# A. K. K. NAMBIAR v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 121
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-10-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1406 of 1969
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-k-k-nambiar-v-union-of-india-anr-4892
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

121
A
A. K. K. NAMBIAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
October 28, 1969
B
[J. C. SHAH; J, M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE
c
D
E
r
G
H
AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
All India Service (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1955-Rule ?-Order
of suspension of officer charged with criminal offence-:-Order is under
R. 7(3) and not R. 1(1)-Ma/a fides-Proof of-Affidavits, verification of.
The appellant was appointed to the Indian Police Service in 1935. In
November 1956 he was posted in Andhra Pr.adesh as Inspector-General elf
Police and in August 1967 he was posted as Special Inspector-Oeneral of
Police for revision of Police Standing Orders. In that year the Chief
Minister of Aodhra Pradesh ordered the Chief Secretary to make an
enquiry with regard to certain allegations against the appellant. The Chief
Secretary recommended that the matter be referred to the Vigilance Commissioner who advised that the matter be investigated
by
the Central
Bureau of Investigation.
Thereafter the said Bureau made an enquiry,
considered the appellant's explanations and made a report. In July 1968
the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs placed the appellant
under suspension. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court
at Delhi and failing there filed an appeal in this Court. The appellant's
contentions that fell for consideration were (i) that under sub-r. (I) of
R. 7 of the All India Service (Appeal and Discipline) Rules, 1955
the
order of suspension could be made only j1f disciplinary proceeding was
initiated and the Government was satisfied that there should be an ordet;
in the present case the order did not satisfy this condition and was therefore bad; (ii) that the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh was hostile to
him and the investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation was conducted by persons hostile to him; the Ministry of Home Affairs should not
have relied on the report since the enquiry was initiated and conducted
ma/a-fide.
HELD: (i) The order in question had no reference to sub-r. (I) of
R. 7, but was an order under R. 7 ( 3) which states . that a member elf the
service in respect of or against whom an investigation inquiry or trial is
pending may, at the discretion of the Government under which he is serv1ag, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings
relating to the charge. The appellant, as appeared from the First Information Report against him stood charged with offences under the Prevention
of Corruption Act and the time of occurrence was the period 1960 to
1967. There was an investigation and the trial was awaiting relating to
the criminal charge against the appellant. The order of suspension had to
be read in the context of the entire case and the combination of circumstances. This order indicated that the Government applied its mind ta the
allegations, the enquiries and the circumstances of the case. The appellant
had failed to establish that the Government acted ma/a fide. There was no
allegation against any particular afficer af the Government of India about
acting mala fide. The order of su&pension. thus made under sub-r. (3) did
not suffer from any vice of infringement of R. 7(1). [124 D-125 Bl
(ii), The affidavits of the parties in the present case suffered.from the
misch•f of lack of verification with the result that the affidavits should
L6 Sup. C.I./70---9
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
not be admissible in evidence. The impbrtance of verification is to test
A
the genuineness and authenticity cJf allegations and also to make the dep<>-
nent responsible for allegations.
In essence verification
is required to
enable the court to find out as to whether it will be safe to act on sru:h
affidavit evidence. [125 C-E]
The affidavit evidence assumed
importance in the present case be·
cause of allegations of ma/a fide acts on the part of the r .. po.ndents. ,The
B
appellant did not name any person of the Union of India who acted iB
that manner and did not implead the Chief Minister as a p

## Text

121
A
A. K. K. NAMBIAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
October 28, 1969
B
[J. C. SHAH; J, M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE
c
D
E
r
G
H
AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
All India Service (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1955-Rule ?-Order
of suspension of officer charged with criminal offence-:-Order is under
R. 7(3) and not R. 1(1)-Ma/a fides-Proof of-Affidavits, verification of.
The appellant was appointed to the Indian Police Service in 1935. In
November 1956 he was posted in Andhra Pr.adesh as Inspector-General elf
Police and in August 1967 he was posted as Special Inspector-Oeneral of
Police for revision of Police Standing Orders. In that year the Chief
Minister of Aodhra Pradesh ordered the Chief Secretary to make an
enquiry with regard to certain allegations against the appellant. The Chief
Secretary recommended that the matter be referred to the Vigilance Commissioner who advised that the matter be investigated
by
the Central
Bureau of Investigation.
Thereafter the said Bureau made an enquiry,
considered the appellant's explanations and made a report. In July 1968
the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs placed the appellant
under suspension. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court
at Delhi and failing there filed an appeal in this Court. The appellant's
contentions that fell for consideration were (i) that under sub-r. (I) of
R. 7 of the All India Service (Appeal and Discipline) Rules, 1955
the
order of suspension could be made only j1f disciplinary proceeding was
initiated and the Government was satisfied that there should be an ordet;
in the present case the order did not satisfy this condition and was therefore bad; (ii) that the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh was hostile to
him and the investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation was conducted by persons hostile to him; the Ministry of Home Affairs should not
have relied on the report since the enquiry was initiated and conducted
ma/a-fide.
HELD: (i) The order in question had no reference to sub-r. (I) of
R. 7, but was an order under R. 7 ( 3) which states . that a member elf the
service in respect of or against whom an investigation inquiry or trial is
pending may, at the discretion of the Government under which he is serv1ag, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings
relating to the charge. The appellant, as appeared from the First Information Report against him stood charged with offences under the Prevention
of Corruption Act and the time of occurrence was the period 1960 to
1967. There was an investigation and the trial was awaiting relating to
the criminal charge against the appellant. The order of suspension had to
be read in the context of the entire case and the combination of circumstances. This order indicated that the Government applied its mind ta the
allegations, the enquiries and the circumstances of the case. The appellant
had failed to establish that the Government acted ma/a fide. There was no
allegation against any particular afficer af the Government of India about
acting mala fide. The order of su&pension. thus made under sub-r. (3) did
not suffer from any vice of infringement of R. 7(1). [124 D-125 Bl
(ii), The affidavits of the parties in the present case suffered.from the
misch•f of lack of verification with the result that the affidavits should
L6 Sup. C.I./70---9
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
not be admissible in evidence. The impbrtance of verification is to test
A
the genuineness and authenticity cJf allegations and also to make the dep<>-
nent responsible for allegations.
In essence verification
is required to
enable the court to find out as to whether it will be safe to act on sru:h
affidavit evidence. [125 C-E]
The affidavit evidence assumed
importance in the present case be·
cause of allegations of ma/a fide acts on the part of the r .. po.ndents. ,The
B
appellant did not name any person of the Union of India who acted iB
that manner and did not implead the Chief Minister as a party. Jn order
to succeed on the proof of mala fi4es in relation to the order of suspension,
the appellant had to prove either that the order of suspension was made
ma/a fide or that tl!e order was made for collateral purposes. The appellant had neither alleged nor established either of these features. [125 F-0]
The allegation of ma/a fide against the central Bureau of Investigation
C
did not arise for consideration because what
wa'S in question was not its
report but the order of suspension wh;-,h satisfied R.
7 ( 3) and was in
honest exercise of powers. [125 HJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1406 of
1969.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 17, 1969 of
the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 611 of 1968.
The appellant appeared in person.
Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Mehta and R. N.
Sachthey, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ray, J.-This appeal by certificate from the judgment of the
High Court at Delhi challenges the order dated 5th July, 1968
placing the appellant under suspension.
The appellant canvassed two grounds : first, that the order of
suspension was passed on a report which was made ma/a fide, and,
therefore, the order of suspension was bad; secondly, the order of
suspension was made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of the All-India
Service (Appeal and Discipline) Rules, 1955, and is, therefore,
liat\le to .be quashed.
The appellant was appointed to the Indian Police Service in
the year 1935.
He was posted as Inspector General of Police of
the State of Andhra Pradesh, on 1 November, 1956. He was
confirmed as Inspector General of Police, Andhra Pradesh in the
year 1957.
On 14' May, 1966, he reached the age of 55 years.
He, however, continued to work as Inspector General of Police,
Andhra Pradesh up to 1 August, 1967. He was then posted as
Special Inspector General of Police for the revision of Police
Standing Orders.
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A. K. K, NAMBIAR V. UNION (Ray, J,)
123
Some time in the year 1967 the Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh ordered that the Chief Secretary should make an enquiry
with regard to certain allegations against the appellant. The
Chief Secretary recommended that the Vigilance Commissioner
in the State of Andhra Pradesh might be requested to look into
the matter.
The Vigilance Commissioner advised that the enquiry
should be conducted by an independ~nt agency like the Central
Bureau of Investigation.
The Central Bureau of Investigation
thereafter made an enquiry. · The appellant was given allegations
to answer.
The appellant submitted explanation and was
examined.
The Central Bureau of Investigation made a report on
the enquiry.
On 11 July, 1968 the Government of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs made an order placing the appellant under suspension.
The appellant alleged as follows. The Chief Minister of the State
of Andhra Pradesh was inimical and hostile to the appellant since
the time of the General Elections in the year 1967.
The investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation was conducted by
persons who were hostile to the appellant.
The Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, should not have relied on the report
because the initiation and the conduct of the enquiry were motivated ma/a fide on the part of the Chief Minister of the State and
other persons.
The other contention of the appellant was that under sub-rule
(I) of Rule 7 of the All-India Service (Appeal and Discipline)
Rules, 1955 the order of suspension could be made only if disciplinary proceeding was initiated and the Government was satisfied
that there should be an order and in the present case the order did
not satisfy the provisions of the rule, and therefore, the order is
bad.
The pre-eminent question in this appeal is whether the order
of suspension is in infraction of Rule 7.
Rule 7 is as follows :-
"( 1) If having regard to the nature of the charges
and the circumstances in any case the Government which
initiates any disciplinary proceeding is satisfied that it is
necessary or desirable to place under suspension the
member of the Service against whom such proceedings
are started that Government may-
( a). if the member of the Service is serving under it
pass a.D. order placing him under suspension, or
(b) if the member of the Service is serving &nother
Government, request that Government to place him
under suspension, pending the conclusion of the inquiry
and the passing of the. final order in the case :
124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
Provided that in cases where there is a difference of
opinion between two State Governments the matter shall
be referred to the Central Government whose decision
thereon shall be final.
(2)
(3) A member of the Service in respect of or against
whom, an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a
criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the
Government under which he is serving, be placed under
suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his
position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves
moral turpitude" .
. . Rule 7 sub-rule (1) contemplates suspension when disciplinary
proceeding is initiated and the Government is satisfied that it is
necessary to place a member of the Service under suspension. It
was contended by the appellant that the order of suspension was
made under sub-rule (1) in the present case without any disciplinary proceedings. The order does not have any reference to
sub-rule (1) of Rule 7.
The order recites first .that there are
serious
allegations of corruption and malpractices against the
appellant, secondly that the enquiry made by the Central Government revealed that there is a prima facie case and t);iirdly that the
Government of India after considering the available material and
having regard to the nature of the allegations against the appellant, the circumstances of the case is satisfied that it is necessary
and desirable to place the appellant under suspe~ion. -..
At the hearing of the appeal Mr. Solicitor General produced
the correct copy of the First Information Report dated 17 August,
1967 under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It
will appear from the report that the appellant was charged with
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 and the
time {)f· occurrence was the period 1960 to 1967.
Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 states that a member of the Service in
respect of, or against·whom, an investigation, inquiry or trial
relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of
the Government under which he is serving, be placed under
suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that
charge.
The appellant contended that the appellant was not
suspended under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7.
That is a contention.
The facts are that there was an investigation and the trial is awaiting relating to a criminal charge against the appellant. The order
of suspension has to•be read in.the cm;1text of the en\4fel,case and
.
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A. K. K. NAMBIAR v. UNION (Ray, J.)
125
combination of circumstances. This order indicates that
the
Government applied its mind to the allegations, the enquiries and
the circumstances of the case.
The appellant has failed to establish that the Government acted mala fide. There is no allegation
against any particular officer of the Government of India about
acting ma/a fide.
The order or suspension was made under subrule (3) and does not suffer from any vice of infringement of Rule
7.
The appellant made allegations against the Chief Minister of
Andhra Pradesh and other persons some of whose names were
disclosed and some of whose names were not disclosed. Neither
the Chief Minister nor any other person was made a party.
The
appellant filed an affidavit in support of the petition. Neither the
petition nor the affidavit was verified. The affidavits which were
filed in answer to the appellant's petition were also not verified.
The reason for verificaiton of affidavits are to enable the Cou1t to
find out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit
evidence of rival parties.
Allegations may be true to knowledge
or allegations may be true to information received from persons or
allegations may be based on records. The importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and
also to make the deponent responsible for allegations.
In essence
verification is required to enable the Court to find out as to whether
it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence.
In the present
case, the affidavits of all the parties suffer from the mischief of
lack of proper verification with the result that the affidavits should
not be admissible in evidence.
The affidavit evidence assumes importance in the present case ,
because of allegations of ma/a fide acts on the part :if the respondents.
The appellant alleged that the Union of India made the
order of suspension because of the pressure of the Chief Minister
of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The appellant, however, did not
name any person of the Union of India who acted in that manner
and did not implead the Chief Minister as a party.
In order to
succee<) on the proof of mala fides in relation to the order of suspension, the appellant has to prove either that the order of suspension was made ma/a fide or that the order was made tor col-·
lateral purposes. In the present cas.~. the appellant neither alleged
nor established either of these features.
The appellant contended that the report of the Central Bureau
of Investigation was made ma/a fide.
The appellant appeared
before the investigation authorities.
We are not concerned with
the correctness and the propriety of the report.
We have on! y to
examine whether the order of suspension was warranted by the
rule and also whether it was in honest exercise of powers. The
order of suspension satisfied both the tests in the present case.
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970} 3 s.C.R.
In view of the fact that the criminal case is pending, it is
A
desirable not to express any opinion on the merits and demerits of
the charges as also the rival contentions of the parties because such
an opinion may cause prejudice.
The appellant raised a contention as to the vires of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the validity of the
investigation. In view of the fact that sanction for the trial is
pending pursuant to the investigation under the First Information
Report dated 17 August, 1967 the appellant did not want a
decision on this point in this appeal because the appellant would
raise that contention in the criminal case.
We have, therefore,"
left open the contention as to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to enable the appellant to agitate that contention,
if so advised, in the criminal trial.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. · In view of the
fact that there was no order as to costs in the High Court, we are
of opinion that each party should bear its costs in this Court:
G.C. -
Appeal dismissed.
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