# A MANAGEMENT OF BANGALORE WOOLLEN, CO'ITON I: SILK MILLS CO. LTD v. THE WORKMEN I: ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 581
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-09-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 501 of 1966
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-management-of-bangalore-woollen-co-iton-i-silk-mills-co-ltd-v-the-workmen-i-4146
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

1181
A MANAGEMENT OF BANGALORE WOOLLEN, CO'ITON
I: SILK MILLS CO. LTD.
v.
THE WORKMEN I: ANR.
September 18, 1967
]l [M. lflDAYATULLAH, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), ss. 10 and 19(6>-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider matters covered by oo earlier atDard
which has not been terminated by notice under s. 19(6}-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to adjudicate on matters provided for Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946).
The Standing Orders of the appellant's establishment. duly certie Jled under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946,
dealt inter alia, with provisions relating to leave to be granted to the
workmen. In l.C. 11 of 1955 the Industrial Tribunal by its award
modified the said standing orders and made provisions for certain
kinds of leave. The award came into operation on November 18, 1956
under s. 19(3t read with s. 17A(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On
further disputes arising the parties entered on September 19, 1958
into a settlement under s. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whereD by in return for the revision of the scales of pay, the workmen agreed
that for a period of three years commencing from January 1, 1958.
they would not raise any dispute on certain matters including leave.
This settlement was terminated by the workmen by notice dated
August 14, 1961 under s. 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In 1963
the State Government again referred to the Industrial Tribunal an
industrial dispute between the appellant and the workmen. This
E dispute was registered as I.D. No. 8 of 1963 and the questions referred
related to privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave. The appellant
urged before the Tribunal that it was not competent to hear the reference because (i) the earlier award in I.C. 11 of 1955 which dealt
with matters relating to leave had not been terminated by a notice
under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act; (ii) the Standing Orders in. question could be modified only by the procedure under the
Standing Orders, Act and not under the Industrial Disputes Act bep
cause the former Act was self-sufficient in regard to the matters
covered by it. The Tribunal and the High Court both rejected the
appellant's objections, whereupon, by special leave, appeal was filed
in this Court. On behalf of the workmen it was stated that notice of
termination of the earlier award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Dilputes Act had been given by them in a letter dated June 26, 1961.
HELD: (i) When there is a subsisting award bindin11 on the parG ties the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the same points In
a fr.esh reference. In the present case the earlier award had not beeD
terminated and the reference was therefore incompetent. [588D]
The letter of June 26, 1961 could not be treated as a notice under
s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act terminating the earlier award
'in I.C. 11 of 1955 because it did not convey any such intention. Moreove! it was written while the settlement of September 19. 1958 by
which the workmen had bound themselves not to raise any dispute
B regarding leave facilities for three years was still in force, for the
noti~e of. termination of the settlement under s. 19(2) was given by
the workmen only on August 14, 1961. Until the said settlement was
terminated the union of workmen had no right to make demands
about leave facilities as Jt purported to do on June 26, 1961. [58'1G588C]
,
SUPREME ('OL"RT BEPOHT~
(1968] 1 8.C.R,
The Workmen of Western India .Match Co. Ltd. v. The Western .A
/ndi" Matcl• Co. Ltd .. [1963) 2 S.C .. R. 27, referred to.
liil The Standing Orders Act which has for its object. the defining ·,\'ith sufficient precision. the conditions of emplo~·ment, under
the industrial establishments and to make the said conditions known
to tl:e workmen, has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the
workmen. for the purpose of having a standing order modified or for
having any question rel

## Text

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1181
A MANAGEMENT OF BANGALORE WOOLLEN, CO'ITON
I: SILK MILLS CO. LTD.
v.
THE WORKMEN I: ANR.
September 18, 1967
]l [M. lflDAYATULLAH, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), ss. 10 and 19(6>-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider matters covered by oo earlier atDard
which has not been terminated by notice under s. 19(6}-Jurisdiction of Tribunal to adjudicate on matters provided for Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946).
The Standing Orders of the appellant's establishment. duly certie Jled under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946,
dealt inter alia, with provisions relating to leave to be granted to the
workmen. In l.C. 11 of 1955 the Industrial Tribunal by its award
modified the said standing orders and made provisions for certain
kinds of leave. The award came into operation on November 18, 1956
under s. 19(3t read with s. 17A(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On
further disputes arising the parties entered on September 19, 1958
into a settlement under s. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act whereD by in return for the revision of the scales of pay, the workmen agreed
that for a period of three years commencing from January 1, 1958.
they would not raise any dispute on certain matters including leave.
This settlement was terminated by the workmen by notice dated
August 14, 1961 under s. 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In 1963
the State Government again referred to the Industrial Tribunal an
industrial dispute between the appellant and the workmen. This
E dispute was registered as I.D. No. 8 of 1963 and the questions referred
related to privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave. The appellant
urged before the Tribunal that it was not competent to hear the reference because (i) the earlier award in I.C. 11 of 1955 which dealt
with matters relating to leave had not been terminated by a notice
under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act; (ii) the Standing Orders in. question could be modified only by the procedure under the
Standing Orders, Act and not under the Industrial Disputes Act bep
cause the former Act was self-sufficient in regard to the matters
covered by it. The Tribunal and the High Court both rejected the
appellant's objections, whereupon, by special leave, appeal was filed
in this Court. On behalf of the workmen it was stated that notice of
termination of the earlier award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Dilputes Act had been given by them in a letter dated June 26, 1961.
HELD: (i) When there is a subsisting award bindin11 on the parG ties the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the same points In
a fr.esh reference. In the present case the earlier award had not beeD
terminated and the reference was therefore incompetent. [588D]
The letter of June 26, 1961 could not be treated as a notice under
s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act terminating the earlier award
'in I.C. 11 of 1955 because it did not convey any such intention. Moreove! it was written while the settlement of September 19. 1958 by
which the workmen had bound themselves not to raise any dispute
B regarding leave facilities for three years was still in force, for the
noti~e of. termination of the settlement under s. 19(2) was given by
the workmen only on August 14, 1961. Until the said settlement was
terminated the union of workmen had no right to make demands
about leave facilities as Jt purported to do on June 26, 1961. [58'1G588C]
,
SUPREME ('OL"RT BEPOHT~
(1968] 1 8.C.R,
The Workmen of Western India .Match Co. Ltd. v. The Western .A
/ndi" Matcl• Co. Ltd .. [1963) 2 S.C .. R. 27, referred to.
liil The Standing Orders Act which has for its object. the defining ·,\'ith sufficient precision. the conditions of emplo~·ment, under
the industrial establishments and to make the said conditions known
to tl:e workmen, has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the
workmen. for the purpose of having a standing order modified or for
having any question relating to the application, or interpretation of B
a standing order. referred to a labour court. But there is no warrant
for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a selfcontained statute with regard to the matters mentioned therein. the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. to adjudicate
upon the matters covered by the standing orders, has been in any
manner. abridged or taken awa~·. It will always be open in a proper
case, for the union or '''orkmen to raise a11 'industrial dispute'
as
that expression is defined in s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. C
and if such a dispute is referred by the Government concerned 1or
aqju~ication the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case
may be will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same. [595B-D]
Guest,. Keen, Wil.liams. Primte Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling. [1960] 1
S.C.R. 348, The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Pathan. (1962]
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697 and Salem Electricity v. Employees. [196'7] 2 S.C.R. D
498, I distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 501 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 23. 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No.
1985 of 1963.
E
H. R. Gokhale. A. N. Sinha and D. JV. Gupta, for the appdlant.
B. R. l. Iyengar. Bislrambe,. Lal and H. K. Puri. for respondent No. I.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
Vaidialingam, J. This appeal. by the Management amcerned, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Mysore
High Court. dated October 23, 1964, dismissing Writ Petiiion
No. 1985 of 1963. and declining to issue :1 writ of, prohitnGion.
restraining the second respondent, the Industrial Tribunal. Bangalore-I from proceeding wit'1 the adjudication. in I. D. No. 8 of G
1963'. The short facts. leading up to the Suite of Mysore. making
the reference. which is the subject of adjudication. by the second
respondent. in l.D. No. 8 of 1963. are as follows:
The appellant. is u iextite mill, in Bangalore. ma.nufacturin~
cotton. silk and cotswool piece·goods. After the I ndustrml E~nplo}·
ment \Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act XX of 19461 (~eremaftcr B
to be referred to. as the Standing Orders Act\. came mto force,
the standine orders of the appellant's establishment ~ere duly
drn.wn up. and certified by the authorities. Those standmg orders.
among other thin&-'• related to the que~tion of leave. I<> be granted
•
BAXGALORE MILLS t·. WOP.!DfEX (Va.i1(i,.li11!J.Cfll<, ./,)
58;~
A to the workmen. By. its order, dated August 2, 1955, the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore,
for adjudication, an industrial dispute, raised by certain categories
of workmen, of the appellant company. That reference was numbered as J.C. No. 11 of 1955. The dispute that was referred, was
"Whether the Standing Orders filed by the ManageB
ment and now certified by the certifying authority be
modified as a modification to the existing Standing
Orders as amended by the employees through their association in the light of the views and as indicated in the
Annexure to this notification".
The Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, made an award, Exhibit M-6.
C on September 25, 1956, whereby the Tribunal directed the addition of certain clauses, in the Certified Standing Orders of the
appellant company. There is no controversy, that paragraphs 50
to. 70, of Exhibit M-6, deal with privilege leave, sick leave and
casual leave, which could be availed of, by the workmen. Exhibit
M-5 is a copy of the Certified Standing Orders of the Mana~
ment company. After the amendments, effected to those Standing
D Orders, in pursuance of the award, Exhibit M-6, ·clauses l, 2, 3
and 4, of Order 9, of Exhibit M-5 deal with festival holidays.
leave with wages, medical leave and casual leave,
respectively.
The award, Exhibit M-6, after publication in the State Gazette.
on October 18, 1956, came into operation on November 18. 1956,
under the provisions of s. 19(3), read with s. 17 A(l), of the IndusE trial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter referred
to. as the Actl.
The first respondent began to make certain claims, for revision of the provisions, regarding leave, and as the appellant was
not willing to concede those claims, the first respondent appears
to have approached the State Government, to refer the dispute,
F regarding this matter, to the Tribunal, for adjudication; but, the
State Government, by its order, Exhibit M-2, dated October IO,
1962, declined to refer the matter for adjudication. In tile said
order, the Government is of the view that, as compared with leave
facilities, provided for, in similar major industries, in Bangalore,
the leave facilities then granted by the Management to the workmen of the appellant company, cannot be considered to be inG adequate. and, therefore, the issue raised, by the workmen, does
not merit reference, for adjudication. But, nevertheless. later on,
the State Government, referred for adjudication, by its order,
dated March 20, 1963, the following matters, to the second res- 1
pondent:
B
"Whether the workmen of Bangalore Woollen,
Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd., are entitled to the following leave benefits:
(a) Privilege leave for
one month in a year with.
pay.
8UPRBllll: COU&T anoars
(1968) 1 e.c.a.
(b) Casual leave of 12 days in a year with pay.
A
(c) Sick leave of 30 days in a year with full pay less
E.S.I. benefits.
If not, to what reliefs they are entitled to"
This reference, out of which the present proceedings arise, was
registered as 1.0. No. 8 of I 963. From the questions, referred to B
above, it will be seen that the dispute, that was referred, for adjudication, almost exclusively relates to the question of privilege
leave, casual leave. and sick leave, which are already provided for.
in the Standing Orders, of the Management, Exhibit M-S.
The first respondent has placed its demands, in respect of
this question, before the Industrial Tribunal, and the Manage- C
ment have also placed their points of view, on these matters. It
is not necessary to refer to the pleas made, either bY the appellant
or the first. respondent, ·regarding the merits of the claim. which
has not been adjudicated, by the Industrial Tribunal.
But the
Management raised two preliminary objections, to the jurisdiction of the ll)dustrial Tribunal, to entertain and adjudicate upon D
the questions, referred by the State Government. Those two preliminary objections were to the effect :
(i) The award, Exhibit M-6, dealing with leave and other
facilities, not having been terminated by the first
respondent, by issue of a notice, as contemplated
under s. I 9(6) of the Act, continues to be in force
a
and. tllerefore, the question of leave cannot form the
subject matter of adjudication.
(ii) The question regarding leave facilities, having been
provided for. in the Certified Standing Orders,
framed by the company under the Standing Orders
Act. any modifications to those provisions, as is
now sought to be done, can only be in the manner
provided for, in the Standing Orders Act, and cannot form the subject of adjudication. by the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act.
The Workers' Union met these contentions by stating tllat the
various representations, made by it, to the Management, as well &
as the presentation of a Charter of Demands, amounted to notice
of termination of the Award and that, notwithstanding the Stand
ing Orders Act, when an industrial dispute was raised, regarding
matters which might be covered by the Standing Orders of the
Management, by the workmen and such a dispute was referred,
for adjudication, under the Act, by the Government concerned, B
the Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate. upon that dispute.
These two questions have been answered, by the Industrial
Tribunal, llgainst the Management, by its order, dated August 26,
1963. The High Court, in its order under attack, has also agreed
BA:SGALORE MILLS V. WORKMEN (V.1Wi;ui11gG1», J,)
1185
A with the findings, recorded by tlle Tribunal. In considering the
first objection, both the Tribunal and the High Court have gone
into the question as to whether the notice, contemplated under
s. 19(6) of the Act, should be in writing, or, whether it can be
oral, and have expressed the concurrent view that such notice
can be oral also: but the ultimate finding, recorded by the TribuB nal, and accepted by the High Court, is that the various cor.respondence, that passed between the Management and the Union,
will clearly show that the Union has terminated the Award. On
the second objection the Tribunal, whose findings have, again,
been accepted by the High Court, has held that the scope of the
Standing Orders Act is very limited, and that there is reaHy no
conflict, between the Act and the Standing Orders Act. It is the
C further view of the Tribunal that. in spite of the provisions, con-•
tained in the Standing Orders, framed by the company, under the
provisions of the Standing Orders Act, it is nevertheless open to
a Tribunal, to adjudicate upon those matters, when the question
is referred to it. as an industrial dispute, under the Act.
In this appeal, on behalf of the Management, Mr. H. R.
D Gokhale, learned counsel, has raised the same two coP.1,entions,
relating to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, fu adjudicate upon the dispute, in question. In respect of the first objection,
that the award, Exhibit M-6, has not been terminated by a written
notice. under s. 19(6\ of the Act, counsel urged that the views,
expressed by both the Tribunal, and the High Court, that there
could be a notice, given even orally terrilinatinv the awara, is not
E correct.
No doubt. the findings, in this regard, that there can be an
oral notice. given under s. 19(6) of the Act. has been sought to
be supported, by Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar, learned counsel, appearing, for the Union. In our opinion it was not really necessary
either for the Tribunal or for the High Court, to embark
r upon. and express an opinion, on the question, as to whether the
notice of termination of an award, under s. 19(6). of the Act, can
be oral. because. so far as we can see. the Union has not raised
any plea that the termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in this
case, has been brought about, by its giving an oral notice to the
Mana~ement. On the other hand. the specific plea of the Union,
G on this aspect. was that the various representations, made bv it.
to the Management. as well as the presentation of the Charter of
Demands. amounted to a notice of termination of the award. The
various representations and the Charter of Demands, referred to,
by the Umon, are the representations and charter given in writing,
to .t~e ~{~nagc:ment, on various matters. Therefore. we express no
opinion. n this case, as to whether the termination of an award,
B can be b•ought about by an ora.1 notice being given, under s. 19(6),
•Jf the Act.
We will then consider the _question, as to whether there has
been a termination of the award, Exhibit M-6, in the manner
pleaded by the Union. It cannot be over emphasized that an
686
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1968] 1 s.c.R,
intimation, claimed to have been given, regarding the termination A.
of an award, must be fixed with reference to a particular date, so
as to enable a Court to come to the conclusion that the party,
giving that intimation, has expressed its intention t() terminate the
award. Such a certainty regarding date is absolutely essential,
because, the period of two months, after the expiry of which. the
award will cease to be binding on the parties, will have to be B;
reckoned, from the date of such clear intimation. It is also necessary to state that, in this case, the High Court and the Tribunal,
have proceeded on the basis tha.t the decision of this Court, in
The Workmen of Western bulia Match Co. ltd. v. The Western
India Match Co. Ltd.('), supports the proposition that an inference of an intention to terminate an award or a settlement,
can be gathered from the various correspondence that passed, C
between the Management and the Union. That decision, in our
opinion, does not lend any support to such a view. From the facts
of that case, it is seen that there was a settlement, between . the
parties, on April 29, 1955, and there was a Charter of Demand,
given by the workmen, on January 25, 1957. On January 14,
J 953, the Government of West Bengal, referred, to the Industrial D·
Tribunal concerned, for adjudication, the demands made by the
workmen. Earlier to that date. on March 29, 1957, the management had sent a reply to the Union that the Charter of Demands,
of January 25, 1957, could not be considered. inasmuch as the
settlement of April 29, 1955, had not been validly terminated,
under the Act. In answer to that communication, the Union wrote,
on April 8, 1957, that the various representations, made by it, E
to the management and the representation of the charter of demands, amounted to a notice of terminatic'li of the settlement.
In dealing with this point, it will be seen that· this Court
observes that no formal notice, as contemplated by s. 19(2), of the
Act, has been given by the Union. But, this Court, ultimately,
held that though no such formal notice was given, thli letter of p
April 8, 1957, written by the Union. could. itself be construed as
notice. within the meaning of s. 19(2), and therefore the Tribunal
had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim, as the reference
was made, by the State Government, long after the expiry of two
· months, from April 8, 1957. It will therefore be seen, that this
Court treated the letter, of April 8, 1957, written by the Union,
as amounting to a notiee of intention to terminate the settlement. ~
But, in the Instant case, we specifically desired Mr. Iyengar, coun·
sel for the Union, to state which was the particular letter, or
representa.tion, made· by the Union, which could be considered
to amount to. a notice of termination of the award. Learned counsel stated that he relied upon the letter, dated June 26, 1961,
written by the Union. to the Management, as amounting to a a:
notice, given by 'his client, intimating its intention to terminate the
award, Exhibit M-6.
Jn view of this stand, taken by the counsel for the Union, "'.e
are not referring to the events that took place, subsequent to this.
(') [1963] 2 S.C.R. 27.
'
< '
A date, viz., June 26, 196 J, excepting to state that, ultimately, the
State Gov.::rnment, referred the present dispute, for adjudication,
to the .Industrial Tribunal. We have already stated that the award,
in l.C. No. 11 of 1957, remained in operation, till November 18,
1957, under s. 19(3), of the Act, but notwithstanding the
expiry of the period of operation, of the award, under sub-s. (3),
B the said award will continue to be binding on the parties, unless
it is terminated, in accordance with s. 19(6), of the Ac\. Even
during the period, when this award was jn operation, i.e .. within
November 18, 1957, the workers made certain demands, as mentioned in their letter, dated October 28, 1957.
The demands
referred to, in the said letter, related to various claims, made by
the l)nion. Tn particular, item 3, of Annexure A. to .the said letter,
C related to certain claims, made by the several employees, regard·
ing privilege leave and casual leave. On September 19, 1958, there
\)'as a settlement, arrived at, between the parties. under Exhibit.
M-3. It is only necessary to note clause 5 of this agreement
whereby the Staff Association withdrew the demands, in respect
of the various claims, made on October 28, 1957, including the
D claim tnade, for privilege leave and casual ·leave. The Staff Association also agreed that, for a period of three years, commencing
from January l, 1958, they would not ra.ise any dispute regarding any of the subjects covered by Annexure A to their original
demands, which included also the claim for privilege leave and
casual leave. No doubt there is a reservation, regarding gratuity,
with which we are not now concerned. Therefore, it will be noted
:I that though a. claim was made, in respect of leave, on October 28,
1957, the Union withdrew that claim. under the agreement, M-3,
and they also agreed not to make any demands, for three years.
This is a settlement, arrived at. by the parties, and this settlement
will be binding on them, unless it is terminated. in accordance·
with s. 19(2l of the Act.
.
F
On August 14, 1961, the Union issued a notice, Exhibit W-3,
to the Man-agement, under s. 19(21 of the Act, stating that the
settlement, of September 19, 1958, will stand terminated, and
cease to be binding, after the expiry of two months. from the
date of receipt of that letter, by the Management. It is in between
September 19, 1958, the date of the settlement .M-3 and August
G 14, ,1961. the date of the notice, W-3, terminating the settlement,
that the letter, dated June 26, 1961, relied on by Mr. Iyengar, as
amounting to a notice of termination of the award, was sent by
tfie Union,· No doubt, in this 'etter. the Vnion has. among other
matters, claimed leave facilities, as stated therein.
Tha.\ claim
related to privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave. Even this
letter does not, as such, intimate the Management, of the Union's
B intention to terminate the award, Exhibit M-6. Mr. Iyengar,
learned counsel, urged that the very fact that the Union has made
claims, 'in this letter, regarding leave facilities which are inconsistent with the award, Exhibit M-6, will clearly show that the
Union is not standing by the award. From the facts, mentioned
588
St:PREME COt:RT REPORTS
(1968] 1 s.0.11.
above, it will be clearly seen that the parties have entered into A
a settlement, on September 19, 1958, and one part of the agreement is that the Union is withdrawing its claim regarding leave
facilities and it has also agreed not to raise any disputes, regarding that matter, for a period of three years.
This settlement is
binding. on both the Management and the Union, and will continue to be binding, until it is terminated, in accordance with B
s. 19(2), of the Act. Notice of intention to terminate the settlement
was given on August 14, 1961, and, under s. 19(2J of the Act, the
settlement will cease to be binding, after the expiry of two months,
i.e., on October 14, 1961. This letter, written on June 26, 1961,
Jong before the issue of the notice, on August 14, 1%1. termina.t-
.ing the settlement, under s. 19(21, is, in our opinion, of no avail.
Unless the settlement is terminated, the
Union had no right to C
make any demands regarding leave facilities, as it has purported
to do, on June 26, 1961. Therefore, in our opinion, this letter
cannot be considered to be a notice, given by the Union, expressing its intention to terminate the award. Apart from the fact that
it does not convey any such intention, it is also invalid, inasmuch
as it has been given. even before the settlement was terminated. l)
From this, it will follow that when there is a subsisting award,
binding on the parties, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to
consider the same points, in this reference.
Normally, this conclusion. arrived at, by us, may be enough
lO dispose of this appeal; but the second question. relating to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. functioning under the Act, to adjudi· E
cate upon a dispute. which may result in the modification of the
Standing Orders, framed by the nianagement. under the Standing
'Orders Act. has also been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and
1he High Court and the correctness of those findings, have been
canvassed, before us. If. later on. there is a proper reference to
the Tribunal, the same questions may arise. for consideration; and
1her.efore, we shall proceed to express, our views on that aspect F
also.
The contention of Mr. Gokhale. learned counsel for the
appellant, is that the Management, after the coming into force
of the Standing Orders Act, had framed standing orders which
have been cettified, by the Certifying Officer.
Those Standing
Orders, originaHy framed, made provision for the grant of privi· G
Jege leave, sick leave, casual leave and other allied matters. The
Award, Exhibit M-6, dealt with the claim of the workmen, in this
regard, and gave certain directions. Those directions have been
incorporated, by the Management, by amending the Standing
Orders and the provisions regarding leave, etc., are all to be
found in those ~landing Orders Exhibit M-5. The Standing Orders B
Act. as the various provisions therein will show, is a self-contained
5tatute, imposing obligations on the Management and also con·
!erring rights. on the parties concerned. for the framing of and
effecting modifications. in the Standing Orders. The manner in
•
)
BANGALORE MILLS v. WOBKMEN (r,.i.tialingam, J.)
:\89
A which the modification is to be sought, is also indicated, in the·
Act.
In this connection, learned counsel referred us to the interpretation, placed upon item 5, in the Schedule to the Standing
Orders Act, by this Court, in The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. v.
R. K. Pathan('),
that it is open, to the authorities functioning
B under the Standing Orders Act, to make substantive provisions
for the granting of leave and holidays; along with conditions in
respect of them. Mr. Gokhale pointed out that ·the Standing
Orders Act placed an obligation, on the management, to have
the Standing Orders certified; it imposes a duty on the Certifying
Officer and the Appel'ate Authority, to adjudicate upon the
C reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders; a right has
been given, both to the workmen, and the management, to apply
to the Certifying Officer to have the Standing Orders modified;
there is provision for appeals; penal provisions are provided, for
failure to submit draft standing orders, or for modifying standing
'orders, otherwise than in accordance with s. IO; and, finally,
jurisdiction is given under s. 13-A, to the Labour ~ourt, constiD luted under the Standing Orders Act, to entertain any dispute
that may be referred to it, by the employer or workman, regarding. the application, or interpretation· of a. standin~ order. These
provisions, according to the learned counsel, cleariy show that
the Standing Orders Act is a self-sufficient statute,
if any proVision made, in respect of leave, in any Standing Orders;
E requires modification, the only procedure to be adopted by the
party concerned, is as indicated in the Standing Orders Act. In
respect of all matters which are to be so dealt with, regarding
industrial establishments, to which the Standing Orders Act applied, the Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Act •. will
have no jurisdiction to entertain a claim or adjudicate upon the
same. When two $tatutes, as in this case. the Act and the Stand'
F ing Orders Act, more or less deal with some common· matters, the·
proper and reasonable view to hold will be that the Act can be
invoked only in respect of industrial establishments which are not
governed by the Stand!ng Orders Act. Mr. Gokhale also pointed
o.ut that ·under such circumstances, the remedy to be adopted is
the one, under the Standing Orders Act; and ·this is- a!so ·to be
G deduced from the views, expressed by this Court, in certain decisions, to which he has .drawn our attention.
Mr. Iyengar, learned counsel for the
Unfon on the other·
hand, points out that the Act and· the Standing Orders Act, have
been enacted fo~ different purposes; the scope of an adjudication,
~nder the .standing Orders Act, counsel points out, is only regardll 1ng the fairness or reasonablenes~. of standing orders. The Standing Orders, certified under the Standing Orders Act, are no doubt
binding on the parties and, in individual cases, it may be possible
for a workman·to ·apply for a modification of a particular Stand-
(') £19621 l)upp; 2 ac.R. l'IYl.
:590
SGPREME COuRT REPORTS
(1968] 1 s.c.a.
ing Order or raise a question, regarding the application or inter- A
pretation of a Standing Order, and refer it to the Labour Court.
But, counsel points out, that does not mean tha:t there cannot be
a htrger question, by way of an industrial dispute, raised by the
Urnon. or the workmen, as a body, concerned, which will necessitate an adjudication, by the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act.
In this connection. counsel drew our attention to the fact B
that the Act and the Standing Orders Act, were amended by a
common Act-the Industrial Disputes (Amendment And Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act KXXVI of 1956). This Amending Act made provision for, adjudication. by the certifying authority and the appellate authority under the standing Orders Act,
upon the reasonableness and fairness of standing orders. It made C
a provision, giving a right to a workman also to apply to the
Certifying Officer, to have the standing orders modified. Section
I 3A, regarding reference being made to the Labour Court, by a
workman or an employer, in respect of the application, or interpretation of a standing order, was also incorporated, by the
Amending Act. Side by side with these amendments, ·made
to the Standing Orders Act, various amendments were effected, D
in the Act also. Provisions regarding the constitution of the
Labour Court, as well as the Industrial Tribunals, and matters
over which they ha.ve jurisdiction, as enumerated in the particular
Schedules to that Act, were also made. An adjudication, made
by the Labour Court, or the Industrial Tribunal, i~ binding on the
parties, referred to, in s. I 8 of the Act. No doubt s. I 3A. of the E
Standing Orders Act, enables an employer or a workman, to refer
to the Labour Court, any question relating to the application, or
interpretation, of a standing order. But the same Amending Act
bas incorporated, in the Second Schedule to the Act, item 2, relating to 'the application and interpretation of standing orders',
over which the Labour Court bas jurisdiction to adjudica.te upon.
Similarly, counsel points out, the lndustrial Tribunal, constituted F
under the Act, bas been given jurisdiction to deal with matters,
referred to. in the Second and Third Schedules to the Act. 'Leave
with wages and holidays' is item 4. of the Third Schedule to the
Act, over which jurisdiction bas been given only to the Industrial
Tribunal. Jf the contention of the appellant is accepted, it will
mean that in respect of a similar question, covered by the stand- G
ing orders framed by a company. the Labour Court, which is
denied jurisdiction, under the Act, will be competent to adjudicate
upon the same. Therefore, counsel points out, that the matters,
covered by the standing orders. in respect of the various items
contained in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act, can no
doubt. be dealt with. in accordance with the provisions contained .
therei;1; but a general or a larger
controversy. regarding those B
matters, can certainly form the subject of an 'industrial dispute'.
as that expression is defined in the Act, and, if that is so, the
lndustrial Tribunal will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those
matters, when a reference is made, by the State Government.
'·
I
DANGALOR~J MILLS v. WORKMEN (Vaidialing11m, J.)
591
A
We are in agreement with the contentions of Mr. Iyengar, on
this point. The scheme of the Standing Orders Act, has been dealt
with, by this Court, in three of its reported decisions:
GueM,
Keen. Willitims, Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling(');
The Bagalkot
Cement Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Pathan('); and Salem
E/ectricitv v.
Employees('). Therefore, we do not think it necessary to cover the
B ground over again. Those decisions have also noted the amendments effected to the Standing Orders Act, by the Amending Act
XXXVI of 1956. Those are the decisions, which have been referred to, by Mr.. Gokhale, in support of his contention that the
observations made, therein, will show that after the amendment of
the Standing Orders Act. in 1956, no industrial dispute can be
raised, under the Act, in respect of the matters covered, by the
C Standing Orders Act, and that the remedy of the parties concerned, will only be, as laid down, therein. On a perusal of those decisions, we do not find that any such proposition, has been laid
therein. On the other hand, we will presently show, that in the
latest decision of this Court, the question. as to whether there can
he an industrial dispute, raised, which can form the subject of an
D adjudication, under the Act, has been specifically left open.
In Guest, Keen, Williams, Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling('), the
Management had framed standing orders which had been certified, under the Standing Orders Act. On the basis of those standing
orders, certain workmen were voluntarily retired, at the age of
55 years, and the dispute, regarding this matter, was referred to
E the Industrial Tribunal, under the Act. The order of the Manage·
ment was set aside, and reinstatement of some of the workers, was
ordered. An objection was raised, on behalf of the Management,
before this Court, that the reference, by the Government, itself,
was bad,. on the ground that s. 7 of the Standing OrdJ:TS Act
makes the standing orders binding, between the employer and his
11 employees, and, till those standing orders, are modified, the parties,
will be governed by those standing orders, and the legality of the
action, taken by the Management, on the basis of the standing
orders, cannot form the subject of a reference, under the Act.
But this court, after referring to the scheme of the Standing
Orders Act, observed that before the Standing Orders Act was
amended, in 1956, if . the employees wanted to challenge the
G reasonableness, or fairness of any of the standing orders, the only
course was to raise an industrial dispute in that matter, but that
this position was altered, by the amendments made, to the
Standing Qders Act, by which it had been made obligatory, on
the part of the Certifying Officer, and the Appell!tite Authority,
to adjudicate upon ,tlJe reasonableness and fairness of a standing
)( order, and a right Jiad been given to the workman also, to ·apply
(') [1960] 1 S.C.R .348.
<'> [19621 Supp. 2 s.c.R. 697.
(') [1968] 2 S.C.R. 498.
592
SUPllKJIE COURT REPORTS
[1968) l 8.0.B.
for the modification of any standing order. This Court further A
observed, at p. 3'58 :
"The sfanding orders certified under the Act no
doubt become part of the terms of employment by operation of s. 7; but if an industrial dispute arises in respect
of such orders and it is referred to the tribunal by the
appropriate government, the tribunal has jurisdiction to
deal with it on the merits."
B
According to Mr. Gokhale, these observations will clearly indica.te
that the view of this Court is that prior to 1956, the questions
regarding standing orders, could form the subject of an industrial
adjudication, under the Act, and he wants us to draw the inference
that, after 1956, the view of this Court is, that the jurisdiction c
of the Industrial Tribunal, in such matters, has been taken away.
We are not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel, for, this Court, in the above decision, had no occasion to
consider the provisions of the Standing Orders Act, in relation
to the Act. In fact, there is no reference at all to the amendments effected in 1956, to the Act.
The next decision is The Baga/kot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R. K.
D
Pathan('). In that decision, this Co11rt had to consider, again, the
effect of the Standing Orders Act, prior to its amendment, in 1956.
No doubt the amendments, effected in 1956, are also adverted to
when considering the scheme of the Standing Orders Act. lo particular, the scope of item 5, of the Schedule to the Standing Orders E
Act, to the effect 'conditions of, procedure in applying for, and
the authority which may grant, leave and holidays:, came up for
consideration. The contention, on behalf of the Management, appears to have been that the jurisdiction, conferred on a Certifying Authority, under this clause, does not empower the said
Authority to deal with the substantive question of the extent and
quantum of leave and holidays. It was further contended th.at the y
said clause only required the Standing Orders to provide for
conditions, subject to which, leave and holidays could be granted,
as well as the procedure, in respect thereof. In short, it was contended that the quantum of leave and holidays. to be granted to
workmen, was outside the purview of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and, as such. they could not be included by the
Certifying Officer, or the Appellate Authority, in the Standing &
Orders. This contention was rejected, by this Court, and it was
held that the substantive provisions, for the granting of leave and
holidays, along with conditions in that respect, could be provided
for, in the Standing Orders. under cl. 5, of the Schedule. It will
be noted that this decision was also concerned, solely with the
question of the jurisdiction of the Certifying Officer and the Ap- H
pellate Authority, under the Standing Orders Act, in relation to
the standing orders, which came up for
consideration, before
them. In this decision also this Court did not have occasion to
--~-------
(') [1946) 2 S.C.R. 498.
'
BANGAI.OBE KILLS "· WORKMEN ( Vaidtali"ll"m, J.)
593
A consider whether those matters could form the subject of an industrial adjudication, under the Act.
B
c
D
Mr. Gokhale, no doubt, relied upon the observation, at
p. 710, to the following effect:
"It is not disputed that the claim for lea.ve and holidays can become the subject matter of an industrial
dispute and if such a dispute is referred for adjudication
to an Industrial Tribunal, the Tribunal can fix the
quantum of holidays and leave. What the Tribunal can
do on such reference is now intended to be achieved by
the Standing Orders themselves in respect of industrial
establishments to which the Act applies. We have noticed
that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority are, in substance, industrial authorities and if they
are given power to make provision for leave and holidays as they undoubtedly are given power to provide for
termination of employment and suspension or dismissal
for misconduct, there is nothing inconsistent with the
spirit of the, Schedule or with the object of the Act."
and attempted to persuade us to hold that in respect of all the
matters, covered by the standing orders, exclusive jurisdiction
is vested only in the authorities, constituted under the Standing
Orders Act. Though, prima facie, the above observations may
appear to give some support to this contention of Mr. Gokhale,
E in our opinion, those observations must be limited to the question
that this Court was considering. in that case, which, again, was
with reference to the powers of the authorities, under the Standing
Orders At:t, as well as the rights of the parties, with reference tQ
those standing orders. But, at any rate, as we shall presently 'show.
i!1 the later decision, the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial
F Tribunal, in such matters, has been specifically left open.
We then come to the decision of this Court, in Salem Electricity v. Employees('). In that case, the appellant had framed standing orders and got them certified, in or about 1947, under the
Standing Orders Act. In 1960, the appellant made an application,
before the C~rtifying Officer, for amendm~.~\ of certain standing
G orders. By virtue of the proposed amendthent, the management
wanted to have two sets of standing orders, lei' govern the relevant
terms and conditions of its employees. Both the Certifying Officer,
as well as the Appellate Authority, declined to modify the standing orders, as desired by the management. The question that arose
for decision was a short one. as to whether the rejection of the
B application of the management, 'was justified or not. This Court.
again. considered the scheme of the Standing Orders Act, both
before and after its amendment in 1956, and held that in regard
(' l (1946] 2 S.C.R.