exclusion
of the other
investigating
agencies, including the regular police force.
Our attention was
also drawn to the resolution of the Government of India (No.
4/31/61-T da-ted April I, 1963 ), reproduced at p. 681 of the
Anti-Corruption Laws of India by P. V. Ramakrishna, by means
of which it was decided 'to set up a Central Bure.au of Investigation at Delhi with six divisions one of which was described as
'investigation and anti-corruption divisions (Delhi Special Police
Establishment)'.
According to the argument the Government
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had designed to set up a special investigating agency for investigating cases o.f corruption and bribery to the exclusion of an
other ,investigating agencies. Our attention was specifically in C
vited to the letter (No. 593/ AC Br. dated February 10, 1966)
from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Branch, to
the appellant in reply to an application of his. In that leitter it
was stated :
"Shri L. Swarup, Labour Officer, Jurisdiction No.
5, C.P.W.D. Delhi is a Central Government employee.
Therefore, Anti-Corruption Branch of Delhi Administration is not competent to make enquiry into the allegations levelled against him."
This letter fortifies his submission, said Mr. Anthony. Support
for his contention was also sought from Abdul Halim vs. State
of West Bengal(l), Om Prakash vs. State( 2), Labh Shankar vs.
State of Saurashtra( 8 ) and Kharaifi Lal vs. State('). These
decisions do not seem to have any direct bearing on the point
which concerns us.
Mr. Anthony also produced before us a copy of an unreport~
ed decision of a single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Kartar
Singh vs. State( 5 ) rejecting a similar contention raised by the
learned counsel.
But the correctness of this decision was questioned by Mr. Anthony.
We now proceed to examine the legal
position.
Statement of objects and reasons for introducing a Bill iu the
Legislature is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the
statute as enacted : far less can it control the meaning of the
actual words used in the Act. It can only be referred to for the
limited purp~se of ascertaining the circumstances which actuated
the sponsor of the Bill to introduce it and the purpose for doing
so. The preamble of a statute which is often described as a key
to the understa:nding of it may legitimately be consulted to solve
(1) A.T.R. 1961 Cat 257.
(2) A.I.R. 1964 Punjal> 407.
(3) A.l.R. 1965 Saurashtra 42.
(4) 1965 D.L.T. 362.
(5) Crl. A. No. 42 of 1971 decided on October 13, 1971.
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an ambiguity or to ascertain and fix the meaning of words in their
context which otherwise .bear more meanings than one. It may
afford use.ful assistance as to what the statute intends to reach,
but ]f the enactment is clear and unambiguous iri itself then no
preamble can vary its meaning. While construing a statute one
has also to bear in mind the presumption that the Legislature
does not intend to make any subs'tantial alteration in the existing
law beyond what it expressly declares or beyond the immediate
scope and object of the statute.
Turning to •the D.S.P.E. Act it extends to the whole of India.
For the constitution and powers of the establishment we have to
turn to s. 2 of this Act which reads :-
"2. Constitution and powers of special police establishment :
( 1) Notwithstanding! anything in the police Act,
1861, the Central Government may constitute a special
police force to be called the Delhi Special P_olice Establishment for the investigation in any Union territory
Of offences notified undeJ" section 3.
(2) Subject to any orders which the Central Gov-
/ errunent may make in this ~half, members of the said
police establishment shall have throughout any Union
territory in relation to the investigation of such offences
and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all
the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police
officers of that Union territory have in conn~ction with
the investigation of offences committed therein.
( 3) Any member of the said police establishment
of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to
any orders which the Central Government may make
in this behalf, exercise in any Union territory any of
the powers of the officer in charge of a police station in
the area in which he is for the time being and when so
exercisin~ such powers shall, subject to any such orders
as aforesaid, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a
police station discharging the
functions of such an
officer within the limits of his station."
Section 3 which empowers the Central Government to specify
the offences to be investigated ttr the D.S.P.E. has already beenset ?Ut.
T~e notification dated November 6, 1956 referred to
earlier specdies numerous offences under various enactments including a large number of ordinary offences under I.P.C. Clauses
(a) to (J) of this notification take within their fold
offences
under a number Of statute& specified therein. Clause (k) extends
the sweep of this notification by including in its 'scope attempts,
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.ll.
abetments and conspiracies in re:l_ation to ~r in connection with the
ofienQes mentioned in ell. (a) to (h) and also any other offence
committed in the course of those transactions arising out of the
same facts. It may also be stared that after 1956 iri a number of
further notifications the list of tho offences specified under s. 3 has
increased manifold. We consider it u~necessary to refer to them
in detail. According to s. 4 t~ superintendence of D.S.P.E. vests
in the Central Government and s.
5 empowers the Central
Government to extend to any area in a State not being a Union
territory the powers and jurisdiction of, members of this establish·
ment for the investigation of any offences or classes of offences specified under s. 3. Subject to the orders of the Central Government
the members of such Establishmerl.t exercising such extended
powers and jurisdiction are to be deemed to be members of the
police force of that area for the purpose of powers, functions, pri·
vileges and liabilities.
But the power and jurisdiction of a mem·
bet of D.S.P.E. in such State is to be exercised only with the con·
sent :Of the Government of the State concerned. The scheme of
this Act does not either expressly or by necessary implication divest
the regular police authorities of their jurisdiction, power and com·
petence to investigate into.offences under any other comptent law.
As a general rule, it would require clear and express language to
effectively exclude as a matter of law the power of investigation of
all the offences mentioned in this notification from the jurisdiction
and competence of the regular police authorities conferred on them
· by Cr. P.C. and other laws and to vest this power exclusivefy in the
D.S.P.E. The D.S.P.E. Act seems to be only permissiVe or empowering, intended merely to enable the D.S.P.E. also to investi·
gate into· the offences specified as contemplated by, s. 3 without
impairing any other law empowering the regular police authorities
to investigate offences.
Turning now to the Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947),
we find that this Act was enacted in March, 194 7 several months
after the enactment of the D.S.P.E. Act for the more effective pre·
vention of brivery and corruption. By virtue of s. 3 of the Act an
offence under s. 165A, I.P.C. was made a cognizable offence ·for
1he purposes of Cr. P.C. notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in that Code. Section 4 provides for presumptions in
certain cases. Section '5 defines criminal misconduct and also provides for punishment for such offences. It further proVides for
punishment for habitual commission of offences under ss. 162, 163
and 165, I.P.C. and also renderers punishable attempts to commit
some offences. Section S is expressly stated to operate in addition
~
an~ nodn derogation of other laws. Section SA which is of
importance may here be set out :
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.,SA. Investigation into cases under this Act:
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A. C. SHARMA v. DELHI ADMN. (Dua, /.)
( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no police officer
below the rank,-
( a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the presidency-towns of Calcutta and Madras,
of an Assistant Commissioner of Police;
(c) in the presidency-town of Bombay, of a Superintendent of Police; and
487
(d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police,
shall investigate any offence punishable under section
161, section 165 or section 165A of the Indian Penal
Code or under section 5 of this Act without the order of
a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class;
as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without
a warrant :
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank
of an Inspector of Police iL authorised by the State
Government in this behalf by general or special order, he
may also investigate any such offence without the order
of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first
class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without
a warrant:
Provided further that an offence referred to in clause
(e) of sub-section ( 1) of section 5 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the
rank of a Superintendent of Police.
(2) If, from information received or otherwise, a
police officer has reason to .suspect the commission of an
offence which he is empowered to investigate under subliection ( 1 ) and considers that for the purpose of investigation or inquiry into such offence, it is necessary to ins*
pect any bankers' books, then, notwitllstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force, he may
inspect any bankers' books in so far as they relate to the
accounts of the person s~spected to have committed that
offence or of any other person suspected to be holding
money on behalf of such person, and take or cause to be
taken certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom,
and the bank concerned shall be bound to assist the
police officer in the exercise of his powers under this
sub-section :
Provided that no power under this sub-section in
relation to the accounts of any person shall be exercised
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
by a poliee officer below the rank of a Superintendent of
Police, unless he is specially authorised in this behalf by
a police officer of or above the rank of a Superintendent
of Police.
Explanation:-ln . this sub-section, the expressions
'bank' arid 'bankers'· books' shall have the meanings
assigned to them in the Bankers' Books Evidence Act,
1891."
Sub-section ( 1) of this section, while regulating the competence of
the officers both of D.S.P.E. and of the regular police force to investigate offences to the extent considered necessary, over-rides the
provisions of Cr. P.C. It expressly prohibits police officers, including those of the D.S.P.E., below certain ranks, from investigating
into offences, under ss. 161, 165 and 165A, I.P.C. and under s.
5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, withOut orders of Magistrates
specified therein and from effecting arrests for those offences without a warrant. The plain meaning of this sub-section appears to
be that Inspectors of Pollee of D.S.P .E. In all places, Assistant
Commissioners of Police in the Presidency Towns ol Calcutta and
Madras, Superintendents of Police in the Presidency Town - of
Bombay, and Deputy Superintendents of Police in all places, other
than Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, are
authorised to investigate into the offences mentioned therein. The
word "elsewhere" incl. (d) does not indicate, as was contended by
Mr. Anthony that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is debarred
from investigating offences mentioned in this clause even when so
ordered by a Magistrate of the First Class in the areas in which
D.S.P.E. is also empowered to function. The word "elsewhere" in
cl. (d) appears to us to refer only to the three Presidency towns
mentioned in ell. (b) and (c). This sub-section, therefore, does
not confer sole power on D.S.P.E. to investigate into the offences
mentioned therein to the· complete exclusion of the regular police
force. It is merely concerned with the object of making provision
for safeguarding against arbitrary use of power of investigation by
officers below certain ranks, so that public servants concerned are
saved from frivolous harassment at the hands of disgruntled persons. In this connection it is also noteworthy that apart from the
~triction contained in s. SA. ( 1) the aoPlicability of the provisions of Cr. P.C. to the. proceedinl!s in relation to the aforesaid
offences is, subject to eertain modifications contained in s. 7 A, expressly recognised.- The schemes of the two enactments, namely,
the D.S.P.E. Act. 1946 and the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947. suggest that they are intended to serve · as supolementa:ry
provisions of law .desi20ed to function harmoniouslv in aid of each
other and of the eXisting rel!lllar pollee investi2atinll alleocies for
~ffectively achieving the object of successful investigation into the
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489
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serious offences mentioned in s. SA without unreasonably exposing
the public servant concernerl to frivolous a~d vexatious proceedings. Mr. Nariman also drew our attention to D.O. No. 21/8/63GD dated October 5, 1963, .addressed by the Central Bureau of
Investigation, Ministry of .Home Affairs, Government of India to
the Inspectors General of Poli_ce inviting their attention to . the
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Government of India Resolution No. 4/31/61-T dated Apnl lJ
1963 establishing the Central Bureau of Investigation consisting of
six Divisions to assist the State Police Forces. The authority of
Central Bureau is stated therein to have been derived from the
D.S.P.E. Act. In this letter para 6 reads :
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"6. In this connection it may also be mentioned that,
on account of inadequacy of staff, it is not possible for
the S.P.E. Division to take up every one of the cases
which might fall under the categories mentioned in the
Annexure to the Government of India Resolution and
which might be considered sUitable for investigation by
the S.P.E. Division. A certain ill.scretion has, therefore,
to be exercised in taking up cases for investigation. In
some instances it may not be possible for it to take up
even those cases which are committed by Central
Government servants, e.g., petty cases of theft, misappropriation, cheating. Such cases could be dealt with
more easily and more expeditiously by the local police
which has concurrent jurisdiction over these cases also."
In para 7 it is stated that for successful investigation of cases it is
most essential that a quick decision is taken about the Agency
which has to investigate them. One of the Agencies mentioned
therein is S.P.E. Division of the C.B.I. In para 8 it is stated that
in respect of cases involving Public Servants or Public Concerns
there is an· administrative arrangement and understanding between
tho S.P.E. and the State Police about the manner in which they
are to be dealt with so as to avoid difficulties and delays. This
para then refers to the existing procedure and practice which, it is
suggested, should continue to be valid in future. No doubt. this
letter contains onlv administrative instru.ctions but it clearly shows
the construction olaced during all these years by the administrative
officers concerned with administering this law on the provisions of
the S.P.E. and the Prevention of Cprruotion Act.
If the v1ews
stated in this letter' is not clearly a2ainst the lanruage and scheme
of these Acts then it i~ entitled to due consideration and has s('lrne
persuasive value.
The contention raic;ed bv Mr. Anthonv ~at
Delhi not beine a State but onlv a Union territorv. the directions
contained in D 0. No 21/ll/t;~.nn are inannlicabl~ and that
i,n Delhi it is ontv the D.S.P.E. whiC'h has e:~tcluc;ive authoritv to investigate into the offences mentioned ins. 5A is not easy to'accept.
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490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C,Il,
Reference to the State Police force in that D.O. in our view in·
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eludes the police force of the Union territory of Delhi.
As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to law. In 1his
connection it may not be out of place al~o to point out that the
function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any
irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence
can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial
by an otherwise competent court of the offence so investigated. In
H. N. Rishabud & Inder Singh v. State of Delhi(l) it was held th~t
an i11egality committed in the course of investigation does not affect
the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where
·c(ll,gn.izance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has
proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investiga·
tion does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been
caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions
relating to investigation is brought to the notice of the coun at an
.early stage of the trial the court will have to consider the nature
and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such
reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such
officer as it consider appropriate with reference to the requirements
of s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1952. This decision
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was followed in Munna Lal v. The State of U.P.(2) where the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak A.li(8) was distin·
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guished. The same view was taken in the State of Andhfa Pradesh
v. M. Venugopal( 4 ) and more recently in Khllndu Sonu Dhobi v.
State of Maharashtra('). The decisions of the Calcutta, Punjab
and Saurashtra High Courts relied upon by Mr. Anthony deal with
different points : in any event to the extent they contain any observations against the view expressed by this Court in the decision
just cited those observations cannot be considered good law.
This takes us to the merits of the case. Mr. Anthony referred
us to the evidence of Bakht Ram, the complainant (P.W. 1) and
<Submitted that this witness has told lies in the witness box. P.W.
4 D.C.