# A. LAKSHMANARACJ v. JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, lST CLASS, PARVATIPURAM &ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] 2 S.C.R. 822
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-11-24
- **Bench:** S. M. S!Kri, V. Bhargava, I. D. Dua; Jj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-lakshmanaracj-v-judicial-magistrate-lst-class-parvatipuram-ors-5127
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 344(1A)-Validiiy-Power to
adjourn and power to remand-Whether guidelines absent;--Order of re-·
mand whether must be made in presence of accusecl to be valid.
The petitioner was arrested on July 17, 1970 and· was produced before
a first class Magistrate next day when he was remanded to judicial custody
under s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. for IS days. He was inform~d at the time of
remand that his arrest was in connection with a case relatina to daco!ty
and murder and conspiracy to commit the same. Although a charge-sheet
had been submitted against about 148 persons accused in the case the·
petioner's name was not among them, because as the police later explained,.
investigations against him had not been completed. The petitioner object'
ed to a second remar.d on August I, 1970 but that very day the prosecution .filed a supplementary charge-sheet including his name.
Remand was
then extended upto August 6 and thereafter upto August 20, 1970.
On·
the last mentioned date he was not produced before the magistrate because
of alleged want of escort and the remand was extended· in his absence. In
a petition under Art, 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged his
detention from August I onwards. The remand order of August 20 was
·challenged on the ground that it was made. in his absence and it was urged'
that the law does not. permit remand without actual ptoduction of the
accused before the Court. The constitutional validity of s: 344(1A) and:
of the Explanation to the section was also challenged.
HEW: (I) In view of this Court's decision in Raj Narain's case it'
could no longer be urged that the production of an accused before the
magistrate for the ·purpose o'f remand was a necessary requirement. though
as a rule of caution it is highly desirable that the accused should be personally produced before the magistrate so that he may if he so chooses
make a representation against his remand.
The orde·r of remand dated
August 20, 1970 was in the circumstances not contrary to law so as to
render the petitioner's custody illegal justifying his release by thi~ Court
on habeas corpus.
It was still open to 'the ·petitioner to apply for bail to
the appropriate court in accordance. with law.
Raf Narain v. Supdt. Central Jail, New Delhi, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 147
applied. [826 G-827 CJ
(ii)Sub-section (IA) of s. 344 of the code vests in the court seized
of a criffl~nal . case, power to postpone the commencement df or adjourn
any inquiry or trial before him by order in writing stating the reason•
therefor from time to time on such terms as the court thinks fit and tor
such time as it considers reasonabie.
When the case is so postponed or
adjourned the court may .also by a warrant remand the accused, if in
custody. The discretion to adjourn being vested in a wurt of law has to
be exercised judicially on welJ recognised principles and is therefore im·
mune from challenge on the ground of arbitrariness dr want of guidelines.
The judicial power to postpone or adjourn the proceedings is to be exer·
...
c
D
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B
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LAXSHMANARAO v. JUDL. MAGISTRATE (Dua, J.)
823
ci- only tr from the absence of witnesses or any other reasonable cause
the court considers it necessary or desirable to do so. It has to record its
reasons for so doing.
Similarly the discretion to order remand of the
accused is to be exercised judicially keeping in view al( the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of the charge the gravity o'i
the alleged offence, the area of investigation, the antecedents of the accused and all other relevant factors which may appropriately help the court
in determining whether to keep the accused in custody or to release him
on bail. Reasonable cause for remand according to the explanation covers
a case where sufficient evidence is obtained to raise suspicion abOut the
complicity of an accused person in the offence and it appears likely :bat
more evidence may be obta:ned by remand. (828 C-E]
Further, both the

## Text

822
A. LAKSHMANARACJ
v.
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, lST CLASS, PARVATIPURAM
&ORS.
November 24, 1970
[S. M. S!KRI, V. BHARGAVA AND I. D. DUA; JJ.J
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 344(1A)-Validiiy-Power to
adjourn and power to remand-Whether guidelines absent;--Order of re-·
mand whether must be made in presence of accusecl to be valid.
The petitioner was arrested on July 17, 1970 and· was produced before
a first class Magistrate next day when he was remanded to judicial custody
under s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. for IS days. He was inform~d at the time of
remand that his arrest was in connection with a case relatina to daco!ty
and murder and conspiracy to commit the same. Although a charge-sheet
had been submitted against about 148 persons accused in the case the·
petioner's name was not among them, because as the police later explained,.
investigations against him had not been completed. The petitioner object'
ed to a second remar.d on August I, 1970 but that very day the prosecution .filed a supplementary charge-sheet including his name.
Remand was
then extended upto August 6 and thereafter upto August 20, 1970.
On·
the last mentioned date he was not produced before the magistrate because
of alleged want of escort and the remand was extended· in his absence. In
a petition under Art, 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged his
detention from August I onwards. The remand order of August 20 was
·challenged on the ground that it was made. in his absence and it was urged'
that the law does not. permit remand without actual ptoduction of the
accused before the Court. The constitutional validity of s: 344(1A) and:
of the Explanation to the section was also challenged.
HEW: (I) In view of this Court's decision in Raj Narain's case it'
could no longer be urged that the production of an accused before the
magistrate for the ·purpose o'f remand was a necessary requirement. though
as a rule of caution it is highly desirable that the accused should be personally produced before the magistrate so that he may if he so chooses
make a representation against his remand.
The orde·r of remand dated
August 20, 1970 was in the circumstances not contrary to law so as to
render the petitioner's custody illegal justifying his release by thi~ Court
on habeas corpus.
It was still open to 'the ·petitioner to apply for bail to
the appropriate court in accordance. with law.
Raf Narain v. Supdt. Central Jail, New Delhi, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 147
applied. [826 G-827 CJ
(ii)Sub-section (IA) of s. 344 of the code vests in the court seized
of a criffl~nal . case, power to postpone the commencement df or adjourn
any inquiry or trial before him by order in writing stating the reason•
therefor from time to time on such terms as the court thinks fit and tor
such time as it considers reasonabie.
When the case is so postponed or
adjourned the court may .also by a warrant remand the accused, if in
custody. The discretion to adjourn being vested in a wurt of law has to
be exercised judicially on welJ recognised principles and is therefore im·
mune from challenge on the ground of arbitrariness dr want of guidelines.
The judicial power to postpone or adjourn the proceedings is to be exer·
...
c
D
A
B
c
D
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LAXSHMANARAO v. JUDL. MAGISTRATE (Dua, J.)
823
ci- only tr from the absence of witnesses or any other reasonable cause
the court considers it necessary or desirable to do so. It has to record its
reasons for so doing.
Similarly the discretion to order remand of the
accused is to be exercised judicially keeping in view al( the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of the charge the gravity o'i
the alleged offence, the area of investigation, the antecedents of the accused and all other relevant factors which may appropriately help the court
in determining whether to keep the accused in custody or to release him
on bail. Reasonable cause for remand according to the explanation covers
a case where sufficient evidence is obtained to raise suspicion abOut the
complicity of an accused person in the offence and it appears likely :bat
more evidence may be obta:ned by remand. (828 C-E]
Further, both the order of adjournment as well as the order of remand
are •ubject to review by the superior cpurts in accordance with law. The
c~lemge to the validity di s. 344.( IA). on the ground of want of guidelines must therefore fail. [829 H-830 A)
(iii) The suggestion that the explanation could. not extend the substantive provisions of sub-s. (IA) has merely to be stated to be rejected
because the explanation merely serves to explain the scope of the expression 'reasonable cause.' (829 El
(iv) The argument that since s. 344 falls in Ch. 24 Cr. P.C. which
i:ontains general provisions as to inquiries and trials and therefore it cannot apply to a case at the stage of investigation and collection of evidence
is negatived by the express language of sub-s. (IA) and the explanation.
Under sub-s. (IA) commencement df the inquiry or trial can also be
postponed. This clearly seems to refer to the stage prior to the commencement of the inquiry. The explanation makes it clear beyond doubt that
reaSol!able cause as mentioned in sub-s. (IA) includes the likelihood of
obtaining further evidence during investigation by securing a remamd.
Indeed a postponment of an. inquiry ·OD trial also seems to be within the
contemplation of the general provisions as to inquiries an.d trials.
(829 C-D]
[Plea to reopen Raj Narain's case rejected.]
ORIGINAL JURISDICT!Ol'f: Writ Petition No. 513 of 1970.
F
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for writ in
the nature of habeas cqrpus.
The petitioner appeared in person.
P~ Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao, for the respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, l. The petitioner, A.
Lakshmanarao, an
Adv6cate
practising at Narasipatnam in the district of Visakhapatnam in the
State of Andhra Pradesh has applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus on the following averments :
II
The petitioner, while going home from the court, was arrested
on 17th July, 19.70 at about 12.30 in the afternoon, He was not
shown any warrant at the time of his arrest.
He was produced
before a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 18th July and
824
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1971] 2 S.C.R.
remanded to judicial custody under s. 167(2), Cr.P.C. for 15 days.
At the time of remand he was informed by the Magistrate that he
was accused of off~es under ss. 120-B, 121-A, l22 read with
A
B
302 and,395, I.P.C. in Crime No. 3 of 1970 (known as Parvatipuram Naxalite Conspiracy Case). This crime had been registered in January, 1970 in ~hich more than 148 persons were
sought to be proceeded agamst.
The names of only 148 accused
persons were specifically mentiooed.
The petitioner and one
Dr. C. Ramadass were not specifically named.
They were apparently included jn the expression "others". On 30th March, 1970
a report was filed by the Investigating Officer describing it as a
preliminary charge-sheet in which it was stated that the investigation ~n the case had not been completed and several accused
persons had yet to be traced.
This report, according to the averments, does not .fall under s. 173 ( 1), Cr.P .C.
Even in this preliminary charge-sheet the names of the petitioner and Dr. Ramadass
were not included. On 1st August wh~n the period of the petitioner's first remand expired, again no charge-sheet was separately
filed against him and Dr. C. Ramadass.
The prosecution, however, sought extension of the period of remand.
When the peti- . D
tioner objected to further remand a second preliminary chargesheet was presented to the court on that very day specifically
including the petitioner's 1I1ame.
His
remand was.
thereupon
extended upto 6th August and thereafter upto 20th August. On
20th August he was not produced in the court becaus• of want of
escort and the order of remand was made in his absence.
He has
expr~ssed ignorance about the period of this remand.
c
E
The prestint petition dated 22nd August, 1970 was forwarded
to this Court
through the Superintendent.
Central Jail,
Rajahmundry
(Andhra Pradesh). The petitioner challenges
the remand orders from the 1st August onwards and claims
that his detention is illegal and that he is entitled to be set
at liberty.
The remand order dated 20th August, 1970 which
. was made ~n his absence because he could not be produced
before the court on the ground of lack of escort is challenged on the
further ground that the law docs not permit remand orders without
the actual production of the accused before the court.
According to the petitioner who himself argued his case,
s. 344(1A), Cr.P.C. does not contain any guidelines for the court
in the matter of rema,nd orders and he added that this section is
otherwise too inapplicable to the investigation stage of criminal
cases.
When his attention was drawn to the explanation to s. 344,
according to which the likelihood of further evidence being obtained by the remand in cases of suspicion against an accused person
raised by the evidence already obtained, he contended that the
F
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LAKSHMANARAO v. JUDL. MAGISTRATE (Dua, J.)
825
A explanation could not, as a matter of law, serve to extend the scope
of the substantive provision contained in sub-s. ( lA). On this
premise the petitiQ11er questioned the vires o.f s. 344(1A) and (2)
and the explanation.
In the counter-affidavit sworn by the Judicial Magistrate in
B whose court the case against the petitioner is pending, while referring to the proceedings held on 1st August, 1970, it is affirmed that
the petitioner and Dr. C. Ramadass were produced in co1m aind it
was submitted by them that since their names had not shown in the
prelinJ.jnary charge-sheet the court had no power to extend the period of remand, On that very d~ the prosecution filed a second preC liminai'y charge-sheet in which the petitioner and Dr. C. Ramadass
were shown as accused nos. l 49 and 150 suspected of having com,
mitted offences under ss. 120-B, 121A, 122 read with 302 and 395,
I.P.C.
The Court thereupon passed an order of remand in respect
of both of them.
A bail application filed on behalf of the petitioner
and Dr. C. Ramadass was thereafter argued by the petitioner and
the matter w8s adjourned to 6th August, 1970 for orders when that
D applicati0:n was disposed of.
On behalf of the other respondents a lengthy affidavit has been
sworn by s. Veeranarayanareddi, Deputy Superintendent of Police, F
Crime Branch, C.I.D., Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
It is affirmed in this affidavit that the petitioner is ainiactive Naxalite
E and along with others is accused of charges under ss. 120-B read
with ss. 302, 395, 397, 399, 364, 365, 368 and 386, I.P.C. in
P.R.C. No. 3/70, pending in the Court of the Judicial First Class
Magistrate, Parvatipuram Taluk.
A separate complaint under ss.
121-A and 120-B read with 121, 122, 123 and 124A, l.P.C. is also
stated to have been filed against the aforesaid persons \rlcluding the
petitioner in the same court in P.R.C. 8 of 1970. These two cases
F
are known as Parvatipurarri Naxalite Conspiracy Cases and relate
to 46 murders, 82 dacoities, 99 attacks on police and 15 abductions
committed by the accused persons in Andhra Pradesh.
The accused persons are also alleged to have committed several off~ttces of
the types just mentioned in the Agency Tracts of Orissa bordering
Andhra Pradesh.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh had on
G account of the gravity of the situation declared certain areas affected by the Naxalite menace in Srikakulam and Waraingal Districts
as disturbed areas under s. 3 of the Ahdhra Pradesh Suppression
of Disturbances Act, 1948.
In the affidavit certain incidents have
been traced from 1964 and it is affirmed that as a result of various
political developments certain volunteers were recruited from
various parts of Andhra Pradesh a.nd the petitioner helped them in
H creating revolutionary bases in the agency tracts of Visakhapatnam
District There is also reference to one of the accused persons
having become an approver ancj another having made a confes-
'
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
L 1971 J 2 S.C.R.
· siOIJ!ll statement. After stating various facts. <11scoverea during
A
investigaJion it is allirmed that the investigation of this case is
limited n<>t only to the State of Andhra Pradesh but it extends to
several States where naxalite movement has. spread, including West
Bengal and Orissa, and as many as 900 wit;nesses have already been
examined during the course of investigation, which has taken .nearly
nine months.
Sanction of the State Government has also beQDi obB
tained for the prosecution of the· petitioner and the other accused
persons under s.191\, Cr.P.C. On 12th October, 1970 the investigation was completed and a fi~al charge-sheet filed in the court of
the Judicial Magis,trate in P.R.C. No. 3 of 1970.
The separate
complaint again§t the petitoner and other accused persons mention.
ed earlier was also filed in the· court of the .Judicial Magistrate ·C'
under ss. 121A, 120B read with 121, 123 and 124A, l.P;C. on the
same day. It is admitted that the preliminary charge-sheet is not
covered by s. 173 ( 1), Cr.P.C.
But it is averred that it is only a
report pep:iding further investigation seeking extension of remand
under s. 344, Cr.P.C. The Jong period of investigation has been
ascribed to the fact that there was an organised attempt on the part ))
of the accused and their followers to thwart the efforts of the authorities in bringing the accused to book.· It is admitted that the petitioner is lodged ih Central Jail, Rajahmundry and that on 20th
August, 1970 he could not be produced before the court for lack
of escort. · Tht? reinand is also admitted to have been extended by
the Magistrate, respondent No. 1, from time to time on 3rd and
17th September and 1st October, 1970.
The court, it is pleaded,
E
is empowered to pass an order of remand even in the absence of the
accused under s. 344, Cr.P.C. unlike the remand prder under·s. 167,
Cr.P.C.
Incidentally, in this counter-affidaviqhere is a reference
to the pre-judicial activities in which the petitioner has been indulg•
ing ~n connection with Naxalite movement. · The . initial noninclusion of his name in the array. of accused persorui has been
F
explained.on the ground that sufficientcorroboration of the approver's testimony incriminating the petitioner was Jllot forthcoming at
that stage.
In so far as the question of legality of the remand order dated
20th August, 1970 without producing the petitioner before a MagisG
trate is comiemed, the. point is c.oncluded by a recent judgment of
this Court in the case of R~i Narain; v. Supdt: Central Jail, New
Delhi(1).
In that case this Court by majority expressed the view
that as a matter of law personal presence of an accused person
before a Magistrate is not a necessary requirement for the purpose
of his remand under s. 344, Cr.P.C., at the instance of the _police,
thou~h as a rule of caution it is highly desirable that the accused
H
should be personaily produced before the Magistrate so that he may,
(I) [1971] S.C.R. 147
A
B
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F
G
H
LAKSHMANARAO v. JUDL. MAGISTRATE (Dua,/.)
827
if he so chooses, make a rei>resentation against his remand and for
his. release on bail. The Court on a review of the decided cases
observed:-
"There is nothing in the law which required his personal presence be.fore the Magistrate because that is a rule
of caution for Magistrates before granting remands at the
insta.nce of the police. However, even if it be desirable
for the Magistrates to have the prisoner produced before
them. whein they recommit him to further custody, a
Magistrate can act only as the circumstances permit,"
The order of remand dated 20th August, 1970 was in the circumstances not contrary to law S!> as to render the . petitioner's
custody illegal justifying his release by this Court on habeas corpus.
It is unnecessary to point out that it was and still is open to the
petiti0iner to apply for his release on bail to the appropriate court
in accordance with law there being no illegal obstacle in his way
in this respect.
The challenge to the constitutional validity of s. 344(1A),
Cr.P.C. is also in our opinion misconceived.
Section 344 reads :
" ( 1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedi.ngs shall
be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular,
when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the
same shall be continued from day to day until all the
witnesses in attendance have beon examined,1unless' the
Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the
following day to be necessary for reilsohs to be recorded.
(J-A) If, from the absence of a witness, or any
other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable
to postpone the comme,ncement of, or adjourn, any·
inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks~~. by order in·
writing, stating the reasons therefor, frorr. time to time;
postpone or adjourn the same· on such terms as it thinks
fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by
a warrant remand the accused if in custody :
Provided that illO Magistrate shall remand an accused
person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time :
Provided further that when witnesses .are in attendance, no adjourrunent or postponement shalJ be granted,
without examining them, except for special reasons to be
recorded in writing.
828
SU)>REME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 2 S.C.R.
( 2) Every order made under this section oy a court
other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the
presiding Judge or Magistrate.
Explanation.-lf sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed <411 offence, and it appears likely that further
evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonab:e cause for a remand."
A
B
.Sub-section ( 1-A) wa> orig:nal!y numb~red as sub-s. (1).
The
present sub-section ( 1) oi s. 344 was added by the Amending Act
· 26 of 1955 when the original sub-section ( 1) was re-numbered as
.~uh-section (1-A).
The impugined sub-section vests ip. the court C
seized of a criminal case power to postpone the commencement of
·or adjourn any inquiry or trial before him by order in writing
·stating the reasons therefor from time to time on such terll)s as the
;court thinks fit and for such time as it considers reasonable.
Wh~n
the case is so postponed or ad1ourned the court may also by a
warrant remand the accused, if in custody.
This judicial power to
D
postpone or adjourn the proceedings is to be exercised only if from
the absence of witnesses or any other reasonable cause the court
·ccmsiders it necessary or advisable to do so. Reasonable cause .for
remand according to the explanation to this section covers a case
where sufficient evidence is obtained to raise a suspicion about the
·complici.ty of an accused person in the offence and it appears likely
E
that more evidence may be obtained by remand.
The court has ·
· i111 the exercise of its judicial discretion in granting or declining
·postponement or adjournment of the case and in ordering remand·
of the accused, to keep in view all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.
The petitioner strongly contended that this
·section clothes the court with a111 unfettered, arbitrary and unguided
power.
A plain reading of the section shows the untenability of
F
the submission.
Apart from the fact that it is only when either
from the absence of a witness or some othPr reasonable cause the
court consipers it either to be necessary or advisable to postpone
the commencement of the illlquiry or trial or adjourn the hearing
of the case that the order can be made, the court is also required
to record the order in writing giving the reasons why it thinks fit
G
that the case should be postpon~d or adjourned.
It is further open
·to the court to impose terms and to fix the period which cannot
exceed 15 days· at one time.
This discretion being vested in a
court of law has to be exercised judicially on well-recognised principles. and is in our view immune from challenqe on the ground of
arbitrariness or want of guidelines.
In our opinio'l, therefore, not
H
onlv are the !!UideHnes clearly contained in the statute but the dis-
·cretion being judicial fs required to be exercised on general orinci-
·ples guided by rules of reason and justice on the facts of each case,
LAKSHMANARAO v. JUDL. MAGISTRATE (Dua, J.)
829
A ain.d not in any arbitrary or fanciful manner. It may also be remembered that if the discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or unjudicial
manner remedy b; way of resort to the higher courts is always opm
to the aggrieved party.
The second limb of the· challenge is based qn: the contention
B
that s. 344 falls in Chapter 24, Cr.P.C. which ·contains general
pro~isions as to inquiries and trials.
According to this submission
thi~ section cannot apply to a case which is at the stage of investigation and collection of evidence only.
Thirargument appears to
us to be negatived by the express language both of sub-s. (IA)
and the explanation.
Under sub-s. (IA) the commencement of
C the inquiry or trial can also be postponed. This clearly seems to
refer to the stage prior to the commencement of the inquiry.
The .
explanatioo makes it clear beyond doubt that reasonable cause as.
mentioned in sub-s. (IA) includes the likelihood of obtaining
further evidence during investigation by securing a remand.
The
language ?f s. 344 is unambiguous and clear allKi the fact that this
section occurs in Chapter 24 which contains general provisions as
D to inquiries and trials does not Justify a strained · construction.
Indeed, postpooi.ement of an inquiry also seems to be within the
contemplation of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials.
So this challenge also fails.
The suggestion that the explanation could not extend the subE stantive provisions of sub-s. (IA) has merely to be stated to be'
rejected because the explanatioin merely serves to explain the scope
of the expression reasonable cause.
The last submission that there is in any event no guideline for
making a remand order and, therefore, the power to remand an
accused person under s. 344 is ultra vires be\ng arbitrary and
F
unguided is wholly unacceptable.
When a case is postponed or
adjourned and the accused is in custody the court has to exercise
its judicia1 discretion whether or not to continue him in custody by
making a remand order. The court is mi th er bound to make an·
order of remand nor is it bound to release the accused person. The
period of remand is in no case to exceed 15 days at a time.
TheG discretion to make a suitable order is to be exercise~ judicially
keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case including
the nature of the charge, ·the gravity of the a:lleged offence, the
area of investigation, the antecedents of the accused and all other
relevant factors which may appropriately help the-court in determining whether to keep the accused in custody or to release him
H on bail. The court has to ensure the presence of the accused and
a just, fair and smooth inquiry IWd trial of the offence charged'.
The order of remand is thus subject to judicial discretion and the·
order is also subject to review by the sttperfor courts in accordance
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
£1971]2 S.C.R.
with faw.
The powe~ conferred being judicial the absence of llJl
A
express, ·precise standard for detennination. of the question would
not reinder the section unconstitutional. Detention pursuant to an
order of remand which appropriately falls within the temis of s. 344
is accordingly not open to challenge in habeas corpus .
. After we had reserved orders the petitiqner forwarded to this
~
Court through jail supplemeintary affidavit containing written arguments.
We have gone through the affidavit but we do inbt find any
new point requiring di!Cussion.
It only discloses a further attempt
to reopen the majority .decision of .this Court in Raj N.:zrain's case
(supra) by relying on the minority judgment and by submitting
thats. 344(1A), Cr.P.C. offends Art. 19(l)(d) of the Constitution.
All that we need say at this stage is that the majority view C
is binding on us.
This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.
G.C.
Petition dismissed.
'