# "" ACHUTANANDA PUROHIT AND ORS v. THE STATE OF ORISSA

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 919
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-03-26
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 312 to 314 of 1972
- **Bench:** Y. V. Ch, Andrachud, V. R. Krishna !Yer, N. L. Untwalia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/achutananda-purohit-and-ors-v-the-state-of-orissa-6850
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951-Secs. 26-27-Constitution
of
India
Articles
31A-31B-3l (2 )-31 (3 )-Agrarian
ref arm-Whether
ii1terr:st
at
n1arket rate or statutory rate-Calculation of cotnpensation.
The appellant was the intern1ediary in respect of vast forest and other land<;
in the State of Orissa. The estates vested in the State i11 April 1960 by force
A
B
of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951.
The appellant submitted necessary
return for compensation as provided by the Act.
The Compensation Officer
passed an order adverse to the appellant whereupon the-appellant filed ah appeal to
C
the Col1ector which was rejei;ted. A second appeal filed before the Board of Revenue was dismissed.
Later on, Revision Petitions were filed in the High Court. The
High Court set aside the order and directed remand to the Compensation Officer.
Thereafter, the District Forest Officer made his appraisal of the annual income
and submitted to the Chief Conservator of Forests who altered the actual yield
an<l reduced it substAntially.
Both the State and the appellant filed appeals to
the Collector which were disn1issed.
A second appeal was filed by the appel-
- lant before the Board of Revenue without success. In the Revision Applications
D
filed before the High Court which led to the re.mand now challenged in the present appeals the appellant contended before this Court :
(l) The interest ought to have been awarded at 12 per cent as against
the statutory rate of 2t per cent from the date of the vesting till
payment.
(2) Compensation money should be so calculated that the purchasing
power of the amount of con1pensation to be paid .on the date of
E
actual payment will not be less than the purchasing pO\\'er on the
date of vesting.
(3) The slab-system of calculation of compensation in the Act providing
smaller multiples for estates yielding larger income is unconstitutional.
( 4) Unlike in case of fisheries etc., where the actual income is to be
included in the gross ass~ts, in the case of forests, the assumed income
and not the actual income is to be included. During the agricultural
F
year immediately preceding the abolition, the petitioners had not
actually derived any income from the forests and as such they ~'ere
under no obligation to pay any income tax on such income.
There·
fore. deduction of income tax from the gross assets is illegal and
unwarranted.
(5) The compensation has not been computed in accordance with the
scheme of the Act.
(6J The date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of
G
compensation should have been made and since that had not been
done the Compensation Officer had become functus officio in awarding
compensation.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD : 1. The policy of the law of agrarian reforms postulates the ext!nguishment of ancient privileges and c9rnering of land r~sources and the socioH
econon1ic yardstick is different from what applies to ordinary purchases of real
estate and this is manifest in the special provisions contained in Article 31A
and 31B of the Constitution. A similar principle applies to the a~'ard of interest
which may sometimes be notional when feudal interests are puffed out. The
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 3 S.C.R,
dynamic rule of Jaw with a social mission makes a meaningful distinction between
rights steeped in the old system and compensation for deprivation of those
interests on the one hand and the ordinary commercial traru;actions on the
other. [923F-GJ
2. It is more or less a world phenomenon that the erosion in value of the
unit of currency has been taking place.
But this invisible devaluation owing
to the inflationary spiral does not affect the quantum of monetary compensation
prescribed by statute. For the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is
the same as the rupee of today although for the purposes of the, market place
and cost of living, the housewife's answer may be different.
[924B-CJ
3. Article 31(3) read with Article 31(2) bars any challenge to

## Text

. ~
I
""
ACHUTANANDA PUROHIT AND ORS.
V.
THE STATE OF ORISSA
March 26, 1976
919
[Y. V. CH,ANDRACHUD, V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]
Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951-Secs. 26-27-Constitution
of
India
Articles
31A-31B-3l (2 )-31 (3 )-Agrarian
ref arm-Whether
ii1terr:st
at
n1arket rate or statutory rate-Calculation of cotnpensation.
The appellant was the intern1ediary in respect of vast forest and other land<;
in the State of Orissa. The estates vested in the State i11 April 1960 by force
A
B
of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951.
The appellant submitted necessary
return for compensation as provided by the Act.
The Compensation Officer
passed an order adverse to the appellant whereupon the-appellant filed ah appeal to
C
the Col1ector which was rejei;ted. A second appeal filed before the Board of Revenue was dismissed.
Later on, Revision Petitions were filed in the High Court. The
High Court set aside the order and directed remand to the Compensation Officer.
Thereafter, the District Forest Officer made his appraisal of the annual income
and submitted to the Chief Conservator of Forests who altered the actual yield
an<l reduced it substAntially.
Both the State and the appellant filed appeals to
the Collector which were disn1issed.
A second appeal was filed by the appel-
- lant before the Board of Revenue without success. In the Revision Applications
D
filed before the High Court which led to the re.mand now challenged in the present appeals the appellant contended before this Court :
(l) The interest ought to have been awarded at 12 per cent as against
the statutory rate of 2t per cent from the date of the vesting till
payment.
(2) Compensation money should be so calculated that the purchasing
power of the amount of con1pensation to be paid .on the date of
E
actual payment will not be less than the purchasing pO\\'er on the
date of vesting.
(3) The slab-system of calculation of compensation in the Act providing
smaller multiples for estates yielding larger income is unconstitutional.
( 4) Unlike in case of fisheries etc., where the actual income is to be
included in the gross ass~ts, in the case of forests, the assumed income
and not the actual income is to be included. During the agricultural
F
year immediately preceding the abolition, the petitioners had not
actually derived any income from the forests and as such they ~'ere
under no obligation to pay any income tax on such income.
There·
fore. deduction of income tax from the gross assets is illegal and
unwarranted.
(5) The compensation has not been computed in accordance with the
scheme of the Act.
(6J The date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of
G
compensation should have been made and since that had not been
done the Compensation Officer had become functus officio in awarding
compensation.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD : 1. The policy of the law of agrarian reforms postulates the ext!nguishment of ancient privileges and c9rnering of land r~sources and the socioH
econon1ic yardstick is different from what applies to ordinary purchases of real
estate and this is manifest in the special provisions contained in Article 31A
and 31B of the Constitution. A similar principle applies to the a~'ard of interest
which may sometimes be notional when feudal interests are puffed out. The
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 3 S.C.R,
dynamic rule of Jaw with a social mission makes a meaningful distinction between
rights steeped in the old system and compensation for deprivation of those
interests on the one hand and the ordinary commercial traru;actions on the
other. [923F-GJ
2. It is more or less a world phenomenon that the erosion in value of the
unit of currency has been taking place.
But this invisible devaluation owing
to the inflationary spiral does not affect the quantum of monetary compensation
prescribed by statute. For the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is
the same as the rupee of today although for the purposes of the, market place
and cost of living, the housewife's answer may be different.
[924B-CJ
3. Article 31(3) read with Article 31(2) bars any challenge to the amount
of compensation on acquisition by the State subject to the compliance with
the prescriptions in the said sub articles on the ground that the amount so fixed
or determined is not adequate.
Presidential assent has been accorded to this
State Act and so the loan operates. [924C-D]
4. The submission of the appellant proceeds on a misreading of section 27.
In the case of forests it is the assumed and not the actual income that forms
the
b:i~is for calculation of compensation. Similarly an assumed income tax
also has to be worked out and deducted.
[924F-G]
5. The scheme of the Act is that the compensation must be calculated on
the basis of appraisal of the apnual yield of the forests en the date of vesting
firstly by a Forest Officer and secondly by the Chief Conservator of Forests,
screening it and approving it. In the present case, the Chief Conservator had
substituted his appraisement which was accepted by the statutory Tribunal. There
was a fundamental difference in the basis adopted by the Forest Officer and
the Chief Conservator of Forests in the matter of assessing in the incorne of
the Forest in Question. What the Chief Conservator did was not to approve
wholly or in a modified form what the Forest Officer did but to make his own
appraisal independently and without reference to the report of the statutory
functionary. This was wrong and contrary to section 26. This
Court
is
in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court and the reasoning \Vhich
has prevailed with it.
[925C, 927A-BJ
6. Before the date of vesting the State never can nor does fix the compensation through the Compensation Officer in any of the agrarian refonn Jaws
and these compensation operations are post-statutory exercises. Therefore, there
is no substance in the funtcus officio argument.
If the officer had no jurisdiction
the land would be gone because of the vesting provision and no compensation
would be forthcoming for want of jurisdiction; a consequence the appellant
never wants. Technicality can be frightened away by technicality. [927D-E]
7. After remand the Forest Officer will do the appraisement of the annual
income, forward his report to the Chief Conservator of Forests who \Vitl take
the said report into consideration and, if necessary, make the modifications
therein or approve it ~th such changes as he deems fit.
Certainly, the Chief
Conservator cannot be ignored by the Compensation Officer nor can the Chief
Conservator ignore the assessment made by the Forest Officer and go through
an independent exercise. The take over of the forest of the appeUant was
effected as early as in 1960. '(he fligh Court has stated that a large part of
the delay has been due to laches committed from time to time by the officers
charged with the duty to calculate the compensation.
It is therefore directed
that the proceedings before the Compensation Officer shall be completed within
six months from today.
[927F-H, 928A-BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 312 to 314
of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
19-3-71 of the Orissa High Court in C.W. Nos. 3'25 to 327 /70.
Appellant No. 1 in person and D. N. Misra for the Appellants.
,
" .
;
'
A. PUROHIT v .. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, J.)
Gobind Das and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
921
KRISHNA IYER, J.
Three civil appeals, stemming from three revision petitions to the High Court of Orissa under the Orissa Estates
Abolition Act, 1951 (Orissa Act I of 1952) (for short, the Act) have
reached this Court, thanks to special leave granted to the appellant,
who is common in all the cases.
The High Court, after deciding
various issues, remanded the cases to the Compensation Officer under
the Act, after over-ruling most of the contentions pressed before it by
the appellant.
Shri Achutananda Purohit, appellant, was the intermediary in respect of vast forests and other lands comprised in the estate of Jujumura
in the district of Sambalpur.
This estate vested in the State on April
1, 1960 by force of the Act and the crucial question agitated before
us, consequentially, turns on the quantum of compensation awardable
under Chapter V of the Act.
The appellant has received
around
Rs. 3,00,000/- but much more, according to him, is due and this
controversy can be settled by examining his specific points.
A
B
c
Shri Purohit, appellant, is an Advocate by profession and is 83
D
years old.
He has argued in person and with passion.
We have
listened with patience to all his submissions, good, bad and indifferent.
If we may anticipate ourselves, none of the nine submissions
has appealed to us, save to the extent the High Court has upheld.
Even so, a minimal narration of the facts and a brief consideration of
each argument is necessary and we proceed to do so.
While his arguments did not impress us, we were touched by his concluding words
E
that he had been born and had grown in an adivasi village, in the
only brahmin family and, in his evening years of life, proposed to
give a substantial part of the compensation the State would give him
for adivasi welfare.
Although he waxed sentimentally on this note,
he did not convince us on his contentions.
With these prefatory
observations, we proceed to formulate the many points urged
and
give our findings and reasons, one after the other.
F
We are directly concerned with the issue of compensation which
is dealt with. as earlier stated, in Chapter V of the Act.
The Compensation Officer is charged with fixing_ the quantum in the prescribed
manner.
A compensation assessment roll containing the gross asset
and net income of each estate, together with the compensation payable in respect of such estate, has to be prepared by him.
Of course,
when there is joint ownership, s. 24 stipulates that the compensation
shall be determined for the estate as a whole and not separately for
each of the shares therein.
Section 26 has great relevance as it lays
down the method of arriving at the gross asset and s. 27 has like
significance as it focuses on the manner in which the net income from
an estate shall be computed by deducting certain items from the gross
asset of the estate. Section 28 states how the amount of compensation is to be determined and the methodology of payment. There
are a few other sections in Chapter VI which deal with payment of
compensation. The Act also provides for appeal, second appeal and
G
H
A
B
c
D
922
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 s.c.R.
revision, the last being to the High Court and the earlier ones being
to the Collector and a Board constituted under s. 22.
The rule-making power is vested in the government under s. 4 7 and there is a
routine 'removal of difficulties' clause contained in s. 50.
These
furnish in bare outline the provisions with which we are directly concerned.
Against the background of law just projected, we may set out Shri
Purohit's points which, if we may say so, are substantially the same
as have been argued by him in revision before the High Court with
partial success.
For convenience of reference, we may extract the
statement by the High Court of the contentions urged before it (and
repeated before us) by the appellant :
"(l) The provisions of s. 37(3) read with s. 26(2) (b)
( v) of the Act make it clear that the date of vesting is the
last date by which the calculation of compensation should
have been made.
As admittedly compensation had not been
calculated by the date of vesting, the Compensation Officer
lost his statutory jurisdiction to do so.
It is
this
Court
which, by its order dated 10-4-1969 in Civil
Revisions
201, 202 and 203 of 1968 conferred new jurisdiction on the
Compensation Officer to deal freshly with the case and therefore notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the compensation has to be calculated according to the directions
given by the Court;
(2) The Court was fully aware of the statutory provision in
s. 26(2) (b) (v) of the Act, but in spite of it, the direction
E
was that the Divisional Forest Officer should make
the
appraisement.
There was no direction that this report of the
D.F.O.
should be further subject to the approval of the
Chief Conservator of Forests.
The calculatiOn made by
the Chief Conservator of Forests therefore has no statutory
force but could be just a piece of evidence.
But as the
Court directed that no further evidence on behalf of the State
F
should be received, Ext. A/l is inadmissible in evidence.
G
H
( 3) Assuming that in spite of the directions of the court
the Compensation Officer is entitled' to follow the procedure
laid down in Section 26(2) (b) (v), the expression 'subject
to the approval of the Chief Conservator of Forests' does
not refer to the appraisement made by the D .F .0. but refers
to his appointment.
(4) Assuming that s. 26(2) (b) (v) would have full force,
what it contemplates is that the appraisement must be made
by the D.F.O., and it is subject to the approval by the Chief
Conservator of Forests.
But what has happened here is that
the Chief Conservator himself made the appraisement without
referring to the appraisement made by the D.F.O. and as such
the appraisement made by the Chief Conservator is invalid.
(5) The report of the Chief Conservator of Forests is also
invalid because of the fact that the appraisement is made
•
)
•
i
"
•
A. PUROH!T v. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, J.)
923
only with reference to the area of the disputed forests withA
out taking into consideration the density of growth therein;
( 6) Unlike in case of fisheries etc., where the actual income
is to be included in the gross assets, in the case of forests,
the assumed income and not the actual income is to be included.
During the agricultural year immediately preceding the
abolition, the petitioners had not actually deriv,ed any income
from the forests and as such they were under .no obligation
to pay any income-tax on such income.
Therefore, deduction of income-tax from the gross assets is illegal and unwarranted.
(7) The slab-system of calculation of compensation in the
Act providing smaller multiples for estates yielding larger
income is unconstitutional.
(8) Compensation money should be so calculated that the
purchasing power of the amount of compensation
to be
paid on the date of actual payment will not be less than its
purchasing power on the date of vesting; and
(9) Interest should be calculated at not less than 12%
per annum from the date of vesting till payment."
B
c
D
The meat of the matter, the primary question agitated in the appeal,
lopping off the fringe issues of lesser import, consists in the statutory
methodology and functionaries prescribed by the Act for quantifying
the compensation and the compliance therewith by the statutory machinery in the case of the appellant.
But before examining this essenE
tial issue we may dispose of the minor points pressed, so that the
deck may be cleared for dealing with what deserves to be
dealt
with.
Point No. 9, in the catalogue already given, relates-to the claim
for 12 % interest on the amount of compensation as against the statntory rate of 2!%. The policy of the law of agrarian reform postulates
F
the extinguishment of ancient privileges and cornering of land resources, and the socio-economic yardstick is different from what applies
to ordinary purchases of real estate and this is manifest in the special
provisions contained in Art. 3!A and Art. 31B of the Constitution.
A similar principle applies to the award of interest which may sometimes be notional when feudal interests are puffed out.
We cannot
import the notion of prevailing bank rates in such situations.
The
G
dynamic rule of law, with a social mission, makes a meaningful distinction .behveen rights s!eeped in the old system and compensation
for depnvatlon of those interests, on the one hand, and the ordinary
commercial. transactions or regulation of rights untinged by
social
!ransformat10n urges, on the other.
This gives r~tionality to the seemmg d1spanty.
Holmes once commented : 'It is revolting to
have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
H
the time of Henry IV'.
Here there is good reason to depart from
the old rule of full compensation and it perhaps legitimates the reduced rate of recompense.
Moreover, the High Court has rightly pointed
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
out that the validity of s. 37(3) of the Act which fixes a small rate
of interes_t on the compensation amount has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Ga;apati Narayan's Case(').
•
Point No. 8 has only to be stated to be rejected.
The contention is that on the date of vesting, which was well over two decades
ago, the purchasing power of the rupee was much higher than its
present value. It is more or less a world phenomenon that the erosii.
•
on in value of the unit of currency has been taking place, but this
invisible devaluation owing to the inflationary spiral does not affect
the quantum of monetary compensation prescribed by statute.
For
the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is the same as the rupee
of today, although for the purposes of the market place and cost-ofliving, the housewife's answer may be different.
Law is sometimes
blind.
The next point in the reverse order is equally unsubstantial and
may be disposed of right away.
The appellant challenges the slab
system of compensation provided in the Act which awards smaller
__.
multiples for estates yielding larger incomes, on the score of violation
r
of the fundamental rights under the Constitution.
The short answer
is that Art. 31(3) read with Art. 31(2) bars any challenge to the
amount of compensation on acquisition by the State subject to compliance with the prescriptions in the said sub-Articles, on the ground
that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate.
Presidential
assent has been accorded to this State Act and so the ban operates.
Moreover, Art. 31A repels the applicability of Arts. 14, 19 and 31
to the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein
etc.
This provision directly demolishes the contention of the appellant.
Point No. 6 in the list of contentions earlier reproduced is also
bereft of force and we may make short shrift of it.
The argument is
that for certain reasons the appellant could not derive any actual
income from the forests taken over by the State from him and therefore there was no income-tax payable on any agricnltural income from
these forests.
The contention is that therefore in arriving at the next
income the deduction of income-tax is uot permissible.
Here again,
the flaw in the submission consists in mis-reading s. 27 of the Act
which expressly states that the net income from an estate shall be
computed by deducting from the gross assets of such estate any sum
'which was payable by the intermediary as income-tax in respect of
any income . . . derived from such estate for the previous agricultural
year'.
No income, therefore no income-tax, and therefore no deduction, is the syllogism of Shri Purohit.
He forgets that in the case of
forests it is the assumed income and not the actual income that forms
the basis of calculation of compensation.
Indeed, if the actnal income
were to be the foundation for computation of compensation on the
premise that no actnal income has accrued, the compensation might
be· zero. On the other hand, statutory compensation is provided for
on the formula of assumed income in the previous year.
Similarly,
an assumed income-tax also has to be worked out and deducted. If
(!) A.LR. 1953 S.C. 375.
'
A. PUROHIT v. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, !.)
925
a notional income on the assumed basis can be used for fixing compensation, a notional income-tax can be calculated and deducted. The
confusion that vitiates the argument is prompted by a circular letter
of government regarding non-deductability of income-tax due to the
State from the amount of compensation lying to the credit of estateholders.
We have examined the circular letter and are satisfied that
it has no relevance to a situation like the present and it deals with
a totally different matter. In short, s. 27 properly construed, can-
. not lend itself to the meaning imputed to it by the appellant.
The serious question that survives for consideration is covered by
the remaining points which more or less
overlap.
The
statutory
scheme of compensation for forest lands consists of a machinery for
assessment of the net income which is multiplied on a sliding scale and
the method of challenge to the determination by the aggrieved owner
of State. Section '26(2)(b) (v) is relevant here and may be
set
out:
"26(2) 'gross asset' when used with reference
to
an
estate means the aggregate of the rents, including all cesses,
which were payable in respect of the estate for the previous
agricultural year-
(b) by the raiyats or any other persons cultivating the
land other than the land settled with the intermediary or intermidaris under Sub-section ( 1) of Section 7 and includes :-
( v) gross income from forests calculated on the basis of
the appraisement made of annual yield of the forests on the
date of vesting by a Forest Officer subject to the approval
of the Chief Conservator of ,Forests, such Forest O!licer
being not below the rank of a Divisional Forest Officer to be
appointed in this behalf by the State Government."
A
B
c
D
E
The expression 'Forest Officer', used here, has been explained in
s. 26.
So the first step is for the Goverrnnent to appoint Forest Officers from out of D.F.Os. in the Forest Department, for the purposes
of the Act.
Those Officers ascertain the income from the forest conF
cerned and the figure so fixed is subject to the approval of the C.C.F.
(Chief Conservator of Forests),, presumably the top expert in
the
department.
The power to approve implies the power to disapprove
or modify but not to report or arrive at an income de hors the Forest
Officer's Report altogether.
The section is clear that the gross income from forests must be
G
calculated on the basis of appraisal of the annual vield on the date of
vesting,, firstly, by a Forest Officer and, secondly, by the Chief Conservator of ~orests scr~ning it a!ld appr<?ving it. . Indeed, p:eliminary to
the appraisal operat10n, the mtermediary receives a nottce in Form
'D' (rule 13) and he is expected to furnish a return of the relevant
particulars and supporting information to enable correct appraisement.
In the present case, the appellant did submit the 'D' return to the Comll
pensation Officer and adduced some evidence to substantiate it. The
Compensation Officer ·passed an order adverse to the appellant, whereupon he filed an appeal to the Collector which was rejected.
A Second
9-725SCIJ76
j\
92 li
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
A
Appeal followed before the Board of Revenue which was dismissed·
Later, revision petitions were filed before the High Court and G. K ..
•
Misra J '" set aside the order disallowing the inclusion of the income
" •
from forests for ascertainment of compensation and directed a remand
to the Compensation Officer.
The said order (th(: relevant portion of
which we are concerned) rnns thus :
B
"He would immediately call upon the Divisional Forest
Ollicer to make appraisement within three months from the
receipt of the record. The appraisement can be scientifically
done by looking to the age of the trees as they stand now.
It is open to the petitioners to give evidence that after the date
of vesting many of the trees and forest prodnce have been
removed. Besides the evidence already on record would be
C
taken into consideration.
The Divisional Forest Officer who
would make the appraisement will be examined as a witne~s
for the Compensation Officer and would be subjected
to
cross-examination.
No other evidence would be permissible
as the State has not chosen to give any other evidence.
Under Rule 13(1-c) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Rnles,
1952 the compensation officer may rely upon· snch other materD
ihis as may otherwise be ascertained by him.
But in such a
case the materials mnst be brought to the notice of the petitioners who would be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses
connected therewith and may give rebutting· evidence.
The
compensation case is to be disposed of b:9 the compensatio11.
officer within six months from today
( 10-4-1969)
with
intimation to this Court."
E
F
G
H
Strictly speaking, the statutory requirement is for initial appraisal
of tl1e annual income by the Forest Officer.
The use of the expression
'Divisional Forest Officer' is erroneous although Forest Officers are
appointed from among Divisional Forest Officers.
Equally clearly, a
slight error has crept into the Judge's order because he does not make
any reference specifically to the statutory requiremi;nt of approval of
the Chief Conservator of Forests of the appraisement made by the
Forest Officer.
However, what followed is interesting though erroneous. · The District Forest Officer (who, inc.identally, happens to be a Forest Officer
under the Act, having been appointed as required thereunder) made
his appraisal of the annual income and submitted to the Chief Conservator who altered the annual yield and reduced it substantially.
But
he pointed out that the Forest Officer had omitted to include the
income from kendu leaves and added that sum to the income from
forests.
Even so, the total figure was less than what the Divisional
Forest Officer had recommended.
The Compensation Officer accepted
the report of the Chief Conservator and made the statutory calculation
on that date.
Both the State and the appellant filed appeals to the
Collector which were dismissed.
A second appeal was filed by the
appellant before the Board of Revenue without success.
Then followed three revisi•m petitions to the High Court which led to the order
of remand now attacked before us in the present appeals.
,.
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t
A. PUROHIT v. ORISSA (Krishna lyer, J.)
927
From this narrative, what follows is that the Chief Conservator
had substituted his appraisement which was accepted by the statutory
tribunal.
Indeed, there was a fundamental ditlerence in the
basis
adopted by the. Forest Officer and the Chief Conservator in the matter
of assessing the income of the forests in question.
We need not go
into this detail except for the purpose of noticing that what the Chief·
Conservator did was not to approve wholly or in a modified form what
the Forest Officer did but to make his own appraisal independently
and without reference to the report of the statutory functionary, viz.,,
the Forest Officer. This was wrong and contrary to s. 26, as was
contended by the appellant and in a way accepted by the High Court.
We are in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court
and the reasoning which has prevailed with it.
The direction given
A
B
by the learned Judge in the remand order is correct although it may
C
require a little clarification. Having heard the appellant at some length,
we see no flaw in the High Court's order on this aspect of the matter.
It is astonishing that anyone should urge, as the appellant did, that the
date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of compensation should have been made and since that had not been done, the
Compensation Officer had becom.e funclus officio in awarding, compensation.
Before the date of vesting the State never can, nor docs, fix
D
the compensation through the Compensation Officer in any of the
agrarian reform laws, and these compensation operations are
poststatutory exercises.
Therefore there is no substance in the functus
officio argument. If the officer had no jurisdiction, the land would be
gone because of the vesting provision and no compensation would be
forthcoming for want of jurisdicltion-a consequence the appellant
never wants.
Technicality can be frightened away by technicality.
E
Nor is it right to contend, as the appellant did, that the Compensation
Officer's jurisdiction was created by the order of remand by the High
Court. No, it was created by the statute and canalised by the order
of remand.
It follows that, after the present second remand,, the re-appraisal of
the annual net income cannot be done solely by the Forest· Officer
without securing the approval of the Chief Conservator.
Nor can the
Fj
Compensation Officer by-pass the Chief Conservator on the misunderstood strength of the High Court's first order of remand. The true
legal drill is-and this holds good after the second remand orderthat the Forest Officer will do the appraisement of the annual income,
forward his report to the Chief Conservator of Forests who will take
the said report into conside.ration and, if necessary, make modifications
therein or approve it with such changes as he deems fit.
Certainly,
the Chief Conservator cannot be ignored by the Compensation Officer
nor can the Chief Conservator ignore the assessment made by the
Forest Officer and go through an independent exercise.
The integrated
process has already been explained by us and will be followed in the
proceedings to ensue on remand. We may make it clear that now that
a Forest Officer has made an appraisement, the Chief Conservator of
Forests will auply his mind to it and approve it as a whole or with
such modifications as he thinks necessary and fonvard it to the Compensation Officer.
This will,, among other things, save time.
Thereafter, the appropriate statutory conrse will follow.
Substantially, this
G
H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 3 S.C.R.
A
is what has been done by the learned Judge when allowing the revisions
and remitting the case back to the Com~nsation Officer.
B
c
The take-over of the forests of the appellant was effected as early
as 1900 and 16 years have passed without the intermediary being out
of the litigative woods.
The High Court has stated that a large part
of the delay has been 'due to !aches committed from time to time by
the Officers who have been charged with thfl duty to calculate the compensation. It is again du~ to mist;lkes committed by the authorities
concerned that the matter is being remitted back to the Compensation
Officer for disposal'. The force of these observations constrains us to
direct that the proceedings before the Compensation Officer shall be
completed within six months from today. In this context, it is perhaps
not irrelevant to remember that the appellant, a freedom-fighter, is an
83-year-old man and, at this stage of his life, the State should show
commisseration not merely in quickly disposing of the proceedin~ but
also in not being cantankerous in awarding and disbursing the balance
compensation.
With these directions and. observations we affirm the
orders under appeal but, while dismissing the appeals, direct the parties
to bear their costs in this Court.
P.H.P.
Appeals dismissed.
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