# ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 493
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1988-07-20
- **Bench:** Sabyasachi Mukharji, S. Ranganathan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/accountant-and-secretarial-services-pvt-ltd-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-9971
- **Pages:** 38

## Headnote

Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act,
1971-Whether the Act to the extent it had been extended to premises
belonging to or taken on lease by a Corporation established by or under·
a Central Act and owned or controlled by Central Government was ultra
vires or beyond legislative power of Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises-Determination of question involved. ·
The first appellant in this appeal, a private limited company,
occupying a portion of the premises belonging to the United Commercial Bank, claimed to be the tenant of the Bank, but this was not admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleged,that the appellant company had been allowed to occupy a portion of the Bank's premises as
licensee in consideratiOn of certain accoiJntancy and secretarial services
rendered to the Bank. The Bank had issued a notice. of eviction to the
appellant company under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
('the 1956 Act'). Subsequently, the Bank issued a notice to the appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants)
Act, 1971 ('the 1971 Act') which is an Act of the Parliament. The
appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court, agitating the question
whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised
occupants from public premises. belonging to or taken: on lease by a,
corporation established by or. under a Central Act mid owned or controlled by the Central Government was ultra vires as it was 'beyond the
"legislative power of the Parliament to.extend the applicability of the said
Act to such premises. The appellants were interested in denying the
legislative power of Parliament in so far as it purported to extend the
'!PPlicability of the 1971 Act to the premises belonging to or taken on
lease by public sector corporations. Their argument. went to the extent
of urging that only the State legislatures and not Parliament were competent to legislate on a topic of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of
land and buildings.
According to the appellants, the provisions of 1956 Act were
squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for
evicting them.
493
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494
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
The appellants contended that a legislation of the type of West
Bengal Land (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1962 (1962Act),
which was on the pattern of the 1971 Act, would fall within the legislative field exclusively open to the State Legislatures and that the 1971 Act
was ultra vires the Parliament in so far as it purported to affect the
appellants' rights.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji. J.
His Lordship agreed with Ranganathan, J. that the appeal should
be dismissed. His Lordship preferred the view of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.I.R. 1980
M.P. 106 to the view of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 458/79-Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn.
This Court had in this Case proceeded on the short question whether
the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it had been extended to premises
belonging or taken on lease hy a corporation established by or under a
Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, was
ultra vires or beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend
the applicability of the Act to such premises. [498D-G I
There was no dispute, as emphasised by Ranganathan, J., as to
whether the premises in question or of this type was a public premises.
For the purpose of this appeal, once it was held that the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act was intra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survived. It was not necessary to consider whether the provisions of the 1971 Act even if intra
vires would pervail upon the provisions of the State Legislation. Fo

## Text

_Characters 0–39,992 of 95,820. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39992 for what follows._

ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES PVT.
LTD. & ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
JULY 20, 1988
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]
Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act,
1971-Whether the Act to the extent it had been extended to premises
belonging to or taken on lease by a Corporation established by or under·
a Central Act and owned or controlled by Central Government was ultra
vires or beyond legislative power of Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises-Determination of question involved. ·
The first appellant in this appeal, a private limited company,
occupying a portion of the premises belonging to the United Commercial Bank, claimed to be the tenant of the Bank, but this was not admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleged,that the appellant company had been allowed to occupy a portion of the Bank's premises as
licensee in consideratiOn of certain accoiJntancy and secretarial services
rendered to the Bank. The Bank had issued a notice. of eviction to the
appellant company under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
('the 1956 Act'). Subsequently, the Bank issued a notice to the appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants)
Act, 1971 ('the 1971 Act') which is an Act of the Parliament. The
appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court, agitating the question
whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised
occupants from public premises. belonging to or taken: on lease by a,
corporation established by or. under a Central Act mid owned or controlled by the Central Government was ultra vires as it was 'beyond the
"legislative power of the Parliament to.extend the applicability of the said
Act to such premises. The appellants were interested in denying the
legislative power of Parliament in so far as it purported to extend the
'!PPlicability of the 1971 Act to the premises belonging to or taken on
lease by public sector corporations. Their argument. went to the extent
of urging that only the State legislatures and not Parliament were competent to legislate on a topic of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of
land and buildings.
According to the appellants, the provisions of 1956 Act were
squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for
evicting them.
493
A
B
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G
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494
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
The appellants contended that a legislation of the type of West
Bengal Land (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1962 (1962Act),
which was on the pattern of the 1971 Act, would fall within the legislative field exclusively open to the State Legislatures and that the 1971 Act
was ultra vires the Parliament in so far as it purported to affect the
appellants' rights.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji. J.
His Lordship agreed with Ranganathan, J. that the appeal should
be dismissed. His Lordship preferred the view of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.I.R. 1980
M.P. 106 to the view of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 458/79-Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn.
This Court had in this Case proceeded on the short question whether
the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it had been extended to premises
belonging or taken on lease hy a corporation established by or under a
Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, was
ultra vires or beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend
the applicability of the Act to such premises. [498D-G I
There was no dispute, as emphasised by Ranganathan, J., as to
whether the premises in question or of this type was a public premises.
For the purpose of this appeal, once it was held that the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act was intra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survived. It was not necessary to consider whether the provisions of the 1971 Act even if intra
vires would pervail upon the provisions of the State Legislation. For the
purpose of this appeal, it was unnecessary to express any view on the
amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution. [498H; 499A-B)
It had to be taken that the legislation in question must be understood in its pith and substance, and so understood, the Act in question
G
in this case is in respect of transfer of property other than agricultural
land and as such falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the
Constitution. It is clear from the decision of this Court in lndu Bhusan
Bose v. Rana Sundari Devi and Anr., 11970] I S.C.R. 443 and the
subsequent decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980]
1 S.C.R. 334 that the subject matter of housing accommodation and
H
control thereof falls within the purview of concurrent list. In that view
,.,,,._
ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U.0.1.
495
of the matter, it could not be convassed that the 1971 legislation in
A
question was beyond the competence of the legislature. [499C-E)
Per S. Ranganathan, J.
The present agrument of the appellants might not have been open
to them if the premises of the Bank could be said to be premises belonging to the Union Government. In that case, the legislation to the extent
it governs such premises can be said to fall !lnder Entry 32 of List I as
one covering the "property of the Union". Though, the premises being
situated in Calcutta, any legislation under that entry in regard thereto
would be subject to State Legislation, the State Legislation can only
govern usave in so far as Parliament by law otherwise prcvides.'' Parli·
amen! having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will prevail
over the 1956 and 1962 Acts. Though the Bank was a corporation
wholly owned and controlled by the Government, it had a distinct
personality of its own and its property could not be said to be the
property of the Union. The position was beyond the pale of controversy
after the decision of this Court in Bacha F. Guzdar v. C.l. T., [1955) l
S.C.R. 876; State Trading Cu1poratiol! of India Ltd. v. C. T.0., [1964)
4 S.C.R. 99, and many athcr cases. II was not possible for the respondents to support. the legislation qu" the premises under Entry 32 of
List I. [SOSA-D]
Entry 32 of List I being out <Jf the way, the appellants contended
that the legislation squarely regularly fell under Entry 18 of List II. A
question as to the interpretation of Entry 18 (or its predecessor, Entry 21
of the Provincial List under the Government of India Act, 1935) had
arisen before the Federal Court and Privy Council, and also was considered in some decisions of this Court, which, except in the case of
lndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, [1970) 1 S.C.R. 443, were
not helpful in deciding the issue before the Court. In respect of Indu
Bhushan 's case, while the respondents contended that the ruling concluded the issue in their favour, the appellants urged that it could not be
taken as a decision that the house tenancy legislation could not come
under Entry 18 of List II. [5tJSE; 5068-C; 513C)
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It was true that the decision in Jndu Bhushan's case ultimately
turned on the wider interpretation of Entry 2 of List I favoured by this
Court, nevertheless, the judgment contains a specific discussion of the
terms of Entry 21. lndu Bhushan must be taken to have expressed a
view that premises tenancy legislation in so far as it pertains to houses
and buildings is referable not to Entry 18 of List II hut to entries 6. 7
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
and 13 of List III. The decision of the larger Bench of this Court in V.
Dhanpal Chettier v. Yesodai Ammal. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, also
reinforced the same line of thinking. The discussion and ratio of
Dhanpa/ Chettier fall into place only on the view that by that time it was
taken as settled law that State house control legislations were referable to
the legislative powers conferred by the Concurrent List. [513C; 5200-E]
Entry 18 should be given as wide a construction as possible consistent with all the other entries in all the three legislative Lists. There is
no reason why the first topic dealt with by the entry, viz. land, should
be narrowly interpreted. It should be understood as including all types
of land, rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural, arid,
cultivated, fallow or vacant, What is 'land' can be gathered from the
other words of the entry which attempt a paraphrase. It is not possible
to interpret this entry as encompassing within its terms legislation on
the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings. All the legislation coming up for consideration in the present case
are referable to entries in the concurrent List and the topic of legislaD lion is not referable to Entry 18 of List II. The provisions of the 1971
Act, in so far as they were made applicable to the premises of the
respondent Bank, arc intra vi res and valid. [520F-H; 525E]
Once it was held that the 1971 Act is intra vires the Parliament, no
further issue between the parties survived. There was some discussion
E
before this Court as to whether the provisions of the 1971 Act, even if
intra vires, would prevail against the provisions of tho State legislations.
This case is clearly governed by the primary rule in Article 254(1) of the
Constitution under which the law of Parliament on a subject in the
concurrent"List prevails over the State Law. Article 254(2) of the Constitution is not attracted because no provision of the State Acts (enacted
F
in 1956 and 1962) were repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law of
Parliament of existing law. Even if the provision of the main part of
Article 254(2) can be said to be somehow applicable, the proviso, read
with Article 254(1), reaffirms the supremacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent
legislation does not in terms amend, vary or repeal any provision of the
(j State Legislation. The provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail
against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked in this case by
the respondent Bank. [525F; 529C-EI
ii,;
There was no substance in the appellants' contention that the
"
provision in the 1971 Act appointing one of the officers of the respon-
(I
I'{ dent Bank as the Estate Officer was violative of Article 14. [529F]
1
ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U.0.1.
497
The appeal failed.
A
L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.J.R. 1980 M.P. 106;
Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation Miscellaneous
Petiton No. 458/79 before Bombay High Court; Indu Bhusan Bose v.
Rama Sundari Devi and Anr .. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443; A.C. Patel v.
Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Bombay 434; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v.
B
Yasodai Ammal, 11980[ 1 S.C.R. 836; Bacha P. Guzdar v. C./. T.,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v.
C. T. 0., [1964] 4 SCR 99; A.P. State Raod Transport Corporation v.
I. T.O., [1964] 7 SCR 17; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State,
[1969] 3 S.C.R. 995; Vidarbha Housing Board v. J.T.O., [1973] 92
I.T.R. 430; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development
Authority,iJl982] 2 S.C.R. 1; Manohar v. C. G. Deasi, AIR 1951 Nag.
C
33; Ram.ciii"Dass v. State, AIR 1954 All. 707; Darukhanawala v.
Khemchand, ILR 1954 Born, 546; M. Karuna v. State, AIR 1955 Nag
153, Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR 1956 Nag 618; Sukumar Dutta v.
Gaurishankar, [1964] 69 CWN 833; Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran,
AIR 1967 Mad. 51;Mangtulal v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1953 Pat. 14;
D
Mi/ap Chand v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1964 Raj 252; Rama Sundari v. Indu ·
Bhusan, AIR 1967 Cal. 355; Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal, AIR 1962 Raj.
193; Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR 1982 Mad. 309-; United Province v. Atiga Begum, [1940] F.C.R. 110; Megh Raj v. Allan Rakhia,
AIR 1947 PC 72; Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
748; Manaklal Chhotalal v. M.G. Makwana & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 65;
E
Babu Jagtanand Sri Satyanarayanji, ILR 40 Patna 625; Union of India
v. Valluri S. Choudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802, State v. Peter, [1980] 3 SCR
290, 292; Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 224;
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State, [1983] 3 S.C.R. 130; Dhillon's case,
11972]· 2 S.C.R. 33; Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. LJC, [1981] 1
S.C.R. 498 and Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State, [1955] S.C.R. 79-9, referF
red to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Ne 900
of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1987 of the Calcutta G
High Court iu Matter No. 676 of 1978.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Anil Mitra, P.H. Parekh, D. Chandrachud,
•
S.C. Ghosh and R.K. Dhillon for the Appellants.
K. Parasaran Attorney General for Union of India.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19881 Supp. 1 S.C.R.
K.N. Bhat, A. Subba Rao and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. I had the advantage of reading
in draft the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother
Ranganathan, J. It is, however, necessary to add a few sentences. I
was reluctant to take up this matter as it arises out of a decision of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta. That decision was
occasioned by a reference made by the Chief Justice of that High
Court on a reference made by me to the Chid Justice sitting singly in
that Court. In the High Court I had not expressed any view on the
contentions urged. In those circumstances both the parties requested
me to take up the matter. It was in those circumstances that I became a
party to this judgment. I agree with my learned Brother that the
appeal should be dismissed and the order he proposes to make as to
costs.
It is not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the
case to refer in detail to the reasons. I would, however, make it clear
that I prefer the view of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in the case of LS. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai,
AIR 1980 MP 106. I would prefer this view in preference to that of the
E learned Single Judge· of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous
Petition No. 458/79 Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn.
Further, it is necessary to reiterate that in this case we have proceeded
on the short question canvassed before the Division Bench of the Hi,gh
Court out of which this appeal arises, i.e., whether the impugned Act
which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public
F
premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or
taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act
and owned or controlled by the Central Govt. is ultra vires or beyond
the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of
the Act to such premises. It is only this question which was mooted
before the High Court and required consideration by us under Article
G
136 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, not necessary to express any
view on any other aspect of the matter.
Furthermore, as has been emphasised by my learned Brother
there was no dispute as to whether the premises in the present appeal
is a public premises. Therefore, the question whether the premises in
H question or of this type is a public premises is not an aspect into which
we were required to go.
.)
ACCOUNTANT ANDSECRETARIALSERVlCESv. U.0.1. IRANGANATHAN,J.] 499
For the purpose of this appeal once it is held that the Public
A
Premises (Evictio~. of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is intra vires
the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survive because
no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High
Court and also in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, no
other issue can be canvassed. It is, therefore,,not necessary, in my
opinion, _to consid~r whether the provisions of 1971 Act even if intra
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vires would prevail upon the provisions of the State legislation. Hence,
for the purpose of this appeal it is unnecessary to express any view on
'
the amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution.
Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama· Sundari Devi. & Anr., I 1970 I 1 SCR
443 is a decision of five learned Judges of this Court affirming the c
Calcutta view which held that the legislation in question in that case
was to be found in Entries 6, 7 & 13 of List III of the 7th Schedule of
->.
the Constitution and neither in Entry 18 of II Schedule nor in Entry 3
of II Schedule of the Constitution. It rejected the Bombay."View expressed in A.C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chadda; !LR 1954 Born. 434. Respectfully, it has to be taken that the legislation in question must be underD
stood in its pith and substance and so understood the Act in question in
the instant case, is in respect of transfer of property other th'an
agricultural land and, as such, falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th
,·
Schedule to the Constitution.· It is clear from the said decision and the
subsequent decision reaffirming the same view in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334 that the subject-matter of E
housing accommodation and control thereof falls within the purview of
concurrent list. In that view of the matter, it cannot in my opinion, be
canvassed that the 1971 legislation in question was beyond the competence of the legislature.
With these observations I agree with respect with my learned F
Brother that the appeal should be dismissed without any order as to
costs.
....
S. RANGANATHAN, J. The first appellant is a private limited
company. The company is occupying a portion of premises No. 18,
Russel Street, Calcutta. The premises belong to the United CommerG
cial Bank, a statutory corporation constituted under the Banking
Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The
appellant company claims to be the tenant of the Bank but this is not
admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleges that the appellant
company, when somewhat differently constituted, had been allowed to
occupy a portion of the Bank's premises as licensee in consideration of H
500
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
A certain accountancy and secretarial services which it was required to
render to the Bank. It appears that sometime in 1975 the respondent
Bank issued a notice of eviction to the appellant company under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the 1956 Act'). Subsequently, however, the Bank issued
a notice dated 4.2.1977 to the appellants under the Public Premises
B (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the ·1971 Act'}; which is an Act of Parliament. The appellants
thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court being Matter
No. 676 of 1978. Though several contentions appear to have been
raised in the writ petition, the judgment of the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court dated 12th February, 1987, (which is the one
C presently under appeal) records that "the only question which has
been mooted and agitated before us is whether the impugned Act
which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public
premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or
taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act
and owned or controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires as it
D was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the
applicability of the said Act to such premises." Though the appellants
are interested only in denying the legislative power of Parliament in so
far as it purports to extend the applicability of the 1971 Act to premises
belonging to or taken on lease by what may be described as public
sector corporations, the contention as urged is somewhat broader. The
E argument goes to the extent of urging that only the State legislatures,
and not Parliament, is competent to legislate on the topic of landlordtenant relationships in respect of land and buildings. This has been the
principal contention addressed to us by Dr. Chitale appearing on
behalf of the appellants.
F
The 1971 Act received the assent of the President on 23rd
August, 1971 but it is deemed to have come into force on the 16th day
..
of September, 1958 for certain 'historical' reasons which are not relevant for our purposes. The Act provides for the eviction of 'unauthorised occupants· from 'public premises' and for certain inciden-
-
tal matters. S. 2(c) defines 'premises' to mean 'any land or any part of
G a building and to include garden, grounds and outhouses appurtenant
to the building or fittings affixed thereto'. The expression 'public premises' has been defined in Section 2( e) of the Act. This definition is in
three parts. Sub-clause (1) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to,
or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central
Government, as well as premises placed by that Government under
H the control of either House of Parliament for providing residential
ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U.0.1. [RANGANAIBAN, J.] 501
accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either
House of Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause ( e) takes in premises
belonging to certain local authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi.
Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) b_rings in premises belonging to or taken on
lease by, or on behalf of, various kinds of bodies, such as Universities,
Institutes of Technology, Board of Trustees of Major Port Trusts and
the Bhakra Management Board. It takes in any premises belonging to
or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, a Government company or its
subsidiary. It also takes in-and this is what we are concerned with
here-premises of "any corporation (not being a company as defined
in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and onwed or controlled by the
. Central Government". There is no dispute that the premises in question in the present appeal is "public premises" within the meaning of
the Act.
The Act contemplates the appointment of an Estate Officer who
is a high placed officer of the Government or of the relevant statutory
authority in respect of public premises controlled by that authority.
The Act enables the Estate Officer to call upon "unauthorised occupants" of public premises (meaning persons occupying such premises
without authority or continuing in occupation after the authority to do
so has expired or has been determined for any reason) to show cause
why they should not be evicted and to proceed to evict them, if need
be, after considering the cause, if any, shown by the persons concerned in response to a notice served on them. It also contains powers
to remove unauthorised constructions, demolish unauthorised constructions, dispose of property left on public premises by unauthorised
occupants, require payment of rent or damages in respect of public
premises and so on. An order passed by the estate officer, under the
provisions of the Act, is appealable, the appellate authority being the
District Judge or such other judicial officer of not less than 10 year's
experience as a District Judge and subject to the above right of appeal,
the orders passed by the estate officer are final. Section 15 bars the
jurisdiction of Courts to entertain any suits or proceedings in respect
of, inter alia, the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises. This, broadly, is the outline of the 1971 Act.
Before proceeding to deal with the contentions urged before us, it is
necessary to refer to two more enactments, which have a bearing on
the topic of discussion before us.
It has been mentioned earlier that the Bank had served a notice
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on the appellants under the 1956 Act. This Act, which received the H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
assent of the President on 30th March, 1956, is on the pattern of the
lease and rent control legislation prevalent in various States. It regulates, inter alia, the matter of eviction of tenants of buildings situated
in Calcutta and certain important cities and localities of the State
where there is scarcity of housing accommodation. It is not necessary
to set out the provisions of this Act except one. Under the second
proviso to section 1(3) the Act is not to apply to (a) any premises
belonging to any local authority, (b) any premises belonging to or
requisitioned by Government and ( c) any tenancy created by Government in respect of any premises taken on lease by Government. The
premises in the present case does not fall within any of these categories
and, according to the appellants before us, the provisions of 1956 Act
were !lqUarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the
Bank for evicting them. This is one.
The other relevant statute is the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as
'the 1962 Act'). This legislation is on the same pattern as the 1971 Act,
D a pattern which appears to have been in existence in various States,
conferring special powers on statutorily named officers to evict unauthorised occupants of public premises. The definitions of 'land',
'public land' and 'unauthorised occupation' contained in sections 2(2),
2(7) and 2(8) are so wide as to leave no doubt that the premises
belonging to the Bank would be within the scope of the said Act and
E that proceedings for eviction of the appellants could also be initiated
by the Collector under that Act. It thus appears that the procedure for
the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well
as either or both of the State Acts and the question is, which of these
will prevail? The appellants urge that a legislation of this type will fall
within the legislative field exclusively open to the State legislatures
F
and that the 1971 Act is ultra vires Parliament in so far as it purports to
affect the appellants' rights.
It will be convenient, at this stage, to set out all the relevant
entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution that may have a
bearing on the discussion before us along with the corresponding
G entries under the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
These are:
CONSTITUTION
List I-Union List
ENTRYJ
1935 ACT
List I-Federal List
ENTRY2
H · Delimitation of cantonment Na val, military and air force works;
ACCOUNTANTANDSECRETARIALSERVICESI'. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN.J] 503
areas, local self-government
in such areas, the constitution and powers within
such areas of cantonment
authorities and the regulation of house accommodation
including the control of
rents in such areas.
ENTRY32
local self-government in cantonment
areas, the constitution and powers
within such afeas of cantonment
authorities, the regulation of house
accommodation in such areas, and the
delimitation of such areas.
.
ENTRY JO
Property of the Union and
Works, lands and buildings vested
the revenue therefrom, but
in, or in the possession of, His
as regards property situated Majesty for the purposes of the
in a State• • •subject to
Dominion (not being naval, military
legislation by the State, save or air force works), but, as regards
in so far as Parliament by law property situate in a Province,
otherwise provide.
subject always to Provincial
legislation, save in so far as
Dominion law otherwise provides,
and, as regards property in an
Acceding State held by virtue of
any lease or agreement with that
State, subject to the terms of
ENTRY43:
Incorporation, regulation
and winding up of trading
corporations, including
banking, insurance and
financial corporations but
not including co-operative
societies.
ENTRY 44:
Incorporation, regulation
and winding up of corporations, whether trading or
not, with objects not
confined to one State, but
not including universities.
that lease or agreement.
ENTRY 33:
Corporations, that is to say, the
incorporation, regulation and
winding-up of trading corporations,
including banking, insurance and
financial corporations, but not
including corporations owned or
controlled by an Acceding State
and carrying on business only
within that State or co-operative
societies, and of corporations,
whether trading or not, with
objects not confined to one unit,
but not including universities.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
LIST JI-STA TE LIST
ENTRY IS:
Land, that is to say, rights
in or over land, land tenures
including the relation of
landlord and tenant, and the
collection of rents; transfer
and alienation of agricultural
land; land improvement and
agricultural loans;
colonization.
LIST II-PROVINCIAL LIST
ENTRY21:
Land. that is to say, rights
in or over land, land tenures,
including the relation of
landlord and tenant, and the
collection of rents; transfer,
alienation and devolution of
agricultural land; land
improvement and agricultural
loans; colonization; courts
of Wards; encumbered and
attached estates; treasure trove.
List III-CONCURRENT LIST
LIST III-CONCURRENT LIST
ENTRY5:
ENTRY7:
D Marriage and divorce; infants Wills, intestacy, and succession,
and minors; adoption; wills, save as regards agricultural
E
F
intestacy and succession;
land.
joint family and partition;
all matters in respect of
which parties in judicial
proceedings were immediately before the, commencement
of this Constitution subject to their
personal law.
ENTRY6:
Transfer of property other
than agricultural land;
registration of deeds and
documents.
ENTRYS:
Transfer of property other
than agricultural land; registration of deeds and
documents.
ENTRY 7:
ENTRY 10:
G Contracts, including partner- Contracts, including partnership,
ship, agency, contracts of
agency, contracts of carriage,
carriage, and other special
and other special forms of
forms of contracts, but not
contracts, but not including
including contracts relating
contracts relating to
H to agricultural land.
agricultural land.
r·
ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U.O.l. {RANGANAIBAN, J.) 505
One thing may be rtiade clear at the outset. The present ar;,ument may not have been open to the appellants if the premises of the
bank could be said to be premises belonging to the Union Government. In that case, the legislation to the extent it governs such premises can be said to fall under entry 32 of List I as one covering the
"property of the union". Though, the premises being situated in
Calcutta, any legislation under that entry in regard thereto would be
subject to State legislation, the State legislation can only govern "save
in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides". Parliament having
provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will, it can be said, prevail
over the 1956 and 1962 Acts. It is, however, common ground before us
that though the Bank is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by
the Government, it has a distinct personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union. The position,
indeed, is beyond the pale of controversy after the decisions of this
Court in Bacha F. Guzdarv. C.I. T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State Trading
Corporation of India Ltd. v. C. T.O., [19641 4 S.C.R. 99; A.P. State
Road Transport Corporation v. /. T.O., [1964] 7 S.C.R. 17; Heavy
Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 995; Vidarbha
Housing Board v. I. T.0., [1973) 92 I.T.R. 430 and Western Coalfields
Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, [19821 2 S.C.R. 1. It is,
therefore, not possible for the respondents to support the legislation,
qua the premises in question, under Entry 32 of List I.
A
B
c
D
Entry 32 of List I being out of the way, Dr. Chi tale, appearing on
E
behalf of the appellants, contends that the legislation squarely falls
under Entry 18 of List II. He points out that judicial decisions have
given the word 'land' in Entry 18 a very wide interpretation so as to
comprehend· not only land of all types-rural or urban, agricultural or
non-agricultural, vacant or built up-but also 'buildings' put up thereon. Since the entry specifically includes the relationship of landlord
F
and tenant, there can be no doubt that tenancy legislations pertaining
to land and buildings derive their authority from Entry 18. He referred
in this context inter alia, to Manoharv. C.G. Desai, AIR 1951Nag33;
A. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Born 434, Raman Dass v.
State, AIR 1954 ALL 707; Darukhanawala v. Khemchand, ILR 1954
Born. 546; M. Karuna v. State, AIR 1955 Nag. 153; Kevalchand v.
G
Dashrathlal, I.LR. 1956 Nag. 618; Sukumar Dutta y. Gaurishanker,
[1964] 69 CWN 833; Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran, AIR 1967 Mad.
57' and a detailed and comprehensive judgment of Parekh J. in Elliot
Waud & Hill P. Ltd. v. L.I.C., [19801 Born. C.R. 590 which we are
informed is pending consideration on appeal, before a Full Bench of
the Bombay High Court. We do not, however, propose to discuss
H
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.
A these cases at length firstly, because there is a contrary line of decisions also vide Mangtulal v. Radheshyam, AIR 1953 Pat. 14; Milap
Chand v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1954 Raj. 252; Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal,
AIR 1962 Raj 193, Rama Sundari v. lndu Bhushan, AIR 1967 Cal
355; L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 M.P. 106 and
Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR 1982 Mad. 309 and the judgment
B presently under appeal and secondly, because a question as tu the
interpretation of Entry 18 (or its predecess·Jr, Entry 21 of the Provincial List under the Government of India Act, 1935, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1935 Act') had arisen before the Federal Court and the
Privy Council and some of the above judgments have also been considered in certain earlier decisions of this Court. It would, therefore, be
C appropriate to refer to these decisions:
( 1) The earliest of the decisions relevant in this context is the
decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiga Begum,
I 1940] F.C.R. 110. That case was concerned with the interpretation of
Entry 21 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government oflndia
D Act, 1935. It raised the issue of the validity of the United Provinces
Regularisation of Remissions Act (14 of 1938). In view of an unprecedented fall in the prices of agricultural produce, the United Provinces Government directed a remission in the rents payable by tenants to their landlords. But this remission was declared by the High
Court to be unauthorised and inoperative as being in contravention of
E the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The Provincial Legislature, therefore, passed the impugned Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in courts.
This Act was held by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court to be ultra
vires the Legislature. The Provincial Government appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court held that the legislation was clearly
F
governed by Entry 21. The learned Chief Justice observed:
G
H
"The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not
always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the
Provincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of
every other item in that List, and Parliament seems to have
been content to take a number of comprehensive categories
and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import. In the case of some of these categories such as
"Local Government", "Education", "Water", "Agriculture" and "Land", the general word is amplified and explained by a number of example or illustrations, some of
ACCOUNTANT ANDSECRETAR.lALSERVICESv. U.0.L [RANGANATHAN,J.] 507
which would probably on any construction have been held
A
to fall under the more general word, while the inclusion
(of) others might not be so obvious. Thus "Courts of
Wards" and 'treasure-trove' might not ordinarily have
been regarded as included under the head "Land", if they
had not been specifically mentioned in item no. 21. I think,
however, that none of the items is to be read in a narrow or B
restricted sense and that each general word should be held
to extend to all ancilliary or subsidiary matters which can
fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. I
deprecate any attempt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general
descriptions; it will be sufficient and much wiser to C
determine each case as and when it comes before this
Court."
The Court then proceeded to hold that, if .the Provincial Legislature
could legislate in respect of collection of rents, it must also have the
power to legislate with respect to any limitation on the power of a D
landlord to collect rents, that is to say, with respect to the remission of
rents as well as to their collection.
(2) The next decision, on certain observation in which Dr.
Chitale placed considerable reliance i.s that of the Privy Council in
Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72. In that case the question E
was whether the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, an Act
of the Punjab Legislature, was void as being ultra vires of the Punjab
Legislature. The Act applied to mortgagees in possession of certain
lands. The expression 'land' was defined as "land which is not
occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied
or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriF
culture or for pasture" and included, inter alia, "the sites of buildings
and other structures on such lands." The object of the impugned Act
was the relief of mortgagors by giving them restitution of the mortgaged premises on conditions more favourable than those under the
mortgage deed and by providing for a procedure before the Collector
which was more summary than that before the ordinary Courts. The G
contention before the Privy·Council, on behalf of the Punjab Province,
was that the provisions of the impugned Act were traceable to item 21
supplemented, it need be, by item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List
of the 1935 Act. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the
impugned Act went beyond the limits of the Legislative· powers of the
Province under list II and could . not be supported by invoking the . H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.
powers ot the Province under List III (i.e. Entries 4, 7, 8 and 10
corresponding to Entries 13, 5, 6 and 7 of List III under the Constitution). It was pointed out that certain provisions of the impugned Act
were repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the
Code of Civil Procedure. The Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the legislation was clearly covered by Entry 21 in List III. In
so holding, they observed:
"The key to item 21 is to be found in the opening word
"land". That word is sufficient in itself to include every
form of land, whether agricultural or not. Land indeed is
primarily a matter of provincial concern. The land in each
Province may have its special characteristics in view of
which it is necessary to legislate, and there are local
customs and traditions in regard to land holding and
particular problems of provincial or local concern which
require provincial consideration. It would be strange if the
land in a province were to be broken up into separate portions some within and some outside the legislative powers
of the province. Such a conflict of jurisdiction is not to be
expected. Item 21 is part of a constitution and would on
ordinary principles receive the idest construction, unless
for some reason, it is cut down either by the terms of Item
21 itself or by other parts of the constitution which has to
be read as a whole. As to Item 21 "land", the governing
word is followed by the rest of the item, which goes on to
say, "that is to say". These words introduce the most general concept-"rights in or over land." "Rights in land"
must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold
or all such rights.