# ABDUL KARIM KHAN AND ORS v. MUNICIPAL COMMITTI:E, RAIPUR

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 300
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-03-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 871 of 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, C. J. Raghubar Dayal, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/abdul-karim-khan-and-ors-v-municipal-committi-e-raipur-3487
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Madhya Prad.esh Public Trusts Act (30 of 1951}-Entry by
Registrar that property be]ongs to Public trust-If conclusive against
real owner.
The first appellant, who was the Mufawalli of a putlic trust,
filed a representative suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from committing acts of encroachment on the suit property,
on the ground that the property was that of the trust and had been
so registered by the Registrar of Public Trusts, under the Madhya
Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951. The suit was dismissed by the trial
court and also on appeal.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court the appellants contended
that, since the respondent did not avail itself of the right to file a
suit within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar
must be held to be final and conclusive against the respondent.
HELD: The fact that the property in suit was added to the
list of the properties belonging to the trust, could not affect the respondent's title. to it. [306 A-BJ
·
The enquiry which the Act contemplates is an enquiry into the
question as to whether a trust is public or private and does not
take within its sweep questions as to whether a property belongs
to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust
at all. The only persons who are required to file their objections
in proceedings before the Registrar are persons interested in the
public trust-not petsons who dispute the existence of the trust or
who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said
trust. Inasmuch as the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any otjections in the proceedings
the· respondent was not bound to file an appeal under s. 4(5) of !ht
Act or a suit under s. 8(1).
challenging order of the Registrar.
Therefore, the finality given to the finding of the Registrar could
not be availed of by the appellant as against the respondent.
[304 G; 305 A-B, D-E]
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 871 of
1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
August 13, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second
Appeal No. 294 of 1959.
S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowa;a, for the appellant.
S. T. Desai and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respopdent.

## Text

300
ABDUL KARIM KHAN AND ORS.
v.
MUNICIPAL COMMITTI:E, RAIPUR
March 8, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL
AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]
Madhya Prad.esh Public Trusts Act (30 of 1951}-Entry by
Registrar that property be]ongs to Public trust-If conclusive against
real owner.
The first appellant, who was the Mufawalli of a putlic trust,
filed a representative suit for an injunction restraining the respondent from committing acts of encroachment on the suit property,
on the ground that the property was that of the trust and had been
so registered by the Registrar of Public Trusts, under the Madhya
Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951. The suit was dismissed by the trial
court and also on appeal.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court the appellants contended
that, since the respondent did not avail itself of the right to file a
suit within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar
must be held to be final and conclusive against the respondent.
HELD: The fact that the property in suit was added to the
list of the properties belonging to the trust, could not affect the respondent's title. to it. [306 A-BJ
·
The enquiry which the Act contemplates is an enquiry into the
question as to whether a trust is public or private and does not
take within its sweep questions as to whether a property belongs
to a private individual and is not the subject matter of any trust
at all. The only persons who are required to file their objections
in proceedings before the Registrar are persons interested in the
public trust-not petsons who dispute the existence of the trust or
who challenge the allegation that any property belongs to the said
trust. Inasmuch as the respondent was not a party to the proceedings and could not have filed any otjections in the proceedings
the· respondent was not bound to file an appeal under s. 4(5) of !ht
Act or a suit under s. 8(1).
challenging order of the Registrar.
Therefore, the finality given to the finding of the Registrar could
not be availed of by the appellant as against the respondent.
[304 G; 305 A-B, D-E]
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 871 of
1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
August 13, 1959, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second
Appeal No. 294 of 1959.
S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowa;a, for the appellant.
S. T. Desai and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respopdent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C . .J;
This appeal arises from a suit filed
by the appellants who are the representatives of. residents. of
Nayapara Ward in particular and of the Muslill1 community of
Raipur in general, in which- they claimed an injunction restraining the respondent, 1\iunicipal Committee of Raipur, from committing acts of encroachmel\t on their rights and the rights of
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ABDUi. K.\RDI KHAN v. >!UXICIPAL COM~IITTEE RAIPUR (Gajendragadkar, c. J.) 301
A
the Muslim community in holding U rs and other ceremonies on
the plot in suit. It appears that at Raipur, there is a piece of land
called "Fazle Karim's Bada" Khasra No. 649 measuring 4.62
acres. Inside this Bada, there are three or four Municipal Schools.
The office of the Electric Power House is also located in one
corner of the land. Behind the School, there is a Pakka platform
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known as "Syed Baba's Mazar". Near the Electric Power House,
there is a raised earth platform on ·which there is a flag.
This
flag is called "Madar Sahib's .Thanda".
Surrounding this land,
there is a brick wall which was made by the respondent several
years past.
According to the plaint, U rs function is held every
year in front of Syed Baba's .Mazar for the last several years.
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On or a.bout the 22nd October, 1956, the employees of the respondent started digging foundation at the places A. B, C and D
shown on the map attacbed to the plaint. These digging operations were commenced under the Qirections of the respondent,
because the respondent intended to construct another school
building on the plot. The appellants then served a notice on the
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respondent to desist from carrying on the digging operations on
the ground that the property on which the said operations were
being carried out, was a part of the wakf property.
When the
respondent did not comply with the requisition oontained in the
said notice. the present suit was filed by the appellants on October
29, 1956. This suit has been filed under 0.1 r. 8 of the Code of
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Civil Procedure.
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The case of the appellants is that the plot of land in suit
was old Kabrasthan known as "Chuchu's Takia'', and is a permanent inalienable wakf property. On this plot are tombs of renowned saints like Syed Baba, and Madar Sahib's Jha .. da. On
a part of the plot, every year Urs and other religious functions
are performed. In fact, the land has been registered under the
Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (No. 30 of 1951) (hereinafter
called the Act) as trust property; as suah, the respondent can
claim no right or title tb the said land. That is the basis on which
the appellants claimed injunction against the respondent.
The respondent disputed this claim. It was urged in the
written statement filed by ~he respondent that the land was never
and could never be wakf property. There was no tomb on the
land. There are only two so-called tombs, but they have no
significance. The Urs is of very recent origin and it is allowed to
be held with t~e licence of the respondent. The plot originally.
belonged to private persons and had been: acquired by the
Government
in
land
acquisition
proceedings
in
1910-11.
The respondent got the said land from the Government in 1922.
In 1932-33, the Deputy Commissioner fixed rent of the land which
is being paid by the respondent eversince. On this land, the respondent has constructed some schools, and a part of the land
which is lying vacant is allowed to be used by the people of the
neighbJurhood for traffic. The respondent thus has full right to
302
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[l9G5] 3 8.C.R.
construct on its own plot of land. The representative character
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of the appellants was disputed by the respondent and their right
to file the present suit was challenged.
On these pleadings, several issues were framed by the learned
trial Judge. They covered the title of appellants, the title of the
respondent, and the right of the appellants to file the suit. The
issue with which we are cor.cerned in the present appeal related
to the registration of the plot in the register kept under the relevant provisions of the Act and its effect. The appellants' contention was that the said registration was conclusive against the respondent and in favour of the appellants' claim. This contention
was rejected by the trial Judge, with the result that the appellants'
suit was dismissed.
With the findings recorded by the learned
trial Judge on the other issues we are not concerned in the present appeal.
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The matter then went in appeal, and the appellate Court
confirmed the conclusions recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellants challenged the correctness of
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the said appellate decree by preferring a seoond appeal in the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, but the second appeal also
failed, and that has brought the appellants . to this Court by
special leave. Thus, it would be noticed that the appellants have
failed on the merits of their claim in all the courts below, and
the technical point raised by them that the registration· of the
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plot under the relevant provisions of the Act concluded the
matter, has also been rejec~ed. It is this last point which has been
urged before us by Mr. Sinha on behalf of the appe!lants.
Before we deal with, this point, however, it would be relevant to mention how the property came to be entered in the
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recister kept under the relevant provisions of the Act. The record
shows that the Masiid Nayapara, Raipur, had been entered in
the register as a public trust on June 25, 1954 in Case No. 23XXXiii /7 of 1952-53. rertain properties were entered in the
said register in respect of this trust. In 1956. Abdul Karim.
Mutawalr Masjid
Nayapara. Raipur applied to
the SubG
Divisional Officer. Raipur alleging that the property now in suit
also belonged to the public trust and should be included amongst
its properties. On this application, public notice was issued
callin~ upon persons interested in the property to show cause
why it should not be added to the properties of the wakf. No
obiection was. however. received; and on October 23, 1956, the
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Sub-Divisional Officer reported that the poperty be shown against
the trust. The said report was sanctioned by the Registrar. Public
Trusts on April 22, 1957. That is how the property came to be
registered as belonging to the public trust. and it is on this entry
that the whole argument of the appellants is based.
In considering the validity of the contention raised by Mr.
Sinha before us, it is necessary to examine broadlv the scheme
AllDU/, KARIM KHAN v. MUNICIPAL COMMiiTEE RA!l'UR (Uajeiuirag •• dfor C.J.) 303
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of the Act and the material provisions on which Mr. Sinha relies.
I he Act was passed in 1951 to regulate and to make better pro·
vision for the administration of public religious and charitable
trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Section 2(4) of the Act
defines a "public trust", and s. 2(8) defines a "wakf". 'Working
trustee' is defined by s. 2(9). Section 3(1) provides that the Deputy
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Commissioner shall be the Registrar of public trusts in respect
of every public trust; and s. 3 (2) imposes on the Registrar the
obligation to maintain a register of public trusts, and such other
bOoks and registers and in such form as may be prescribed.
Section 4(1) deals with the registration of public trusts and it
requires that within three months from the date on which the
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said section comes into force in any area or from the date on
which a public trust is created, whichever is later, the working
trustee of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having
jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust. Section 4(3)
lays down the particulars which have to be stated by the application which is required to be made under s. 4(1).
All these
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particulars are in relation to the nature of the trust, its properties,
the mode of succession to the office of the trustees, and other
allied matters. Section 4(4) empowers the Registrar to decide the
merits of the application, while s. 4(5) provides for an appeal
against his decision which is required to be filed within 30 days
of the order. Mr. Sinha relies .on a specific provision contained
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in s. 4(5) which says that subject to the decision in such appeal,
the order of the Registrar under sub-section (4) shall be final,
Section 4(6) requires the signing and verification of the application in the manner laid down in the code of Civil Procedure for
signing and verifying plaints.
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That takes us to s. 5 which deals with the enquiry to be held
by the Registrar on the application made before him under s. 4(1).
Eight points are set down under s. 5(1) which the Registrar has to
consider. Section 5(2) lays down that the Registrar shall give in the
prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be
made under sub-section (!) and invite all persons interested in the
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public trust under inquiry to prefer objections, if any, in respect
of such trust. Under s. 6, the Registrar has to make his findings on
the point specified by s. 5(1); and under s. 7, the Registrar
causes entries to be made in the Register in accordance with his
findings. Section 7(2) naturally lays down that the entriei: made
under s. 7(1) shall be final and conclusive. Section 8(1) allows a
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civil suit to be filed against the findings of the' Registrar within
six months from the date of the publication of the notice under
s. 7(1); such a suit can be filed by a working trustee or a person
_having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust
property. Section 9 permits applications to be made for change
in the entries recorded in the register. It will be recalled that the
application which was made in 1'156 by Abdul Karim was under
the provisions of s. 9(1). If an application is made for change in
30·1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) 3 S.C.R.
the entries as, far instance, for adding to the list of properties
belonging to the trust, a proceeding has to be taken for making the
said change and this is prescribed by s. 9(2). Section 9(3) makes
the provisions of s. 8 applicable to any finding under s. 9 as they
would apply to a finding under s. 6. These provisions are contained
in Chapter II of the Act. Chapter III deals with the management
of trust property; Ch. IV with the problem of audit; Ch. V with
control; and Ch. VI contains miscellanemis provisions, including
s. 35 which confers the rule-making power on the State Government. That, broadly stated, is the nature of the scheme of the Act
and the' material provisions which fall to be considered in the
present appeal.
Mr. Sinha relies on the fact that under s. 4(5) of the Act, the
decision of the Registrar is made final, subject to the appellate
decision, if any; and he also refers to the right of instituting a
suit reserved by s. 8. His argument is that if any person who claims
interest in the property which is alleged to be trust property fails
to satisfy the Registrar about his claim, he can file a suit under
s. 8(1). Section 8(1) allows a suit to be filed, subject to the conditions prescribed by it, and the right to file sudh a suit is given to
a working trustee, or a person having interest in a public trust or
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any property found to be trust property. The respondent is
interested in the property in suit which is found to be trust property, and since it did not avail itself of the right to file a suit
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within the specified time, the order passed by the Registrar must·
be held to be final and conclusive against its claim. If finality does
not attach to such an order even after six months have expired
within the meaning of s. 8(1), then the ,provision contained in
s. 4(5) will serve no purpose whatever. That is the manner in which
Mr. Sinha has presented his case before us.
We are not impressed by this argument. In testing the validity
of this argument, we must bear in mind the important fact that the
Act is concerned with the registration of public, religious and
charitable trusts in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the enquiry
which its relevant provisions contemplate is an enquiry into the
question as to whether ·the trust in question is public or private.
The enquiry permitted by the said provisions does not take within
its sweep questions as to whether the property belongs to a private
individual and is not the subject matter of any trust at all. It cannot
be ignored that the Registrar who, no doubt, is given the powers
of a civil aourt under s. 28 of the Act, holds a kind of summary
enquiry and the points which can fall within his jurisdiction are
indicated by clauses (i) to (x) of s. 4(3). Therefore; prima facie,
it appears unreasonable to suggest that contested queStions of title, ·
such as those which have arisen in the present case, can be said
to fall within the enquiry which the Registrar is authorised to hold
under s. 5 of the Act.
Besides, it is significant that the only persons who are required
to file their objections in response to a notice issued by the
p
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ABDUL KAR DI KHAN v. i\IUNICIPAI, cmIMl'YrEE llAIPlTR ( Gajendragadkar, C.J .) 305
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Registrar ort receiving an application made under s. 4(1), are
pe~sons interested in the public lrust-not persons who dispute the
existence of the trust or who challenge the allegation that any
property belongs to the said trust. It is only persons interested in
the public trust, such as beneficiaries or others who claim a right to
manage the trust, who can file objections, and it is objeetions of
this character proceeding from persons belonging to this limited
class that fall to be considered by the Registrar. It cannot be said
that the respondent falls within this olass; and so, it would be
idle to contend that it was the duty of the respondent to have filed
objections under s. 3(2).
It is true, s. 8(1) permits a suit to be filed by a person having
interest in the public trust or any preperty found to be trust property. The interest to which this section refers must be read in
the light '6f s. 5(2) to be the interest of a beneficiary or the
interest of a person who claims the right to maintain the trust
or any other interest of a similar character. It is not the interest
which is adverse to the tr.us! set up by a party who does
not claim any relation with the trust at all. That is why we think
the finality on which Mr. Sinha's argument is based cannot avail
him against the respondent inasmuch the respondent was not a
party to the proceedings and could not have filed any objections
in the said proceedings.
Then again, the right to file a suit to which s. 8(1) refers is
given to persons who are aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar.
Having regard to the fact that the proceedings before the Registrar
are in the nature of proceedings l:.efore a civil court, it would be
illogical to hoi.i that the respondent who was not a party to the
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proceedings can be said to be aggrieved by the findings of the
Registrar. The normal judicial concept -0f a person aggrieved by
any order necessarily postulates that 'the said person must be a
party . to the proceedings in which the order was passed and by
which he feels aggrieved. It is unnecessary to emphasise that it
would be plainly unreasonallle to •assume that thouth a person is
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not a party to the proceedings and cannot participate in them by
way of filing objections, he would still be bound to file a suit within the period prescribed by s. 8(1) if the property in which he
claims an exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a
public trust.
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Similarly, the right to prefer an appeal against the Registrar's
order prescribed by s. 4(5) necessarily implies that the person must
be a party to the proceedings before the Registrar; otherwise how
would he know about the order? Like s. 8(1), s. 4(5) also seems to
be confined in its operation to persons who are before the
Registrar. or who could have
appear~d before the Registrar
under s. 5(2). The whole scheme is clear, the Registrar
enquires into the question as to whether a trust is private or public,
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.a.
and deals with the points
specifically enumerated by s. 4(3).
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Therefore; we have no hesitation in holding that the courts below
were right in coming to the conclusion that the fact that the
property now in suit was added to the list of properties belonging
to the wakf, cannot affect the respondent's title to it.
On the
merits, all the courts below have rejected the appellants' case
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and have upheld the pleas raised by the respondent in defence.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with _costs.
Appeal dismissed.