# AHMEDABAD MFG. & CALICO PTG. CO. LTD v. RAM TAHEL RAMNAND & ORS - **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 185 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1972-04-14 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1044 of 1968 - **Bench:** C. A. Vaidialingam, I. D. DuA - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ahmedabad-mfg-calico-ptg-co-ltd-v-ram-tahel-ramnand-ors-5776 - **Pages:** 16 ## Headnote 185 Bombay lndu:mjal Relation. A.Ct 11 of 1947,,s. 3(13) and (14)- Malls employed ~n4~r a contractor to look after garden adjacent to a factory whether 'emplo,vetf of factory-Maintenance of garden wlutlwr work ordinarily part of undertak/n[f-Considerations of social ;ru1ke, relevancy of-Constitution of India, A.rt. 221-Jurlsdiction of High Court under A.rt. 133(1)(c)-Certificat•-High Court must give reasons. The respondents ""re malis who under a contractor looked after the maintenance of a garden adjacent to but outside the premises of the appellant company which produced textiles. In an application before the Labour Court the ~nts claimed that they were ~ployees of the company within the meaning of s. 3(13) <'f the Bombay Ip.dustria1 Relations Act 11 of 1947 and therefore entitled to dearnell.'l allowanc.r. The Labour Court rejected the claim on the ground that the respoodents worked under a contractor. On appeal the Industrial Court held that the company was under no legal obligation to maintain the ga,rdeo llDd theref work done by the appellants and to the fact that they were not directly employed by the employer but through a contractor, it has been held that they cannot be covered within the scope of section 3 ( 13) . Shri J yotikar had also argued that under the Standing Orders, the term 'operative' has bee>n dejined to include persons employed through contractor; but the Standing Orders would apply to a particular person only if he is an employee as defined under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The definition under the Standing Orders cannot; therefore, be of any help in considering whether a pe.rson is· covered within the scope of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act or not. Shri J yotikar had then urged that in view of the fact that matters concerning health, safety and welfare of the employees are included in Item 3 of Schedule. III, maintenance of gardens would be an ordinary part of the work of the undertaking. It is trne that maintenance of gardens may be a matter concei-ning health or welfare of the employees, but there is no Iega.l obligation to maintain such gardens. Had any such obligation been created under any provision of law, t!te position might have been as urged' by Shri Jyotikar; but, as the facts stand· at present, it is not mandat6ry on a management of a cotton textile undertaking to maintain any garden and hence the work of maintenance of a garden cannot be said to be a work which is a part of the ordinary work of a cotton textile mill. It is clear from the above that the appellants cannot be held to be employees as defined under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and so the Labour Court was · right in dismissing the application." (I) 11964] 3 S.C.R. 724. (2) [1963] II L.L.J. 207. 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973) 1 S.C.R. The High Court, on being approached by the aggreived ma/is under Art; 227 of the Constitution, went into the matter at considerable length and after copi&usly quoting from the decision in the case of.J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills case (supra) the High Court found it difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Industrial Court that the work of maintaining the garden was not a part of the ordinary work of a cotton textile mill. Earlier in the course of its judgment the High Court, after referring to the definitions of the term "employee" in s. 3 (13) and of the word "industry" in s. 3 (19) of the Act had observed : " .... The definition of the tenn 'industry' is thus wide enough to include a workman employed in any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of employees and it would not be correct to assume that simply because a workman happened to be engaged as a gardener, he would not fall within the,definition of the term 'ernpl:lyee' as givim in the Bombay Ir,dustrial Relations Act. A garden when attached to a mill is an amenity that, is provided to the workers employed in the mill and it is not necessary that an amenity should arise from a statutory rt\(juirement or obligation and it hardly makes any difference if the garden was provided for voluntarily or under. a statutory obligation. The activities in an undertaking sud ?.s a textile mill are not confined purely to factory work of manufacturing textile fabric within the mill premises, but various other incidental and connected institutions such as hospital, a canteen, a playground and a garden might be maintained by the mill to provide amenities to its workers and tkese activities could be considered as the activities made in relation to and in the usual · course of conducting the affairs of the mill. Not merely ,within the turning of tl1(l wheels of the machine which, .no doubt, is directly responsible for the production of the article for which the plant of the particular industry was installed and not merely in utilising the power to move the machine to action, the field· of .activities of the undertaking is restricted and exhausted, but there are .. many more varieties though allied and c6mplementary activities which are being carried on by the management and which help, though in an indirect. manneir, in creating a healthy atmosphere of well being: and cooperation amongst the workers by providing essential facilities such as means for treating of their ailinents, for general entertainment and. care not only of the workers but of the children who ;are left unattended wb.ile their parents are engaged in their work in the factory. While, thereA B c D E F G H A B c D E F AHMEDABAD MPG. CO. v. 'RAM TAllEL (Dua, /.) 19l fore, oonstruing the words 'in the course. or and 'ordinarily ~ patt of the undertaking' we must give them a. . · meaning which is natural and consistent with the working of a factory as it exists in the present times and while doing so, our approac? should no~ be theoretica! -~ academic but pragmatic and practical. The activities that are usually conducted as a part of an un~aking by which not only ·workers participate in the actual runmng of the machinery but also activities which conduce to the smooth working of the plant as a whole must be considered to . fall within the ambit of the definition. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Patel that the application of the Act must be restricted to only those workers who are directly engaged in the manufacture of textile fabric." While commenting on the or!ler of the Industtial Court where it is stated that the maintenance of gardens though a matter concerning h~th or welfare of the employees was not mandatory on the management of a cottrin textile mill undertaking and hence the work of maintenance of a garden could not 1;>e said to be part of the ordinary work of such mill, the High Court observed that "an activity undertaker. as a part of the undertaking and in the course of its conduct may be undertaken . voluntarily or as a resuh cl a staturory duty or obligation but win t is necessary is that the activity must reasonably be attributable to the undertaking "in its usual and ordinary course in the conduct of the business or undertaking, and if that be so then such an activity could be considered as the activity of a worker who would fall within the definition of employee within s. 3 (13) of the Act." · · It was, however, contended in the High Court on behalf of the present appellant that the garden in which the present respondents h.ad been working as gardeners was not situateid within G the premises of the mill and that the garden area included office ot some other concerns, a Government post office' and a museum which was open to the public and, some quarters for worlcers as well as assistance and officers of the hospital. The garden area, acco!'lling to Mr. Patel who reprented the present appell::nts in the High Court . comprised of the buildings jliSt mentioned and H the area round the eaustic plant factory as well as the field at ·Dami Limda in respect of which .an agreement had been entered into with the contractor for keeping the trees and plants in proper trim. This contention having not been considered by the 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 973 J 1 S.C.R. Industrial Court the High Court, as already observed, sent the case back to the Industrial Court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations of the High Court Jo this Court Shri Desai on behalf of the appellants contended that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution, was not empowered to reverse the findings of the Industrial Court and the Labour Court because under that Article it could not perfonn the functions of an appdlate or a revisiona! court. On the merits also he contended that having regard to s . .2 ( 3) of the Act read with the notification dated May 30, 1939, the Act only applied to cotton spinning and cottoft weaving department, mechanic: shop:,, dyeing and bk.aching and printing departments and ofiices of the appellant, and to no other activitias of the appellant company. The counsd further contended that els. ! J 3) and l4(e) of s. 3 of the Act have to be ri-ad together and whc.n so read they could not take within their fold a person employeJ by an independent contractor because such ;;. person could by no means be considered as an employee of the appellant company unless the work done by him can be described as "ordinarily part of the textile undertaking". While developing this point the le::rned counsel said that the word "ordinarily" occuning in the context "work which is ordinarily a part of tll~ undertaking" in s. 3 ( 14) ( e) conveys the idea that the work should be in the line or in the regular or normal course of the textile undertaking or any part of it. The work it was explained, should be such as, in the regular or normal course, is part and parcel of the textile undert1king and not merely having sonl.e sort of incidental connection with the same. The work of gardening, added the colllliCI, can!lot be considered to have done in "execution" · of any "work" which is "ordinarily" part of the textile undertaking. Before considering these points it would not be out of place to mention that in the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court there is no indication about the precise point or points which induced the High Court to certify the case to be fit for ;;ppeal under cl. ( c) of Art. 133 (l). This clause tllough couched in general terms is intended to apply to special cases in which the question raised is of such great public or private importance as deserves appropriately to be authoritatively settled by this Court. This clause of course does not in terms say so but it has always been so construed. The question whether or not to certify a given case to be fit for appeal under this clause is a matter for tile judicial discretion of the High Court. . The word "certify" used in this clause suggests that the High Court is expected to apply its mind before certifying the case to be fit for appeal. The l!lere grant of a certificate would, however, not preclude this Court from determining whether the conditions pre-r~quisite for the grant are .. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H AHMEDABAD MFG. co. v. RAM TAHEL (Dua, J.) 193 satisfied. It is, therefore, always desirable and expedient for the High Court to give its reasons for granting the certificate. That would assist this Court better in appreciating if the conditions pre-requisite are satisfied. In the application for certi~cat~ in the present case a number of grounds were stated for secunng it. We are . unable to find from the certificate as to which ground Was considCred by the High Court to be important enough to justify the certificate. Now, in this case the respondents in fact questioned before· us the competence of the High Court to grant the certificate of fitness but the objection raised by Shri Shukla was based only on the submission !hat Art. 133 is inapplicable because the imp .. gned order is not a final order. We may first deal with this preliminary objection. Article 227 of the Constitution no doubt does not confer on the High Court power similar to that of an ordinary court of appeal. The material part of this Article substantially reproduces the provisions of s. 107 of the Govern'Ilent of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to Tribunals as well. Section 107 according to preponderance of judicial rypinion clothed the High Courts with a power of judicial superintendence apart from and independently of the provisions of the other laws conferring on them revisional jurisdiction. The power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and·, not for correcting mere errors: see Nary11n Singh v. Amar Nath('). At this stage we consider it proper to refer· to some of the judicial pronouncements by this Court with regard to the right of appeal unde,r Art. 133 from interlocutary orders. In Tarapur & Co. v. MIS: V/O Tractors Export( 2 ) it was observed that an order of the High Court in appeal which does not dispose of the suit but merely refuses to grant an interim injunction is not a final order within the meaning of Art. 13 3 even though as a result thereof the pending suit as framed may become infructuous requiring amendment of the plant. On the 'other hand, an order dismissing a writ petition challenging industrial award which disposes of only onei of the items of a charter of demands by the workmen, leaving the rest of the items to be adjudicated by a subsequent award was held in Asbestos Cement Ltd. v. Savarkar( 3 ) to be a final order in a civil proceeding and, therefore, appealable under Art. 133. Under Art. 226 of the Constitution it may in this connection be pointed out the High Court does not hear an appeal or a revision : that court is moved to interfere after (I) [1954] S.C.R. 565. (2) [1969J 2 S.C.R. 699. (g) A.l.R. 1971 S.C. JOO. . •194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973] l S.C.R . l;iringin~ before itself ~ record of a case decided by .or pending ~ore a court, a tribunal or an authority, within its jurisdiction. A decision in the exercise of this elitraordinary jurisdiction which finally disposes of the proceedings is a final order, in an original proceeding. An appeal or a revision on the other hand is generally considered to be a continuation of the original suit or proceeding a11.d in a case, where the High Court deals with an appeal or a revision, finality for the purpose of Art. 133 must attach to the whole of the matter so that after the decision of the· High Court the matter is not a live one. (see Ramesh v. Ganda Lal(1) Th'e impugned order before us was made by the Gujarat High Court on an application under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the prayer in that application being, to remove the record of the case of the High Court "and after examining the same" (a) to quash the order and judgment of respondent no. 2 at. Annexure 'B' and (b) to direct respondent no. 2 to dispose of the appeal of the petitioner according to law." Now, in some High Courts Art. 227 i< utilised for the purpose of securing relief by way of writs or directions in the nature of writs more accurately contem· plated by Art. 226 of the Constitution: (Ramesh v. Ganda Lal( 1), and in some this Article is invoked for getting orders of tribunals revised just as s. 115, C.P.C. is utilised for revision of orders of subordinate courts : (Surinder Nath 'fl. Stiphen(2 ) (P) Ltd. As such power under Art. 227 may also be exercised suo motu. In the present case Art. 227 appears to us to have .been used in effect as a suj)s!titute for Art. 226 for seeking a direc .. tion in nature of a writ for quashing the orders of the subvrdinate tribunals. At least it appears that the proceeding before the High Court was so treated by al! concerned. We should, however, not be understood to express our approval of the use of Art. 227 for s.eeking relief by way of writs or directions in the nature of writs for which pmpose Art. 226 is expressly and in precise language designed. From that point of view if otherwise the High Court. while disposing of a petition under Art. 227, finally settles some points affecting the rights of the parties then to that extent the impunged order may be considered to operate as a final order just as an order made under Art. 226 would. As to whether the High Court has jurisdiction to make the impugned order while exercising its power under Art. 227 will depend on our conclu· sion when considering the merits of the case. A B c D F G Coming to the merits of the case we should like first to reproduce the notification dated May 30, 1939 and the definitions of the word "employee" and "employer" so far as relevant for our H purpose as contained in the Act. The notification reads : (l)A.l.R.1%5S.C. !445at 1449. (!) [1966] J S.C.R. 458. " A B c D E F G AHMEDABAD MFG. co. v. RAM TAHEL (Dua, ].) 195 "BOMBAY CASTEL, 30th May, 1939 BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1939 No. 2847 /34-A.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 3) of Section 2 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938 (Born. XXV of 1938), and in supersession of Government Notification in the Politi- ·ca]· and Service Department No. 2847 /34-2 dated the 14th March, 1939, the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the provisions of the Act which have been extended t0 the Province of Bombay under Government Notification in the Political and Services Department No. 2847/34-1, dated the 14th March, 1939, shall apply to the cotton Textile Industry as specified below :- (a) All concerns using power and employing twenty or more workers which are engaged in cotton spinning; ( b) all concerns using power and employing twenty or more workers which are engaged in cotton weaving with or without an admixture of silk, rayon, artificial silk or one or more of these; ( c) all mechanics shops attached to and (all dyeing bleaching and printing departments, whether situated within or outside the precincts of and forming integral part of) the concerns falling under clause (a) or (b). ( d) All the offices, whether situated within or outside the precincts of the concerns falling under clause (a) or (b)." ··Employee" and "ernplo.}'er" so far as relevant for our purpose are defined as : "3. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- ( 13) 'employee' means any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hirt- or reward in any industry, and includes- ( a) a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in the execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning of sub-clause (c) of clause (14); ', • ·· 1 ·employer· inclades- ( e) where the owner of any undertaking in the course of or for the purpose of conducting the undertaking 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] l S.C.R. contracts with any person for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the iindertaking, the owner of the undertaking." Shri Desai on behalf of the appellant submitted that the ·respOndents in this Court who were gardeners employed by a contractor ~annot fall within the definition of the word employee as contained m s. 14 ( e) of the Act. He further contended that the notification issued under the Act extending its applicability t!) fh!l textile under.:aking does not take within its fold the respondents who are not directly connected with. any part of the activity with which the appellant textile industry is directly concerned. In support of his contention he relied on some deci.d cases. The first decision· to which our attention was drawn is reported as Kesar Lal Narsing Bhai v. M/s. Calico Printing Ltd.( 1). This is a decision by the Labour Appt'llate Tribunal of India, Bombay and the present appellant was a respondent in that case. There, the gardeners who used to work outside the gate of the factory and had been employed through a contractor had applied under s. 78(1) (A)( c) of the Act for a declaration from the first Labour Court that the mill's failure to pay wages and Dearness Allowance in accordance with the Standardisation Award amounted to an illegal change. The Labour Court had granted their application but the Industrial Court on appeal had reversed that decision. The employees took the matt~ on further appeal to the Appellate Tri- . bunal but without success. In that case the employees had wrongly .a6'erted in their applications that they were direct employees of the mills in question and the relief ,elain1ed was based on this erroneous assertion. The Standardisation Award by which the company was bound, it is pertinent to point out, was given only in respect of those persons who had been . employed directly for the purpose of looking after the garden of the factory proper. It would thus be obvious that the employees' claim there was liable to fail on the short ground that they were not direct employees as wrongly claimed by them and that the relief under the award was confined to direct employees 011ly. But this apart. it. is further clear from the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that under the agreement with the con~ractor there the latter had. ~en employed for the purpose of lookmg after the garden not withm the fac~ry compound proper but beyond it. Indeed, the contractor's obligation to Jook after the garden extended further beyond even that area. It is in this context and background that the Appellate Tribunal observed in the concluding part of its order that. "statutory definition of an employee· in our ppinion cannot be mvoked by a gardener who has been employed thro~gh a con~ract~ _for the work as undertaken here." (emphasis supplted). This dec1s1011. (1) J955 Industrial Court Reporter 1105. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H AHMEDABAD MFG. CO. v. RAM TAHBL (Dua,/.) 197 therefore, does not assist us on the precise question raised. The n~xt decision re?ed upon by Mr. Desai is reported as Hakim Smgh v. /. C. Mills Ltd.(!). In that case the mills had employed a contractor to supply packing material. The contractor because of the nature of his work was given a room in the mills premises for preparing a particular packing material. An employee of the contractor applied to the Industrial Court for relief under the provisions of the Act. It was held that he could .not be deemed to be an employee of the mills because the work which was carried on by the employer of the petitioner was not a part of the industrial undertaking. While commenting on the scope of s. 3 ( 13) (a) ands. 14(e) of the Act which define the words "empl~ee" and "employer", it was said that for the purpose of these provisions, there must be an industrial undertaking owned by somebody' some work, which is ordinary part of the undertaking must have been entrusted by the owner to the contractor: that contractor must be emplo~ed an employee' that employee can then by the combined operation of these provisions insist upon being treated as employee of the owner himself, the obvious idea behind this scheme being that the owner of an industrial underttking should not be allowed to evade responsibilities towards his employees which are imposed by the labour laws, by entru~ting a part or whole of the undertaking to a contractor. The actual decision of this case is on different facts and is clearly not of much help though the observations regarding the purpose of the provisions of the definitions admit of no controversy. Reliance was further placed by Shri Desai on the decision of this Court in Messrs Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. D. K. Worlikar( 2 ) where a notification applicable to the manufacture of sugar and its by-products was held not to cover the head-office of the sugar mills at Bombay and the employees engaged there, when the head-office was separated from the factories by hundreds of miles. The notification was held .not to cover sugar industry as such. Shri Desai also sought support from Begibhai M. Chohhi v. Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd.(3 ) (a decision of the Industrial Court, Bombay) which dealt with running of a retail shop; New India Tannis v. Aurora Singh Moibi(') a case of doing repairs to the machinery of the factory and from S. M. Ghose v. National _Street & Metal Works Ltd.(') a case of an employee of a contractor engaged to paint ihe premises. Both the Calcutta decisions are under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (I) [1969] M.P.L.J.,714. (9) (1958) JI L.L.J. 126. (5) A.LR. 1950 Cal. 548. (2) [1960] 9 S.C.R. 950. (4) A.LR. 1947 Cal. 619. 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] l S.C.R. The respondents' learned counsel, apart from urging that the High Court has sent the case back for deciding the nature of work done by the malis in this case and that, therefore, the appellant <:an!l\>t appropriately ask this Court to determine these questions which are awaiting decision by the Industrial Court, also relied on Basti Sugar Mills ,Ltd. v. Ramjagar( 1) and on J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills (supra). In the former case the respondents there employed by a contractor to remove press and from the sugar factory were held to be workmen employed by the factory because removing press mud was considered ordinarily to be a part of the sugar industry. The latter case is an authority for the proposition that an employee engaged in any work or operation which is incidentally connected with the main industry is a workman if other requirements of s. 2 ( s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 194 7 are satisfied and that the ma/is in that case were workers within the meaning of s. 2 of U.P. Inc!ustriiil Disputes Act, 28 of 1'947. The bungalows and gardens on which the m.xlis in that case worked were a kind of amenity supplied by the mills to its officers and on this reasoning the Malis were held to be engaged in operations incidentally connectd with the main industry carried on by the employer. It was by relying on the ratio of this decision that the High Court in the present case came to the conclusion that the workers in order to come within the definition of "employee" need not necessarily be directly connected with the manufacture of textile fabrics. This decision is binding on us and indeed Shri Desai also fairly accepted its ratio. He only contended that the ma/is employed by a contractor unless directly connected with the textile operations cannot get the benefit of ,this deci.sion. In our view on the conclusions of the High Court which have not been shown to be erroneous justifying interference it is not possible to reverse its decision on the basis of the abstract submission advanced by Shri Desai. As observed in J. K. Cotton Spg, & Wvg; Mills case (supra) the problem has to be looked at from the considerations of social justice which has. become an integral part of our. industrial law. This copcept of social justice has a comprenensive sweep and it is neither pedantic ncr one-sided but is founded on socio-economic equality. It demands a realistic and pragmatic approach for resolving the controversy between capital and labour by weighing it on an even scale with the consciousness that industrial operations in modem times have become complex and complicated and for the efficient and successful functioning of an industry various amenities for those working in it are· deemed as essential for a peaceful and healthy atmosphere. ')'he- High Court has left open for the decision by the Industrial Court the question as to the nature of the work done by the (1) [1964]2 S.CR 838. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H AHMEDABAD MFG. co. v. RAM TAHEL (Dua, J.) 199 respondents for determining whether or not; in view of the fact that they are employed through a contractor and not directly, their case falls within s. 3 ( 13); This is what the High Court has said: "It was urged by Mr. Patel that the garden in wliich the petitioners were working as· gardeners was not situated within the premises of the mill and that the garden area fucluded a large area of offices of some other concerns, a Government Post Office and Museum which were open to public and some quarters for workers· as well as assistants and officers of a hospital. It was also urged by Mr.