# ABDUL MATEEN v. RAM KAILASH PANDEY AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/abdul-mateen-v-ram-kailash-pandey-and-others-2642
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

"><I
.. _.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
industrial
dispute pending:
adjudication at the
relevant; time,
The result is that the appeal must be allowed
the order passed hy the tribunal set aside and the
respondent's application under s. 33-A is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dllowed.
ABDUL MATEEN
v.
RAM KAILASH PANDEY AND OTHERS
(B· P. SINHA, C. J., K. N. WANOHOO, and
J. c. SH.AH, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles-stage carriage
permits-Applications
invited by Regional Transport Authority for two vacanciesMinister of Transport gave an additional permit-Whether lega~
-Scope of s. 64-A-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (4 of 1939), as
amended by Bihar Amen<lment Act No. XXVII of 1950, ss. 47,
48, 57, 64, 64-A.
A new route was advertised by the Regional Transport
Authority and applications were invited for two permanent
stage carriage permits. The Regional Transport Authority
granted the two permits to the appellant and another person.
An appeal against that order failed.
Sudhakar Sharma, one
of the respondents, moved the High Court under Art. 226 and
the order of the appellate authority was quashed.
When the
case went back to the Appellate Authority, the permit granted
to the appellant was cancelled and was given to Sudhakar
Sharma. The appellant made an application to the State
Government under s. 64· ~ of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
as amended by the B1har Amendment Act No. XXVII
of 1950. The Minister of Transport upheld the order of the
appellate authority cancelling the permit of the appellant and
granting the same to Sudhakar Sharma, but granted an additional permit to the appellant. Ram Kailash Pandey filed a
~rit petiOon in the Hi~h Coiμ-t
challen~i~ tP.e 9rder of tll(i
190B
Kirloskar fi>il
Engines
. v.
llanmant Loxman
Bibawe
Gojendragadknr J.
191J2
July 31.
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
I96S
Minister of Transport. ·He-contended that the State Govern·
ment had no power when dealing with an application under
Ab"':l :!"'""
s. 64·A to increase tho number of permits to be granted and
.Bam K ailash Pand•y the order granting the third permit to the appellant was with·
out.jurisdiction. The High Gout accepted the contention and'
set aside that part of the order of the Minister of Transport
by which he had granted a third permit to the appellant. The
appellant came to this Court by special leave.
-
\
Hola, that where a limit has been fixd under '- 47 (3)
by the Regional Transport Authority, and thereafter the said
authority proceeds to consider applications for permits under
•· 48 read with •· 57, the Regional Transport Authority must
confine the number or permits issued by it to those limits and
on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved person, the Appellate
Authority or the Revisional Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the Ii mits fixed under s. 4 7
(3). The State Government cannot pass any order when
e~ercislng revislonal authority which the authority whose
orders the government Is revising, has no authority to pa9'.
It may not be generally possit>le to conclude from the
number of vacancie!I shl')wn in an advertisement that that is
the number of fixed under s. 47. (3) by the Regional Transport
Authority, but when it is a case of a new route which is being
opened for the first time and an advertisement is issued calling
for applications for such a new route specifying the number of
vacancies for it, it is reasonable to infer that when the number
of vacancies is specified, that sh<>Ws lhe limit which must have
been decided upon by the Regi'lna\
Transpor.t Authority
under•· 47(3).
-
,
Ram Gop•l v. A.~.-t Pran-1, [l 1j9] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692
and Arunachalam Pillai v. Sout1'arn R'lilways (Priual.e) Lid.,
[1960] 3 S.C.R. 764 followed.
Moh>Jmma<l Luqman Sbrif v. State Transport Aulhority,
A.I.R. 1961 All. 342, approved .
. •· · Pho Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v, Shri Nalhu Ram
, Mir<lha, I. L. R. (1959) Raj. 120, reversed.
Crv1L APPELLA.TE Ju&ISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
No. 195. of 1962.
.
Appe

## Text

"><I
.. _.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
industrial
dispute pending:
adjudication at the
relevant; time,
The result is that the appeal must be allowed
the order passed hy the tribunal set aside and the
respondent's application under s. 33-A is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dllowed.
ABDUL MATEEN
v.
RAM KAILASH PANDEY AND OTHERS
(B· P. SINHA, C. J., K. N. WANOHOO, and
J. c. SH.AH, JJ.)
Motor Vehicles-stage carriage
permits-Applications
invited by Regional Transport Authority for two vacanciesMinister of Transport gave an additional permit-Whether lega~
-Scope of s. 64-A-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (4 of 1939), as
amended by Bihar Amen<lment Act No. XXVII of 1950, ss. 47,
48, 57, 64, 64-A.
A new route was advertised by the Regional Transport
Authority and applications were invited for two permanent
stage carriage permits. The Regional Transport Authority
granted the two permits to the appellant and another person.
An appeal against that order failed.
Sudhakar Sharma, one
of the respondents, moved the High Court under Art. 226 and
the order of the appellate authority was quashed.
When the
case went back to the Appellate Authority, the permit granted
to the appellant was cancelled and was given to Sudhakar
Sharma. The appellant made an application to the State
Government under s. 64· ~ of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
as amended by the B1har Amendment Act No. XXVII
of 1950. The Minister of Transport upheld the order of the
appellate authority cancelling the permit of the appellant and
granting the same to Sudhakar Sharma, but granted an additional permit to the appellant. Ram Kailash Pandey filed a
~rit petiOon in the Hi~h Coiμ-t
challen~i~ tP.e 9rder of tll(i
190B
Kirloskar fi>il
Engines
. v.
llanmant Loxman
Bibawe
Gojendragadknr J.
191J2
July 31.
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
I96S
Minister of Transport. ·He-contended that the State Govern·
ment had no power when dealing with an application under
Ab"':l :!"'""
s. 64·A to increase tho number of permits to be granted and
.Bam K ailash Pand•y the order granting the third permit to the appellant was with·
out.jurisdiction. The High Gout accepted the contention and'
set aside that part of the order of the Minister of Transport
by which he had granted a third permit to the appellant. The
appellant came to this Court by special leave.
-
\
Hola, that where a limit has been fixd under '- 47 (3)
by the Regional Transport Authority, and thereafter the said
authority proceeds to consider applications for permits under
•· 48 read with •· 57, the Regional Transport Authority must
confine the number or permits issued by it to those limits and
on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved person, the Appellate
Authority or the Revisional Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the Ii mits fixed under s. 4 7
(3). The State Government cannot pass any order when
e~ercislng revislonal authority which the authority whose
orders the government Is revising, has no authority to pa9'.
It may not be generally possit>le to conclude from the
number of vacancie!I shl')wn in an advertisement that that is
the number of fixed under s. 47. (3) by the Regional Transport
Authority, but when it is a case of a new route which is being
opened for the first time and an advertisement is issued calling
for applications for such a new route specifying the number of
vacancies for it, it is reasonable to infer that when the number
of vacancies is specified, that sh<>Ws lhe limit which must have
been decided upon by the Regi'lna\
Transpor.t Authority
under•· 47(3).
-
,
Ram Gop•l v. A.~.-t Pran-1, [l 1j9] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692
and Arunachalam Pillai v. Sout1'arn R'lilways (Priual.e) Lid.,
[1960] 3 S.C.R. 764 followed.
Moh>Jmma<l Luqman Sbrif v. State Transport Aulhority,
A.I.R. 1961 All. 342, approved .
. •· · Pho Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v, Shri Nalhu Ram
, Mir<lha, I. L. R. (1959) Raj. 120, reversed.
Crv1L APPELLA.TE Ju&ISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
No. 195. of 1962.
.
Appea.l by speoia.l leave from the judgment
,--
a.nd order dated 1961, August 24 of the Patna High
Court in M. J. C. No. 126 of 1961.
1,-
i-
"".
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~·
'.
3 S.C.R! ·
SUPREME' COURT REPORTS
525
Basudeo Prasad, R, K. Garg, 8. 0 . .Agarwal
and M. K. Ram:zmurthi for th~ appellant.
B. D. Sharma for respondent No. 1.
D. Goburdhan for respondent No. 2.
8 .. P. Verma for respondent No. 3.
1962. July 31. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment of the Patna High Court.
Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these.
It appears that' a new route Gopalganj-Pahlezghat
was advertised by the North
Bihar Regional
Transport Authority in July 1957 and application•
were invited for permanent stage carriage permits
and the .adyertisement stated that there were two
vacancies on the route. A number of persons
applied for the two permits and in January 1958,
the Regional Transport Authority granted permits
to the appellant· and another person. This order
was taken in appeal to the Appellate Authority,
which however failed. Thereafter Sudhakar Sharma
who is one of the respondents, before us, moved
the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
and in April 1960 the High Court qual!lhed the order
of the Appellate Authorit,y on the basis of the
judgment of this Court in Ram Gopal v . .Anant
Prasad.(l) The case then went back to the· Appellate
Authority for re-hearing. The Appellate Authority
thereupon modified the order of the Regional
Transport Authority and the permit granted to the
appellant was·cancelled and in his place a permit
was granted to
Sudhakar Sharma; the permit
granted to the other per1;1on was not interfered with.
Thereupon, the appellant made an application to
the State Government under s. 64-A of the Motor
Vehicles .Act, No.4 of 1939, (herein1.fter refered to
as·the .Aot) as.amende~ by the Bih'1r Amendment
(1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R, 692.
196S
Abdul Mat1m
v.
R11111 K'aila•h Pa""6.J
Waaoh.oJ.
1962
.4.hdul Maiten
v.
Ri;m JrallashPa11d1y
Wanchoo J.
526
SUPREME COURT REPoltTS niu6aj
Act No. 27 of 1950, which provides that "the State
Government may, on application made to it in
this behalf within 30 days of the passing of the
order in the course of any proceeding taken under
this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, call for the records of such proceeding
and after examining such records pass suoh orders
as it thinks fit". The application was heard. by the
Minister for Transport and he upheld the order of
the appellate
Authority. At the same
time,
however, he took the view that."with the introduction of bus-service in North Bihar, people are
becoming more and more bus-minded as they have
been getting cheap and quick means of transport
and therefore
an additional service could be
allowed on this route, and that would add to the
facilities provided to the public without. impairing
in any way the efficiency of the existing service".
Therefore, while upholding
the
order of the
Appellate Authority cancelling the permit of the
appellant and granting a permit instead to Sudhakar
Sharma., he felt that the ends of justice would be
met if an additional permit was granted to the appellant, who had proved to be a desirable operator. He
therefore ordered that an additional service be allo·
wed to the appellant for the said route. Thereupon
Ram Kailash Pandey who had also made an application under s. 64·A and whose application had
been dismissed filed a. write petition before the
High Court challenging the order of the Minister
for Transport. His main contention was that the
grant of an additional permit to the appellant was
wholly unjustified, particularly in the face of his far
11uperior claim. To this petition the appellant as
well as the two persons to whom permits were granted and the State of Bihar, the Appellate Authority
as well as the Regional Transport Authority were
made parties. . When the petition came to be heard
before the High Court it was contended that the
~·
-.•
·-
'
a s.o.&.
·suPREME ooriRT nEPORTs
State Government had no power when dealing with
an application under s. 64-A, to increase the number of permits to be granted from two which was the
limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority, to
three, and therefore, its order granting the third
permit to the appellant was without jurisdiction.
This contention was accepted by the High Court,
and it set aside that part of the· order by which a
third permit was granted to the appellant. But the
, High Court refused to interfer~ with the rest of the
order granting permits to the two 'other persons.
Thereupon, the appellant applied for a certificate
to appeal to this Court, which was refused. He
then moved this Court for special leave, which was
granted; and that ia how the matter has come up
before us.
The main question for decision in this appeal's
whether the State Government acting under s. 64-A
of the Bihar Amendment Act had the power to inc·
rease the number of permits for which application
-..,, '.
had Leen invited by the Regional Transport Authority. It is contended on behalf of the appellant
that the State Government has the same power
under s. 64-A as the Regional Transport Authority
has, as held by this Court in RAM GOPAL'S CASE,
and it was therefore open to the State ·Government
to increase the number of permits as the Regional
Transport Authority would always have the power
to increase the number of permits whenever it thou .
._ · ght necessary to do so,
In order to appreciate the argument put for·
ward on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to
refer to the scheme of the Act in the matter of
granting stage carriage permits. The scheme of
the Act for the control of transport vehicle is to be
found in Chap. IV. Section 42 provides that "no
owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the
•
1911
Aitlul M•te•n
.. v.
Ram Kail4sh Pani..J
Wancboo J.
•
1981
AbduZ Mateen
v.
·
1
Ram Kailaeh Pandt:J
I
I
I
I
I
Wan,;hoo J.
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or
countersigned by a Re,.ional or State Transport
Authority ... " Section 43 gives power to the State
Government to issue directions to the State Transport Authority with respect to various matters specifised therein. Section 44 provides for the constitution of Regional Transport Authorities and the
State Transport Authority, and powers thereof.
Section 45 then provides that an application for a
permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use
the vehicle and this is subject to two provisos, with
which however we are not concerned in the present
appeal. Section 46 then provides for the form in
which an application for a sta.ge carriage permit·
shall'be made, Then we come to s. 47 (1) which
Jays down certain criteria which shall be taken into
consideration by a Regional Transport Authority
while dealing with an application for a stage carriage permit. Section 47(3) which is important gives
power to the Regional Transport Authority to
limit the number of stage carriages generally or of
any specified type for which stage carriage permits
may be granted in the region or .in any specified
area or on any specified route within the region,
having regard to matter mentioned in sub s.(l)·
Section 48 then provides that subject to the provisions of s. 47, the Regional Transport Authority
. may, on an application made to it under s, 46,
grant a stage car. iage permit in accordance with the
applicatibn or with such modification as it deems
fit or refuse to grant such a permit and also provides,
subject to rules, for conditions that may be attached
to a permit. Section 57 provides for the procedure
in applying for and granting permits. Section 64
provides for an appeal from certain orders passed
by the Regional Transport AuthoritJ within prescribed time and in the prescribed manner to the pres-
•
...
\
__,...;
3 S.C.R.
SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
529
..
cribed authority. Then comes s. 64-A, as inserted
· by the Bihar Amendment Act providing for revision
by the State Government.
It will be clear from this scheme of the Act
that the main section for the grant of a stage carriage permit is s. 48 and in passing an order granting
or refusing to grant a stage c&rriage permit, the
Regional Transport Authority has to act subject to
the provisions of s. 47.
Section 57 is a procedural
section and provides for the procedure in applying
for and granting permits. The power of the Regional
Tranaport Authority to · grant
stage carriage
-permits is to bei found in s. 48 and that power is
is subject to the provisions oh. 47. Section 47 (1)
lays down matters'for which the Regional transport
Authority shall have regard when considering·an
application far a stage carriage permit _and s. 47 (3)
gives power to the said authority having regard to
the matters mentioned in sub-s. Cl) to limit the
number to stage carringes generally etc. It would
be clear therefore that when the Regicanl Transport
Authority proceeds in the manner provided in s. 57
· to consider an application for a stage carriage permit and eventually deoides either to grant it or not
to grant it under s. 48 its order has to be subject to
the provisions of s. 47, including s. 47 (3) by which
the Regional Transport Authority is given t)e power
to limit the number of stages generally etc. Therefore, if the Regional Transport Authority has limited the number of stage carriages by exerr.:ising its
power under s. 4 7 ( 3), the . grant of permits by it·
under s. 48 has· to be subject to the limit fixed
under s. 47 (3). We cannot accept the contention on
behalf of the appellant that when the Regional, Tra•
nsport Authority following the procedure provided
ins. 57, comes to grant or refuse a permit it can
ignore the limit fixed under s. 47 (:3), because it is
also the authority making the order under s. 48.
Seotiou 47 (3) is ooncerned w~th a general order
1962 !
--
.Abdul Matea•
v,
Ram K'a/Zas" Pand~y
Wanch1~J •.
1161
~bdul Mateen
v.
Ram KailasfJ Pandey
W.•nchoo J.
/>3o
stJi>ilEME COURT REPoRTs (19631
limiting stage oarriages generally eto. on a consideration of matters specified in s. 47 (1). That
general order can be modified by the Regional Transport Authority. if it so decides, one way or the
other. But the modifioation of that order is not a
matter for consideration when the Regional Transport Authority is dealing with the actual grant of
. permits under s. 48 read with s. 57, for at that stage
what tho Regional Transport Authority has to do is
to oh.oose between various applicants who may have
made applications to it under s. 46 read withs. 57.
That in our opinion is not the stage where the general order passed under s. 47 (3) can be re-considered
for the order under s. 48 is subject to the provisions,
of s. 47, which inoludes s. 47 (3) under which a
general order limiting the number of stage carriages
etc. may have been pa.seed. Section 57 (2) shows
that an applioation for permit may be made at any
time not less than six weeks before the date on
which it is desired that the permit shall take effect
or if the Regional Transport Authority appoints
dates for the receipt of suoh appliactions, on such
dates. All applications, whether received one way or
the other, have to be dealt with in the manner provided by s. 57 and the final order for grant of stage
carriage permit has to be passed under s. 48· But,
at that stage, as we havet already pointed out, the
Regional Transport Authority is only considering
whether the applications made before it are to be
granted or not and has to choose between various
applicants where there are more applicants than the
number of vacanoies which might have been advertised or there are more applicants than the number
limited under s.47 (3). The soheme of the Act therefore is that a limit is fixed under s. 47 (3) and the
applications received are dealt with in the manner
provided by s. 57 a.nd permits can be granted under
s. 48 subject to the limit fixed under s. 47 (3).
.......
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..
r-
':..,
->--1
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPoRTS
531
"· .
Further, it will be clear from s. 64 that the
appeal there contemplated is by a person who is
aggrieved by various orders specified therein. Sec·
tion 64 clearly does not contemplate any appeal
from an order under s. 47 (3) limiting the number of
stage carriages generally etc. for that order being
Ram I\ •il&rh Pon'•.J
a general order cannot be a ground for grievance to
any individual who may have the right of appeal
under s. 64.
Therefore,
when the Appellate
Authority deals with an appeal under s. 64 it is not
sitting in appeal on the general order passed under.
s, 47 (3) and has to deal with the same matters
with which the Regional Transport authority dealt
with under s. 41, namely, to choose between various applicants in the matter of grant of permits.
Further, when under s. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act an application is made to it, the State
Government can call for the record of any proceeding taken under Chap. IV by any authority or
officer subordinate to it and pass such order in
relation to the oase as deems fit.
It may be mentioned thats. 64-A as it now
stands in the Act is very diferent from s. 64-A as
inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act and there
is no power in the State Government now to a.ct
under the present s. 64-A. A question may very
well arise whether s, 64-A as inserted by Central
Act No. 100 of 1956 has by necessary implication
repealed s. 64-A as inserted by the Bihar Amend·
ment Act. As the proceedings in the present case
began in 1957 Central Act 100 of 1956 would apply
to these proceedings and therefore if s. 64-A as
inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act is repealed
by necessary implication by s. 64-A as inserted by ·
Central Act 100 of 1956, there would be no power
in the State Government to revise the order of the
Appellate Authority after 1956. However, we
need not consider this matter further, as it was
never raised in the High Court and shall prooeed
Wsnchoo J.
.Abdul Mateen
••
Ram Kaiiash P•n~ey
Wanelioo J.
,532
:SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
on the assumption that s. 64-A of the Bihar
Amendment Act applied .
'
Further, it is not necessary in the present
case to decide whether under s. 64-A as inserted
by Central Act 100 of 1956 it was open to the State
Transport Authority to vary a general order passed
under s. 47 (3); we are here dealing with a_ revision based on an application made under s. 64-A,
as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act, by a
_person who was aggrieved by the order of the
Appellate Authority under s. 64. In such a ease
we are
of opinion that the power of the revisional authority is confined only to considering
matters whioh the H,egional Transport Authority
and the Appellate Authority could have considered
under s. 48 and s. 64. We have already pointed
out that under
s. 48 the Regional Transport
Authority is to choose between various applicants
in the matter of granting permits or refusing to
grant permits and u.ader s. 64 the power of the
Appellate Authority is also limited to the same
function on. an appeal by a person aggrieved as
provided therein. Therefore, when a revisional
l_luthority is dealing with an application under
e: 64·A bya person who is aggrieved by an order
under a. 64, it is also confined within the same
limits
within
which
the Appellate Authority
acting under s. 64 and the Regional-Transport
Authority
aoting under s. 48
are confined.
This was the view taken by this Court in Ram
Gopal's case(') and the same view has been reiterated
in A.8.T.Arunachalam Pillai v. MeBsrs. Southern
Roadways (Private) Limited,(') where it was pointed
. out that though the words "as it deems fit" in
s:· 64•A are wide in expression, they do not mean
that the State Government can pass any order when
exercising revisional authority which the authority
whose .orders•· the Government is: revising, has no
(I) [1960] 3 s.<;:.R. 764."
(2).[1959j Supp. 2.S.C.R. 692,
. ..
.},.
...
3 S.C.R.
·SUPREME COURT.REPORTS
533.
authority to pass. The a.rgumen t on behalf of the
appellant is that the Regional Transport A,uthority
undoubtedly has the power to revise a general
order passed under s. 47 (3) and therefore the
revisional authority when acting under s. 6t.A
wouM have power to ge> beyond the limits fixed
under s. 47 (3) and grant a permit eve:i in excess of
. the number fixed under s. 47 (3). There is a faUacy
in our opinion in this argument. It is true that the
Regional Transport Authority has the pow~r to
revise the limit fixed by it under s. 47 (3) but that
power to revise the limit in our opinion is not
under s. 48, when it is dealing with the question of
grant or refusal of permits to individuals. Section
48 is always subject to the provisions oi s. 47 and
therefore must be subject to the limits which may
be fixed under s. 4 7 ( 3). The power to revitie the
limits under s. 4 7 (8) in the Regional Transport
Authority must not be confused with the powers'
which it has when it is dealing with the grant or
refusal of -permits under s. 48.
Therefore, though
it is true that the Regional Transport Authority can
revise the general order passed by
it under
s. 47 (3), that revison is a separate power in the
authority and not a power arising when it is dealing
with
individual permits.
Therefore, when an
appeal is taken from an order . under s. 48 and a
revision is taken by an aggrieyed person under
s. 64-A, the power of the Appellate Authority as
well as of the revisional authority is as much
subject tbs. 47 (3) as the power of the Regional
Transport Authority under s. 48. This means that
the Appellate Authority as well as the revisional
authority under s. 64-A when dealing with an
appeal or a revision of an aggrieved person with
respect to grant or refusal of permits must act in the
same manner as the l{.egional Transport Authority
and its order will be subject to the same restriction
{namely, that it must act subject to the provisions
1961'
.4.'111/ul.Mateen
v.
Rat11 Kai/ash Pan/9
Abdul Mat<m
••
R;m Kai/as/, Pand~y
Wanehoo J~
534
SUPREME'COURT REPORTS (1963)
of s. 47) and if there is a limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority under s. 47 (3) that limit
will apply equally to the Appellate Authority under
s. 64 and to the revisional authority under s. 64.A,
when the reTisional authority is dealing ·with
the matter on an application by an aggrieved
person. In the present case, the Regional Tranport
Authority was dealing with certain · applications
made to it on its advertisement for two vacancies
on the route concerned and had to choose between
a large number of applications who had applied for
the two permits. It made a certain
choice and
pasaed an order under s. 48.
There were then
appeals to the Appellate· Authority which
made
a. modification in the orders passed by the· Regional
Transport Authority; but both these authorities
proceeded on the basis that there were only two
permits to be issued, that being the number fixed
under s. 47 (3).
Then there was a. revi•ion under
the Bihar Amendment Act by one of the aggrieved
persons, the grant of permit to whom had been set
a.side by the Appellate Authority. Iri such a. case
the revisional authority acting under s. 64-A could
only consider the question as to which persons
should be chosen and could not go beyond the
limits fixed unner s. 47
(3) by the Regional
Transport Authority and incr!'ase the number of
permits to be issued from two to three.
We may in this connection refer to the proviso
to s. 57 (3) introduced in 1956 which lays down that
where limits have been fixed under s. ·47 (3) the
Regional Transport Authority
may summarily
refuse applic11.tion1 for permit if the
result of
granting permits on such application would be to
increase the number of vehicles beyond the limit
fixed under s. 47 (3).
This shows that the power
under s. 48 read with the procedure under s. 57 is to
be exercised within the limits fixed under s. 47 (3)
~nd it is not necessary for the Regiona.J Tra.ns:pot1
'
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,.,.
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a s.c.n..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5~5
Authority even to go through the procedure provided under s. 57, if the vehicles operating on a.
particular route are already equal to the number
limited under s. 47 (3).
This also shows how a.n
order under s. 48 read with s, 57 is subject to the
provisions of s. 47 (3) and how when dealil).g with
an application for permit under s. 48 read with
. s. 57, the Regional Transport Authority is to act
within the limits prescribed under s. 4 7 (3) and the ,
order under s. 47 (3) is not open to modification
when the Regfonal Transport Authority is acting
under s.48 read with s.57, though as we have said, it
may bfl revised at any time by tb.e Regional Tran~
port Authority if it properly comes to the conclusion
that revision is necessary in view of the factors
specified in s. 4 7 ( 1 ) .
We therefore agree with the High Court that
where a limit has been fixed under s. 47 (3) by
the Regional Transport Authority and thereafter
the said authority proceeds to consider applications
for permits under s. 48 read withs. 57, the Regional Transport Authority must confine the number
of permits ·issued by it within those limits and on
an appeal or revision by an aggrieved person, the
Appellate Authority or the revisional authority
must equally be confined to the issue of permits
within the limits fixed under s. 47 (3).
It is further contended on behalf of the appellant that there were no limits fixed by the Regional Transport Authority and therefore it was
open to the State Government to increase the
number of permits from two or three. Now the
usual manner in which a Regional Transport Au.
thority can fix a limit under s. 47 (3) is by a resolution. Similarly it can vary those
limits by
a~other resolution.
It is urged that there is Qo
' i
I
~
,
_ .
:
J ;
1941
Abdul Mal1en
.
v.
.
Ram Kailaah Pandey
196B
' A.bd1d Matttn
..
Ram~Jrailash Pant!1y
Warichoo·J.
'
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
proof on the record that there was any such ~eso
lution under s. 4 7 (3) by the Regional Transport
Authority in this case.
It is true that there is
nothing on the r1icord to prove that there was
any resolution as .such by the Regional Transport
Authority in this case limiting the number of stage
carriages on this route to two. But the High
Court has held that the number can be deemed to
have been fixed in view of the advertisement issued
by the Regional Transport Authority calling for
applicatioPs for two vacancies. Tb is .view of the
High Court ill
bo~ever strenuously challenged on
behalf of the appella11t. It may be conceded that .
it may not be generally possible' to conclude from
the number of vacancies shown in an advertisement of tbiR kind that that is the number fixed
under s. 47 (3) by the -Regional Transport Authority. There is, however, in our opinion, one. exception to this general rule, and that is when a new
route is being advertised for the first time. .It
is· not disputed that io this case a new route was
being advertised for the first time and the advertisement said that there were two vacancies for
which applications were invited. In ·the case of
a new route it is clear that the Regional Transport
Authority must have coll]e to some conclusion as
to the number of stage carriages whiah were to be
permitted to operate on that route and the advertisement would only be issued on b,ehalf of the
Regional Transport Authority calling for applications for the
number
so fixed.
Therefore when
it is· a case of a new route which is being open for
the first time and an advertisement is issued calling for applications for such a. new raute apeoifying
the number of vacancies for it, we think, it is ·
reasonable to infer that when the number of vacan- ·
cies was !lpecified that shows the limit wh~ch must
have been decided upon by the Regional Transport
Authority under s. 4 7 (3) ; otherwise, it is impossible to understand in the case of a new route why
1~
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a s.c.R.
SUPREME' COURT REPORTS
537
the advertisement was only for two vacancies and
not (say) for four or six. The very fact that in the
case of a new route opened for the first time, the
advertisement mentions two vacancies shows that
the Regional Transport Authority must have deci·
ded before issuing the advertisement that on that
route the number of stage carriages will be limited
to two under s .. 4 7 (3 ). This is also the inference
which. the High Court has drawn in this
connec·
tion, though it has not specifically mentioned the
fact that this was a case of a new route opened
for the first time.
As we have said above, such
an inference from the advertisement would be
justified in the case of a new route which is opened
for the first time. Where the advertisement is
with respect to an old route the fact that the
advertisement mentions a particular number of
vancancies· would not necessarily mean that that
was the number fixed under s. 47 (3), for the num.
her fixed may be much more and there may be only
a few vacancies because a few permits had expired.
Therefore, in the circumstances of this case we are
of opinion t.bat it will be legitimate to infer a.s it
was a new route opened for the first time that
when the advertisement was made for only two
vacancies, that :was because the Regional Trans·
port Authority had already decided to limit the
number of state carriages· on this route only to two
under s. 47 (3).
Once this is held, it foll0ws that
under 11.
48, the Regional Transport Authority
could not grant more than two permits and there·
fore the AppeHate Authority also could not grant
more permits under s. 64; nor could the revisiona.I
authority on
an application made to it by an
aggrieved person grant more permits. We have
already said that it is not necessary to decide in
this case whether it would be open otherwise to
the revisional authority under s. 64-A as inserted
hr Central Act 100 of 1956 to revise a general
l9~t
Abi/ul.¥aften<'
'I'.
flam Kai/asfi.Pdndey
-__,
;v a11choo. J,
1962
AbdulMolun
'v.
Ram Caila11, h•dey
WonfhHJ.
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
order of the Regional Transport Authority passed
under s. 47 (3). We are in the present case concerned only with a case where an order passed
under s. 48 by the Regional Transport Authority
has
been taken in appeal
by •m aggrieved
person to the Appellate Authority under s. 64
and thereafter the order of the Appellate Authority
has been taken in revision by an aggrieved person
under s. 64-A as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act and in such a case the limit fixed under
s. 47 (3) would bind the Regional Transport Authority, the Appellate Authority as well as the revisional authority and they cannot issue permits
beyond the limits fixed under s. 47 (3). We are
therefore of opinion that the High Court was right
on the facts of this case in holding that the State
Government had no power to increase the number
of permits which bad been fixed at two by the
Regional Transport Authority under s. 47 (3) to
three on the application of an aggrieved person
under s. 64-A arising from a proceeding before the
Regional Transport Authority under s. 48 and tho
Appellatt) Authority under s. 64.
.
We may point' out that there has been a
difference of opinion between various High Courts
, on this
question. The Rajasthan High Court iu
The Automobile
Transport (Rajasthan)
v. Shri
Nahtu Ram Mirdha (') has taken one view and the
Allahabad High
Court in
Mohammad Luqman
Sharif v. State Transport Authority (') has takfn
the contrary view.
The Rajaethan High Court
held, dealing
with s. 48 (a)
of the Act (a11
it was before the amendment of 1956) which is
similar to s. 4 7 (3) ·after the amendment, that
under s.( 48 )(a) as it stood before the amendment,
limiting of the number of stage carriages on any
specific route did not make the order of the Regional Transport Authority a final decision binding on
UJ l.L.&. (1959) Rai· 120.
(2) A.I.R. (1961) All. 3f:;?·
..
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
539
the appellate authority.
The Allahabad High
Court on the other hand held that when an order
limiting the number of stage carriages had been
passed.under s. 48 (a) as it was before the amendment of 1956, there could be no appeal against
that order under s. 64 and therefore the Appellate
Authority on an appeal under s. 64 could not refix
the number of stage carriages in respect of that.
route. We are of opinion, in view of what we
have said.above and in the light of the limitations
which we have indicated above, that the view of
the Allahabad High Court is correct.
Lastly, it is urged on behalf of the appe11ant
that respondent No. I who filed the writ petition
in ti:e High Court had no locus standi. We are
of opinion that there is no force in this contention.
Respondent No. I was contending in the High
Court that he should have been granted a permit
and not the appellant. Therefore he had locus
st,andi to file the writ petition and it was during
the consideration of that writ petition that the
point on which the appellant has lost, arose.
We therofore dismiss the appeal with costs
to respondent No. 2 (Sudhakar Sharma) as he alone
supported the construction of the High Court on
the question of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
1962
Abdul JJ,/:,,/~tn
v.· .
Ram Kailtuh Pa11<l,y
Waneheo .I.