# AJANTHA TRANSPORTS (P) LTD. COIMBATORE ETC v. M/S T. V. K. TRANSPORTS, PULAMPATTI, COIMBATORE, DISTT. ETC - **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 166 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1974-09-24 - **Case number:** CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1402 OF 1974 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ajantha-transports-p-ltd-coimbatore-etc-v-m-s-t-v-k-transports-pulampatti-6284 - **Pages:** 18 ## Headnote 166 AJANTHA TRANSPORTS (P) LTD. COIMBATORE ETC. v. M/S .. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS, PULAMPATTI, COIMBATORE, DISTT. ETC. September 24, 1974 IH. R, KHANNA, M. H. BEG.AND v. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.] Motor Vehicles Act 1939!-.S. 47-Scope df. Decisions of this Court hav1~ made it clear that an exercise of the permit issuing power, under s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, must rest on facts and · circumstances relevant for . decision on the question of public interest which has. to be always placed in the forefront in considering applications for grant of permits. Consideration of matters which are not relevant to ·or are foreign to the scope of powers conferred by s. 47 will vitiate the grant of the permit. A fact which, in certain circumstances, is relevant for a ·decision on what, the public interest demands may become irrelevant where in other circum· stances; it is not connected with such public interest. Every class of consideration specified in s. 47 (I) of the Act is correlated to the interests of public gene· rally. Section. 47(1 )(a) gives the dominant purpose and sub-els. (b) to (f) are only its sub-categories or illustrations. If any matter taken into considera· lion is not shown to be correlated to the dominant purpo_sc or, the relationship ot the effect of a particular fact, which has operated in favour of grant is such; as to show that it is opposed, on the fa~ of it, to public interest, the grant will be bad. The power to grant permits under s. 47 of the Act is limited to the purpose for which it is meant to be exercised. Considerations which are relevant for applying Articles 14 and 19( 1 )(g) of the Constitution could not be foreign to the SCOPe of s. 47(1 )(a). [178 D-GJ All powers conferred by the Act including those given by s. 47 must be deemed to be> confined to the limits· imposed by constitutional guarantees to citizen~. Hence, the manner in which a grant would affect guaranteed funda• menta I rights Of citi~ns could also be considered. Even where powers to be exercised by authorities which are orpns of the State, are not clearly •fined, the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the . Constitution would certainly limit the scope •nd regulate tho exercise of much powers. [177 C-D] Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. M4ngrulp/r Jt. Motor Service (P) Ltd. &: Ors. [1971] Supp. t: S.C.Jl. S6i @ 570; Patlala Bui (Slrhlnd) Pvt. L1d. v. Stat,~ Transport Appellate Tribunal Pun/ab & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1174 @ 1177 folloWl:d. Pal Singh v. State Transport Aut/1orlty Trib1ma/ rJ.P. and Ors. A.I.R. 1957 B c D F G All p. 254 (ii! 256 referred to. H The obser\iations of Andhra Pradesh High Court in M /s. N: S. Ghouse Mia/1 & Abdullaha. Shariff v. Regional Transport A11thorit)', Cuddapah AIR 1963 A.P. B c 0 E G H AJANTHA TRANSPORTS V. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS 167 263 @. 266 to the effect that even matters not specified in the section .can be ta~en mto account must therefore, be understood to 111ean that powers contamed m. s. 47 of the Act as well as the rule-making powers of the State must be ex~rc1sed conformably with the Constitutional guarantees given to citizens by articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, and, if this is all that is meant by the observation, the view is unobjectionable. [177B; CJ (.1) Therefore, the relevance of the previous possession or grant of a permit appears only when other facts and circumstances, connectinl! it with, and showing either the adverse or beneficial effects of its impact, m a particular case, on the interests o.f the public are shown to exist. Unless and until these other facts . and circumstances, indicating the nexus or connection with the public interest, appear, such a fact, by itself, should not affect an application for a permit : and [180 C-D] (2) the weight to be attached to such a consideration will e>byiously depend upon the totality cif all such facts and circumstances viewed in a proper perspective. [I SOD] · In C.A. 1402 of 1974 the Regional T ## Text _Characters 0–39,965 of 53,650. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39965 for what follows._ 166 AJANTHA TRANSPORTS (P) LTD. COIMBATORE ETC. v. M/S .. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS, PULAMPATTI, COIMBATORE, DISTT. ETC. September 24, 1974 IH. R, KHANNA, M. H. BEG.AND v. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.] Motor Vehicles Act 1939!-.S. 47-Scope df. Decisions of this Court hav1~ made it clear that an exercise of the permit issuing power, under s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, must rest on facts and · circumstances relevant for . decision on the question of public interest which has. to be always placed in the forefront in considering applications for grant of permits. Consideration of matters which are not relevant to ·or are foreign to the scope of powers conferred by s. 47 will vitiate the grant of the permit. A fact which, in certain circumstances, is relevant for a ·decision on what, the public interest demands may become irrelevant where in other circum· stances; it is not connected with such public interest. Every class of consideration specified in s. 47 (I) of the Act is correlated to the interests of public gene· rally. Section. 47(1 )(a) gives the dominant purpose and sub-els. (b) to (f) are only its sub-categories or illustrations. If any matter taken into considera· lion is not shown to be correlated to the dominant purpo_sc or, the relationship ot the effect of a particular fact, which has operated in favour of grant is such; as to show that it is opposed, on the fa~ of it, to public interest, the grant will be bad. The power to grant permits under s. 47 of the Act is limited to the purpose for which it is meant to be exercised. Considerations which are relevant for applying Articles 14 and 19( 1 )(g) of the Constitution could not be foreign to the SCOPe of s. 47(1 )(a). [178 D-GJ All powers conferred by the Act including those given by s. 47 must be deemed to be> confined to the limits· imposed by constitutional guarantees to citizen~. Hence, the manner in which a grant would affect guaranteed funda• menta I rights Of citi~ns could also be considered. Even where powers to be exercised by authorities which are orpns of the State, are not clearly •fined, the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the . Constitution would certainly limit the scope •nd regulate tho exercise of much powers. [177 C-D] Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. M4ngrulp/r Jt. Motor Service (P) Ltd. &: Ors. [1971] Supp. t: S.C.Jl. S6i @ 570; Patlala Bui (Slrhlnd) Pvt. L1d. v. Stat,~ Transport Appellate Tribunal Pun/ab & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 1174 @ 1177 folloWl:d. Pal Singh v. State Transport Aut/1orlty Trib1ma/ rJ.P. and Ors. A.I.R. 1957 B c D F G All p. 254 (ii! 256 referred to. H The obser\iations of Andhra Pradesh High Court in M /s. N: S. Ghouse Mia/1 & Abdullaha. Shariff v. Regional Transport A11thorit)', Cuddapah AIR 1963 A.P. B c 0 E G H AJANTHA TRANSPORTS V. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS 167 263 @. 266 to the effect that even matters not specified in the section .can be ta~en mto account must therefore, be understood to 111ean that powers contamed m. s. 47 of the Act as well as the rule-making powers of the State must be ex~rc1sed conformably with the Constitutional guarantees given to citizens by articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, and, if this is all that is meant by the observation, the view is unobjectionable. [177B; CJ (.1) Therefore, the relevance of the previous possession or grant of a permit appears only when other facts and circumstances, connectinl! it with, and showing either the adverse or beneficial effects of its impact, m a particular case, on the interests o.f the public are shown to exist. Unless and until these other facts . and circumstances, indicating the nexus or connection with the public interest, appear, such a fact, by itself, should not affect an application for a permit : and [180 C-D] (2) the weight to be attached to such a consideration will e>byiously depend upon the totality cif all such facts and circumstances viewed in a proper perspective. [I SOD] · In C.A. 1402 of 1974 the Regional Tran ;port Authority granted a stage carriage permit to ihe appellant. On appeal the State Appellate Tribunal set aside the claim of the respondent on the ground imer alia that the appellant was a recent grantee and that it had three permits whereas the respondent had only a single permit. The High Court rejected the revision petition of the appellant under s. 115 C.P.C. Aliowing the appeal, HELD : (I) Ordinance 4 and 6 of 1971. having been repealed by Motor Vehicles Tamil Nadu (Amen.dment) Acts, 10 and 16 of 1971, the provmons of s. 4i(l)(e) of the Motor Vehicles Act were applicable to the grant. [180G] (2) Section 47(l)(a) is wide enough to include all categories of public interest including those laid down by valid rules. Clause '(f)' of sub-rule (3) of rule 155A, framed by the State Govt. under s. 133(1), should, therefore, have teen taken into account, and, unless there was good enough reason to depatt from it, the rule should have been followed. Had this been done every stage carriage upto four would give an applicant an additional mark so as to help him to make up the 'Viable Unit' of five. A recent grant could not, considered by itself and singly, be converted into a demerit as the Appellate Tribunal seems to have done. In as much as the Appellate Tribunal acted in a mechanical fashion, by ignoring clause (f) of sub-rule (3) of Rule !SSA and without showing the correlationship of facts mentioned by it to any Qf the categories of public interest found ins. 47(1) of the Act or to the Constitutional guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, . tho observance of whiCh must also be presumed to be in public interest, the order of the Appellate Tribunal was vitiated by. a material irregi.llarity. The High Court should, therefore, have interfered even in the exercise ·of ita power under s. 115 C.P.C. which has been made applicable to such ca51ls. [181 E-0) Relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a permit could be a jurisd.ictional matter. A grant or its refusal on tptally irrelevant grounds would be ultra vlres or a case of excess of power. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account with others which are relevant, or, a relevant 11round. which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under s. 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material· irregularity. Both wilt be covered by s. 115 C.P.C. [!SOB] In C.A. 2254 of 1968 the respondent was granred a stage carriage perimt by t~e Regional Transport Authority on the ground that it was better acquainted with the routes and rejected the claim of the appellant that it was a recent,' grantee of a stage carriage permit. The State Transport Appellate Tribunaf 168 SUPREME COURT .REPORTS [1975) 2 s.c.R. preferred the claim of. the appell~nt on the ground t~at it was a local enter· prise of persons and did. not consider grant of a permit on another route as. a disqualification. The High Court remanded the case to the Tribunal for its reconsideration as to whether it would be consistent with the .Public interest to grant further permits to the aippellant. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : The High Court only held that the fact that an applicant is a recent grantee may be a relevant consideratio·n. As the order was not a final one it was not a case for a certificlte under Art. 133(1 )(c). Further. it is not' a fit case on merits for the grant of special leave under Article 136. Rele· •Vance or irrelevance of such a considewtion will depend upon the totali•.y of facts and circumstances wh:c~ must correlate such a ground to pubiic interest. [I 82El · A B In C.A. 1481-83 of 1970, the Regional Transport Authority granted a stage carriage permit to the respondent. On appeal the State Tr:rnsport Appellate C Tribunal granted to the appellant over-ruling the objection tha: he was a rece~t grantee. The High Ccurt held !hat the Tribunal had not understood the rat~o of the decisions relating to the relev~ncy of ri ·:~μt grants :•3d there had m reality been no selection and remitted the mailer to the Tribunll. Dismissing the appeals, HELD : . The High Court h3s rightiy observed that, whe:·e the results of exercise of power to grant permit shows th\tt permits are, without sufficient D ground for a discrim:nation or p;-eference- based on an app;·aisement cf merits or requirements of public interest. beihg invariably granted to one particular party the powers are not fairly or impartially exercis.~d. Quasi-judicial powers have to be exercised fairly, reasonably and impartially. [l83B] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1402 OF 1974 (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 30th April 1974 of the Madras High Court in C. Revsn. Peto. No. 576 of 1974. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2254 OF 1969 Appeal from the Judgment ·and order dated the 17th September 1959 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 282 of 1969. CIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1481 TO 1483 OF 1970 (Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and orde1 dated 9th October 1969, of the Madras High Court in· W. Appeal Nos. 437439 of 1969). SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1376 OF 1970 (From the Judgment and order dated 2nd September, 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. A. No. 312 of 1969). Y. S. Chitale and Vineet Kumar,· for the Appellant (in CA No. 1402/74). . E F G T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, K. Jayaram and G. S .. Prakasrao for ff the Appellant in CA No. 2254/69. K. Jayaram for the Appellant (in CAs. No. 1481-83/iO). ... A D G .H AJANTHA TRANSPORT_S v. _r._v. K. TRANSPORTS (Beg, J.) 169 M. K. Ramamurthi, A. S. Nambiar and Vineet Kumar for the , Petitioner (In SLP 1376/70). K. S. Ramamurthi and A. T .. M. Sampath for the Re~pondent in CA No. 1402/69). . A. S. Nambiar for the Respondent (In CA No. 2254/69). A. S. Nambiar for Respondents (In CAs. Nos. 1481-83/70). M. K. Ramamurthi, Mrs. Shyama/a Pappu, A. S. Nambiar. Vi11eet Kumar, and S. Srinivasan for Respondent No. l (In CA No. 1481/ 70). -· Thc'1udgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. We wHI detail facts k.'.ding up to the 1ther was rejected because the applicant was dead. Six were eliminated because of bad entries ·on their permits during the preceding year. Five were rejected ori the ground that they hiid either no workr.hops or not sufficiently equipped workshops. Out· of the three remainir.g applicants, one was considered inferior in merit in comparison with the remaining two, as his knowledge of the route was not so good as of the oth-er two. The joint applicants Chettiar and Ariother at No. 6 were preferred to Natarajan, applicant No. 13, on two grounds : firstly, the applicants at No. 6 were considered as somewhat better acquainted with the routes; and, m:ondly, the applicant No. 13 had secured a recent grant of a permit on another route. Hence, it was considered more equitable to drop him to as "not to·· inflict strain on the same operator by granting him more than one permit at a time". A!!ainst the above mentioned decision of the R. T. A .. there were three -appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which elaborately considered the claims of each appellant vis-a-vis the successful respondents. It preferred the claim of Kannon Motor Transport (P) Ltd., principally on tbe ground that it was a locJl enterprise of persons residing along the route. It seemed t" take the view that the mere fact that Kannon Motor Transport . (P) Ltd. had been granted a permit on another route at the same me:::ting of the RT.A. was no disqualification. It did not actually hold such a ground to be irrelevant. But, its remarks showed that a recent grant of a permit on another route was not considered by it to be really material. It, however, made it clear that the principal ground cif its preference was that Mis. Kannon Motor Transport (P) Ltd. was "a local enterprise" of persons who could be expected to be better acquainted with the needs of the locality. A learned Judge of the Madras High <;:ourt rdused to quash the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal because the main ground for the preference was that the local residence of the parties whose appeal had been allowed by the Tribunal gave them a better· claim. In the course of his judgment, however, the learned Judge observed that the State Tribunal could not be compelled to take into account matters which were "external" or irrclcv~nt for the purposes of exercising the power of granting permits. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, disagreeing with this view, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and remanded the case for reconsidcrntion to the Tribunal on the ground : "The Tribunal could well have considered whether in all the circumstances, the first respondent before us, should, having regard to public interest, be .granted more than one permit at the same meeting of the Regional Transport Authority. That would be a relevant question". 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975) 2 s.c.R. lt pointed out : "The first respondent altogether got three permits at the hands of the Tribunal. Whether he having: got a permit beJore the Regional Transport Authority it would be cousistcnt with public interest to grant further permits at the stage oi appeals was undoubtedly a matter relevant to the consideration and that having not been decided by· the Tribunal, its order is vitiated". The Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969 has come up before this Court after certification of the. case by the Madras High Court under Article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution as fit one for an appeal to this Court. · . Civil Appeals Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970 have resulted from 42 applications made for the grant of a permit to ply on the route Chidambaram to Tirukoilur via Vedalur, Kadampuliyur, Panruti, and ~·ome other places, by the Ref!ional Transport Aut:iority, S~uth Arcor. It appears that, after the elimination of a number of apphcations on various grounds of disqualification, the R. T. A. embarked, ultimately, on a comparison of the r·~lative merits of three applicants : I. M/s. P;·3bh~1 TranspJ:'.s (P) Ltd.: 2. Sri Dhanalakshmi Bus Service; 3. lv1. R. S. Motor Service. The R. t. A. found, on 23rd December l %5. the 4ualifications of M/s. Prabhu Transports (P) Ltd., to be superior, to those of its rival; and ordered the grant of the permit to it. Fifteen appeals were filed against the order of the R.T.A. After setting out the qualifications of .:~ch of the appellants before it elaborately, the State Transport Apptllate Tribunal considered the 1:ase of the ~1ppellant before us, M/s .. Kannan Motor Transports (P) Ltd., to be best and overruled the objection that a recent grant on a different route altogether should also be considered material. It said : "The 9th appellant is M/s. Kannan Motor Transports (P) Ltd., Chidambaram. It owns 2 route buses. lts main office and residence are at Chidambaram. It has a fully equipped workshop at that place and arrangements for effecting repairs have been made at the other end of the route i.e., Tirukoilur. Its experiem:e is from al'r.ut the beginning of 1961. Its history sheet is perfectly clean. Its route knowledge is limited to 7-1 /2 miles. This appellant is a local enterprise who is trying to have a viable unit. It has a fully equipped workshop at one of the termini and at the other termini arrangements for effecting repairs haw been m3de. It has sufficient experience and some· knowledge of the route. It thus possesses basic qualifications for the grant. But then it was pointed out that this appellant is a recent grantee of another permit. In W. P. No. 852 and 1049 of 1962. it has been held that where the recent grant relates to a different route altogether uuJ if that is the onlv circumstance present that in itself may not be relevant as the A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G / H AJANTHA TRANSPORTS V. T, V. K. TRANSPORTS (Beg, J.) 17 3' sole ground for declining the grant of permit. It is not the case of any of the appellants that grant for this appel!ant is in respect of this identical route. Thi:> appellunt who · has the basic qualifications and who is trying to build. up a viable unit in my view. is the most suited person to receive this permit, for each 'of the remaining appellants owns more route buses than what he has". .· Three connected writ petitions were filed in the l\fadras _High: Court against the judgment and order of the State Transport-·AppelJate Tribu11al preferring the appellant's claim over those of others on t.1ie ground that the appellant should have an opportunity to -build up a viable unit as each of "the remaining appellants owns more route buses"· than what the appellant had. A learned Single Judge. of the Madras High 'Court, after examining the ordt:r;; "f the State Tribunal in the light of~all the facts of cases of the claimants as set out by the Tribunal itself, concludect /and ordered : "There has in reality been no selection, crnsidering the claims of the applicants together. A comparative assessment with ref~rence to relevant and material facts is !Jcf:ing artd the ratio of the decisions relating to the rekvancy ot recent: grants not understood. In the circumstances,· the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal _cannot be sustained. JI; is, therefore, quashed.' The Tribunal has now to take up the matter and consider' the claims of the aggrieved applicants, the petitioners in the Writ Petitions and the 1st Respon~e!!t, afresh, in the light of the observations .contained herem ·. · 1 he mattclr was then taken before· a Division Bench of lthe Madras. High Court in these appeals. The Division Bench quoted :he following passage from the 'judgment of ihe learned Single fudge setting out the main grievan9e of the petitioners in the High Court : "Counsel pointed out that, in the instant case, it is ncit even a case of recent grant in favour of the common first respondent, and that, ignoring the salutary and e'ssential principle of giving equal opportunity to competeflt operators, the conimon 1st respondent has been made to build up his viable unit out of permits granted at the same ~ittfog of the Regional Transport Authority, one by the Regional Tranwort Authority and two by the Tribunal. It i~ submitted that the petitioners have not been found to be unfit and if they were not otherwise disqualified their cl:iims to build up viable units along with the 1st respondent should have been considered and the permits· distributed." lt then g<.:ve the !allowing justification of the view of .the learned'. Single Judge and the dismissal in limine of the appeals before it.: , · "Now it is pointed out to us that the .grant of the per- . mits for the routes Porto Novo to Puliyangudi and Chidam- 174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s.c .. R. baram to Perambalur has been set at large for fresh consideration of the merits of the applicants, by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. What the learned Judge has done in the present case, rel!lting to the grant of the permit for the route Chidambaram to Thirukoilur, is to set at large the grant of the permit for the route also, that the claims of the rival applicants can be considered bearing in mind also the circumstance mentioned above, which was consider~d as a relevant circumstance for the grant of the permits more or less at the same time, for different overlapping routes as between competing operators. It is this reason which appears to have weighed priml!,rily with the learned Judge in ~etting aside the order of the State Transport Appellate Tnbunal and remanding the matter to the same Tribunal for fresh disposal. In our opinion the correctness of the principle relied on by the learned Judge for setting the matter at large in the present case cannot be seriously disputed. It was clearly necessary to have the matter regarding the grant of the permit for the route Chidambaram to Thirukoilur also considered afresh, since the grant of the permits for the other routes also has been set at large. The learned Judge in the order now impugned has also mtricted the scope of the lower Appellate Tribun11l's order to the claims of the petitioner and the 1st Respondent in the Writ petition. To this extent the scope of the fresh enquiry has been narrowed and this will be an advantage to the appellant. In the above circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with the order of the learned Judge in the Writ Petition in these writ appeals which are dismissed in /imine". Against the Division Bench judgment and order we have three :appeals Nos. 1481-1483 of 1970 before us by grant of Special leave. The questions which fall for consideration upon the facts set out ~bove are: (1) Is possession by at recent grant of another permit to an .a,Pplica.nt for a stage carriag~ permit, either by itself, or, in conjunction with other facts· and circumstances a relevant con£ideration in either refusing or granting a permit to a;1 applicant 7 A B c D E F (2) If it is, in any particular set of circumstances a relevant consideration, 'what is the weight to be attached to it in the assess1nent G of the comparative merits of rival claims ? ( 3), Does the High ~ourt's, judgment or order in any or thG> cases dealt with by it call for 1nterfercnce by us in a1ty respect in exercise <>f our .powers under Article 136 of the Constitution ? Tl1e. questions .P~sed a~ve , must, we think, be •lnswered hav1n H regard tn the prov1s1o~s of Sectton 4 7 of the Motor Vehicles Act anS such relevant and valid rules as mav be framed for laying down the B c D G H AJANTHA TRANSPORTS V. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS {Beg, /.) 17 5 mode 0f exercising power to grant of per:uits. Section 4 7 (1) of the Act reads as follows : . "A ~e~ional Transport Authority shall. in considering an apphca~1on for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the followmg matters, namely : - (a) the interests of the public generally; ( b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any cnnvenicnce arising from journeys not being broken; 1( c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate .in the near. future, whether by road or other mean~, between the places to be served; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities Iikelv to be affected by the service; . ' ( e) the operation by the applicant cf other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending; ( f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed _ route or area; and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities. by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by. the State Government, •>r by any loc~l authority or polict' authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies : Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a. stage carriage permit from a cooperative society · registered or deemed to have beeri registered under any · enactment in force for the time being shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners". One of the submissions before us was that the Regional Transport Authority can act on considerations falling cren outside the purview of Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. But, no case decided by this Court, where such a view may have been tHken, wns placed before us. Reliance was, however, placed on M/s.' N. S. Gho11se Miah and Abc/111/aha She1·lff v. Regional Transport A utlrorlty, Cudtlapah,(I) and, Pal Singh v. State Transport Authority Trl/lunal U.P, and Ors.(a) (I) AIR 1963 A. P. 263@ 266. (2) AIR 1957 All p, 254 ~ 256, 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s.c.R. In Glwuse Miah's case (!;upra) the Andhra Pradesh High Court had while considering the validity of a rule observed (at page 266) : "The State Government is surely competent to lay down by way of general guidance certain fundamental principles, which will be according to them in the interests of the public generally. The heading will 'cover any grQund which might noi. have been expressly mentioned in Section 4 7. It is neither possible nor is it desirable 'to restrict the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit o'n consid~ration of public iuterest." It went on to express (at page 266) : "Even otherwise we do not think that the scope of the section is limited to the factors to be taken into consideration while granting stage carriage permit mentioned in Section 4 7. It b not correct to say that Section 4 7 of the Act forms a complete code or that the factors mentioned therein are exhaustive. · in our view that is clear from the words 'shall have regard to' in Section 4 7. The requirement of the section b that thf~ matter specified in the section may not be taken into consideration. In other words, the primary duty of the Regional Transport Authority is lo take into consideration the matters specified but it does not follow that the hands of the Regional Transport Authority are . tied to the ccnsideration of these matters alone and they must shut the.ir eyes to everything e)se". In Pal Sim~h's case (supra), the Allah2bad High Court had observed (at page 256) : "The law on the subject is not exhaustively contained in . Secl!on 4 7; any direction given by the State Trans port Authority in its appellate jurisdictio11 is also to be complied with by the Regional Transport Authority. If the State Transport Authority has jurisdiction to pass an order, it must be complied with by the Regional Transport Authority. Therefore our learned brother GopaJji Mehrotra was not correct when he observed that an application for renewal cannot ht' dismissed except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4 7, and that when a permit had been granted to the petitioner the renewal application cannot be refused on the ground that the original permit itself was illegal". Pal Singh's case (supra) was decided before this Court held, in Ml s. Ramw1 & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras allll Ors. (1) that the administrative directions issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, I 939, as amended by the Motor \'chicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, did not have the force of law in regulating the rights of parties. In Ghouse Miah's case (supra), the Andhra Pradesh Hil!h Court had. after indicating the amplitud1: of the ''intere6t of the public generally", mentioned in Section 47(1 )(a), held that (I) [ 19S91 2 Sup~!· S. C. R. 227. c [l; F G A AJANTHA TRANSPORTS V. T. V. K. TRANSPORTS (Beg, J.) 177 the use of the words "shall have regard to in Section 4 7" meant that the Section did not exhaustively specify every kind of matter which may be takeu fo account. The High Court had then .tested the rules framed under the Act by the norms provided by Articles 19 ( 1) (g) and 14 of the Constitution. It struck down a part of Rule 153 (d) for violating Article 14. B . What the Andhra Pradesh High Court seems to havt: meant was c .D E F G / H. that powers contained in Section 4 7 of the Act as well as the ·rule making powers of the State must be exercised conformably with the Constitutional guarantees given to· citizens by Articles 14 and 19 ( 1 ) (g) of the Constitution which are certainly not, mentioned specifically anywhere in the Act. All powers conferred by the Act, including . thos~ given by Section 4 7, must be deemed to be confined to the limits imposed by Constitutional guarantees to citizens. Hence,. the manner in which a grant would affect guaranteed fundamental rights of citizens could also be considered. If this is all that is meant by laying down that even matters not specified in Section 4 7 of the Act can be taken into account, we think that the view is unobjectionable. · Even where powers to be exercised by authorities, which arc organs o[ the State, are not clearly defined, the Constitutional guarantc.es contained in Articles 14 ·and 19 ( 1 )(g) of the Constitution would certainly limit the scope and regulate the exercise of such powers. This Court recently, in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mangrulpir Jt. Motor Service (P) Ltd. & Ors.(1'), after setting out the provisions of Section 4 7 of the Act, observed about the manner in which the Regional Transport Authority has to function (see p. 570) : . "It is a statutory body. It is to exercise statutory powers in the public interest. Such public interest would have to be considered with regard to particular matters enumerated in Section 4 7 of the Act and the particulars of an application are to be judged with reference to sections 46 and 4 7 in particular of the Act" .. More recently, in Patiala Bus (Sirhind.) Pvt. Ltd. v. State Trans· port Appellate Tribunal Punjab & Ors.( 2 ) this .Court said with regard to the provi~ions of•Section 47 of the Act (at p. 1177) : "The main considerations required to be taken into account are the interest of the public in general and the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, and these would include inter alia consideration of factors such as the experience of the rival claimants, their past performance, the availability Of stand-by vehicles with them, their financial resources, the facility of well equipped workshop possessed by them etc; The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, however, failed to take into account any of these considerations and proceeded as if the stage carriage permits were a largesse to be divided fairly and equitably amongst the rival claimants. We do not find in the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribup,al any discussion of the U97lJ Supp. S. C.R. 561 @ 570. (2) A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1174@ 1177. 13-1251-'fop.CI/75 178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975) 2 S·!C·R· question as to what the interest of the public in general requires and who from amongst the rival claimants would be able to provide the most efficient and satisfactory service to the public. None of the relevant factors is considered, Cir even adverted to, by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal merely seems to have considered what would be fair as between the appellant: and the third respondent and thought that it would be most fair if one stage carriage permit with a return trip were granted to the appellant and one stage carriage permit with return trip were granted to the third respondent. That is a wholly erroneous approach. The question that has to be considered is not as to what would be fair as between the appellant and the third respondent, but what does the interest of the public, which is to be provided with an efficient and satisfactory service, demand. The order of the State Transport Appellaite Tribunal; therefore, suffered from an infirmity, in that it failed to take into account relevant considerations and proceeded on the basis of an irrelevant consideration." Thus, decisions of this Court have made it clear that an exercise of the permit issuing power, under Section 4 7 of the Act, must rest on facts and cir~umstances relevant for decision on the question of public interest, which has to be always placed in the fore-front in considering applications for grant of permits. Consideration of matters which arc not relevant to. or are foreign to the scope c;f powers conferred by Section 4 7 will vitiate the grant of a permit under Section 4 7. A fact which, in ce1tain circumstances, is relevant for a decision cin what the public interest demands may. become irrelevant where it is not connected with such public interest. . Instead, every class of consideration specified in Sec:tion 4 7 (1) of the Act seems correlated to the interests of the public generally. tt appears that Section 47 ( 1) {a) gives th.e dominant purpose and Section 47{1)(b) to (f) are only its sub-c::itegories or illustrations. If any matter taken into consideration i£ not shown to be correlated to t!ie dominant purpose or, the relationship or the effect of a particular fact, which has o.perated in favour of a grant is such as to show that it is opposed, on the face of it, to public interest, the grant will be bad. The power to grant permits under Section 4 7 of the Act i.s limited to the purposes for which it is meant to be exercised. Considerations which are relevant for cpplying Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution could not be foreign to the scope of Section 47(1) (a) which is fairly wide. Where the power to grant permits shows that its exercise is meant to be judged on the touchstone of the interests of the public generally. the test being broad enough to take in applications of Articles 14 and 19(1 )(g), read with the relevant proviso, which rrt.quire a just and reasonable balancing and rec:o. ncillation of general nnd Individual Interests, wo think that it would not be correct to hold thnt the power contained In Section 4 7 cnn go beyond it or again.st it, because, to take such a view, would make the provision itself Constitutionally invalid. Therefore, we hold that permit issuing· power under Sectibn A. B. c D E. F G A B c D E r G H AJANTHA TJ.lANSPORTs v. T. v. K· TRANSPORTS (Beg,/.} 179 4 7 is restricted to service of interests of the public generally in a broad enot~gp sense to include ~ue res~ect for guaranteed fundamental ~ights of c1llzens. Indeed, service of mterests of the public generally 1s the expressed object of even Section 68C in Chapter IVA of the Act authorising framing of schemes of nationalisation of transport services. Such an object underlies the whole mac.hinery of r1-gulation by issue of permits for plying . motor vehicles on hire. It should be clear, when the main object, to which other considerations must yield in cases of conflict, of the permit issuing powers under Section 4 7 of the Act is the service of interests of the public · generally, that any particular fact or circumstances, such as a previous recent grant in favour of an applicant of the holding of other permits by an operator, cannot, by itself, indicate how it is related to this object. Unless, there> are other facts :md circumstance which link it with this object the nexus will not be established. For instance, an applicant may be a recent grantee whose capacity to operate a transport ~ervice efficiently remains to be tested so that a fresh grant to him may be pre-mature.