# Ajit Ii umar Pa/it v. 'late of Wtst Bmgal A.1,,angar, J

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, J\.. N. Wanchoo, K .. c. DAS GUPTA, j. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ajit-ii-umar-pa-it-v-late-of-wtst-bmgal-a-1-angar-j-2757
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Letting of Houses and Rent Control-Provisions for oollection of information and letting of accomodation-Construction
of-Displaced person-Meaning-Central Provinces and BerarLetting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, els. 22, 23, 24,
24A, 13, 2(2).
The respondent had let out his house to a firm against
whom he obtained permission from the Rent Control Authority
to terminate the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent.
Meanwhile, the tenant intimated to the respondent by telegram
that he had vacated the premises, but prior to the receipt of the
telegram, the appellant had applied to the Additional Deputy
Commissioner that since the premises were likely to fall vacant,
they should be allotted to him as he was a displaced person, and
provisional allotment was made in his favour and he continued
to be in possession since then. The respondent then moved for
the cancellation of the said allotment on the ground that he
needed the premises for his own use, but the allotment was confirmed in favour of the appellant by the Additional Deputy
Commissioner. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the
High Court for cancellation of the said order, which was set
aside and the case was remanded for disposal in accordance
with law ; against this the appellant filed a Letters Patent
Appeal. On remand the earlier order was confirmed by the
Additional Deputy Commissioner, against which the respondent
filed another writ petition in the High Court. The Letters
.,
-,
. j
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
Patent Appeal and the subsequent w.it petition were heard to1962
gether and the High Court allowed the writ petition and set Chimandas Bagomal
aside the order of allotment in favour of the appellant on the
Sindhi
ground that as soon as it appeared that the appellant had a
v.
place of business of his own, he ceased to he a displaced person
Jogeshwar
within the meaning of cl. 23( 1) and the other relevant clauses.
Held,, that cl. 23(1) refers to the persons in the specified
categories and empowers the Deputy Commissioner to make an
order of allotment in their favour. There are no terms of Iimi·
tation qualifying the said persons and the scheme of the relevant
provision does not seem to contemplate any such limitation.
Clause 23(1) as well as els. 24 and 24A do not necessarily exclu·
de the cases of persons specified in them on the ground that the
said persons already have an accommodation of their own and
the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of
els. 23(1), 24 and 24A impliedly postulated that the persons be·
longing to the respective categories specified by them could
receive allotment only if they had no previous accommodation
of their own.
Held, further, that after remand the Additional Deputy
Commissioner did not properly appreciate the scope and effect
of the provision contained in the relevant clause and he took an
unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which h.e was
bound to hold as a result of the remand order and that has
vitiated his final conclusion.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 201/60.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 18, 1958, of the Bombay High
Court, Nagpur, in Misc. Petn. No. 391 of 1956.
M.O. Setalvad,
S. N. Andley,
and
appellant.
Attorney-General for India,
Rameshwar Nath,
for the
S. N. Kherdekar, N. K. Kherdakar and A. G.
Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent No. 1.
1962. November 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
lim.ndlllh Bag(, m rzl
Sintlhi
v.
Jogeshwar
;aiendragadkar, J.
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal raises a
short question about the construction of clauses 23, 24
and 24-A in The Central Provinces and Berar Letting
of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter
called
the Order).
Jogeshwar s/o
Parmanand
Bhishikar (hereinafter called the respondent) owns a
house known as the Bhishikar Bhawan in Nagpur.
Block No. 2A had been let out by him to a firm
known as the Dayalbagh Stores for ca

## Text

1962
.Ajit Ii umar Pa/it
v.
'late of Wtst Bmgal
A.1,,angar, J,
1962
No1lf111her, a.
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
impug11ing the jurisdiction of the special court and
we have no hesitation in repelling that argument .
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
CHIMANDAS BAGOMAL SINDHI
ti.
JOGESHWAR AND ANOTHER
I
(P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J\.. N. WANCHOO,
K .. c. DAS GUPTA and j. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Letting of Houses and Rent Control-Provisions for oollection of information and letting of accomodation-Construction
of-Displaced person-Meaning-Central Provinces and BerarLetting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, els. 22, 23, 24,
24A, 13, 2(2).
The respondent had let out his house to a firm against
whom he obtained permission from the Rent Control Authority
to terminate the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent.
Meanwhile, the tenant intimated to the respondent by telegram
that he had vacated the premises, but prior to the receipt of the
telegram, the appellant had applied to the Additional Deputy
Commissioner that since the premises were likely to fall vacant,
they should be allotted to him as he was a displaced person, and
provisional allotment was made in his favour and he continued
to be in possession since then. The respondent then moved for
the cancellation of the said allotment on the ground that he
needed the premises for his own use, but the allotment was confirmed in favour of the appellant by the Additional Deputy
Commissioner. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the
High Court for cancellation of the said order, which was set
aside and the case was remanded for disposal in accordance
with law ; against this the appellant filed a Letters Patent
Appeal. On remand the earlier order was confirmed by the
Additional Deputy Commissioner, against which the respondent
filed another writ petition in the High Court. The Letters
.,
-,
. j
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
Patent Appeal and the subsequent w.it petition were heard to1962
gether and the High Court allowed the writ petition and set Chimandas Bagomal
aside the order of allotment in favour of the appellant on the
Sindhi
ground that as soon as it appeared that the appellant had a
v.
place of business of his own, he ceased to he a displaced person
Jogeshwar
within the meaning of cl. 23( 1) and the other relevant clauses.
Held,, that cl. 23(1) refers to the persons in the specified
categories and empowers the Deputy Commissioner to make an
order of allotment in their favour. There are no terms of Iimi·
tation qualifying the said persons and the scheme of the relevant
provision does not seem to contemplate any such limitation.
Clause 23(1) as well as els. 24 and 24A do not necessarily exclu·
de the cases of persons specified in them on the ground that the
said persons already have an accommodation of their own and
the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of
els. 23(1), 24 and 24A impliedly postulated that the persons be·
longing to the respective categories specified by them could
receive allotment only if they had no previous accommodation
of their own.
Held, further, that after remand the Additional Deputy
Commissioner did not properly appreciate the scope and effect
of the provision contained in the relevant clause and he took an
unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which h.e was
bound to hold as a result of the remand order and that has
vitiated his final conclusion.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 201/60.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 18, 1958, of the Bombay High
Court, Nagpur, in Misc. Petn. No. 391 of 1956.
M.O. Setalvad,
S. N. Andley,
and
appellant.
Attorney-General for India,
Rameshwar Nath,
for the
S. N. Kherdekar, N. K. Kherdakar and A. G.
Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent No. 1.
1962. November 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
lim.ndlllh Bag(, m rzl
Sintlhi
v.
Jogeshwar
;aiendragadkar, J.
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal raises a
short question about the construction of clauses 23, 24
and 24-A in The Central Provinces and Berar Letting
of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter
called
the Order).
Jogeshwar s/o
Parmanand
Bhishikar (hereinafter called the respondent) owns a
house known as the Bhishikar Bhawan in Nagpur.
Block No. 2A had been let out by him to a firm
known as the Dayalbagh Stores for carrying on business.
Since the tenant was in arrears as to rent, the
respondent obtained from the Rent Control Authorities permission to terminate the said tenancy. Meanwhile, the tenant intimated to the respondent by
telegram on July 24, 1955, that it had vacated the
said premises on that day. Prior to the receipt of
this telegram, however, the appellant Chimandas
Bagomal Sindhi had made an application to the
Addi. Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, on July 15, 1955,
that the premises occupied by the said tenant were
likely to fall vacant, and prayed that the same should
be allotted to him as he was a displaced person within
the meaning of the Order. The Addi. D. C. passed
an order of provisional allotment in favour of the
appellant on the same day and since then, the appellant has been in possession of the said premises.
The respondent then came to know about the
said provisional allotment and gave intimation to the
Addi. D. C. that he needed the premises for his own
. purposes, and so, he moved for the cancellation of the
said provisional allotment order. On July 23, 1956,
the Addi. D. C. purporting to exercise his powers
under clause 23 (1) of the Order confirmed the
,,
provisional allotment in favour of the appellant.
-'
The respondent then moved the Nagpur High
Court by a writ petition No. 307 of 1955 for cancellation of the said order.
On April 10, 1956,
Mr. Justice Bhutt set aside the order of allotment and
remanded the case for disposal in accordonce with
•
t
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
'
••
law. That is how the first stage of this dispute came
to an end.
On remand, the Addi. Dy. Commissioner confirmed the earlier order.
He held that the respondent did not need the premises for his own occupation
and he tho 1ght that there was no going back on the
earlier provisional order of allotment in favour of the
appellant. This second order was challenged by the
respont'ent by another writ petition filed
in the
Nagpur High Court (No. 391 of 1956).
Meanwhile,
the appellant had filed a Letters Patent Appeal (No.
95of1956) against the decision ofBhutt, J., on the
earlier writ petition filed by the respondent. By
consent, the said Letters Patent Appeal and the
subsequent writ petition filed by the respondent were
heard together by a Division Bench of the High
Court. 1 he Division Bench has set aside the order
of allotment passed in favour of the appellant and
allowed the subsequent writ petition filed by the respondent. It is against this order that the appellant
has come to this Court by special leave.
It appears that after remand, the respondent
brought it to the notice of the Addi. D. C. that
the appellant owned As.-/4/ · share in the Hind Vastra
Bhandar and that he had, therefore a place where
he could carry on his business. This allel'ation
was repeated by the respondent in his second writ
petition and it was urged by him that in view of
the fact that the appellant had a place of business
of his own, he was not entitled to the accornmo·
dat~on alloted to him by the impugned ordfr .
This plea was met by the appellant on the ground
that the. business mentioned by the respondent had
been dissolved.
Irom the affidavit filed by the
appellant in that behalf it does appear that the
appella?t had a share in the Hind Vastra Bhandar
and Knshna Watch Co .. both of which partnerships
carried on
their busineS§ at
Nagpur, but on
1962
Ohimandas Bhogomol
Sindhi
v.
Jogeshwar
G~}t11dragadkar1 J.
1962
himan-;;;;&,go~I
Sindhi
"·
J ogeJhwaT
Gajmd,.gat!kar; J.
'972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
.
-
April 8, 1957 the said partnerships had been dissolved
and so, after the said date of dissolution there was no
place of business to which the appellant could lay
any claim. In support- of this plea, the appellant
has filed the d.eed of Dissolution in question.
...
1:.
The High Court has held that reading the
definition of .the words 'displaced person' prescribed
f
by clause 2 (2) together with the relevant clause of
the Order under which the impugned allotment had
been made in favour of the appellants it must be held
that•the appellant was not a displaced person and as
such, he was not entitled to the said allotment. That
is how the main point which arises for our decision
in the present appeal is about the construction of the
said releyant clauses of the Order.
The order had been passed by the Government
of the Central Provinces and Berar by virtue of the
powers oonferred on it by section 2 of the Central
Provinces
and Berar Act No. XI of 1946. Subclause (2) of clause 2 defines a displaced person as
meaning any person who, on account of the setting
up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, or on
account of civil disturbances or fear of such distur·
bances in any area now forming part of Pakistan, has
been displaced from or has left his place of residence
in such area ·after the !st day of March, 1947, and
who has subsequently been residing in India. The
Appellant claims to be such a displaced person.
Clause 13 provides, inter alirs, that the landlord would be entitled to claim ejectment of his
tenant if he shows that he needs the house or portion
thereof for the purpose of his bona fide .residence,
provided he ,is qot occupying any other residential
house o~ his own in the city or town concerned.
He can also obtain ejectment of his tenant if it is
shown that the
tenant has secured
alternative
accommodatfon or has left, t.he area for a continuous
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME C0URT REPORTS
973
period of four months and does not reasonably peed
the house.
Clauses 22 to 27 form part of Chapter III
which deals with the· collection of information and
letting of-accomnwdation. Clause 22 ( 1) provides
that every landlord of a house situate in an area to
which this Chapter applies, shall give intimation
about the impending va~ancy as specified by subclauses (a) and (b). Clause 22 (2) lays down that no
person shall occupy any house in respect of which
this Chaptar applies except under an order unqer subclause (1) of clause 23 or clause 24 or on an assurance
from the landlord that the house is being permitted
to be occupied in accordance with sub-clause (2) of
clause 23. It would thus be neiiced that all vacancies
occuring in houses governed by Chapter III have
to be filled in the manner specified by clause 22 (2).
Clause 23( 1). provides that on receipt of the
lntimation under clause 22, the Dy. Commissioner
may within fifteen days from the date of receipt of
the said intimation, order the landlord to let the
vacant house 'to any person holding an office of profit
under the Union or State Government or to any person holding a post' under the Madhya Pradesh
· Electricity Board, or to a displaced person or to an
evicted person and thereupon, notwithstanding any
agreement to the· contrary, the landlord shall let the
house to such person and place him in possession
thereof immediately; if it is vacant or as soon as it
becomes vacant. The proviso to this sub-clause gives
right to the landlord to plead that he needs the house
for his own occupation, and if such a plea is accepted
by the Dy. Commissioner, the landlord would be
allowed to occupy the same. In other words, in cases
falling under clause 23(1) before the D. C. ma.J-es an
order directing the landlOrtl to let the house to <;ine
of the persons specified in the _different categories by
that clause, it would be open to the landlord to urge
IP62
Ckimanifas Bt«om•l
Siridhi
;,;
Jogtshwc
G4jendrazaakar, J.
1962
imanthu Bagomal
Sindhi
v.
l•11i/iwar
ajendragatlkar. J.
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
•
his own need and if that need is established, an order
urtder clause 23(1) would not be passed against him.
Clause 23(2) provides that if no order is passed and
served upon the landlord within the period specified
in sub·clause (1), he shall be free to let the vacant
house to any person.
Clause 24 provides for the penalty for noncompliance with the requirements of clause 22(1 ).
Under this clause, the Dy. Commissioner is empowered to order the landlord to let the house forthwith to
any of the persons falling under the categories specified by that clause. Since the power conferred on
the D. C. to make an order under this clause is intended, in a sense, to punish the landlord for his contravention of clause 22, it prim a facie appears that the
landlord is not given an opportunity to prove his own
need as under the proviso to 23 ( 1 ).
Clause 24-A deals with cases where the Dy.
Commissioner receives information to the effect that
a house is likely to become vacant or available for
occupation by a particular date ; and in such cases
it empowers the Dy. Commissioner to make an order
on the same lines as provided by clause 23(1 ).
This
dause lays down that the order passed under it shall
be complied with by the landlord unless the house
does not become vacant or available for occupation
within one month from the date of receipt by him of
the said order, or the landlord applies for the cancellation of the said order stating his grounds thereof.
This provision means that an order passed under
clause 24A can be challenged by the landlord by
pleading that he needs the premises for himself.
That, in brief, is the scheme of the relevant provisions.
The High Court has taken the view that in
allotting the premises in question to the appellant'
the Addi. D. C. has failed to notice the fact that on
.July 15, 1955, when the provisional allotment order
,.
'
••
•
,
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
was passed, the appellant had a place of business of
his own inasmuch as he was a 4 annas sharer in a
partnership which had its place of business. According
to the High Court, as soon as it appeared that the
appellant had a place of business of his own, he ceased to be a displaced person within the meaning of
clause 23(1) and the other relevant clauses.
This
conclusion proceeded on the basis that though the .
appellant may be taken to have satisfied the requirements of the definition of the expression "displaced
person" under clause 2(2), that definition had to be
read in the light of the context of clause 23(1) and
its meaning had to be controlled by the said context.
Clause 2 begins with the words that in this Order.
unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context, the defined terms will carry the meaning
assigned to them by the respective definitions. The
whole object of enabling the Dy. Commissioner to
make an order of allotment in respect of the persons
specified in different categories by the relevant clause,
is to provide accommodation to those persons who
were without any accommodation. Since that object
is implicit in the relevant provision, the definition
must be construed in the light of the said implicit
assumption of the relevant provision. It is on this
view that the impugned order has been set aside by
the High Court.
It may qe conceded that prima facie the view
taken by the High Court appears to be attractive.
It does appear w be reasonable that provisions of
the kind contained in Chapter III would normally
be expected to assist persons of specified categories
to obtain accommodation and that would impliedly
postulate that such persons have no accommodation
which they can claim their own. If the words of
the relevant provision are ambiguous, or if their
effect can reasonably be said to be a matter of doubt,
it may be permissible to construe the said provisions
in the light of the assumption made by the High
1962
Chim1nd1r B1111m1l
Sindhi
v.
J ogeshwar
Gq,itntlrae11d!01) J,
1962
immufas Bagomal
Sindhi
v.
Joges/1war
976 SUPREME COURT RJiPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Court. But, are the word~ of ·the relevant provision
in any sense ambiguous, or is the effect of those
words' doubtful ? In our opinion, the answer to
these questions must be in the negative.
.;.naraeadkar, J•
Clause 23 (1) refers
to the persons in the
specified categories, and empowers the D.C. to make
an order of ·allotment in their favour. Thare are no
terms of limitation qualifying the said pers,ons; and
the scheme of the relevant provisions does not seem to
contemplate any such limitation. It is significant
that the said persons are not entitled as a matter of
right to an order of allotment. What clause 23(1)
does is to confer power on the D.C. to make an order
of allotment if he thougqt it expedient, just as fair to
do so in a particular case. It is only where an order
is made by the D.C. that an obligation is imposed
on the landlord to let the premises to the person
named in the order. Having regard to the words
used in describing the persC?ns and the categories, it
seems plain that the provision contemplated that a
person belonging to one of those categories may be
entitled to claim its benefit on the ground that
accommodation already available to him was patently
insufficient or unsuitable. When such a plea is made,
the D. C. may have to consider it and in doing so, he
may have to examine the contentions raised by the
landlord against such a plea ·as· well as the claim that
the landlord may make for his own personal occupation.
The enquiry i,yhich would thus become necessary would be in the μature of a quasi-judical
enquiry and the "power conferred on the D. C. may
have to be exercised in a fair and just manner. We
do not think that clause 23 U) as well as clauses 24
and 24 A necessarily .eicclude the cases of persons
specified in them on tli<:. ground that the said persons
already have an accommodation which they can call
their own.
Persons there spc;cified would no doubt
have a much better cla'im for accommodation if it is
shown that they have no accommodation at all: But
,
)
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
even if such persons have accommodation, their
claims cannot be mled out on the preliminary ground
that the very fact that they have accommodation
takes them out of the provisions of the respective
clauses. It is quite tme that if a person belonging
to the
specified categories has
suitable
and
sufficient accommodation, he would normally not be
entitled to claim the benefit of clause 23(1).
That,
however, is a matter to be considered by the Dy.
Commissioner on the merits. We are, therefore,
satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of clause 23( 1) and clauses 24
and 24A impliedly postulate that the persons belonging to the respective categories specified by them can
receive allotment only if they have no previous
accommodation of their own. That being so, we
must hold that the appellant's case cannot be thrown
out merely on the ground
that
he had other
accommodation by virtue of the fact that he was a
partner in two concerns to which we have already
referred.
This conclusion cannot, however, finally dispose
of the appeal before us because it seems to us that
after the remand order was passed by Mr. Justice
Bhutt, the Addi. D.C. has not dealt with the matter
in accordance with law as he was required to do. He
appears to have taken the view that since a provisional order had already been passed, there was "no
going back" upon it. He thought that after remand,
the scope of the enquiry was confined to the examination of the question as to whether the respondent
proved that he needed the pr~is~s for his own ?Ccu:
pation. It is true that he has mcrdentally m~tioned
the fact that the appellililt owned a -/4/- share m the
business which was carried on in Nagpur, bu! he has
added that the said fact does not preclude him from
obtaining a shop for starting a business exclusively of
his own. This observation shows that the Addi. D.C.
did not properly appreciate the scope and effect of the
1962
--·
Chimandas &gomal
SintlhiJ
v.
JogeshwtJr
Gajendragadkar. J.
1962
Chi11u.11das Bhagomal
Sindhi
v.
Jog,_shwa1
Gu.Jendragadkar, J.
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963} SUPP.
provision contained in the relevant clause. Besides,
reading the order as a whole, it is quite clear that he
took an unduly narrow view of the limits of the
enquiry which he was bound to hold as a result of
the remand order and that has vitiated his final conclusion. We, therefore, think that it is necessary that
the matter should be sent back to the Addi. Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur, with a direction that he
should consider the case on the merits afresh. We
wish to make it clear that the question as to whether
the appellant should be given allotment of the premises in question should be determined by the Addi.
D. C. in the light of the position as it stood on
July 15, 1955.
We are making this observation
because there has been some controversy before us as
to whether the appellant has lost his right in the premises belonging to the partnership of which admittedly he was a member by reason of the fact that the
said partnership is alleged to have been dissolved
on April 8, 1957. The learned Attorney-General
has contended that if the matter has to go back, the
Addi. D.C. should be free to consider the subsequent
events that have taken place, and the appellant's case
should. therefore, be dealt with on the basis that he
has no longer any shares in the said partnerships. We
are not inclined to accept this contention. The fact
that the present proceedings have been protracted
would not entitle the appellant to ask the Addi. D.C.
to take subsequent events into account. It is clear
that the dissolution of the partnership took place long
after the appellant obtained the provisional allotment
from the Addi. D.C. and it is by no means clear that
if the Addi. D.C. had been then told that the appellant had a place of business of his own, he would
have granted accommodation to him in the present
premises on the same day that he moved him in that
behalf. W c arc satisfied that the question about the
propriety and validity of the said provisional order
must be .judged in the light of the facts as they
obtained on that day.
!
.,.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
Mr. Kherdekar for the respondents wanted to
argue before us that under cl. 2(2) the appellant was
not a displaced person on that day and he has relied
on the fact that the appellant had been carrying on
business in several places in Indfa since 1945.
This
point has not been considered either by the Addi.
D.C. or the High Court. If so advised, the respondents may take this point before the Addi. D.C. and
we have no doubt that if raised, it would be dealt
with by the Addi. D.C. in accordance with law.
The result is, the appeal is
allow~d, the order
passed by the High Court on the writ petition is set
aside and the matter is remanded to the Addi. Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur, with a direction that he
should deal with the dispute between the parties
afresh in accordance with Jaw.
Costs incurred by the
parties so far would be costs in the final order which
may be passed after remand.
Appeal allowed.
---
1962
Chim«ntlas Ba11m.
Sindhi
v.
Jognhwar
Go;andragadkar • ,