# AJMER SINGH v. 'l'HE STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 418
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-09-14
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1952
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, Das, Bhag Wati J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ajmer-singh-v-l-he-state-of-punjab-27
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Crirninal Procedzire Code, 1898, SS. 842, 417--AJJ1Jeal aaa,inst
acquittal-Inte1Jerence-Guidina pri nciple-Cri·minal trio l-Exaniina tion of· acciisefl-D·nty of Court-Irregular exam.inationValirlity of trial-Question of prejudice.
After an order of a.cqnittal has heon ma.de tho presumption of
innocence is further re-inforcocl by that orde1', and that- being so,
the trial court's decision cannot be reversed 1nerely on the ground
that the accused had failed to expla.in the cil'cumstances appearing
against him but only for very substantial and cOn:1pelling reasons.
In an appea.1 under s. 487, Criminal Procedure Code, tho High ,
Court bas full po\ver to revie"v t.he evidence upon 'vhich the ordtir
of acquittal \Vas founded .
. The duty of a Sessions Judge under s. 342; Criminal Pro·
cedure Code, to examine the accused is not discbargitd by merely
l'eading over the questions put to the accuB;ed in tbe ,l\Iagistrate's
Court and his answers, and by asking hjm whether he bas to say
anything about them. It is also not a sufficient compliance with
the section to generally ask the accused that, having heard the
vrosecution evidence what he has to say about it. Re p:iust be
questioned separately about each material circumstance which is
intended to be used against him.
The whole object of the section
S.O.R.
SUPREM:El COURT REPOR'rs
419
is to afforcl the accused a fair aud proper opportunity of explain·
1962
ing circumstances which appear against him and the questions
must be fair and must be couchecl in a form which an ignorant or
Ajmer Singh
illiterate person may be al)le to appreciate and understand.
v.
It is, however, well settlecl that every error or omission• in
The State of
complying with s. 342 does not necessarily vitiate the trial.
Punjab.
Errors·of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities and the question whether the trial has been vitiated clependR
in each case upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice
~
has been or is likely to have been caused to the accused.
Tara Si111Jh v. The State ([1951] S.C.R. 729) referred to.

## Text

418
SOPREME COOR'l' REPOR'l'S
(19531
1952
the deprivation of that right by a piece of discriminatory legislation would be sufficient to bring the
Ameeruiinissa
· h ·
h
·
l
case wit m t e purview of artic e 14 of the ConstiBagut1i
and OthM s
tution.
v.
Having regard to the view that we have taken, it
!Iahboob Begum is unnecessary to consider whether the impugned
and ot1iccs.
legislation violates the provisions of article 31(1) or
Mukh.,jea J. article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 'l'he result is
that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
1952
Dec. 10.
. Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for respondents Nos. 1 to 12: M. &. K.
Sastri.
AJMER SINGH
v.
'l'HE STATE OF PUNJAB.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAG WATI J J.]
Crirninal Procedzire Code, 1898, SS. 842, 417--AJJ1Jeal aaa,inst
acquittal-Inte1Jerence-Guidina pri nciple-Cri·minal trio l-Exaniina tion of· acciisefl-D·nty of Court-Irregular exam.inationValirlity of trial-Question of prejudice.
After an order of a.cqnittal has heon ma.de tho presumption of
innocence is further re-inforcocl by that orde1', and that- being so,
the trial court's decision cannot be reversed 1nerely on the ground
that the accused had failed to expla.in the cil'cumstances appearing
against him but only for very substantial and cOn:1pelling reasons.
In an appea.1 under s. 487, Criminal Procedure Code, tho High ,
Court bas full po\ver to revie"v t.he evidence upon 'vhich the ordtir
of acquittal \Vas founded .
. The duty of a Sessions Judge under s. 342; Criminal Pro·
cedure Code, to examine the accused is not discbargitd by merely
l'eading over the questions put to the accuB;ed in tbe ,l\Iagistrate's
Court and his answers, and by asking hjm whether he bas to say
anything about them. It is also not a sufficient compliance with
the section to generally ask the accused that, having heard the
vrosecution evidence what he has to say about it. Re p:iust be
questioned separately about each material circumstance which is
intended to be used against him.
The whole object of the section
S.O.R.
SUPREM:El COURT REPOR'rs
419
is to afforcl the accused a fair aud proper opportunity of explain·
1962
ing circumstances which appear against him and the questions
must be fair and must be couchecl in a form which an ignorant or
Ajmer Singh
illiterate person may be al)le to appreciate and understand.
v.
It is, however, well settlecl that every error or omission• in
The State of
complying with s. 342 does not necessarily vitiate the trial.
Punjab.
Errors·of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities and the question whether the trial has been vitiated clependR
in each case upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice
~
has been or is likely to have been caused to the accused.
Tara Si111Jh v. The State ([1951] S.C.R. 729) referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1952.
App~al by special leave from the
Judgment and Order dated the 14th September, 1951,_
of the High Court 0£ Judicature for the State of
Punjab at Simla (Bhandari and Soni JJ.) in Criminal
Appeal No. 3~>1 of 1950, arising out of Judgment and
Order dated the 13th May, 1950, of the Court of the
s·essions Judge, Ferozepore, in Trial No. 28 of 1950
and Case No. 5 of 1950.
P. S. Safeer for the appellant.
Gopal Singh for the respondent.
·'
1952. December 10. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-Ajmer Singh, a young man of about
22 years of age was tried for the murder of Bagher
Singh, his first cousin, and was acquitted by the
Sessions Judge of Ferozepore by his judgment dated
13th May, 1950.
On appeal by the State Govern·
ment, the order of acquittal was set aside by the High
Court and the appellant was convicted under section
304, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to ten "years'
rigorous imprisonment.
This is an appeal by special
leave against that decision. ,
One Nikka Singh had three sons, Bhagwan Singh,
r_,al Singh and Sunder Singh.
Bhagwan Singh died
issueless some years ago and disputes arose between
Lal Singh and his brother Sundar Singh in regard to
the division of the property of Bhagwan Singh.
Sunder Singh was in possession of some of his landed
1962
v.
The State of
-Punjab.
}.fahajan J.
420
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1953)
properties and Lal
Singh obtained a number of
decrees against him but Sunder Singh declined to
restore possession of the properties to his brother
Lal Singh. In view of this litigation the relations.
between Lal Singh and Sunder Singh were considerably strained. and ·it is said that for some time they
were not even on speaking terms.
Lal Singh is
married to Mst. Dhan Kaur and from her he had two
sons.
One of them Bagher Singh was murdered and
the other, Arjan Singh, is P. W. 5. Accused Ajmer
Singh is the son of Sunder Singh and Banta Singh
is his real brother. Ajmer Singh is married to Jagir
Kaur and- Banta Singh to "Kartar Kaur. It is alleged
by the prosecution that on the evening of the 27th
January, 1948, Jagir Kaur complained to her fatherin-law that her husband had pawned her ear-rings in
order to pay off his gambling debts. On the morning
of the 28th Banta Singh inquired from Ajmer Singh
about this matter ana he replied that he had pawned
the ear-rings to one Banta .Singh Mazhbi.
Soon
after this Ajmer Singh, Banta Singh and one Teja
Singh went to Banta Singh Mazhbi and asked him to
return the ear-rings but the la-tter replied that no
ornaments had been pawned with him and added that
he would give a sum of Rs. 30 to them if Ajmer
Singh took an oath that the ornaments had in fact
been left with him. It is said that Lal Singh was
also present when this conversation took place and
took up cudgels on behalf of Banta Singh Mazhbi
and this led to an exchange of hot words between
Lal Singh and the party of Sunder Singh's two sons
and their companion '1
1eja Si,ngh.
The parties, however, ·dispersed after exchanging hot words but without coming to blows.
·At about sunset the same day Lal Singh and his
brother Sunder Singh started abusing each other from
their respective houses which open out into a common courtyard. This wordy warfare between the two
brothers attracted the attention of Arjan Singh,
Bagher Singh and one Ujagar Singh Mazhbi who on
bearing the noise came to the house of Lal Singh.
f
••
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4:31
Lal Singh finding himself supported by three others
threw out a challenge to Sunder Singh and told him
to come out in the open.
It is said that Sunder
Singh, his two sons Banta Singh and Ajmer Sin~h,
and Teja Singh, a cousin of theirs, accepted the
challenge and rushed out of the house.
Teja Singh
and Banta Singh were armed with spears and they
made an attack on Lal Singh and Dhan Kaur and
inflicted on their persons-a number of injuries. Ajmer
Singh, it is said, was armed with a spear and he
plunged his weapon into the chest of Bagher Singh
wh~ collapsed and died almost instantaneously.
Arjan Singh soon after reported this incident at the
police station after travelling a distance of about
seven miles at 11-45 p. m.
He gave to the police
substantially the same version as has now been deposed to by him in the witness box. In this report it
was stated by Arjan Singh that it was Ajmer Singh
who dealt Bagher Singh a barchha blow on his chest
and that Bagher Singh fell down at this blow.
The
police arrested Sunder Singh, Teja Singh and Banta
Singh but the appellant could not be found.
Sunder Singh, Teja Singh and Banta Singh were
prosecuted under section 302/34 but were convicted
under section 324, Indian Penal Code, Banta Singh
and Teja _Singh were sentenced to two years' rigorous
imprisonment each and Sunder Singh to six months'
rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, Sunder Singh was
acquitted and the sentences imposed on Banta Singh
and Teja Singh were reduced.
A lenient view of the
affair seems to have been taken because the fight
between these near collaterals took place suddenly
and ended promptly. Bagher Singh died as a result
of one blow and injuries on the person of IJal Singh
and Dhan Kaur were not "ery serious
Ajmer Singh
was apprehended on 4th December, 1948, and as
above stated, was tried by the learned Sessions
Judge of Ferozepore and acquitted, but was convicted by the High Court on appeal by the State
Government.
1952
Ajmer Sing7i
v.
The State of
Punjab,
Mahajan J.
195;!
A.f1ner Singh
v.
The State of
Pu,.njab.
Jfahajan J.
422
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
[1953]
Lal Singh, P. W. 3, father of the deceased, Dhan
Kuar, his mother, and Arjan Singh, his real brother,
have given direct evidence about the occurrence.
Uj'a,gar Singh Mazhbi whose name is mentioned in
the first information report was tendered for crossexamination but no question was pnt to him abont
the a,ctual fight, and the manner in which it took
place or the part that was taken in it by the accused.
One Bishandas, whose shop adjoins the shop of Banta
Singh Mazhbi, was tendered for cross-examination as
P.W.7. He deposed that Banta Singh Mazhbi and
Lal Singh were the only persons when the quarrel
about, ear-rings took place near his shop. In reexamination he stated that Banta Singh, brother of
the accused, and 'l'eja Singh .had Gome on one side
and Lal Singh on the other when the quarrel about
the ear-rings took place.
No direct question was
put to the witness about the presence of Ajmer
Singh on that occasion. The learned Sessions Judge
considered him a wholly independent witness and
accepted his evidence about the incident that took
plac.e at Banta Singh Mazhbi's shop on the morning
of the 28th. He held that Ajmer Singh was not
present at Banta Singh Mazhbi's shop and that Lal
S-ingh and Arjan Singh had falsely implicated him in
the quarrel over the ear-rings, and that if the
witnesses could falsely involve him in-;:egard to one
part of the occurrence, the possibility of his being
implicated for the murder of Bagher Singh merely as
a matter of vindictiveness could not be outruled. A'fter
examining the evidence of the three eye-witnesses in
detail, the learned Sessions Judge reached the conclusion that they had suppressed the facts in order to
absolve themselves of all liability for the happenings
of the 286h, and bad uttared untruths and that no
confidence could be reposed in their statements about
the part that they had assigned to Ajmer Singh.
In
the concluding part of the judgment be observed
that " the parties were at logger-heads on several
issues and in the a~sence of independent evidence it
is difficult to place reliance on the prosecution story
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
in regard to Ajmer Singh." The High Court on
appeal minutely reviewed the evidence of these three
eye-witnesses and considered that the variations in
the
statements of
witnesses made at the
two
trials and which had weighed on the' mind of the
Sessions.Judge were of a minor and trifling character
and were quite natural as the statements at this
trial had been made 27 months after the occurrence
and that the narration of e·rnnts by Arjan Singh
was substantially the same as had been given by him
at the earlier trial and in the first information report.
As regards Lal Singh, who had resiled from
his earlier statement and bad denied that he was
armed with a phaura or that Arjan Singh was armed
with a lathi, it was said th!!>t this omission on his part
was due to mere lapse of memory and forgetfulness
rather than to a deliberate design to improve upon
the prosecution story.
It was argued by Mr. Pritam Singh Safeer that in
this case there were no compelling reasons for setting
aside the order of acquittal and that due proper
weight had not been given by the High Court to the
opinion of the trial judge as regards the credibility
of witnesses seen and examined by him. The learned
counsel submitted that the High Court was in error
in the view that "when a strong prima facie case is
made out against an accused person it is his duty to
explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
against him and he cannot take shelter behind the
presumption of innocence and cannot state that the
law entitles him to keep his lips sealed."
We think
this criticism is well founded.
After an order of
acquittal has been made the ptesumption of innocence is further reinforced by that order, and that
being so, the trial court's decision can be reversed not
on the ground that the accused had failed to explain
the circumstances appearing against him but only for
very substantial and compelling reasons.
As the courts below expressed divergent opinions
on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, we
~~
1952
Ajmer Singh
v.
The State of
Pun,iab.
Mahajan J.
Afrner Singh
v.
·The State of
Punjab.
}lfa.ltajan J.
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
had to read the evidence adduced in the case with
great care and after doing so, we are on the whole
inclined to agree with the view expressed by the High
Glourt.
It is difficult to believe that without there
being any truth in the fact that the appellant struck
Bagher Singh with a barchha, Arjan Singh selected
the appellant and ascribed to him that part soon after
the occurrence.
There are no material discrepancies
in the statements made by Arjan Singh on different
occasions and in our view the reasons given by the
learned Sessions Judge for rejecting his testimony
are not convincing.
vYe agree with the High Court
that there are no sufficient reasons for distrusting his
evidence. The number of persons who took part in
the quarrel was not more than seven or eight and the
blows inflicted were few, and in these circumstances
Arjan Singh could have made no mistake as to th.e
identity of the person who struck Bagher Singh fatally.
This part of his statement is corroborated by the
evidence or Lal Singh and Dhan Kaur.
No crossexamination was directed against this part of their
statements. It seems that the learned Sessions Judge
took too exaggerated a veiw of the minor discrepancies in these statements and read them with a rather
hypercritical mind. Bishandas, whose statement considerably impressed him, was only tendered for cross·
examination and never made a full statement about
the happenings of the 28th morning. The statement
made by him is somewhat cryptic and from this it
cannot be definitely concluded that Ajmer Singh was
not present on the morning of the 28th at the shop
of Banta Singh Mazhbi. The learned Sessions Judge
was not right in rejeeting the whole of the prosecution evidence as unreliable merely on the basis of this
cryptic statement. Ujagar Singh, the other so-called
independent witness, was tendered for cross-examination but the defence did not ask him a single question
a.bout the happenings of the 28th.
The argument
therefore that the prosecution withheld from court independent witnesses who had witnessed the occurrence
is without any substance. '!.'he learneq Sessions Judge
1
/
--
' .
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
was apparently labouring under some misapprehension
when he said that the prosecution had withheld from
the court independent witnesses of the occurrence.
Apart from Ujagar Singh Mazhbi, no one else appears
to have been present when the attack was made on
Bagher Singh, Lal Singh and Mst. Dhan Kaur by the
party of the accused.
All that appears in evidence
is that after the fight was over a number of persons
arrived on the scene but as they did not witness the
attack on Bagher Singh they could give no evidence
on this point and their non-production as witnesses
cannot havi any consequence on the case.
It is
significant that the defence also led no evidence to
prove that the fight took place in a manner different
from the one described by the prosecution witnesses,
or that Ajmer Singh was not present on the occasion.
-In an appeal under section 417 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure the High Court had full power to
review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal
was founded and we are satisfied that it did not in any
way exercise it wrongly.
'rhe injuries on the person
of Kartar Ka;ur and Sunder Singh were not proved
to have been inflicted at the time of the occurrence and \Vere of no consequence.
The prosecution
was under no obligation to explain how they came
about.
It was next argued that the trial held by the Sessions Judge was vitiated as the examination of the
appellant was not in accordance with the provisions
of section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. There is considerable force in the point that the examination of
the appellant by the Sessions Jndge was defective.
All that the Sessions Judge did was, that he read out
the examination of the accused in the committal
court to him and then recorded the following questions and answers :-
" Q: Did you make before the Committing Magis·
trate the statement that has just now been read out
to you?
A: Yes.
1953
Ajmer Singh
v.
Tha State of
Punjab.
Mahajan J.
1952
· Aj1ner SinfJh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Mahajan J.
426
SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S
[1953]
Q: Now that you have heard the eutire evideuce
agaiust yourself and the charge has beeu explained
to you, do you wish to say anything else?
•A: I am innocent.
Q : Do you wish to produce any evideuce m
defence ?
A: No."
In the committal court the questions put to the accused and his answers were these :-
" Q: Did you pawn the ear-ring of your wife with
Banta Mazhbi and squander the proceeds on or about
28th January, 1948?
A: No.
Q : Did Lal Singh interfere when you were demanding the ear-rings from said Banta Singh on 28th
Jauuary, 1948, at Nathuwala and remark that the
sweeper, i.e., Banta, was speaking truth when he
denied the transaction ?
A: No.
Q: Did you on 28th January, 1948, at Nathuwala
along with your father Suuder Siugh, Banta Singh,
and Teja Singh, you Banta Singh and Teja Singh
being armed with spears, attack r~al Singh, his son
Bagher Singh and Dban Kaur at their house and in
furtherance of the commou iutention of you all, Banta
and 'l'eja caused simple injuries to Lal Siugh with
spears aud you caused fatal iujuries with a spear to
Bagher Singh deceased?
A: No.
Q : Why this case against you ?
A: Due to enmity.
Q : Auything else to say?
A: No."
The Sessions Judge did not even take care to ask
the accused the routine question whether the statement made by him iu the committal court was correct.
As if bard pressed for time, be simply asked him
whether he had made that statement read out to him
in the committal court, and wa' sati~fied with an
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
answer in the affirmative. The second question asked
is of a general character and does not satisfy the
requirements of section 342, Criminal Procedure Co.de.
We are of the opinion that when the Sessions Judge is
required by that section to make the examination of the
accused, his duty is not discharged by merely reading
over the questions and answers to the accused put in
the committing magistrate's court and by asking him
whether he has to say anything about them. It is not
sufficient compliance with the section to generally
ask the accused that having heard the prosecution
evidence what he has to say about it.
'l'he accused
must be questioned separately about each materiaJ
circumstance which is intended to be used against
him. It was pointed out by this Court in Tara Singh .
v. The State(1) that the whole object of the section is
to afford the accus<il4 a fair and proper opportunity of
explaining circumstances which appear against him
and that the questions must be fair and must be
couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate
person will be able to appreciate and understand.
In this particular case at one stage of the argument
we were inclined to order a retrial of the accused in
view of the defective examination of the accused by
the Sessions Judge but on further thought we have
reached the conclusion that the High Court was right
in the view that the defective procedure followed by
the Sessions Judge in this respect has not occasioned
any prejudice to the accused. 'l'he facts of the case
are free from any complication and the point in issue
was a simple one and it cannot be said that the perfunctory examination of the appellant did any damage.
The only point appearing in the evidence against the
accused was that he gave a barchha blow to Bagher
Singh. The witnesses had stated that fact in his face
and had been cross-examined on the point by his
counsel. He was fully apprised of the part ascribed
to him in the quarrel.
His answer to this specific
question in the committal court was that he was innocent and that he was being implicated owmg to
(!) (1951] S.C.R. 729.
1952
I
Ajme1· Singk
v.
The State oj
Punjab.
·Mahajan
1962
Ajtnsr Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Mahajan J.
1962
Dee. 12
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
enmity. He stuck to that reply in the Court of Session
after fully understanding what he was asked. It is
wejl settled that every error or omission not in compliance with the provisions of section 342 does not
necessarily vitiate a trial. Errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities, and, as held
in Tara Singh's case('), the question, whether $he trial
is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree
of the error and upon whether prejudice has been or
is likely to have been caused to the accused.
We are
of the opinion that the disregard of the provisions
of section 342 in this case is not so gross as would
justify our quashing the conviction and ordering a
retrial.
The result is that we uphold the judgment of the
High Court and dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: R. S. Gheba.
Agent for the respondent : G. H. Ra}adhyaksha.
WORKERS OF THE INDUS'l'RY COLLIERY,
DHANBAD
'V.
MANAGEMEN'l' OF 'l'HE INDUSTRY
COLLIERY.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Ind1<strial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 20 (2) (b), 22 ( 1) ( d), 24Gonciliation proceedings-Withdrawal of workers-Strike after
Conciliation Officer has made his report but befo1·e it is received by
Governnient-:::Legality of strike-Chief
Labo~ir Oo1n1nissioner
whether agent of Government.
A conciliation proceeding cannot be deemed to have concluded
under s. 20 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in a case
where no settlement has been arrived at, as Soon as the Conciliation Officer sends his report. It can be deemed to have concluded
only when the report is actually received by the appropriate
Governme:nt.
(1) (1951) S.C.R. 729.
;