# ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS - **Citation:** [2000] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 382 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2000-11-07 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. G 741-743 of2000 - **Bench:** S.P. Bharucha, D.P. Mohapatra, Y.K. Sabharwal - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/abdul-karim-v-state-of-karnataka-and-ors-17637 - **Pages:** 39 ## Headnote Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 321-Prosecution-Withdrawal from-Application of mindC By court-Before grant of consent-Application of Public Prosecutor (PP)- Requirements of-Popular film actor kidnapped by Veerappan and h~s associates-State Government in panic yielding to Veerappan 's demands to withdraw TADA charges against his associates in jail facing charges under various penal statutes so as to facilitate their release-Demand also included· D release of some of Veerappan 's associates detained under National Security Act (NSA) for the release of the film actor-Accordingly, PP moved an application under S.321 for withdrawal of TADA charges-State Government also revoked detention order under NSA in respect of 4 detenues-No material to show PP applied his mind in good faith and in public interest-Court granted consent for withdrawal of TADA charges-Accused persons thereafter E granted bail-Validity of-Held: PP must independently apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied that public interest will be served by his withdrawal from prosecution-This is despite any order or direction to the PP-PP must set out the materials considered by him briefly, but concisely, in his application or affidav_it or place it before the court-Court's power is supervisory but grant of consent is not a matter of F course-Court has to give an informed consent-It must be satisfied that the PP has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that withdrawal from prosecution is in public interest-Court must consider whether grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice-Upon such considerations only court has to accord G informed consent for withdrawal from prosecution-On facts, order of consent does not meet requirements of S.321 and is bad in law-No materials, on the basis of which PP applied his mind in good faith; and in public interest, placed before court-Affidavit of PP shows complicity with ·the accused persons to secure their release on bail-Hence, bail order cancelled-Conduct of State Government and PP deprecated. H 382 - ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 383 The border between the States of Karnataka and ramil Nadu runs A through mountainous forest and ori this forestland, half in Karnataka and ·half in Tamil Nadu, a man named Veerappan, a dreaded criminal, has held sway for more than 10 years. He was alleged to have poached elephants and smuggled out ivory and sandalwood in a very big way. He was alleged to be guilty of the most heinous crimes, including the murder of 119 persons, B including Police and Forest Officers and kidnapping. Despite various attempts over a number of years Veerappan could not be apprehended. Cases were filed against Veerappan and his associa,es under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) and other penal provisions, i.e. Indian Penal Code (IPC), Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act. On 30.7.2000 Veerapp~n abducted Rajkumar, a popular film actor, from his farmhouse along with C three others. In order to release Rajkumar, Veerappan demanded withdrawal of charges under the TADA Act framed against some of his associates who were in judicial custody and withdrawal of detention order passed under the National Security Act against some of his other associates and their release. The State Government accepted these demands. The arrangement was that once TADA charges were withdrawn, the accused in judicial custody would move bail applications in cases of offences under IPC and other penal enactments. The Public Prosecutor would concede D and would not oppose the grant of bail. The court would grant the bail and, thus, accused would come out from judicial custody. Accordingly, the Special Public Prosecutor filed application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal E Procedure, 1973 seeking consent of the Designated Court at Mysore to withdraw the TADA charges. The application was made when the trial of the ca ## Text _Characters 0–39,230 of 96,358. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39230 for what follows._ A ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. NOVEMBER 7, 2000 B [S.P. BHARUCHA, D.P. MOHAPATRA AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 321-Prosecution-Withdrawal from-Application of mindC By court-Before grant of consent-Application of Public Prosecutor (PP)- Requirements of-Popular film actor kidnapped by Veerappan and h~s associates-State Government in panic yielding to Veerappan 's demands to withdraw TADA charges against his associates in jail facing charges under various penal statutes so as to facilitate their release-Demand also included· D release of some of Veerappan 's associates detained under National Security Act (NSA) for the release of the film actor-Accordingly, PP moved an application under S.321 for withdrawal of TADA charges-State Government also revoked detention order under NSA in respect of 4 detenues-No material to show PP applied his mind in good faith and in public interest-Court granted consent for withdrawal of TADA charges-Accused persons thereafter E granted bail-Validity of-Held: PP must independently apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied that public interest will be served by his withdrawal from prosecution-This is despite any order or direction to the PP-PP must set out the materials considered by him briefly, but concisely, in his application or affidav_it or place it before the court-Court's power is supervisory but grant of consent is not a matter of F course-Court has to give an informed consent-It must be satisfied that the PP has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that withdrawal from prosecution is in public interest-Court must consider whether grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice-Upon such considerations only court has to accord G informed consent for withdrawal from prosecution-On facts, order of consent does not meet requirements of S.321 and is bad in law-No materials, on the basis of which PP applied his mind in good faith; and in public interest, placed before court-Affidavit of PP shows complicity with ·the accused persons to secure their release on bail-Hence, bail order cancelled-Conduct of State Government and PP deprecated. H 382 - ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 383 The border between the States of Karnataka and ramil Nadu runs A through mountainous forest and ori this forestland, half in Karnataka and ·half in Tamil Nadu, a man named Veerappan, a dreaded criminal, has held sway for more than 10 years. He was alleged to have poached elephants and smuggled out ivory and sandalwood in a very big way. He was alleged to be guilty of the most heinous crimes, including the murder of 119 persons, B including Police and Forest Officers and kidnapping. Despite various attempts over a number of years Veerappan could not be apprehended. Cases were filed against Veerappan and his associa,es under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) and other penal provisions, i.e. Indian Penal Code (IPC), Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act. On 30.7.2000 Veerapp~n abducted Rajkumar, a popular film actor, from his farmhouse along with C three others. In order to release Rajkumar, Veerappan demanded withdrawal of charges under the TADA Act framed against some of his associates who were in judicial custody and withdrawal of detention order passed under the National Security Act against some of his other associates and their release. The State Government accepted these demands. The arrangement was that once TADA charges were withdrawn, the accused in judicial custody would move bail applications in cases of offences under IPC and other penal enactments. The Public Prosecutor would concede D and would not oppose the grant of bail. The court would grant the bail and, thus, accused would come out from judicial custody. Accordingly, the Special Public Prosecutor filed application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal E Procedure, 1973 seeking consent of the Designated Court at Mysore to withdraw the TADA charges. The application was made when the trial of the cases to which it related was in progress and evidence of 51 witnesses had been recoi:ded. The Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the trial regarding other offences were being continued and the charges under the Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act, to certain extent covered the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA. Therefore, no injustice would be caused if the prosecutor withdrew the charges for the offence~ punishable under Sections 3, 4 and F 5 of the TADA Act. It was also submitted by the Special Public Prosecutor G that as a matter of policy, since the Central Govemmenfhad already.withdrawn the Central enactment no purpose would be served immediately by the prosecution for the offence punishable under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the TADA Act. The appellant opposed the Special Public Prosecutor's application. The H 384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A appellant's son was a Sub-Inspector of Police and was allegedly killed by Veerappan and his associates. The appellant's statement of opposition referred to the abduction of Rajkumar and alleged that, consequent thereupon, the Government of Kamataka had yielded to the demands of Veerappan and had issued notifications that it would withdraw all cases against Veerappan and his associates, and this had been widely publicized by the media. The statement B of opposition submitted that no cogent reasons had been given for the decision to drop the TADA cases. The Special Public Prosecutor rejoined to the statement of opposition by contending that all cases against Veerappan and his associates were not C being withdrawn, and they would be prosecuted. The Special Public Prosecutor, therefore, denied the submission in the statement of opposition that the Government of the State of Karnataka had yielded to the blackmail by Veerappan. The Special Designated Judge, Mysore designated for the trial ofT ADA D offences stated in his order dated 19.8.2000 that he was satisfied that the Special Public Prosecutor had applied his mind in filing the application. In view of the grounds and circumstances mentioned by the Special Public Prosecutor, he was satisfied, on the materials placed before him, ~that the grant of permission to withdraw, sub-served the administration of justice and E the permission had not been sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of law, which the executive organs were in duty-bound to further and maintain." The Special Judge observed that the cases against the accused for other offences would be proceeded with. Accordingly, the Judge allowed the application, according consent to withdrawal of the charges relating to offences punishable under the TADA F Act against the accused. He ordered, "the accused i~ custody and on bail, ~ G facing trial for offences under TADA Act stand acquitted/discharged as the case may be." He transferred the cases to the court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysore for disposal in accordance with law of all charges other than under the TADA Act. The accused who were in custody and were discharged by the Special Court in' respect of the TADA charges against them immediately filed an application for bail before the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Mysore. On 28.8.2000, the Judge noted in his order that the counsel for the present appellant had informed him that the appellant had filed a petition for special H leave to appeal against the order on the Special Public Prosecutor's .. ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 385 application which was to be taken up for hearing on the next day and that A the counsel had prayed that orders on the bail petition should not be pronounced until thereafter. But keeping in view "the urgency of the matter" ...... and the change in the circumstances in view of the fact that the Designated Court had permitted the State to withdraw the TADA charges, the Judge held that no prima facie case was made out against the accused for the said offence B and, therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances, the social status of the accused and other relevant factors, the Judge allowed the bail petition. The accused were directed to be released on bail, on each of them executing a bond for Rs. 10,000 with one surety for the like sum or, in the alternative, on each furnishing cash security of Rs. 20,000, on the conditions that they would appear before the court regularly as and when required, and that they C would not tamper with the prosecution witnesses and they would not commit any other offence. On 14.8.2000 the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu issued a Government Order directing that charges against one R in respect of two cases registered against him under the provisions of the TADA Act be D withdrawn "in the public interest". The Inspector General of Police Intelligence, Chennai was directed to take necessary action accordingly. On 16.8.2000 the Special Public Prosecutor before the Designated Court at Chennai made two applications under the provisions of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating that R was charged before the E Designated Court in cases arising under the TADA Act, the Explosive Substances Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act and the cases were pending for framing charges, and that the Special Public Prosecutor was satisfied that under the new change of circumstances and also in the public interest the charges under the TADA Act be withdrawn. The court granted permission to withdraw the TADA cases against the accused. F The Government of the State of Tamil Nadu also passed an order revoking the detention of four detenues under the National Security Act in public interest in view of the tense situation prevailing due to the kidnapping of Rajkumar and therebeing an apprehension that in case any harm was G caused to him, there might be a backlash on Tamils in Karnataka. The order dated 19.8.2000 on the Special Public Prosecutor's application was impugned in the appeal before this Court. The Government order of the State of Tamil Nadu dated 14.8.2000 and the order of the Designated Court, Chennai were also challenged in the two Public Interest H 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A Petitions filed before this Court. The revoking of the detention of the four detenues was also challenged in Public Interest Petition before this Court. B Allowing the appeals and the writ petitions, the Court HELD : (Per Bharucha, J. for himself, and Mohapatra, J) 1.1. Though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied · thereon that the public interest will be served. by his withdrawal from the C pr.osecution. In turn, the court has to be satisfied, after considering all that material, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind independently thereto, that the Public Prosecutor, acting in good faith, is of the opinion that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest, and that such withdrawal will not stifle or th"'.art the process of law or cause manifest injustice. (406-G-HJ D 1.2.An application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or · E cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly btit concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case, placed before the court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The court has to give an informed consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion F that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest; but it is not for the court to weigh the material. The court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest G injustice. If, upon such consideration, the court accords consent, it must make such order on the applicat•on as will indicate to a higher court that it has done all that the law requires it to do before granting consent. (407-A-D) Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (19871 1 SCC 288, relied on. H 2. The application made by the Special Public Prosecutor before the - ... ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 387 Designated Court at Mysore under Section 321 Cr. P.C. did not state why A the Special Public Prosecutor apprehended a disturbance of the peace and normalcy of "the border area" or the "particular village," nor was any material in this behalf, or a summary thereof, set out. There was, therefore, no basis laid in the applications upon which the Judge presiding over the Designated Court could conclude that the Special Public Prosecutor had applied his mind to the relevant material and exercised discretion in good B faith and that the withdrawal would not stifle or thwart the course of the law and cause manifest injustice. The order of the Judge did not note that the statement of opposition also said that, consequent upon the abduction of Rajkumar the State of Karnataka had yielded to the demands made by Veerappan and had issued notifications that it would withdraw all cases against C Veerappan and his associates. No query in this regard was made by the Judge with the Special Public Prosecu!or. The Judge said that he was satisfied on the material placed before him that grant of permission to withdraw subserved the administration of justice and it had not been sought covertly, but he did not state what those materials were. No materials were placed before the Judge upon the basis of which he could have been satisfied that the D Special Public Prosecutor had applied his mind thereto and had reached, in good faith, the conclusion that the withdrawal he sought was necessary for the reasons he pleaded. The Judge placed on record, as he called it, the decision of this Court in the case of Sheonandan Paswan, but he did not appreciate what it required of a Public Prosecutor and of a court as regards E Section 321, and he did not follow it. The order granting consent on the Special Public Prosecutor's application, therefore, does not nieet the requirements of Section 321 and is bad in law. (407-E-H; 408-A-D) 3. As regards to the decision of the Government of the State of Karnataka in view of its apprehension of the unrest that would follow if any F harm were to come to Rajkumar, that it was better to yield to Veerappan's demand and to withdraw the TADA charges against Veerappan and his associates, including the accused-respondents, the Special Public Prosecutor should have considered and answered the following questions for himself before he decided to exercise his discretion in favour of such withdrawal G from prosecution of the '.f ADA charges:- (410-F-G) (a) Was there material to show that the police and intelligence authorities and the State Government had a reasonable apprehension of such civil disturbances as would justify the dropping of charges against Veerappan and others accused of TADA offences and the H 388 A SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. release on bail of those in custody in respect of the other offences they were charged with? (410.:.H] (b) What was the assessment of the police and intelligence authorities and of the State Government of the risk of leaving Veerappan free to commit crimes in future, and how did it weigh against the risk to Rajkumar's life and the likely consequent civil disturbances? (411-A-B] (c) What was the likely effect on the morale of the law enforcement agencies? (411-B] C (d) What was the likelihood of reprisals against the many witnesses who had already deposed against the accused-respondents? (411-C] D E F (e) Was there any material to suggest that Veerappan would release Rajkumar when some ofVeerappan's demands were not to be met at all? (411-C] (t) When the demand was to release innocent persons languishing in Karnataka jails, was there any material to suggest that Veerappan would be satisfied with the release of only the accused-respondents? (411-D) (g) In any event, was there any material to suggest that after the accused-respondents had secured their discharge from the TADA charges and bail on the other charges, Veerappan would release Rajkumar? (411-E) (h) Given that the Governments of the State of Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu had not for 10 years apprehended Veerappan and brought him to justice, was this a ploy adopted by them to keep Veerappan out of the clutches of the law? (411-F) 4. The affidavit of the Special Public Prosecutor reveals that he w.as "informed" that the Government of the State of Karnataka had intelligence G reports that if any harm were to be caused to Rajkumar, it would lead to . problems between two linguistic communities. Clearly, he was not shown the intelligence reports. There is no statement therein which shows that the Special Public Prosecutor had the opportunity of assessing the situation for himself by reading primary material and deciding, upon the basis thereof, whether he should exercise his discretion in favour of the withdrawal of H TADA charges. Acting upon information, which he could not verify, the Special - ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 389 Public Prosecutor could not be satisfied that such withdrawal was in the A public interest and that it would not thwart or stifle the process of the law or cause manifest injustice. The Special Public Prosecutor, in fact, acted only upon the instructions of the Govern~ent of the State of Karnataka. He, therefore, did not follow the requirement of the law that he be satisfied and the consent he sought under Section 321 cannot, therefore, be granted. B (413-F-H; 414-A) 5.1. The affidavit of the Special Public Prosecutor speaks of"withdrawal of the TADA charges which would enable the accused to file necessary bail applications and their consequent release on bail .......... ". It is, thus, clear that what was envisaged by the Government of the State of Karnataka and the C Special Public Prosecutor was a package, which comprised of the withdrawal of the TADA charges against the accused-respondents and their release on bail on the applications filed by them. This indicates complicity with the accused-respondents. Stress was laid by the Special Public Prosecutor in his application under Section 321 on the fact that the prosecutions against the acc1,1sed-respondents on charges other than under the TADA Act would D continue, and this was noted in the order of the Designated Court. The Designated Court was not told either in the application or thereafter that the Government of the State of Karnataka and the Special Public Prosecutor had in mind that the accused-respondents would file bail applications subsequent to the order under Section 321, which would not be opposed. There can, in E the circumstances, be little doubt that after their release on bail the accusedrespondents were not expected to attend the court to answer the remaining charges against them and that the stress laid as aforesaid was intended to mislead the Designated Court. The conduct of the Government of the State of Karnataka and the Special Public Prosecutor in this behalf is deprecated. It is appropriate, in the facts and circumstances, to set aside the orders F granting bail to the accused-respondents. (414-B-E) 5.2. Having set aside the order under Section 321 passed by the Designated Court at Chennai in the matter of R, the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu cannot comply with Veerappan's demand to release the five G prisoners from its jails. It is appropriate in the circumstances to set aside the orders of the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu under the National Security Act releasing the other four persons from detention. (414-G) 6. There is no material on record that could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such civil disturbances as justifies the decision to drop TADA H 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A charges against Veerappan and his associates, including the accusedrespondents, and to release the latter on bail. There is nothing on the record, which suggests that, the possibility of reprisals against the witnesses who have already deposed against the accused-respondents or the effect on the morale of the law enforcing agencies were considered before it was decided -=3 to release the accused-respondents. There is also nothing to suggest that there was reason to proceed upon the basis that Veerappan would release Rajkumar when his demands were not being met in full. The Government of the State of Karnataka would appear to be unaware that once the accusedrespondents were discharged from TADA charges, the deal was done; and that when they were released on bail they could not be detained further, C whether or not Rajkumar was released in exchange. While it cannot be asserted that conceding to Veerappan's demands was a ploy of the Government of the State of Karnataka to keep him out of the clutches of the law, it acted in panic and haste and without thinking things through in doing so. That this is so, is clear from the fact that the demands were conceded overnight and also from the fact that the Government of the State of Karnataka did not D ascertain the legal position that it was not for it but for the court to decide upon the release of persons facing criminal prosecution~. (415-A-DJ 7. What causes the gravest disquiet is that when, not so very long back, as the record shows, his gang had been considerably reduced, Veerappan was E not pursued and apprehended and now, as the statements in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu show, Veerappan is operating in the forest that has been his hideout for 10 years or more along with secessionist Tamil elements. It is certain that Veerappan will continue with his life of crime and very likely that those crimes will have anti-national objectives. F (415-E-FJ 8. It would have been prudent in the circumstances, to post round the clock at Rajkumar's farmhouse one or two policemen who could inform their local station house of his arrival there and thus ensure his safety. (415-GJ 9.1. The order under appeal, dated 19.8.2000, is set aside. The order G dated 28.8.2000 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysore granting bail to the accused-respondents is also set aside. (416-CJ 9.2. Further, the order of the Designated Court at Chennai dated 16.8.2000 is set aside. The orders of the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu passed on 14.8.2000 under the National Security Act in respect of the H four detenues revoking the orders of their detention under the National ABDUL KARIM v. ST ATE OF KARNAT AKA 391 Security Act are also set aside. (416-D] Per Sabharwal, J (supplementing) 1. The Public Prosecutor has to be straight, forthright and honest and has to admit the arrangement and inform the court that the real arrangement A is to ultimately facilitate the release of these accused from judicial custody B by not opposing the bail applications after the withdrawal of TADA charges. It is well established that the real purpose for withdrawal of TADA charges . was to facilitate the grant of bail to the accused. In such circumstances why the camouflage. In fact, it is a deceit. These are the questions for which th¢re is no plausible answer. No court of law can be a party to such a camouflage and deceit in judicial proceedings. The answer to these basic questions cannot C be that the Judge knew about it from the very nature of the case. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the application was made in good faith. [418-H; 419-A-CJ 2.1. The satisfaction for moving an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. has to be of the Public Prosecutor which in the nature of the case in hand D has to be based on the material provided by the State. Grant of consent by the court is not a matter of course and when such an application is filed by the Public Prosecutor after taking into consideration the material before him, the court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such material and on such consideration either gives consent or declines consent. The E court has to see that the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not thwart or stifle the process of law or suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given. [419-C-D-E] Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, [1,987] 1 SCC 288, relied on. F ~.2. True, the power of the court under Section 321 is supervisory but that does not mean that while exercising that power, the consent has to be granted on. mere asking. The court has to examine that all relevant aspects have been taken into consideration by the Public Prosecutor and/or by the Government in exercise of its executive function. (419-F] G 3. Besides the eight questions noticed in the main judgment, the question and aspect of association of Veerappan with those having secessionist aspirations were also not considered. Further, though it may have been considered as to what happened immediately after the abduction ofRajkumar, but what does not seem to have been considered is that those were spontaneous H 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A outbursts and the authorities may have been taken unaware but what would be the ground realities when the law enforcing agencies have sufficient time to prepare for any apprehended contingency. (419-G-H] 4. The application and order under Section 321 is a result of panic reaction by overzealous person without proper understanding of the problems B and consideration of the relevant material, though they may not have any personal motive. It does not appear that .anybody considered that if democratically elected governments give an impression to the citizens of this country of being lawbreakers, it would breed contempt for law; it would invite citizens to become a law onto themselves. It may lead to anarchy. The C Governments have to consider and balance the choice between maintenance of law and order and anarchy. It does not appear that anyone considered this aspect. It yielded to the pressure tactics of those who according to the Government are out to terrorise the Police force and to overawe the elected Governments. It does not appear that anyone considered that with their action people may lose faith in the democratic process, when they see public authority D flouted and the helplessness of the Government The aspect of paralysing and discrediting the democratic authority has to be taken into consideration. It is the executive function to decide in public interest to withdraw from prosecution as claimed. But it is also for the Government to maintain its existence. Self-preservation is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To E preserve its independence and territories is the highest duty of every nation and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. Of course, it is for the State to consider these aspects and take a conscious decision. In the present case, without consideration of these aspects the decision was taken to withdraw the TADA charges. It is evident from the material now placed on reQ>rd before this Court that Veerappan was acting F in consultation with secessionist organisations/groups, which had the object of liberation of Tamils from India. There is no serious challenge to this aspect. None of the aforesaid aspects were considered by the Government or the Public Prosecutors before having recourse to Section 321 Cr.P.C. (420-B-F) CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. G 741-743 of2000. H From the Judgment and Order dated I 9.8.2000 of the Special Court Judge at Mysore (Designed under TADA Act ) in Special Case Nos. 3/98, 11/ 97 and 44 of I 994. WITH ABDUL KARIM v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [BHARUCHA, J.] 393 Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 271, 273, 283-315, 317-342, 343-372, 373-402 of A 2000. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, K.N. Raval, Additional Solicitor General, K. Parasaran, V.R. Reddy, Gopal Subramaniam, Ms. Indira Jaising, Chava Badri Nath Babu, S. Umesh, S.K. Manjunath, Amarendra Sharan, Dr. B.L. Wadehra-in-person in W.P. No. 273/ B 2000, Adarsh Ganesh-in-person in W.P. No. 271/2000, R.C. Kaushik, Laxmi Narayan, Ms. Renu George,, A.N. Jayaram, General for Kamataka, Mohan Shankargowda, A.P. Joshi, Sanjay R. Hegde, Satya Mitra, Ms. Niti Dikshit, Samrat Nigam, Alok Sinha, Sanjeev Puri, N. Ganpathy, V.G. Pragasam, Anip Sachthey, Jaideep Gupta, B.K. Prasad, Sanjoy Ghosh, Ms. Manjula Gupta, C Girish Ananthamurthy, Venugopal, T.N. Rao, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar, D.P. Chaturvedi, A.T.M. Sampath, V. Balaji, N.P. Midha, Ms. Anitha Sh