# ADI PHEROZSHAH GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI, ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MAHARASHTRA,BOMBAY - **Citation:** [1971] 1 S.C.R. 863 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1970-08-21 - **Bench:** M. HmAYATULLAH, J. M. Shelat, G. .l(. MITTER, c. A. VAIDIALINGAM, A. N. Ray - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/adi-pherozshah-gandhi-v-h-m-seervai-advocate-general-of-maharashtra-bombay-5295 - **Pages:** 68 ## Headnote A.dvocatts Act (25 of 1%1) s. 37--,:ferson aggrieved', meanmg OJAdvocate-General of State taking part in proceedings before Disciplinnry Committee of Bar Council-If 'person aggrieved' with a right of appeal. The appellant wa~ an advocate from Maharashtra. He was convicted by a Summttry Court in London on a charg~ of pilfering from a Departmental Store and was sentenced to pay a fine. The State Bar Council chlled upon him sou motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct. lie submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council was satisfied that there was no reason for holding him guilty of profession~ misconduct. The Advocate-Genen.l of the State who was sent a noti~ of tile proceedings as required by s. 35(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961, and had appeared before the Discip-. Jinary Committee, tiled an appeal tp the Bar Council of India un~r s. 37 of the Act, under which, any 'person aggrie\·ed by an order of the Disciplinary Committe~: of the StatQ Bar Council mad~ under s. 35 of the Act, may prefer an appeal to thl: Bar Council of India. The appel~ !ant objected that the Advocate-Gene~al had no locus standi to file the appeal. The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of tbe Bar Council of India and the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct. · In appeal to this Court, on the question of the compett:u~y of the Advocate-General to file the appeal under s. 37. HELD : (Per Jiidayatullah, C.J., Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) The Advocate-General Was not 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of .s. 37 and therefore, the appeal filed by him was incompetent and hence, the finding of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India should be set aside. [887 H; 904 E) (Per Hidayatullah C.J.) (1) The expression 'person aggrieved' must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances. Under the Act, disciplinary proceediags before a State Bar Council commence on a complaint to it or suo mtJtu and are referred to its Disciplinarr. Committee. The Disciplinary Committee can reject the matter summartly; but if it proceeds to hear it further, notice thereof is sent to the 6oncemed advocate and to the Advocate.{Jeneral of the State. The Advocate-General may appear personally or by counsel. If the Disciplinary Committee after giving the A,lh-ocate and the Advocate-General an opportunity to be heard holds that the Advocate is not guilty of any misconduct it makes an order ::ither dismissing the complaint, or where the pro:eeding was started by the Bar Council makes an order that the matter may be filed. If it finds the advocate guilty it may either reprimand the advocate or suspend 864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS thi advocate from practice for a specified period or remove his name from the roll of Advocates. From the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India at the instance of 'a person aggrieved'. The appeal is heard by the DiscipHnary Committee of the Bar Council of India and from its decision an app-:al lies to this Court. ([884 E-H; 885 A-B] (a) In these proceedings before the disciplinary committee the Ad\·ocate-General is not in the nature of a party having independent rights which he can claim nor is ,be injured by the decision. The decision doe5 not deny him 1>nything nor does it ask him to do anything, He j; also not intended to be bound by the decision. He does not represent the Bar nor has he a right to speak on behalf the body of the advocates. Such a privilege is neither expressly conferred on him nor can it be implied from the provisions of the Act. [885 C-D; 886 A-B] (b) In the State Bar Councils (except in Delhi), the Advocate-General o( the State is an e.x-offl.cio member, but his functions are not different from those of other members. He has a right of pre-aud·ience, but the Admcatcs Act does not confer any other right on him. W,hen the Co ## Text _Characters 0–39,867 of 188,701. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39867 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H ADI PHEROZSHAH GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI, ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MAHARASHTRA,BOMBAY August 21, 1970 863 [M. HmAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, G. .l(. MITTER, c. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N. RAY, JJ.] A.dvocatts Act (25 of 1%1) s. 37--,:ferson aggrieved', meanmg OJAdvocate-General of State taking part in proceedings before Disciplinnry Committee of Bar Council-If 'person aggrieved' with a right of appeal. The appellant wa~ an advocate from Maharashtra. He was convicted by a Summttry Court in London on a charg~ of pilfering from a Departmental Store and was sentenced to pay a fine. The State Bar Council chlled upon him sou motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct. lie submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council was satisfied that there was no reason for holding him guilty of profession~ misconduct. The Advocate-Genen.l of the State who was sent a noti~ of tile proceedings as required by s. 35(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961, and had appeared before the Discip-. Jinary Committee, tiled an appeal tp the Bar Council of India un~r s. 37 of the Act, under which, any 'person aggrie\·ed by an order of the Disciplinary Committe~: of the StatQ Bar Council mad~ under s. 35 of the Act, may prefer an appeal to thl: Bar Council of India. The appel~ !ant objected that the Advocate-Gene~al had no locus standi to file the appeal. The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of tbe Bar Council of India and the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct. · In appeal to this Court, on the question of the compett:u~y of the Advocate-General to file the appeal under s. 37. HELD : (Per Jiidayatullah, C.J., Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) The Advocate-General Was not 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of .s. 37 and therefore, the appeal filed by him was incompetent and hence, the finding of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India should be set aside. [887 H; 904 E) (Per Hidayatullah C.J.) (1) The expression 'person aggrieved' must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances. Under the Act, disciplinary proceediags before a State Bar Council commence on a complaint to it or suo mtJtu and are referred to its Disciplinarr. Committee. The Disciplinary Committee can reject the matter summartly; but if it proceeds to hear it further, notice thereof is sent to the 6oncemed advocate and to the Advocate.{Jeneral of the State. The Advocate-General may appear personally or by counsel. If the Disciplinary Committee after giving the A,lh-ocate and the Advocate-General an opportunity to be heard holds that the Advocate is not guilty of any misconduct it makes an order ::ither dismissing the complaint, or where the pro:eeding was started by the Bar Council makes an order that the matter may be filed. If it finds the advocate guilty it may either reprimand the advocate or suspend 864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS thi advocate from practice for a specified period or remove his name from the roll of Advocates. From the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India at the instance of 'a person aggrieved'. The appeal is heard by the DiscipHnary Committee of the Bar Council of India and from its decision an app-:al lies to this Court. ([884 E-H; 885 A-B] (a) In these proceedings before the disciplinary committee the Ad\·ocate-General is not in the nature of a party having independent rights which he can claim nor is ,be injured by the decision. The decision doe5 not deny him 1>nything nor does it ask him to do anything, He j; also not intended to be bound by the decision. He does not represent the Bar nor has he a right to speak on behalf the body of the advocates. Such a privilege is neither expressly conferred on him nor can it be implied from the provisions of the Act. [885 C-D; 886 A-B] (b) In the State Bar Councils (except in Delhi), the Advocate-General o( the State is an e.x-offl.cio member, but his functions are not different from those of other members. He has a right of pre-aud·ience, but the Admcatcs Act does not confer any other right on him. W,hen the Comnittee considers in limini to decide whether the matter should be proc:;-ded with at all. the Advocate General's presence is not considered necessary. Therefore, the Advocate-General is not a prosecutor on behalf ot rhe Bar Council.· He is noticed and brought before the Committee because he is the Chief Counsel of the State and therefore his assistance ·at the hearing is useful. He is generally a lawyer of some standing hav- . ing made a mark in the profession and his contribution to the deliberatic-ns of the Disciplinary Committee is welcome, because, thus the Disciplinary Committee is helped to reach a l?roper conclusion. The fact th;;,t he can appear throug,h counsel shows that the intention is merely to ha\'e his opinion as an amicus curiae who is neither siding with the complaintant nor with the Advocate and w~o will thus have an unbiased und impartial approach to the case. He must after he has done his duty ~~~ve the matter to the complainant and the advocate or the Bar Council to take the matter further if they choose. [883 C, E-F; 885 E-H; 886 A] (c) If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order but a person who is ,beard in a &ispute between others merely to be of assistance in reaching the right conclusion he can hardly have a grievance. Am· person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not 'a perSon aggrieved'. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would ba\'e received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something or must have a tendency to inJure him. That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be ~onvicted does not by itself r,i\'e rise to a legal grievance. [876 A-C] Therefore it cannot be said that by reason of the provisions of the Advocates A~t, the Advocate-General of the State enjoys such a position that he must necessarily be treated as 'a person aggrieved' entitling him tD file an appeal. f882 H; 886 G) In re. Sidebotham Ex. Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458(C.A.). In A B c D E F G n. Lamb Exp. Board of Trade, [1894] 2 O.B.D. 805, 812, In re. Kitson, Ex;~. Sugderi·(Thomcs) & Sons, .Ltd. [19.11]2 K.B. 109, 112::.._114, Bl!'·- H re · BI'Own E.xp. Debtor v. Offi.cwl Rece1ver (1943) Ch. D. 177. Ell1s · E;p, Ellis (1876)2 Ch. D. 779, ln re. Words Exp. Dalton (1874)~ L.T. 297(C.A.). R. v. London Count,v Keepers of .Peace and Just1ce [1890] 20 Q.B.D. 357, Jennings v. Kelly, (1940] A.C. 206, (H.L.). In A B c D F H ' A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SBBll.VAI ses '- re. Reviere (1884) 2 Ch. D. 48, Robinson v, Currey {1881] 7 Q.B.D. 465, 470. (C.A.}; Seven Oaks Urban District Council v. Twynham (1929) 2 K.B. 440, 443, Ealing Corporation v. Jones L. R. [1959] 1 Q.BD. 384, B. M. Madani v. Commissioner of Workmen's Com,ensation Bombay, C.A. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968 and Municipal Corporation oj the City of Bombay v. Chandukzl Sht.maldas Patel, C.A. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred to. ( 2) It could not be said that in the present case there were several points of general public interest which needed to be solved and there· fore, if the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council was wrong, the Advocate-General, in public interellt, could take the matter further. [886 G-H] Unlike the position of an Attorney General in a Crown Colony, the Advocate-General of a State in India does not represent the Executive or the Legislature or ~he Judiciary, or the Central Government in disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee. . The magniloquent phrases such as Leader of the Bar, Keeper of the Conscience of the Bar have no meaning neither under the Advocates Act nor under the Bar Councils Act, 1926. They are just honorofic titles given by the courtesy but are not grounded on law, the keepers of the conscience of the Bar being the Bar Councils. [883 F-G; 886 C-D} In the present case. the appellant was not precluded from questioning the charge in the disciplinary proceedings beca\lle of the decision of the Criminal Court in London. His explanation was accepted by the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council. They were also satisfied that the summary proceedings in the criminal trial in EiJ.Jlano offended against the principles of natural justice, and that thercfo~, the conviction· of the appellant in· England did not show any moral turpitude in the appellant. If the Advocate General's view on these matters were not accepted by the Disciplinary Committee he • could not ha\'e any 8tcievance. He could not make it his own cause or a cause on behalf of others whom he did not represent. He had done his duty and tl\e matter should have rested there. rss7 C-F] Attornt:J·Gtneral t1j Gambia v. Pierre StuJr N'Jie, [1961] A.C. 617 (P.C.) referred to. (3) (a) The facts that in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Phlro1: Rustam/1 Barucha 37 Born. L.R. 722 (P.C.) the staudina of the AdvocateGenCl'al to apply for special leave in a proceeding relatinf to profeuional lnisconduct of an Advocate was questioned bellore the Pr'lVy Council, but that the Privy Council refused SJ?tCial leave on a different ground cannot import a rejection of the objection as to the standing of the .AdvocateGeneral. rsst E-FJ (b) The observations in B. Nc.grshV:•ara Rao v. The Hon'ble Judges uf the Madras High Court, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1055 that in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act, it was inappropriate to make the Judges respondent, and that the appropriate parti~s should be the con~erncd Advocate the complainant (if any), the Bar Council and the Advocate-G.:neral of the State, do not advance the case of the AdvocateGeneral in this case. [882 E} (Per Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) ( 1) A State Bar Council consists of a ·number oi 111embers including the Advocate-General of the State ex-afficio. Under the provisions of the Advocates Act, subject to a Jight of appeal to this Court under s. 38, inquiries into char~es of misconduct against L169CI/71-ll 866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 197 J ] 1 S.C.R. advocal~s arc to be in the exclusive jurh.diction of the Bar Councils. · If a compla_int is received against an Advocate it is reft!rred to tbe Disciplinary Cornrmttee of the Bar Council or the :aar Council c:tn take such a step suo. motu. lt is however not obligatory to refer each and every coroplamt but only when the Bar Coun~il is satisfied that there is a prima facie ca~e for investigation. If it is not so satisfied it can throw out the complaint as frivolous. And it is only when the Disciplinary Committee does not s~arily reject the complaint that a date has to be fixed for its hearing and notice thereof must be given to the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General of the State but it is not incumbent on the Advocate-General to appear in person; he can appca·r through at~othcr i!dvocate and place his view-point before the Disciplinary Commtttee. The Advocate and a complainant who makes allegations against an advoca.tc are persons aggrieved entitled to file an appeal under s. 37 if an ::>rder Js made against the advocate, N the complaint is dismissed by the Discivlinary Committee:. But the State Bar Council cannot be such a person as the order is made by itself and acting through its Disciplinary Committe':'. [889 B-C; 891 B-CJ · Generally speaking a person is said to be aggrieved by an order whkh is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to u litigation bas no right of appeal merely because the juugmcnt or order contains som<> adverse remarks against him. A person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal, with the leave of the' appellate court when the judgment would be binding on him. But because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is gh·cn a right to appear ami make his submissions, he docs not without more, have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. To .place the Advocate-General in the company of "persons aggrieved" one must be able to say that t.he Disciplinary Committee committed an error which it was his duty to attempt to set right because of some function attribut· able to him as the Advocate Gene1 al or. some obligation cast upon him by the Act or the general law of the land to safeguard and maintain standards of conduct of Advocates laW down by the Bar Council of India. [892 B-Fl (a) The Advocate-General is entitled to a hearing if. the complaint is not rejected summarily. But it is not obligatory on him to take .part i~ the proceedings. It is only w,hen he feels that a case requires a care- 'ful investigation and proper elucidation of ,the facts or .the exposition of the law on the subject that he is called upon to render a.~sistance. He hAs to take a fair and impartial attitude and r.~n neither raised nor argued.. Therefore, the observation in the case that S68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1971] 1 S.C.R. the Advocate-General of the State is an appropriate party in the appeal should not be accepted. [903 G-HJ (Per Vaidialinaam and Ray, JJ. dissenting) : The appeal tiled by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra was competent as be was 'a person aggrieved' under s. 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961. [908 B-C; 920 G-H] ·(Per Vaidialiogam, J.) : (1} 'Ibe question whether the Advocate General is a 'person aggrieved' under s. 37 of the Advocates Act will have to be tackled with refero}nce to the scheme and provisions of the Act. Under the Act, the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India have been n;.ade autonomous units and various functions regarding the legal pr~fesston have been entrusted to them including taking disciplinary action against delinquent members and conducting inquiries. Barring a right of appeal to this Court under s. 38 the ·courts are completely out of the picture. Under ss. 3(2)(a), 23(4) and 35, the Advocate.General of t.be State is given a very important and responsible position and the Act has gi\'en due recognition to his status by virtu~ of his being the hi~est law officer in the State, and as one who may be trusted to 'place ~ disinterested and dispassionate Yiew before the Disciplinary Committee to enable it to come to a proper decision with respect to the advocate con- ~erned and the legal profession. Apart from being an ex of!lc:io member of the State Bar Council, he bas also a right of pre-audience over other advocates. [909 D-G; 911 G-H; 912 B-D; 916 A] Under ss. 35 and 37, (i) the State Bar Council can suo motu or on receipt of a complaint, OW1hen it has reason to believe that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, refer the case to its IJis- .ciplinar!' Corlimittee (ii) If the Committee does not summarily reject the complaint, it is bound to fix a elate fo•· its hearing ando al~o bound to give n\ltice to the advocate and the Advocate General of the State; (iii) The Committee is bound to give an opportunity of being heard to the Ad\'o· ·cate and the Advocate-General and there is no distinction in the opportu- ·nity so afforc.led to both of them; (iv) The Advocate-General may appear 4n person or through counsel: (v) the Committee can pass one or other of the orders enumerated in s. 3S(a) to (d) and the orders have to be communicated to the Ac.lvocate.Oeneral also, and under s. 37 'any person aggrieved' i~ entitled to file an appeal to the Bar Council of Jndiu. Unlike under· the Bar Com1cits Act. the Advocate-General is associated with the disciplino.ry proceed ina~ right from the ~to.ge of the inquiry by· the Committee. The notice to the Advocate.General cannot be a formal · and empty notice, because he should be given nn opportunity of being heard. Even though there may be no 'lis' and the Advocate-General may not be a 'party' in the usual sense, he is also entitled. like the advocate against whom the inquiry is being conducted. to place before the Committee all aspects of the matter in favour of and against the advocate. He is allowed to appear bv counsel. because, he may not be able to appear personalty and participate !n all the disc.iplinary p:oceedin.gs. He n~d not be ,;ndictive or take stdes, but by vutue of h1s spectal and dispassionate role he will be able to place all releva.nt material to enable the Committee to come to a proper and correct findmg. [912 D-H; 913 A-H: •)14 A·Bl (a} The fact that the Advocate General docs not allege an infrin~e ment of any legal rights of his own is of no consequence. It may be that fo a particular case the Ad\'"Ocate General may !eel !hat the fin~ing arrived at either in favour of the advocate or agamst h1m or the pumshment imposed on the advooate. is not jus!ified bv the evidence. on record. Under such and similar circumstances the Advocate General wJil be competent. as 'a person agg~iev~d', to ·bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee so that JUShce may be done. [914-G; 915 A-CJ A B c D E F G H A 8 c D E F G H A. P, GANl>lU v. H. M. SBERVAJ 869 Sevenoaks Urhan District Council v. Twynham [1929] 2 K.B. 440. Ecding Corporation v. Jones [1959] 1 Q.B. 584, Madani v. Commissioner of Workme~r's Compensation, Bombc.y, C.A. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, I 968. Re. Siclehotham 14 Ch. D. 458, The Queen v. The Keepers oj the Peace and lltstice.1· of the County of London, 25 Q.B.D .. 357, Re. Reed, Brow" & Co. 19 Q.B. 174, Rex v. London Quarter Sessions (1951) 2 K.B. 508 and Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v, Chandulal Shamaldas Patd. C.A. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred to. (b) The fact that the Legislature provided that the Advocate-General should be associated with the disciplinary proceedings from the very beginning of the inquiry brings him undtt s. 37 as 'a person aggrieved' and hence the fact that the Ccmmittee decided in favour of the Advocate has no bearing on the question. [914 G-Hl (c) The fact that the Ad\-ocate General is not given notice before rejecting a complaint summarily does not militate against the view that be is 'a person aggrieved' because, probably, the Legislature felt that if there was a wrongful summary reje,,:tioo of a complaint, it could be ~t right by the Bar Ccuncil of India \lnder s. 48A by exercising its revlsional powers. [916 E-F] (d) In thi.'l view it is unnecessary to mention the Advocate General specifically 'a person aggrieved' in ~. 37. [918 A] (2.) The analogy of the Attorney-General in a Colony repre5enting the Crown and being the guardian of public interest as stated in .AttorneyGtneral of Gambia v. Pelrre Sarr N' lie (1961) A.C. 617 cannot be brought in for interpreting s.37 of the Advocates Act, and the observa- · tions therein must be related to the particular legal provisions which were considered. But even that decision recognised that the words 'person aggrieved' are very wide and should not be subjected to any restrictive tnteqirctation. (912 A-B: 920 A·B, EJ (3) The decisions in Advocate-General of Bom/Jay v. Pitambardas Gokuldas, 62 I.A. 235 and Advocate-General of Bombay v. Phiroz Rustomji Barucha, 37 B.L.R. 722(P.C.) do not decide the quec;tion one way or the other. [917 A-Bl (Ptr Ray, J.) : (1) The purpose and the provisions of the Advocates Act ;:!etermine whether the Advo;:ate-General is a person aggrie\·ed within the meaning of s.37 of the Advocate~; Act. Under the Act. a State Bar Council i,; empowered to con!ltitutc a Disciplinary Committee. Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council ha~ reason to hetieve that an advocate on it~ roll i!; guilty of profcs~ional mi~conduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee, l\nd if the Committee does not summarily reject it, a date of hearing shall be fixed. The provisions relating to inquirie'> into profes~ional misconduct of an advocate. establish first that the Advocate General entitled to a notice of the date of hearing, secondly. that no order can be made bv the Disciplinary Committee without givin~ him an opportunity, and thirdly that he may appear in person or th·rough an advocate and that he has a right of preaudience. He may not choose to appear but if he docs appear, his right is ba~d on statute: and he does not apnear as ·a mere friend of the court. He is heard because he is the t1ead of the Bar in the State and the proceedings affect the discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the profe:o;sional ~10 SUPR.EME COUilT REPORTS (1971] 1 S.C.R. conduct of aa adl-ocate. Under Art. 165 of the Constitution the AdV'ocatc Oeoeral has to discharge the functions conferred on him by the Constitution or any other law in force. The Advocates Act concerns .an advocate and it is in the fitness of things that the Advocate General of the State is heard ~ a person representing the profession which assists the Jitipnt public and: tbe courts in the administration of jurtice. He i~ liiUIIIy a penon of hilh standina and experience and will not adopt any pctilan attitude in the proceedings. The purpose of the inquiry is not &o .~ the gri,evance of an individual complainant-in fact ss. 35 and 36 do not contemplate any notice to the complainant-but to find out whether there is any breach of professional standards and conduct. . \ [926 C-H; 827 F-H; 928 A-C} I (a) It is not the intention of the statute that he would be merely a <1eutral observer before the Disciplinary Committee and that he would have no duty to perform. He would have to express his views, and if in. a matter \of sufficient gravity a totally inadequate punishment is impoted or if the punishment is too severe the Advocate General would be a 'per100 agrieved', to have. it corrected. The words 'person aggrieved' MD be referable to the Advocate, complainant, and the Advocate General or Attorney General as the case may be. The Advocate-General and the Attorney General will be persons aggrieved because they are in- .terested in maiotain~ng professional rectitude. [929 C-G] (b) Further if the proceedin~ were held without notice to the Advocate General or without ginng him an · opportunity of being heard he would be a· person aggrieved. . His participation in the proceedings .data not ~ter the position. If he has a right to be heard, he may have a grievance aa to the result of the hearing. [929 A-B] Re. Exparte Sidebotham -14 Cb. D. 458; Exparte Official Receiver. ln re. Reed Bowen, 19 Q. B. D. 174, Sevenoaks Urban British CounciL · v. Twynhtm ( 1929) 2 K. B. 104, Queen v. Keepers of the Ptt;ee and Justices of the County of London, 25 Q .. B. D. 351 and Madani ... Commir.Jioner of Workmen's Compensation, Bombay, C.A. 811 of 196~ decided on October 10, 1968, referred to. (2) lD dilciplinary proceedings there is no party in the usual ·sense. ·n.. Ad\"OC&te-Geoeral is not a party to a 'lis' and has no personal or peamiary or proprietary interest in the matter. That is why the Act . usa tbe words 'person aggrieved' and not 'party aggrieved'. But he is heard, not beCause he is a party, but because he represents the interest of tbe profession anct for the purpose of upholding its purity and t.be p..ervation of correct atandards and norms. Prom this point of view he will be an aagrieved peliOn wbco he find1. that the interests of the Bar. Nbich is a matter of public interest, is not properly safeguarded by the Dlaclp,Jinary Committee. In Attorney General of Gambia v. Pierre Bllllr N' Jl~. (1961) A.C. 617 the JudJcial Committee construed tbe words ~penon agrieved" as not to be su~ected to a restrictive interpretation but to include &\person who has a genuine grievance because an order hu been made which prejudicialtv affected his interest, and that the . worda~would ioclude the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest. ·1927 E-F; 928 C-D, G-H; 929 G·HJ · ·(3) The decisions of the Judicial Committee in Advocate-General of Bomhay v. Phiroz ,Bcruc'Jra, 62 I. A. 235 and of this Ccurt in B. Nagnhwara Rao v. The Hon'ble Jud!(eJ of the Madras High Court, rt955) l .s,C.R. 1055 indicate that the Advocate General under the Bar Councils .Act,· 1926 had locus standi to prefer an appeal. [925 D-E, G) A c D H F G H A c A. P. GANDHI v . . H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 871 CIVIL APPELLATE JuRlsmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 2259 of 1969. Appeal under s. 38 of the Advocate's Act, 1961 from the order dated October 26, 1969 of the Discip1inary Committee of .the Bar Council of India ia D.C. Appeal No. 18 of 1968. C. K. Daphtary, A. S. R. Chari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and S. Swarup, for the appellant. V. S. Desai and B. D. Sharma, for re~pondent No. 1. M. C. Bhandare and S. B. Wad, for r~pondent No. 2. V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for Attorney~Gene· raJ for India. A. V. Rangam, for Advocate-General for the Tamil Nadu. ·M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, for Bar Council of India. D 0. P. Rana, for Advocate-General for the State of"U.P. A. G. Pudissery, for Advocate-General for the State of Kerala. K. Baldev Mehta, for Advocate-General for the Stote of R<~_jasthan. E A. P. S. Chauhan, A. D. Mathur and N. P. Jain, for Bar Council U.P. Sukumar Ghose and G. S. Chatterjee, for the· Advocate General for the State of West Bengal. P. Patmeswara Rao, for Advocate-General for the Andhra F Prade:;h, G I. N. Shroff, for Advocate-General for the State oE Madhya Pradesh. J. C. Medhi, Advocate-General for the State of Assam and Naunit Lal, for the Advocate-General for the State of Assam. 1 .HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., and· MITTER J. on behalf of SHBLAT J. ·o.md himself delivered separate judgments. VAII>IALlNGAM and RA 'I' JJ. delivered separate dissenting opinions. \ Hidayatullah, C.J.-1 agree with the judginent delivered by my broth~r Mitter but in view of the importan~ ·of the question and the dtfference between my brethren I have chosen to express myself separately. 872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1971] 1 S.C.R. We he~rd this appeal on a preliminary point raised by th~; appellant that the appeal of the Advocate-General of Maharashtra filed before the Bar Council of India was incompetent as the Advocat~neral did not fall within the expression a 'person aggrieved' to whom alone is given the right of appeal under s. 37 of the Advocates Act of 1961, against the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State. The facts necessary to bring out the controversy may be briefly stated. The appellant is an advocate from Maharashtra. The Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra had called. upon him suo motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct. It appears that the appellant was convicted before a Summary Court in London Qn a charge of pilfering some articles from departmental stores and sentenced to a fine. The record ·of the proceedings in London was not before the Bar Council of the State and action was taken on the basis of a brief report of the incident in a newspaper. The appellant explained before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State that he was the victim of a misunderstanding but as he had no means of defending himself effectively, he was found guility lWi received a light sentence of fine. He explained how he had fallen into this unfortunate predicament and did not know llow to extricate himself. The order of the Swnmary Court was not a speaking order and the proceedings were summary. The disciplinary committee were satisfied .that there was no reason to hold him guilty of professional or other misconduct. They, therefore, ordered that the proceedings be filed. The Advocate-General of the State, who was sent a notice of the proceedings, as is required by the second sub-section of s. ·! 35, and had appeared before the committee, purportin~ to act :! . under s. 37 of the Act filed an appeal before the Bar Ciuncil of II India. It was heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India. The advocate objected that the Advocate- , 1 i General had no locus standi to file the appeal. The objection .. r· was overruled and the appeal was accepted. The advocate was held guility of misconduct .and suspended for a year from practice. The advocate now appeals under s. 38 of the Act to this . Court. His appeal raises questions of merit but he contenqs at the tbreshhold that the Advocate--General was not competent to file the appeal under s. 37 of the Act. Th point in controversy before the disciplinary committee of 'he Bar Council of India arid now before us, is a short one. It is : whether the Advocate-Genex:al can be said to be a -person aggrieved' by the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Counci1 of the State Having heard this poi·nt in detail we took time to consider. I am of the opinion that it must be held in favonr 8 c D E F G H i I A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 873 A of the advocate and the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, now under appeal before us, must be set aside on this short ground without going into the merits of the case. B c D E F G H Section 37 of the Advocates Act 1961 reads : "37. Appeal to the Bar Council of India. ( 1). AID _a;woo~ggrieyed py an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council made under section 35' may, within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India. . ( 2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which may pass such order thereon as it deems fit." The expression a 'person aggrieved' is not new, nor has it oc-· curred for the first time in the Advocates Act. En fact it occurs in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a hundred years. In the latter a right of appeal to a 'person aggrived' is conferred in diverse contexts. It occurs in the Ale House Act, the B8lllkruptcy Acts, Copyright Act, Highway Act, Licensing Acts, Milk arul Dairies (Amendment) Act. Rating and. Valuation Act, Summary Jurisdiction Act, Union Committee Act, Local Acts, in certiorari proceedings and the Defence of Realm Regulations to mention only a few. The list of Indian Acts is equally long. As a result of the frequent use of this rather vague phrase. which practice, as Lord Parker pointed out in Ealing Corporation v. JoMs(l), has not been avoided, in spite of the confusion it causes, selections from the observations ot judges expounding the phrase in the context of these varied statutes were cited before us for our acceptance. The observations often conflict ~ince they were made in different contexts and involved the special standing of tbe party claiming the right of appeal. Yet these definitions are not entirely without value for they disclose a certain unanimity on the essential features of this phrase, even in the diversity c.f the contexts. The font and origo of the discussion is the well~ known definition of the phrase by James L.J. in In Re Sidehotham Ex. j. Sidebotham(2). It was observed that the words 'person .aggrieved' in s. 71 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 meant: "1not really a person who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received, if some order had been (I) L R. {1959] I Q. B. D. 3P4. (:') mPO) 14 0. D. 4~8 C. A 874 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1971]1 S.C.lt made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man Wh(' had suffered a legal g,rievMJCe, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of so111ething or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.'' ·The important words in this definition are 'a benefit which h~ might have received' and 'a legal grievance' against the decision which 'wrong!fully deprives him of somethmg' or affects 'his title to something'. The definition was held in later r.ases to be not exhaustive and several other features of the phrase were pointed out. Thus Wlder the Bankruptcy Acts, where the Board of Trade summoned to support the validity of the appointment of a trustee, went before the judge, and failed, it was considered a 'person aggrieved' on the prindple th<;tt a person who is brought before the Coun to submit to its decision, but not a person who is heard in a dispute between othe.rs must lJe treated as a ·person aggrieved' (see br Re l.amb Ex., p. Board of Trade(!) per Lord Esher). Her~ again the words to notice are 'brought before the court to submit to its decision', that is to say, a person who is in the nature of a party as contra-distinguished from a person who is next described as 'a person who is heard ir. a dispute between other!'i.' To distinguish between these two positions I may refer to a few more decisions. In In Re Kitson, Ex. fJ. Sugden! (Thomas) & Sons Ltd. e), it was further explained that. "the mere fact that an order is wrongly made does not of itse1f give a grievance to a person not otherwise aggrieved." (per Phiilimore J.) A B c D It was added that a person deprived of the fruit~ of litigation F which he had instituted in the hope for them, is a 'person aggriev- . ed'. Similarly, a creditor who did not wish an adjudication order to be made was held not to be a 'person aggrieved'-Sce In Re Brown Ex. p, Debtor v. Official Receiver(8 ). The utmost that this series of cases goes is to be found in the observations of James L.J. in Ellis Ex. p. Ellis(') that even a rersor.. not bound G by the order of adjudication must be treated as a 'person a~grieved' if the order embarrasse.<> him. In a later case ( Tn Re Woods Ex. P. Ditton)(D) Cotton L.J. held that ev~1l so the person must be aggrieved by the very ordl'r and not b-y any of the consequences that en:rue. This was clarified in R. v. London Countv Keeper.~ of the Peace and Justices( 6 ), by Lord Coleridge C.J: while . .H (1) [1894} 2 Q. B. D. 805 at 812. (3) P94~J Ch. D. D. 177. ,(S) [1879] ~0 L. T. 297 C.A. 79. (2) [1911] 2 K. B. lOQ Rl 1!::·114. (4) [l R76l :! Ch. D. 797. (6) (l ~90] 20 Q. B. D. 357 at ~fi1. A 8 c D E F H A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SBERVAI (Hidayatullah, C./.) 875 dealing with the Highway Act, denying the right of appeal in these words : "Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a 'person aggrieved' ? He may be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach of the law is not a breach of law; but is he aggrieved because some one is held not to have done wrong ? It is difficult to see that the section meant anythi;ng of the kind. The section does not give an appeal to anybody but a person who is by the direct act of the Ma- . gistrate 'aggrieved'-that is who has had something done or determined against him by the Magistrate." These observations again show that the person must himself suffer a grievance, or must be aggrieved by the very order because it affects him. Two cases which may usefully be seen in the same context may next be mentioned. In Jennings v. Kelly( 1) in relation to the Government of Ireland Act 1920, Lord Wright did say that if a person was treated in certiorari proceedings as a competent party 3jll,d notice was served on him as being a proper party he would be a 'person aggrieved.' The point to bear in mind is that the person must be treated as a party.