# A. K. JAIN & ORS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 673
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-07-25
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 189 of 1966
- **Bench:** S. M. S!Kri, G. K. Mitter, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-k-jain-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-4678
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Essential Conunodities Act, 1955, s. 3-Sugarcane (Control) Order
1955 Rule 3(3)-0ffence if purchaser does not pay price of sugarcane
p"rcliased, within 14 days-Validity of rule-Whether s. 3 of Act deals
H'ith food crops or only with foodstuffs-Competence of Parliament to
pass s. 3-Eff.ect of Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1947-Fundaw
n1c111al right under Art.
19(1) of
Constitution whether
affected fry
in1p11gned rule-Offence whether cognizable within meaning of s. 4( 1) (f J
Code of Criminal Pro~edure.
The appellants were the cffice bearers of a sugar concern.
A complaint \Vith the police was registered against them under sub-rule 3 of Rule
3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order. 1955 read with s. 7 of the Essential
Commodities Act. 1955, on the ground that they had failed to pay to the
sellers \vithin the time prescribed the price of the suga~rcane purchased
by them. Objecting to the investig&tion of the alleged offence the appellants
filed a writ petition under.Art. 226 of the Constitution but the High Court
refused to interfere. By special Jeave they came to this Court The contentions urged on behalf of the appellants were (i) that sul1-rule 3 of
rule 3 could not have been validly issued under s. 3 of the Essential Comn1odities Act because -the 1atter section applied only to foodstuffs and not
to food crops, (ii) that the regulation of the price of sugarcane being
expressly dealt 'vith by the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 the
s.3me power could not by implication be spelt out from the provisions of
the Order and the Act, (jii) that Parliament had no competence to enact
2ny lav.1 relating to the .Control of sugarcane as that sub.iect v.'as within
the exclusive legislative juFisdiction of the State, the same being a part of
agriculture, (iv) th,at there was violatioo of the fundamental rieht under
Art. 19(1) of the Constitution by the impugned order. (v) that in view of
s. 11 of the Act no cognizance could have been taken of the offence.
(\•i) that the complaint made before the police did not disclose a cognizable
offence and as such the police was not empowered to
invcsti2ate th~
con1plaint.
HELD : (i) Jn view c)f the scheme of ss. 2 and 3 of the Act and the
judgment of this Court in Ch. Tika .Raniji',f case the contention that food
croos \vere outside . the purvk·w of s. 3 of the Act
must be rejected.
r675 B-GJ
Ch. Tika Ramii & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1956] S.C.R. 4.12.
applied.
(ii) The power sought to be exercised in tl_lf" present case was not an
implied one for .sub-rule (3) of rule 3 gives a sp~cific mandate that unless
there is an agreement in· :writiog to the contrary between the parties the
purchaser shall nay to the seller the price of the sugarcane purchased
within 14 days. [676 G·H]
674
SUPREME COUAT REPORTS
[1970] I s.c.R.
A
Even if the Bihar Sugar Factories Control, Act, 1937 provides anything
to the contrary it must be held to have been altered by a competent authority namely Parliament, under Art, 372 of the Constitution. [677 A-BJ
(iii) Parliament was competent to enact the Essential Commodities
Act and to confer power on the Government under s. 3 of the Act as Entry
33 of List Ill of the Constitution empowers Parliament to legislate in re$-
pect of production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs. [677 C-DJ
B
(iv) There was no contravention of Art. 19(1) because no fundamental
right is conferred on a buyer not to pay the price of the goods purchased
.by him or to pay the same whenever he pleases. [677 EJ
(v) The plea based on s, 11 of the Act was premature because no
-court had yet taken rognizance of the case. [677 F]
(vi) The offence complained of was punishable with three years' imC
prisonment and fell within the 2nd Schedule of the Code of Criminal Pro-
·cedure.
It was therefore a cognizable offence as defined in s. 4(1)(0
of the Code. [677 GJ

## Text

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A. K. JAIN & ORS.
V.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
July 25, 1969
(S. M. S!KRI, G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Essential Conunodities Act, 1955, s. 3-Sugarcane (Control) Order
1955 Rule 3(3)-0ffence if purchaser does not pay price of sugarcane
p"rcliased, within 14 days-Validity of rule-Whether s. 3 of Act deals
H'ith food crops or only with foodstuffs-Competence of Parliament to
pass s. 3-Eff.ect of Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1947-Fundaw
n1c111al right under Art.
19(1) of
Constitution whether
affected fry
in1p11gned rule-Offence whether cognizable within meaning of s. 4( 1) (f J
Code of Criminal Pro~edure.
The appellants were the cffice bearers of a sugar concern.
A complaint \Vith the police was registered against them under sub-rule 3 of Rule
3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order. 1955 read with s. 7 of the Essential
Commodities Act. 1955, on the ground that they had failed to pay to the
sellers \vithin the time prescribed the price of the suga~rcane purchased
by them. Objecting to the investig&tion of the alleged offence the appellants
filed a writ petition under.Art. 226 of the Constitution but the High Court
refused to interfere. By special Jeave they came to this Court The contentions urged on behalf of the appellants were (i) that sul1-rule 3 of
rule 3 could not have been validly issued under s. 3 of the Essential Comn1odities Act because -the 1atter section applied only to foodstuffs and not
to food crops, (ii) that the regulation of the price of sugarcane being
expressly dealt 'vith by the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 the
s.3me power could not by implication be spelt out from the provisions of
the Order and the Act, (jii) that Parliament had no competence to enact
2ny lav.1 relating to the .Control of sugarcane as that sub.iect v.'as within
the exclusive legislative juFisdiction of the State, the same being a part of
agriculture, (iv) th,at there was violatioo of the fundamental rieht under
Art. 19(1) of the Constitution by the impugned order. (v) that in view of
s. 11 of the Act no cognizance could have been taken of the offence.
(\•i) that the complaint made before the police did not disclose a cognizable
offence and as such the police was not empowered to
invcsti2ate th~
con1plaint.
HELD : (i) Jn view c)f the scheme of ss. 2 and 3 of the Act and the
judgment of this Court in Ch. Tika .Raniji',f case the contention that food
croos \vere outside . the purvk·w of s. 3 of the Act
must be rejected.
r675 B-GJ
Ch. Tika Ramii & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1956] S.C.R. 4.12.
applied.
(ii) The power sought to be exercised in tl_lf" present case was not an
implied one for .sub-rule (3) of rule 3 gives a sp~cific mandate that unless
there is an agreement in· :writiog to the contrary between the parties the
purchaser shall nay to the seller the price of the sugarcane purchased
within 14 days. [676 G·H]
674
SUPREME COUAT REPORTS
[1970] I s.c.R.
A
Even if the Bihar Sugar Factories Control, Act, 1937 provides anything
to the contrary it must be held to have been altered by a competent authority namely Parliament, under Art, 372 of the Constitution. [677 A-BJ
(iii) Parliament was competent to enact the Essential Commodities
Act and to confer power on the Government under s. 3 of the Act as Entry
33 of List Ill of the Constitution empowers Parliament to legislate in re$-
pect of production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs. [677 C-DJ
B
(iv) There was no contravention of Art. 19(1) because no fundamental
right is conferred on a buyer not to pay the price of the goods purchased
.by him or to pay the same whenever he pleases. [677 EJ
(v) The plea based on s, 11 of the Act was premature because no
-court had yet taken rognizance of the case. [677 F]
(vi) The offence complained of was punishable with three years' imC
prisonment and fell within the 2nd Schedule of the Code of Criminal Pro-
·cedure.
It was therefore a cognizable offence as defined in s. 4(1)(0
of the Code. [677 GJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
189 of 1966.
Appeaf by special leave from the judgment and order dated
D
July 4, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Crimi,nal W.J.C. No. 11
of 1966.
B. R. L. Iyengar and U. P. Singh, for the appellants.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and
S. P. Nayar, for respondent
No. I.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. This appeal against the decision of the High Court
of Patna in Criminal W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966 was brought af!Er
obtaining special leave from this Court.
The principal question
raised herein is whether the investigation which is being carried
on against the appellants under sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955 (to be hereinafter rofcrred to as the
Order) read with s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (to
be hereinafter referred to as the Act) is in accordance with law.
The appellants arc office bearers of M/s. S. K. G. Sugar, Ltd.
(Lauriyll). A complaint has been registered against them under
sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of the Order read with s. 7 of the Act on
the ground that they have failed to pay to the sellers the price of
the sugarcane purcha~ed by them, within the time prescribed.
The said complaint is being investigated.
The appellants are
objecting to that investigation on various grounds.
They unsuccessfully sought the intervention of the High Court of Patna
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in Cr. W.J.C. No. 11 of
1966. Hence this appeal.
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A. K,' JAIN v. UNION (Hegde, !.)
67 5
Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar appearing for the appellants challenged:
the validity of the investigation in question on various grounds.
We shall now proceed to deal with each one of those grounds.
The 1st contention. of Mr. Iyengar was that sub-rule (3) of
rule 3 could not have been validly issued under s. 3 of the Act.
According to him the said s. 3 cannot be used for controlling the
payment of the price of food crops; it can only deal with foodstuffs; food .crops are o\itside its scope. This contention has been,
negatived by the High ~ourt. We agree with the High Court that
there is no merit in this contention.
Section 2(a) of the Act
defines "essential commodity". Sub-cl. (v) of that clause brings
foodstuffs within the definition of essential commodity. Clause (b)
of s. 2 provides that food-crops include sugarcane. The next im·
portant provisions in the Act are els. (b) and ( c) of s. 3 ( 1).
Section 3 ( 1 ) provides ·that if the-Central Government is of opinion·
that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their
equitable distribution. and availability at fair prices, it may, by
order, provide for regulating or prohibiting · the production,
supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.
Sub-s. (2) of that section says that without prejudice to the
generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) an order made
thereunder may provide .. · ...
"(b) for bringing under cultivation any waste or
arable land, whether appurtenant to a building or not,
for the growing !hereon of food-crops generally or of
specified food-crops, and for otherwise maintaining or
increasing the cultivation of food-crops generally, or of
specified food-crops;"
Clause ( c) provides for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold.
From the scheme of
els. (b) and ( c) of s, 2 and s. 3 of tile Act, .it is clear that the
Parliament intended to bring under control the cultivation and
sale of food-crops. In view of these provisions it is idle to :ontend that sugarcane does not come within the ambit :if the Act.
The question whether the cultivation and sale. of sugarcane can
be regulated under s. g of the Act came up f(>r the consideration
of this Court ih Ch. Tika Ramji and Ors. e.·..:. v. The State of U.P.
and Ors.(')
At page& 432 and 433 of the report it is observed :
"Act X of 1~55 included;;Within the definition of
essential commodity foodstuffS which we have seen
above would incfode sugar as Well as sugarcane. This
Act was enacted 'by Parliament in exercise of the conm (1956) S.C.R. 432.
·676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] l S.C.R.
current legislative power under Entry 3 3 of List III as
amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act,
1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops
of sugarcane and section 3 ( 1 ) gave the Central Government powers to control the production, supply and
distribution of essential commodities and trade and
commerce therein for maintaining or increasing the supplies thereof er for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices.
Section 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government to provide inter alia
for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land
whether appurtenant to a building or not for growing
thereon of foodcrops generally or specified foodcrops
ans section 3 (2 )( c) gave the Central Government
power for controlling the price at which any ess~ntial
commodity may be bought or sold.
These prov1s1ons
w.:mld certainly bring within the scope of Central legislation the regulation of the production of sugarcane as
also the controlling of the price at which sugarcane may
be bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control
Order, 1955 which was issued by the Central Government on 27th August, 1955, it also issued the Sugare11ne Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing
it With the power to fix the price of sugarcane and direct
payment thereof as also the power to regulate the movement of sugarcane.
Parliament was well within its powers in legislating
ill regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was
also well within its powers in issuing the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 in the manner it did because all this
',las in exercise of the concurrent power of legislation
under Entry 3 3 of List UL"
It 1-i needless to say anything more on this question.
It '!+as next contended by Mr. Iyengar that the regulation of
·the IJCi:ce of sugarcane is expressly dealt with by the Bihar Sugar
Factorlell Control Act, 1937 and therefore we should not impliedly ~pell out the same power from the provisions of t.he Order
and the Act.
Mr. Iyengar is not right in cmltending that the
power that is sought to be exercised in the instant case is an implied one. Sub-rule (3) of rule 3 specifically provides that unless
t~ere is an agreement in writing to the contrary between the par-
!ies the purc~as~r shall pay to the seller the price of the sugarcane
purchased w1thip .14 days from the date of the delivery of the
s~garcane .. Tins 1s a specific mandate. If the Bihar Act pro-
·v1des anythmg to the contrary the same mnst be held to have been
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A. K. JAIN' v. UNION (Hegde, J.)
677
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altered in view of Art. 372 of the Constitution which· provides
that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before
the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force
therein until ~ltered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. Quite_ clearly the Bihar Act
is a pre-Constitution Act and it could have continued to be in
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force only till it was altered, repealed or amended by a compe.ent
legislature or other competent authority.
We shall presently see
that the authority that altered or amended that law is a competent
one.
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The next contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants
was that the Parliame.nt had no competence to enact any law
relating to the control of sugarcane as that subject is within the
exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the State, the same being a
part of agriculture. This contention is again unsustainable in
view of Entry 33 of List III of the Constitution which empowers
the Parliament to legislate in respect of production, supply and
distribution of foodstuffs.
It is not disputed that the Parliament
had declared by law that it is expedient in public interest that it
should exercise control over foodstuffs. That being so it was well
within the competence of Parliament to enact the Act and hence
the power conferred on the Government ·under s. 3 of the Act
cannot be challenged as invali:I.
There is no substance in the contention that the impugned
order contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to !he citizens
under Art. 19 (1). No fundamentai right is conferred on a buyer
not to pay the price of: the goods purchased by him or to pay the
s~me whenever he pleases.
The contention that in view of s. 11 of the Act, no cognizance
could have been taken of the offence alleged is premature.
111is
question does not arise in this case.
No court has yet taken
co~nizance of the case.
That stage has still to come.
There is no substa)lce in the contention that the compfaint
made before the police does not disclose a cognizable offence and
as such the police could not have taken up the inves.igation of
that complaint.
The offence complairied of is punishable with
three years· imprisonment and as such it falls within the 2nd Sch.
of the Cr. P.C. and consequently the same is a cognizable offence
as defined in s. 4(l)(f) of the Cr. P.C.
Hence it \\as open to
the police to investigate the same.
For the reasons mentioned above we. are unable to accept any
of the c?ntention advanced on &half of the appellants.
In the
result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.