# A ZOROASTRIAN CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. AND ANR v. DISTRICT REGISTRAR CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (URBAN) AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2005] 3 S.C.R. 592
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-04-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1551 of2000
- **Bench:** B.N. Agra Wal, P.K. Balasubramany An
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/a-zoroastrian-co-operative-housing-society-ltd-and-anr-v-district-registrar-co-20596
- **Pages:** 38

## Headnote

Cooperative Societies :
C
Gujarat Cooperative Societies, 1961-Sections 4, 24 and 30--Gujarat
Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965-Rule 12(2)-Constitution of India, 1950--
Articles 19(/)(c) and 300A-Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Section 10Cooperative Housing Society-Admission of Member-Transfer of
Membership-Bye laws of Society confining membership to persons belonging
D to Parsi community-Validity of-Held: Bye laws ;·estricting membership to
Parsi community do not violate Act or Rules-Nothing precludes Society from
restricting membership to particular religion, bf!/ief or tenet-Restriction being
in interest of Society and consistent with its object, not opposed to public
policy-Right to become member of Co-operative Society governed by its own
bye laws is not a fundamental right-Further, when person becomes member
E of Society, he enters into a contract submitting to its bye laws which cannot
be curtailed relying on fundamental right-Bye laws are not absolute restraint
on alienation to attract section l 0 of l 882 Act but only a partial restraint
which is valid in law-Also does not violate Article 300A-Bye laws being
valid, Society cannot be directed to amend bye-laws relating to qualification
F for membership-Property is to be dealt by member and assigned only to
persons qualified to be member of Society, in terms of its bye-laws.
Several persons formed appellant-society for purpose of erecting
housing 1"or residential use of its members. After coming into force of
Gujarat Act, society was regulated by Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act,
G 1961. Society acquired land and allotted plots of land to its members. Bye
law 7 of the Housing Society confined its membership to those of Parsi
community and as per bye law 21 members could sell their share with
previous sanction of the Commiittee of society only to person belonging
to Parsi Community. Father of respondent No. 2 purchased flat from a
H
592
- ,-
I ,
.....
---
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD." DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE
593
member being qualified under the bye laws. Respondent No. 2 became A
member of society on death of his father. On Respondent No. 2's application
Society granted permission to demolish the bungalow and construct residential
flats to be sold to Parsis. Thereafter, in terms of the order of Board of
nominees respondent No. 2 sought permission to transfer his share to
respondent No. 3-a builder Association, non-parsi. Society rejected the B
permission. Tribunal held that the bye laws restricting membership to Parsi
was a restriction on the right to property and right to alienate property and
thus invalid in terms of Article 300-A of the Constitution. High Court
dismissed both Writ Petition and Writ Appeal. Hence the present appeal
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The right of the appellant society to insist that the property
has to be dealt by respondent No. 2 only in terms of the bye-laws of the Society
and assigned either wholly or in parts only to persons qualified to be members
c
of the Society in terms of its bye-laws is upheld. Respondent No. 3 is restrained
from entering the property or putting up any construction therein on the basis D
of any transfer by respondent No. 2 in disregard of the bye-laws of the Society
·and without the prior consent of the Society. (629-E-FJ
2.1. The action of the Society in refusing membership ~o a person has
to be tested in the anvil of the provisions of the Act, the Rules and its byelaws. The Act, the Rules and the bye-laws are not to be given the go-by, merely E
because the particular bye-law or action of the Society may not accord with
the concept of fairness or propriety in terms of the rights available to an
ordinary citizen. A legislative provision in the Act can be introduced for the
purpose of eliminating a qualification for membership based on sex, religion
or a persuasion or mode of life. But so long as there is no legislative F
intervention of that nature, it is not open to the court to coin a theory

## Text

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A ZOROASTRIAN CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. AND ANR.
B
v.
DISTRICT REGISTRAR CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (URBAN)
AND ORS.
APRIL 15, 2005
[B.N. AGRA WAL AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.]
Cooperative Societies :
C
Gujarat Cooperative Societies, 1961-Sections 4, 24 and 30--Gujarat
Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965-Rule 12(2)-Constitution of India, 1950--
Articles 19(/)(c) and 300A-Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Section 10Cooperative Housing Society-Admission of Member-Transfer of
Membership-Bye laws of Society confining membership to persons belonging
D to Parsi community-Validity of-Held: Bye laws ;·estricting membership to
Parsi community do not violate Act or Rules-Nothing precludes Society from
restricting membership to particular religion, bf!/ief or tenet-Restriction being
in interest of Society and consistent with its object, not opposed to public
policy-Right to become member of Co-operative Society governed by its own
bye laws is not a fundamental right-Further, when person becomes member
E of Society, he enters into a contract submitting to its bye laws which cannot
be curtailed relying on fundamental right-Bye laws are not absolute restraint
on alienation to attract section l 0 of l 882 Act but only a partial restraint
which is valid in law-Also does not violate Article 300A-Bye laws being
valid, Society cannot be directed to amend bye-laws relating to qualification
F for membership-Property is to be dealt by member and assigned only to
persons qualified to be member of Society, in terms of its bye-laws.
Several persons formed appellant-society for purpose of erecting
housing 1"or residential use of its members. After coming into force of
Gujarat Act, society was regulated by Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act,
G 1961. Society acquired land and allotted plots of land to its members. Bye
law 7 of the Housing Society confined its membership to those of Parsi
community and as per bye law 21 members could sell their share with
previous sanction of the Commiittee of society only to person belonging
to Parsi Community. Father of respondent No. 2 purchased flat from a
H
592
- ,-
I ,
.....
---
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD." DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE
593
member being qualified under the bye laws. Respondent No. 2 became A
member of society on death of his father. On Respondent No. 2's application
Society granted permission to demolish the bungalow and construct residential
flats to be sold to Parsis. Thereafter, in terms of the order of Board of
nominees respondent No. 2 sought permission to transfer his share to
respondent No. 3-a builder Association, non-parsi. Society rejected the B
permission. Tribunal held that the bye laws restricting membership to Parsi
was a restriction on the right to property and right to alienate property and
thus invalid in terms of Article 300-A of the Constitution. High Court
dismissed both Writ Petition and Writ Appeal. Hence the present appeal
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The right of the appellant society to insist that the property
has to be dealt by respondent No. 2 only in terms of the bye-laws of the Society
and assigned either wholly or in parts only to persons qualified to be members
c
of the Society in terms of its bye-laws is upheld. Respondent No. 3 is restrained
from entering the property or putting up any construction therein on the basis D
of any transfer by respondent No. 2 in disregard of the bye-laws of the Society
·and without the prior consent of the Society. (629-E-FJ
2.1. The action of the Society in refusing membership ~o a person has
to be tested in the anvil of the provisions of the Act, the Rules and its byelaws. The Act, the Rules and the bye-laws are not to be given the go-by, merely E
because the particular bye-law or action of the Society may not accord with
the concept of fairness or propriety in terms of the rights available to an
ordinary citizen. A legislative provision in the Act can be introduced for the
purpose of eliminating a qualification for membership based on sex, religion
or a persuasion or mode of life. But so long as there is no legislative F
intervention of that nature, it is not open to the court to coin a theory that a
particular bye-law is not consistent with the scheme or a provision of the
Constitution in Part Ill or IV thereof, and be declare it to be opposed to public
policy by the court. (613-F-G; 616-G-H; 617-A)
Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1971) SC 966, G
referred to.
Daman Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 973,
explained and relied on.
2.2. The validity of a bye-law, that too an approved bye-law, has to be H
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A tested in the light of the provisions of the Act and the rules governing cooperative societies. In so testing, the search should be to see whether a
particular bye-law violates the mandate of any of the provisions ()f the Act
or runs counter to any of its provisions or to any of the rules. Normally, the
bye-laws of a society do not have the status of a statute but may be binding
between the persons affected by them .. They are only the rules which govern
B the internal management or administration of a society and they are of the
nature of articles of association of a company incorporated under the
Companies Act. (616-F-G; E]
Co-operative Central Credit Bank ltd v. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad,
C AIR (1970) SC 245, relied on.
2.3. In the instant case, the bye-laws had already been approved on the
basis that it is consistent with the Act and the Rules. Even then, it may be
possible in a given case to point out that a particular bye-law was against the
terms of the Act or the Rule. Therefore, one has to search for a provision in
D the Act or the Rules which prevails over bye-law No. 7 of the Society, confining
membership in it, to only a person who is a Parsi. Section 24(1) of the Act
only provides for open membership subject to a person, aspiring to be a
member, possessing the qualification ·prescribed under the provisions of the
Act, the Rules and the bye-laws of such society. It is not an open membership
dehors the qualification prescribed by the bye-laws of the Society. Nor is there
E anything in the Act which precludes a society from prescribing a qualification
for membership based on a belief, a persuasion or a religion for that matter.
Section 30(2) of the Act even places restrictions on the right of a member to
transfer his right. If the relevant bye-law of a society places any restriction
on a person getting admitted to a co-operative society, that bye-law would be
F operative against him and no person, or aspiring member, can be heard to
say that he will not be bound by that law which prescribes a qualification for
his membership. In fact, the individual right of the member, respondent No.2",
has got submerged in the collective right of the Society. (613-H; 614-A-C)
"
r
State of UP. and Anr. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society
G ltd and Ors., [1997] 3 sec 681, relied on.
~
Jain Merchants Co-operative Housing Society v. HUF of Manubhai, (1995)
__
1 Gujarat Law Reporter 19, referred to.
2.4. It is not possible to import one's inherent abhorrence to religious
H groups or other groups coming together to form, what respondent called
---
-
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP HOUSING SOCIE. LTD. 1·. DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE.
595
"ghettos". That is certainly an important aspect but that is an aspect that A
has to be tackled by the legislature and not by the authorities under the Act
directing the co-operative society to go against its own bye-laws or by the
courts upholding such orders of the authorities, based on presumed public
policy when the Act itself does not warrant it or sanction it 1624-E-F)
2.5. Jn the activities of a society, as envisaged by the bye-laws, the society B
may acquire rights or incur obligations which may be enforced but the same
cannot stand in the way of the right to form an association guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution available to the members of the society
who formed themselves into the appellant Society. The position under the
Bombay Co-operative Societies Act was also no different. Therefore, it is not C
open to the Registrar or any other authority under the Co-operative Societies
Act to direct the Society to go against its own bye-laws and to admit a person
to membership. 1623-F-Gl
2.6. The approved bye-laws confer power on the Committee to reject
the application for membership of a person who is not qualified in terms of D
the bye-law concerned and this cannot be interfered with on the basis of
anything contained in the Act or the Rules. Therefore, by introducing a theory
of what the court considers to be public policy, a society registered under the
Cooperative Societies Act, cannot be directed to admit a member who is not
qualified to be a member in terms of its duly registered bye-laws. Neither the
member, respondent No. 2, nor the aspirant to membership, respondent No.
3 had the competence to challenge the validity of the bye-laws of the Society
or to claim a right to membership in the Society. 1617-GJ
State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Karvanagar Sahakari Griya Rachana
Sanstha Maryadit and Ors., 12000) 9 SCC 295 and State of U.P. and Anr. v.
C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd and Ors., (19971 3 SCC
681, relied on.
E
F
2.7. Unless appropriate amendments are brought to the various
Cooperative Societies Acts incorporating a policy that no society shall be
formed or if formed, membership in no society shall be confined to persons G
of a particular persuasion, religion, belief or region, it could not be said that
a society would be disentitled to refuse membership to a person who is not
duly qualified to be one in terms of its bye-laws. [617-H; 618-AJ
3.1. The doctrine of public policy is governed by precedents, its principles
have been crystallized under the different heads and though it was permissible H
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2005] 3 S.C.R.
A to expound and apply them to different situations it could be applied only to
clear and undeniable cases of harm to the public. Although, theoretically it
was permissible to evolve a new head of public policy in exceptional
circumstances, such a course would be inadvisable in the interest of stability
of society. (626-E-Fl
B
Gheru Lal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Ma;ya and Ors., [19591Suppl.2 SCR
406, relied on.
3.2. When a statute is enacted, creating entities introduced thereunder
9n fulfillment of the conditions laid down therein, the public policy in relation
to that statute has to be searched for within the four corners of that statute.
C The statute reflects the policy of the Legislature in respect of the subject matter
dealt with thereunder. (615-A-B)
3.3. Appellant Society was formed with the object of providing housing
to the members of the Parsi community. It is open to that community to try
D to preserve its culture and way of life and in that process, to work for the
advancement of members of that community by enabling them to acquire
membership in a society and allotment oflands or buildings in one's capacity
as a member of that society, to preserve .its object of advancement of the
community. It is also open to the members of that community, who came
together to form the co-operative society, to prescribe that members of that
E community for whose benefit the society was formed, alone could aspire to
be.members of that society. There is nothing,in the Bombay Act or the Gujarat
Act which precludes the formation of such a society. [625-F; 627-A)
3.4. When the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 was enacted, it
could not be taken that the Legislature was unaware of the fundamental rights
F of citizens enshrined in Articles 19(l)(d) and (g) of the Constitution. But the
Legislation, in aid of the cooperative movement and in the context of the rights
available to citizens under Article 19(l)(c) of the Constitution, imposes only
certain restrictions as reflecte~ by the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws of the
particular society. The Acts specifically gave sanctity to the bye-laws of a
G Society duly approved by the authorities under the Act The expression 'public
policy' in the context of Section 4 of the Act can be understood only as being
opposed to the policy reflected by the Cooperative Societies Act Prima facie,
public policy, in the context of Section 4 of the Act, is the policy that is adopted
by the concerned. Act and the Rules framed thereunder. One does not find
anything in the Act which prevents the Society from refusing membership to
H a person who does not qualify in terms of bye-law No. 7 of the Society and in
·--==
--
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LID. v. DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOC!E.
597
the absence of any prohibition contained therein against the forming of a A
society for persons of Parsi origin, it could not be held that the confining of
membership as was done by bye-law No. 7, was opposed to public policy.
(620-E]
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v. General Electric Co., (1994) Supp. 1 SCC
644, relied on.
3.5. By Rule 12(2), of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965 the
primacy given to the bye-laws of the society is in no manner sought to be
whittled down by reference to any public policy going by the larger concept
of that term and outside the Act. (615-E-F]
3.6. It is true that in secular India it may be somewhat retrograde to
conceive of co-operative societies confined to group of members or followers
B
c
of a particular religion, a particular mode of life, a particular persuasion. But
that is different from saying that you cannot have a co-operative society
confined to persons of a particular persuasion, belief, trade, way of life or a
religion. The fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution are normally D
enforced against State action or action by other authorities who may come
within the purview of Article 12. A co-operative society is not a State within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. [62l-A-B]
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1981) 1 SCC 722, relied on.
3. 7. It cannot be said that a person has a fundamental right to become
a member of a voluntary association or of a co-operative society governed
by its own bye-laws. So long as this position holds, it is not possible, especially
for a Registrar who is an authority under The Co-operative Societies Act, to
direct a co-operative society to admit as a member, a person who does not
qualify to be a member as per the bye-laws registered under the Act. Nor
E
F
can a Registrar direct in terms of Section 14 of the Act to amend the byelaws since it could not be said that such an amendment, as directed in this
case is necessary or desirable in the interests of the appellant society. What is
relevant under Section 14 of the Act is the interest of the society and the
necessity in the context of that interest. It is not the interest of an individual G
member or an aspirant to a membership. (623-C-Fl
3.8. With regard to the submission that Articles 14 and 15 prevent any
d.iscrimination based·on religion or origin in the matter of equal treatment
or employment and to apply the same even in respect of a co-operative society,
the Court must also consider what lies behind the formation of co-operative H
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2005] 3 S.C.R.
A societies and what their character is and how they are to be run as envisaged
by the various Cooperative Societies Acts prevalent in various States of this
Country. Running through the Cooperative Societies Act, is the theory of area
of operation which means that membership could be denied to a citizen of
this Country who is located outside the area of operation of a society.
B
r6t9-B-DJ
3.9. High Court made a wrong approach to the question of whether a
bye-law like bye-la~ No. 7 could be ignored by a member and whether the
Authorities under the Act and the court could ignore the same on the basis
that it is opposed to public policy being against the constitutional scheme of
C equality or non-discrimination relating to employment, vocation etc. So long
as the approved bye-law stands and the Act does not provide for invalidity
of such a bye-law or for interdicting the formation of co-operative societies
confined to persons of a particular vocation, a particular community, a
particular persuasion or a particular sex, it could not be held that the
formation of such a societ)r under the Act would be opposed to public policy
D and consequently liable to be declared void or the society directed to amend
its basic bye-law relating to qualification for membership. [626-A-CJ
4.1. Under the Contract Act, a person suijuris has the freedom to enter
into a contract The bye-laws of a cooperative society setting out the terms of
membership to it, is a contract entered into by a person when he seeks to
E become a member of that society. Even the formation of the society is based
on a contract. This freedom to contract available to a citizen cannot be
curtailed or curbed relying on the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III
of the Constitution against State action. A right to enforce a fundamental right
against State action, cannot be extended to challenge a right to enter into a
F contract giving up an absolute right in oneself in the interests of an association
to be formed or in the interests of the members in general of that association.
This is also in lieu of advantages derived by that person by accepting a
membership in the Society. The restriction imposed, is generally for retaining
the identity of the society and to carry forward the object for which the society
was originally formed. The person exercises his right of association when he
G becomes a member of a society by entering into a contract with others
regulating his conduct vis-a-vis the society, the members constituting it, and
submerging his rights in the common right to be enjoyed by all and he is really
exercising his right of association guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution in that process. His rights merge in the rights of the society and
H are controlled by the Act and the bye-laws of the society. r620-F-H; 621-A-CJ
..
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD. ''· DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE.
5 99
4.2. Section 23 of the Contract Act provides that where consideration A
and object are not lawful the contract would be void. But for Section 23 to
apply it must be forbidden by law or it must be of such a nature that it would
defeat the provision of any law or it is fraudulent or it involves or implies
injury to the person or property of another or the court regards it as immoral
or opposed to public policy. Something more than a possible or plausible B
argument based on the constitutional scheme is necessary to nullify an
agreement voluntarily entered into by a person. The basic premise is that
public policy in relation to a co-operative society is to be looked for within
the four corners of the Act, the very emrctment under which the very society
is formed. A bye-law that does not militate against any of the provisions of
the Act cannot be held to be opposed to public policy unless it is immoral or C
offends public order. 1624-G-H; 625-A)
4.3. In the context of the freedom of contract available to a person and
the right to form an ussociation. guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution, and the law governing such an association, the Courts have to
be cautious in trying to ride' the unruly horse of public policy in acceding to D
a challenge to a qualification for membership in the bye-laws, not taboo under
the Act and the Rules themselves. Respondent No. 2 became a member of
the Society of his own volition acquiring the rights and incurring the
obligations imposed by the approved bye-laws of the Society. By invoking
considerations of public policy, there is no justification in relieving a member- E
respondent No. 2 of a Cooperative Society of the obligations undertakrn by
him while joining it on the ground that the same might affect his fundamental
rights guaranteed by Article 19(l)(d) or (g) of the Constitution or that it
offends Article 300A of the Constitution. [621-H; 622-A; 622-D-F)
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v. Sampson, (1874-75) Vol.19 F
LR Equity Cases 462; Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros., (1919) A.C. 59; Fender v.
Mildmay, (1938) AC 1 and Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge Disposal
ltd and Ors., [1993) 3 All ER 417, referred to.
5.1. Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act relieves a tram;feree of
immoveable property from an absolute restraint placed on his right to deal G
with the property in his capacity as an owner thereof. As per section 10 a
condition restraining alienation would be void. The Section applies to a case
where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely
restraining the transferee from parting with his interest in the property. For
making such a condition invalid, the restraint must be an absolute restraint
[627-H) H
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005) 3 S.C.R.
A
It must be a restraint imposed while the property is being transferred
to the transferee. When a person accepts membership in a cooperative society
by submitting himself to its bye-laws and secures an allotment of a plot of
land or a building in terms of the bye-laws and places on himself a qualified
restriction in his right to transfer the property by stipulating that the same
B would be transferred back to the society or with the prior consent of the society
to a person qualified to be a member of the society, it cannot be held to be an
absolute restraint on alienation offending Section 10. He has placed that
restriction on himself in the interests of the collective body, the society. He
has voluntarily submerged his rights in that of the society. Section 10 cannot
have any application to transfer of membership which is regulated by the byeC laws. The bye-laws in that regard are· not in challenge and cannot effectively
be challenged. (628-A; 628-G-H- 629-A]
5.2. The restriction, if any, is a self-imposed restriction to which the
father of respondent No. 2 was a party and respondent No. 2 voluntarily
became a party. It is difficult to postulate that such a qualified freedom to
D transfer a property accepted by a person voluntarily, would attract Section
10 of the Act. Moreover, it is not as if it is an absolute restraint on alienation.
Respondent No. 2 has the right to transfer the property to a person who is
qualified to be a member of the Society as per its bye-laws. At best, it is a
partial restraint on alienation. Such partial restraints are valid if imposed in
E a family settlement, partition or compromise of disputed claims. (628-E-F]
Mohammad Raza v. Mt. Abbas Bandi Bibi, 59 I.A. 236 and Gummanna
Shetty and Ors. v. Nagaveniamma, AIR (1967) SC 1595, relied on.
5.3. It is property in the hands of the member on the strength of the
F allotment. It may also be attachable and saleable in spite of the volition of
the allottee. But it does not enable the Court to hold that the condition that
allotment to the member is subject to his possessing the qualification to be a
member of the cooperative society or that a voluntary transfer by him could
be made only to the society itself or to another person qualified to be a member
of the society and with the consent of the society could straightaway be
G declared to be an absolute restraint on alienation and thus an interference
with his right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution and as such
is to be set aside. (629-C-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1551 of2000.
H
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.7.99 of the Gujarat High Court
-
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD. v. DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE. [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J] 60}
in L.P.A. No. 129/97 in S.C.A. No. 6226 of 1996.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Sanjeev Sen, Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. Seema Sundd,
Ms. Jasmine Damakewal, Ms_ Kanika Agnihotri and Ashim Sood for Mrs.
Manik Karanjawala with him for the Appellants.
A
V.A. Bobde, A.P. Mayee, N.S. Tambwekar, Sanjeev K. Choudhary, B
Vishwajit Singh, Arjun Bobde, Ms. Hemantika Wahi with him for the
Respondensts.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J. 1. The Zoroastrian Co-operative C
Housing Society is a society registered on 19.5.1925, under the Bombay Co-
.operative Societies Act, 1925. The Society applied to the Government of
Bombay for acquisition of certain lands in Ahmedabad District, then in the
State of Bombay, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of
erecting houses for residential use of its members and to further the aims and. D
objects of the Society. On the Government of Bombay agreeing to the proposal,
the Society entered into an agreement on l7.2J928 with the Government
under Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. Certain lands were acquired.
From the lands thus acquired at its cost and given to it, the Society allotted
plots of land to the various members of the Society in furtherance of the
objects of the Society. On the re-organization of States, the Society became E
functional in the State of Gujarat and came within the purview of the Gujarat
Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. Section 169 of that Act, repealed the Bombay
Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 . and in sub-section (2) provided that all
societies registered or deemed to be registered under the Bombay Act, the
registration of which was in force immediately before the commencement of
the Gujarat Act, were to be deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Act. F
The Gujarat Act came into force on l.5.1962. Thus, the Society came to be
regulated by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred
to ~s 'the Act').
2. On the scheme of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter G
referred to as 'the Bombay Act'), the Society had applied for registration in
terms of Section 9 of that Act. The application was accompanied by the
proposed bye-laws of the Society. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies,
on being satisfied that the Society had complied with the provisions of the
Act and the Rules and that the proposed bye-laws were not contrary to the
Act and the Rules, granted registration to the Society and its bye-laws and H
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[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A issued a certificate of registration in terms of Section I I of that Act. As per
the bye-laws, the objects of the Society were to carry on the trade of building,
and of buying, selling, hiring, letting and developing land in accordance with
Co-operative principles and to establish and carry on social, re-creative and
educational work in connection with its tenets and the Society was to have
full power to do all things it deemed necessary or expedient, for the
B accomplishment of all objects specified in its bye-laws, including the power
to purchase, hold, sell, exchange, mortgage, rent, lease, sub-lease, surrender,
accept surrenders of and deal with lands of any tenure and to sell by
installments and subject to any terms or conditions and to make and guarantee
advances to members for building or purchasing property and to erect, pull
C down, repair, alter or otherwise deal with any building thereon. All persons
who had signed the application for registration, are original members by
virtue of bye-law No. 7. The said bye-law further provided that other members
shall be elected by the Committee of the Society, provided that all members
shall belong to the Parsi Community subject to satisfying other conditions in
that bye-law. Bye-law No. 21 provided for sale of a share held by a member
D but with previous sanction of the Committee which had full discretion in
granting or withholding such sanction. It was also provided that until the
transfer of a share is registered, no right was acquired against the Society by
the transferee, and no claim against the transferor by the Society was also to
be affected. In short, the qualification for becoming a member in the Society
E was that the person should be a Parsi and that the transfer of a share to him
had to have the previous sanction of the Committee of the Society.
3. Some of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Act may now oe
noticed. Under Section 3, the Registrar had the right to classify all societies
under one or other of the heads referred to in that Section. Under Section 5
F of that Act, a society which had as its object, the promotioA of economic
interests of its members in accordance with economic principles, may be
registered under the Act with or without limited liability. Section 6 placed
restrictions on the interests of the members of the society with limited liability.
Section 6A enacted that no person shall be admitted as a member of a society
unless he w~ a person competent to contract under Section 11 of the Indian
G Contract Act. Section 7 stipulated the conditions for registration and provided
that no society could be registered under the Act which did not consist of at
least 10 persons who were qualified to be members of the society under
Section 6A and where the object of the society was the creation of funds to ·
be lent to its members, unless all persons forming the society resided in the
H same town or village or in the group of villages or they belonged to the same
-
..
ZOROASTRIAN CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD. 1·. DIST. REG. CO-OP. SOCIE. [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 60}
tribe, class or occupation, unless the Registrar ordered otherwise and no A
person could be admitted to membership of any such society after its
registration unless the persons fulfilled the two requirements as mentioned
above. If the Registrar was satisfied that a society has complied with the
provisions of the Act and the Rules and that its proposed bye-laws are not
contrary to the Act or to the Rules, under Section I 0 he was to register the B
society and its bye-laws. According to the Society. it '.:<!d submitted its duly
filled in application under Section 9 of the Act accompanied by its bye-laws
and the said bye-laws have been approved and registerl!d by the Registrar on
being satisfied that the proposed bye-laws were not contrary to the Act or to
the Rules.
4. After the Society was formed and registered as indicated earlier, the
Society got lands acquired by the State by i'lvoking the Land Acquisition
c
Act, 1894. The Society entered into an agreement in that behalf with the
Government under Section 41 of the Act on 17 .2.1928. The said agreement
recited that the Government of Bombay was satisfied that the land should be
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act "for the purpose of erecting houses D
thereon". It was also stated that the Government was satisfied that the
acquisition of the land was needed for the furtherance of the objects of the
Society and was likely to prove useful to the public and it consented to put
in operation the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. An extent of 6 acres
12 guntas was thus acquired and handed over to the Society, on the Society E
bearing the cost of that acquisition. The Society in its tum allotted portions
of the land to its members for the purpose of putting up residential houses
in the concerned plots.
5. One of the members of the Society sold the plot in which he had
constructed a residential building, to the father of Respondent No. 2 with the F
previous consent of the Committee of the Society. The father of Respondent
No. 2 was also admitted to membership of the Society, he being qualified for
such admission in terms of the bye-laws of the Society. After the rights
devolved on Respondent No. 2, consequent on the death of his father, he
became a member of the Society of his volition. Thereafter, he applied to the G
Society for permission to demolish the bungalow that had been put up and
to construct a commercial building in its place. The Society refused him
permission stating that die bye-laws of the Society did not permit commercial
use of the land. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 applied to the Society for
permission to demolish the bungalow and to construct residential flats to be
sold to Parsis. The Society acceded to the request of Respondent No. 2, H
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[2005) 3 S.C.R.
A making it clear that the flats constructed could only be sold to Parsis. It
appears that, earlier, the Society had written to the Registrar that it was
apprehending that certain members of the Society were proposing to sell their
bungalows to persons outside the Parsi community only with commercial
motive and in violation of clause 7 of the bye-laws. The Registrar replied that
B any transaction of sale should be in accordance with the bye-laws of the
Society and any sale in violation of the bye-laws would not be pennitted,
thus, stressing the sanctity of the bye-laws. On 20.7.1982, the Government of
Gujarat had also issued a notification declaring that persons or finns dealing
with the sale and purchase of lands and buildings, contractors, architects and
engineers were disqualified from being members of Co-operative Hcusing
C Societies. Though, pennission was given to Respondent No. 2 as early as on
17 .5.1988 for construction of residential flats in the land, to be sold only to
members of the Parsi community, he did not act on the pennission for a
period of seven years. Apprehending that Respondent No. 2 intended to
violate the bye-laws of the Society, the Society passed a resolution reminding
D its members that in accordance with bye-law No. 7, no person other than a
Parsi could become a new member of the Society and infonning the existing
members of the Society that they could not sell their plots or bungalows to
any person not belonging to the Parsi community. Respondent No. 2 appears
to have started negotiations with Respondent No. 3, a Builder's association,
in violation of the restriction on sale of shares or property to a non-Parsi. The
E Society, in that context, filed a case before the Board of Nominees under the
Act for an injunction restraining Respondent No. 2 from putting up any
construction in plot No. 7 and from transferring the same to outsiders in
violation of bye-law No. 7 without valid prior pennission from the Society.
Though, initially an interim order of injunction was granted, the Board
F infonned the Society that the Society could not restrict its membership only
to the Parsi community and that membership should remain open for every
person. A clarification was also sought for from the Society as to why it had
refused permission to Respondent No. 2 to transfer plot No. 7 belonging to
him. Subsequently, the Board of Nominees vacated the interi order of
injunction granted, inter alia, on the ground that the construction of a block
G of residential flats would not create disturbance and nuisance to the original
members of the Society. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 applied to the Society
for pennission to transfer his share to Respondent No. 3. The said application
was rejected by the Society, since according to it, the application was contrary
to the Act, Rules and the bye-laws of the Society. While the Society challenged
H the order of the Board of Nominees before the Gujarat State Co-operative
-----...
ZOROASTRIAN CO.OP. HOUSING SOCIE. LTD."· DIST. REG. CO.OP. SOCIE. [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J] 605
Societies Tribunal, Respondents 2 and 3 challenged the rejection of the request A
of Respondent No. 2 to sell his plot to Respondent No. 3, by way of an
appeal before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 24 of the
Act. The Tribunal, in the revision filed by the Society, took the view in an
interim order that the bye-law restricting membership to Parsis was a restriction
on the right to property and the right to alienate property and, therefore, was
invalid in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. This order was B
challenged by the Society and its Chairman before the High Court of Gujarat
in Special Civil Application No. 6226 of 1996. By judgment dated 16.1.1997,
a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition
essentially holding that the restriction in a bye-law to the effect that
membership would be limited only to persons belonging to the Parsi C
community, would be an unfair restriction which can be validly dealt with by
the appropriate authorities under Section 24 of the Act and Rule 12(2) of the
Rules. It was also held that such a bye-law would amount to a restraint on
alienation and hence would be hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property
Act. The Society and its Chairman, ch~llenged the said decision before a
Division Bench, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 129 of 1997. By judgment D
dated 23. 7.1999, the said appeal was dismis~ed, more or less, concurring with
the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Single Judge. The decision of the
Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court thus rendered, is challenged in this
appeal by Special Leave.
6. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants contended that under Article 19( l )( c) of the Constitution of India,
Pars1s had a fundament right of forming an association and that fundamental
right cannot be infringed by thrusting upon the association, members whom
it does not want to admit or against the terms of its bye-laws. He submitted
E
that the content of the right of association guaranteed by Article 19(l)(c) of F
the Constitution of India has been misunderstood by the High Court and the
Authorities under the Act. He .also contended that there was nothing in the
Act or the Rules which precluded a society from restricting its membership
to persons of a particular persuasion, belief or tenet and the High Court was
in error in holding that membership could not be restricted to members of the G
parsi community for whose benefit the very society was got registered. Though,
grounds based on Article 26 of the Constitution of India raised, were not
pursued, it was pointed out that under Article 29, the parsis had the right to
conserve their culture. It was submitted that bye-law No. 7 was perfectly
valid and so long as it did not violate anything contained in the Act or the
Rules, it could not be held to be invalid or unenforceable and the society H
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[2005] 3 S.C.R.
A cannot be compelled to act against the terms of its bye-laws. He also submitted
that there was no absolute restraint on alienation to attract Section IO of the
Transfer of Property Act and the restraint, if any, was only a partial restraint,
valid in law. There was nothing illegal in certain persons coming together to
form a society in agreeing to restrict membership in it or to exclude the
B general public at its discretion with a view to carry on its objects smoothly.
Mr. Bobde, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents,
Respondents 2 and 3, contended that Section 4 of the Act clearly indicated
that no bye-law could be recognized which was opposed to public policy or
which was in contravention of public policy in the context of the relevant
provisions in the Constitution of India and the rights of an individual under
C the laws of the Country. A bye-law restricting membership in a co-operative
society, to a particular denomination, community, caste or creed was opposed
to public policy and consequently, the Authorities under the Act and the High
Court were fully justified in rejecting the claim of the Society.