# AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. & ORS. ETC - **Citation:** [2016] 11 S.C.R. 172 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2016-12-16 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 5360-5363of2013 - **Bench:** RANJAN GOGOi, Prafulla C. Pant - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ahmedabad-municipal-corporation-v-gtl-infrastructure-ltd-ors-etc-31320 - **Pages:** 21 ## Headnote Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - ss. 145A, 127(1), 2(5), (30), (34AA) - Levy of property tax on mobile towers - Held: Mobile towers comes within the fold of 'land and building' appearing in Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule - Power of taxation on mobile tower is vested in the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule - Tax would be payable by the occupier and not the owner of the land and building - Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011 - s. 145A - Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 - Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 - Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Constitution of India - Entry 49, List II. Seventh Schedule. Disposing of all the appeals, writ petitions and the transferred cases, the Court HELD: 1.1 The meaning of any Legislative Entry e.g. "Taxes on lands and buildings" (Entry 49 of List II) should not be understood by reference to the definition of the very same expressions appearing in a statute traceable to the particular Legislative Entry. In the instant case, though the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 defines the expressions "land" and "building", it would be self defeating to understand the meaning and scope of Entry 49 of List II by reference to the definition clauses in the Gujarat Act. Definitions contained in the statute may at times be broad and expansive; beyond the natural meaning of the words or may even contain deeming provisions. Though the wide meaning that may be ascribed to a particular expression by the definition in a statute will have to be given effect to, if the statute is otherwise found to be valid, it will, indeed, be a contradiction in terms to test the validity of the statute on the touchstone of it being within the 172 AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL 173 INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. Legislative Entry, by a reference to the definition contained in A the statute.(Para 14] (181-C-E] 1.2 The second aspect, is one concerning the permissible operation of two different statutes relatable to two different Entries in List I or II or even in List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This has been acknowledged by the High Court, in the impugned Order, by accepting that even if a mobile tower is a part of the apparatus pertaining to "telegraphs" covered by Entry 31 of List I, yet, the Gujarat Act could still co-exist as a statute levying a tax on lands and buildings so long and if only mobile towers can come within the scope and ambit of the said expressions "land and building" in Entry 49 of List II. The endeavour, therefore, must be to trace out the true meaning of the expressions "land and building" appearing against Entry 49 of List II by a correct application of the parameters and principles governing the interpretation ofa Constitutional provision specially an Entry in any of the legislative fields under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (Para 15](181-F-H; 182-A] 1.3 The fields of taxation on which the Union Parliament and State legislatures are competent to enact legislations to meet the constitutional mandate under Article 265 of the Constitution are clearly indicated in the respective Lists. While there can be no encroachment either way, it is possible that in a given situation though there may be some similarity between the taxes levied by a Central and a State enactment, both can co-exist having regard to the subject of the levy. A tax on income derived from land and a tax on the land itself wherein the income or earning therefr.>m forms the basis of the rates of the levy of tax. Even if it is assumed that the cellular operators are right in contending that mobile towers are covered by the field "telegraphs" (Entry 31 of List I), it cannot be said that if mobile towers can come within the fold of Entry 49 of List II, such a legislation would be legislatively incompetent. [Para 20) [184-F-H] 1.4 A cardinal principle of interpretation of a Legislative Entry in any of the Lists ## Text _Characters 0–39,844 of 47,723. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39844 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H [2016] 11 S.C.R. 172 AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. & ORS. ETC. (Civil Appeal Nos. 5360-5363of2013) DECEMBER 16, 2016 [RANJAN GOGOi AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.) Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - ss. 145A, 127(1), 2(5), (30), (34AA) - Levy of property tax on mobile towers - Held: Mobile towers comes within the fold of 'land and building' appearing in Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule - Power of taxation on mobile tower is vested in the State Legislature under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule - Tax would be payable by the occupier and not the owner of the land and building - Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011 - s. 145A - Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 - Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 - Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Constitution of India - Entry 49, List II. Seventh Schedule. Disposing of all the appeals, writ petitions and the transferred cases, the Court HELD: 1.1 The meaning of any Legislative Entry e.g. "Taxes on lands and buildings" (Entry 49 of List II) should not be understood by reference to the definition of the very same expressions appearing in a statute traceable to the particular Legislative Entry. In the instant case, though the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 defines the expressions "land" and "building", it would be self defeating to understand the meaning and scope of Entry 49 of List II by reference to the definition clauses in the Gujarat Act. Definitions contained in the statute may at times be broad and expansive; beyond the natural meaning of the words or may even contain deeming provisions. Though the wide meaning that may be ascribed to a particular expression by the definition in a statute will have to be given effect to, if the statute is otherwise found to be valid, it will, indeed, be a contradiction in terms to test the validity of the statute on the touchstone of it being within the 172 AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL 173 INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. Legislative Entry, by a reference to the definition contained in A the statute.(Para 14] (181-C-E] 1.2 The second aspect, is one concerning the permissible operation of two different statutes relatable to two different Entries in List I or II or even in List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This has been acknowledged by the High Court, in the impugned Order, by accepting that even if a mobile tower is a part of the apparatus pertaining to "telegraphs" covered by Entry 31 of List I, yet, the Gujarat Act could still co-exist as a statute levying a tax on lands and buildings so long and if only mobile towers can come within the scope and ambit of the said expressions "land and building" in Entry 49 of List II. The endeavour, therefore, must be to trace out the true meaning of the expressions "land and building" appearing against Entry 49 of List II by a correct application of the parameters and principles governing the interpretation ofa Constitutional provision specially an Entry in any of the legislative fields under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (Para 15](181-F-H; 182-A] 1.3 The fields of taxation on which the Union Parliament and State legislatures are competent to enact legislations to meet the constitutional mandate under Article 265 of the Constitution are clearly indicated in the respective Lists. While there can be no encroachment either way, it is possible that in a given situation though there may be some similarity between the taxes levied by a Central and a State enactment, both can co-exist having regard to the subject of the levy. A tax on income derived from land and a tax on the land itself wherein the income or earning therefr.>m forms the basis of the rates of the levy of tax. Even if it is assumed that the cellular operators are right in contending that mobile towers are covered by the field "telegraphs" (Entry 31 of List I), it cannot be said that if mobile towers can come within the fold of Entry 49 of List II, such a legislation would be legislatively incompetent. [Para 20) [184-F-H] 1.4 A cardinal principle of interpretation of a Legislative Entry in any of the Lists of the Seventh Schedule is to treat the words and expressions therein as inclusive in meaning and give the same all possible flexibility instead of restricting such meaning to the perceptions contemporaneous with the times when the B c D E F G .H 174 A B c SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 11 S.C.R. Constitution was framed. The Constitution, an organic document, has to be allowed a natural growth by such a process of interpretation. Interpretation of a Legislative Entry has to grow and keep up with the pace of times. [Para 24] [188-B-C] 1.5 To test the vires of the provisions of the statute in question the scope and expanse of the words 'land' and 'building' has to be understood in the context of the provisions of the Legislative Entry (Entry 49 List JI) and not the Statute relatable to the Entry. However, what would be of significance is to take into account the principles of interpretation which were followed by this Court in coming to its conclusions with regard to the true meaning and scope of the expressions 'land' and 'building' contained in the statute. The principles of interpretation of the ordinary statute are not foreign to the principles of interpretation of the constitutional provisions. [Para 27) [189-G; 190-A-B] 1.6 The discussions on the financial relations between the D Union and the States would suggest a constitutional scheme wherein the federating States of the Indian Union are not destined to remain financially weak despite a situation where the Union undoubtedly has the upper hand by an allocation of the more lucrative subjects of taxation under the Seventh Schedule. E Constitutionality of the Gujarat Act must be answered in favour of the State. [Para 27)(191-A-B] 1.7 The expression "building" appearing in Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule in view of the settled principles that would be applicable to find out the true and correct meaning of F the said expression it will be difficult to confine the meaning of the expression "building" to a residential building as commonly understood or a structure raised for the purpose of habitation. [Para 28) [191-C] 1.8 The regulatory power of the Corporations, G Municipalities and Panchyats in the matter of installation, location and operation of 'Mobile Towers' even before the specific incorporation of Mobile Towers in the Gujarat Act by the 2011 Amendment and such control under the Bombay Act at all points of time would also be a valuable input to accord a reasonable extension of such power and control by understanding the power H of taxation on 'Mobile Towers' to be vested in the State AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. Legislature under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. (Para 29] (191-F) 1.9 The measure of the levy, though may not be determinative of the nature of the tax, cannot also be altogether ignored. Under both the Acts read with the relevant Rules, tax 011 Mobile Towers is levied on the yield from the land and building calculated in terms of the rateable value of the land and building. Also the incidence of the tax is not 011 the use of the plant and machinery in the Mobile Tower; rather it is on the use of the land or building, as may be, for purpose of the mobile tower. That the tax is imposed on the "person engaged in providing telecommunication services through such mobile towers" (Section 145A of the Gujarat Act) merely indicates that it is the occupier and not the owner of the land and building who is liable to pay the tax. Such a liability to pay the tax by the occupier instead of the owner is an accepted facet of the tax payable on land and building under Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule. (Para 30) (191-G-H; 192-A-B) 1.10 If the definition of "land" and "building" contained in the Gujarat Act is to be understood, there is no reason as to why, though in common parlance and in everyday life, a mobile tower is certainly not a building, it would also cease to be a building for the purposes of Entry 49 List II so as to deny the State Legislature the power to levy a tax thereon. Such a law can trace its source to the provisions Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [Para 31] [192-C-D] 1.t: The judgment passed by the Gujarat High Court is set aside and the appeals arising from the order of the Bombay High Court; transferred cases and the writ petitions are answered accordingly. (Para 33) (192-F] Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State qf Uttar Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 109 : 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 623 ; Good Year India Ltd vs. State qf Haryana & Anr. A~ 1990 SC 781 : 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 510; State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) 10 SCC 201 : 2004 (1) SCR 564; Trutuf Safety Glass Industries vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (2007) 7 SCC 242 : 2007 (8) SCR 860; India Cement vs. State of Tamil Nadu 175 A B c D E F G H 176 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 I I S.C.R. (1990) 1 sec 12 : 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692; Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC 1563 : 1963 SCR 220; Elel Hotels & !11vest111e11ts Ltd. & Ors. vs. u.0.1. (1989) 3 sec 698 : 1989 (2) SCR 880; In re. The Bill to a111e11d Section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 : 1964 (3) SCR 787; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat and Others (1975) 2 SCC 175 : 1975 (3) SCR 220; Goodricke Group Ltd. and Others vs. State of W.B. and Others (1995) 1 Supp SCC 707 : 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 120; Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee vs. Lpcal l}oard of Barpeta AIR 1965 SC 1561 : 1965 SCR 47; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1991 SC 686 : 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 365; Govern111e11t of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. AIR 1975 SC 2031 : (1975) 2 sec 274 : 1975 Suppl. SCR 394 - referred to. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Fifth Edn.; Black's Law Dictionary Seventh Edn;; P. Ra111anatha A~yar 's Law Lexicon Second Edn.; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Fifth Edn; Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edn.; P. Ramanatha Aiyar 's Law Lexicon Second Edn.; Collins Dictionary ef the Eng_lislJ.. Lan!{Ual{e First Edn. 1979 - referred to. Case Law Reference 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 623 referred to Para 16 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 510 referred to Para 16 2004 (1) SCR 564 referred to Para 16 2007 (8) SCR 860 referred to Para 16 1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 692 referred to Para 16 · 1963 SCR 220 referred to Para 16 1989 (2) SCR 880 referred to Para 16 1964 (3) SCR 787 referred to Para 17 1975 (3) SCR 220 referred to Para25 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 120 referred to Para26 AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL 177 INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. 1965 SCR 47 referred to Para 26 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 365 referred to Para 27 1975 Suppl. SCR 394 referred to Para 28 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 53605363 of2013. From the Judgment and Order dated 24-25.04.2013 of the High Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 4084/ 2012, 3411/2012, 15596/2012 and 3787/2013 WITH A B C. A. Nos. 5364, 5365, 6385-6387, 673 7-6738, 6739, 6836-6926, C 7865-7894, 8114, 8115, 8116 and 8117of2013, C. A. No. 2854-2855 of2014, C. A. No. 5348 of2015, C.A.Nos.12209, 12211, 12212, 12213, 12214-12215, 12216, 12217, 12218, 12219, 12220,12221,12222,12223,12224, 12225, 12226, 12227, 12228, 12229, 12230, 12231, 12232, 12233, 12234, 12235 and 12236of 2016, W. P. (C) Nos. 216, 611 and 577 of2015, T. C. (C) Nos. 128, 130, 129 and 131 of2015. Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, Prag P. Tripathi, Prashant G. Desai, K. V. Vishwanathan, K. Kumar, Mihir Joshi, Gopal Jain, Gourab Banerji, Sr. Advs., Preetesh Kapoor, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Aagam Kaur, Ms. Puja Singh, Mohit Paul, Dhaval Nanavati, Ms. Diksha Jhingan, D. N. Ray, Lokesh K. Choudhary, Mrs. Sumita Ray, K. N. Rai, Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Ms. Gauri Subramanium, Sayan Ray, lshan Das, Puneet Taneja, Aman Gandhi, Ms. Bindi Girish Dave, Ms. Prinaz Vakil, Vivek A. Vashi, Anush Raajan, Sandeep Deshmukh, Nar Hari Singh, Venkita Subramoniam T. R., Pavan Kumar, R. N. Pareek, Ajit Kulshreshtha, Santosh Sachin, Ms. Manali Singhal, Abhijat P. Medh, Deepak Singh Rawat, Rohit Kaul, Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Shally Bhasin, Lakshmeesh . Karnath, Rishab Gupta, Raghav Pandey, Abhishek Kaushik, E. C. Agrawala, Dhananjay Bhaskar, Ravi Raghnath, Shamik Bhat, Purvish Jitendra Malkan, Ms. Dharita Malkan, Jitendr Malkan, Ms. Arunima Singh, Sameer Parekh, Ms. Rukhmini S. Bobde, Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh, Ms. Sanjana Ramachandran, Stephenie Sonawane (for M/s. D E F G H 178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 11 S.C.R. A Parekh & Co.), Sahil Tagotra (For Mis. Parekh & Co.), Vinay Navare, K. B. Gwen, V. N. Raghupathy, D. M. Nargolkar, Ms. Abha R. Shmma, Ms. Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Ms. Promita Majumdar, Ms. Jaya Khanna, Mis. J. S. Wad & Co., Suhas Kadam (For Mis. Lemax Lawyers & Co.), Vijay Kumar, Ms. Apama Jha, Arvind S. Avhad, Nishant B Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Arpit Rai, Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, S. S. Rawat, D. S. Mahra, C. George Thomas, Ejaz Maqbool, Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Ms. Shreya Bhatnagar, Raghunatha Sethupathy, Nimimesh Dubey, Nikhil Guliani,Advs. with them for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c RANJAN GOGOi, J. I. Delay condoned. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions. 2. This group of cases may be conveniently arranged in four different categories. The first are the appeals arising from the judgment and order dated 24125.04.2013 passed by the Gujarat High Court declaring D Section l 45A of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Gujarat Act") as ultra vires the Constitution and on that basis interdicting the levy of property tax on "mobile towers". The High Court, by the impugned judgment, however, took the view that the Cabin in a mobile tower in which BTS system, details of which are noticed below, is located, would be a building and, E therefore, exigible to tax under the Gujarat Act. The State Government and th~ different Municipal Corporations have cha] lenged the first part of theiorder of the High Court whereas the Cellular operators have challenged the later part. 3. The Bombay High Court which was in seisin of a somewhat F similar challenge, by the order under challenge, has taken the view that the writ petitions challenging the levy of property tax on mobile towers should not be entertained and the aggrieved writ petitioners therein (cellular operators) should be left with the option of exhausting the alternate remedies provided by the Act. This would be the third category of cases. G In this regard, it must be noticed that in the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, the charging section does not specifically contemplate levy of taxes on mobile towers as in the Gujarat Act. The impugned levy, nevertheless, was imposed on the reasoning that mobile towers are buildings as defined in the Act. At this stage, it must also be noticed that the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 H AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL 179 INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.] was applicable to the State of Gujarat also until the year 2011 when by A the Gujarat Short Titles (Amendment) Act, 2011 the word 'Gujarat' has been inserted in place of the word 'Bombay'. 4. The fourth and fifth categories of cases would be the writ petitions raising identical issues which have been transferred from the Bombay High Court to this Court and the writ petitions filed before this B Court by the cellularoperators under Article 32 of the Constitution raising a similar challenge as in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. 5. As the elaborate arguments advanced in the course of the prolonged hearing have centered around the provisions of the Gujarat Act, it may be convenient to take up the Gujarat cases in the first instance. C The answer to the issues arising therein would, in any way, effectively decide the issues arising in the Bombay cases also as well as in the transferred cases and the writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. 6. The relevant provisions of the Gujarat Act defining the D expressions "building'', "land" and "mobile tower" are as follows: "Section 2(5) "building" includes a house, out-house, stable, shed, hut and other enclosure or structure whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatever whether used as a human dwelling or otherwise, and also includes E verandahs, fixed platforms, plinths, doorsteps, walls including compound walls and fencing and the like. xxx xxx xxx xxx xx.x Section 2(30) "land" includes land which is being built upon or is built upon or covered with water, benefits to arise out of land, F things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and rights created by legislative enactment over any street. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Section 2(34AA) "Mobile tower" means a temporary or permanent structure, equipment or instrument erected or installed on land or upon any part of the building or premises for providing telecommunication services." 7. Section 127(1) of the Gujarat Act, the charging section, is in G H 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 11 S.C.R. A the following tenns: B "127. Taxes to be imposed under this Act.- (1) For the purposes of this Act, the Corporation shall impose the following taxes, namely:- ( a) Property taxes either under section 129 or under section 141AA. (b) a tax on vehicles, boats and animals. (c) a tax on mobile towers: Providedthatxxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx C 8. Section 129 of the Gujarat Act deals with different components D E F G H of the property tax which can be levied under the Act. Briefly put the said components are water tax; conservancy and sewerage tax; general tax of not less than 12% but not exceeding 30% of the rateable value etc. 9. Section 141AA deals with the rate at which water tax, conservancy tax and sewerage tax are to be imposed. Section 141B of the Gujarat Act provides for the rate at which the general tax is leviable. I 0. Section I 45A (inserted by the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 20 I I) provides for tax on mobile towers at rates not exceeding those prescribed by order in writing by the State Governme11t. Such tax which is levied on mobile towers is to be collected from persons engaged in providing telecommunication services through service towers. Section I 45A is in the following terms. "145A Tax on mobile towers.- ( I) A tax at the rates not exceeding those prescribed by order in writing by the State Government in this behalf from time to time shall be levied on mobile towers from the person engaged in providing telecommunication services through such mobile towers. (2) The Corporation shall from year to year, in accordance with Section 99, determine the rates at which the tax shall be levied." 11. By the aforesaid Gujarat Local Authorities .Laws (Amendment) Act, 20 I I similar provisions for levy of tax on mobile towers have been inserted in the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and also the Gujarat Panchayats Act, I 993. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. GTL INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.) 12. The short contention of the cellular operators advanced before the High Court is that Section 127(1)(c) read with Section 145A of the Gujarat Act are legislatively incompetent as mobile towers are beyond the scope of Ent!)' 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which is in the following terms. "49. Taxes on lands and buildings." 13. The High Court thought it proper to accept the said contention and on that basis to hold that levy of tax on mobile towers under the Gujarat Act is ultra vires the Constitution except insofar as the Cabin that houses the BTS system is concerned. 14. Two significant aspects connected to the issues arising may be taken note of at the outset. The meaning of any Legislative Ent!)' e.g. "Taxes on lands and buildings" (Ent!)' 49 of List II) should not be understood by reference to the definition of the vety same expressions appearing in a statute traceable to the particular Legislative Ent!)'. In the present case, though the Gujarat Act defines the expressions "land" and "building", as rightly held by the High Court, it would be self defeating to understand the meaning and scope of Ent!)' 49 of List JI by reference to the definition clauses in the Gujarat Act. Definitions contained in the statute may at times be broad and expansive; beyond the natural meaning of the words or may even contain deeming provisions. Thoqgh the wide meaning that may be ascribed to a particular expression by the definition in a statute will have to be given effect to, if the statute is otherwise found to be valid, it will, indeed, be a contradiction in terms to test the validity of the statute on the touchstone ofit being within the Legislative En tty, by a reference to the definition contained in the statute. 15. The second aspect, mentioned above, is one concerning the permissible operation of two different statutes relatable to two different Entries in List I or II or even in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This has been acknowledged by the High Court, in the impugned Order, by accepting that even ifa mobile tower is a part of the apparatus pertaining to "telegraphs" covered by Ent!)' 31 of List I, yet, the Gujarat Act could still co-exist as a statute levying a tax on lands and buildings so long and if only mobile towers can come within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid expressions "land and building" in Ent!)' 49 of List II. The endeavour, therefore, must be to trace out the true meaning of the expressions "land and building" appearing against Entty49 of List II by a correct application of the parameters and principles governing 181 A B c D E F G H 182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 11 S.C.R. A the interpretation ofa Constitutional provision specially an Entry in any of the legislative fields under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 16. Certain accepted and settled principles of Constitutional interpretation may now be taken note of. It will not be necessary to enter into any detailed deliberations and debate in this regard in view of B the undisturbed precedents on which such principles have come to rest. Broadly and illustratively some of the principles which have been culled out from the decisions of this Court are enumerated hereinbelow. (i) In interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the Legislative Entry, a broad, liberal and expansive c interpretation is to be preferred as the meaning of an Entry is always inclusive. [Syntltetics tmd Cltenricflls Ltcl vs. State of Uttar Pradeslt 1] (ii) Principles of interpretation of a statute are not foreign and altogether irrelevant for the purposes of interpreting a D constitutional provision and/or a specific Legislative Entry. [Good Year India Ltd. vs. State ofHaryana & Anr.2] (iii) A Constitution is an organic document that must grow and live with the times. [Sl