# Alan:gir &· AnoJhcr v. The State of /Jiht1r Gajendragadluir N ove111ber I 4

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 478
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** S. R. Das, N. H. Bhagwati, ll. P. SINHA, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. \Vanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/alan-gir-anojhcr-v-the-state-of-jiht1r-gajendragadluir-n-ove111ber-i-4-1559
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Land Reform-Abolition of Intermediaries-Validity of Enactmrnt-Competcncy of Legislature-Liability to rernmptir"' of jagir
esfates-Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and La11d J«forms Act,
1955 (Ajmer III of z955), ss. 8, 38-Cot1slil11tiot1 of India, Scvrnth
Schedule, List I, entry 33, List JI, miry 36, List III, e11lry 42.
Section 4 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and
Land Reforms Act, 1955, provided for vesting of all estates held
by intermediaries, as defined in the Act, in the State from a <late
to be notified, and the petitioners who were affected th ere by
filed petition~ under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the Yalidity of the Act and, in particular, ss. 8 and 38 of
the Act on the grounds that (r) entry 36 of List II of the
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution gave power to the State
legislature to acquire property for purposes other than the purposes of the Union, while the property acquired under the Act
vested in the President and therefore the Union after its acquisition, and the Act was really for the acquisition of property for
the purposes of the Union and could not have been passed by
the Ajmer legislature, (2) s. 8 provided for retrospective cancellation of leases granted at a time when the land-owner had a
right to dispose of his property as he liked under Art. 19(1)(f) of
the Constitution and there was no restriction on such right, and
(3) s. 38 which fixed a maximum rent was an unreasonable
restriction on the right of the land-owner to let his holding.
It
was also contended for some of the petitioners who were
assignees of land revenue as also owners of land that, under the
Act, an intermediary included a jagir and that as a jagirdar
was merely an assignee of land revenue, only that assignment
could be said to have been acquired under the Act.
Held, (1) that the purposes for which the estates were
acquired were purposes of the State of Ajmer and, consequently,
the Act was within the competency of the Ajmer legislature as it
fell within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution,· and it was not necessary .to consider where the
property should vest after acquisition in deciding the ambit of
the competence of the legislature under the entry ;
(2) that the provisions in s. 8 of the Act which gave power
to the Collector to cancel leases which were found to have been
made in anticipation of legislation for abolition of intermediaries
and which were, consequently, a fraud upon the Act, subserve
the purposes of the Act and would, therefore, be an integral part
of the Act, though ancillary to its main object, and wer~ protected under Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution ;
(3) that the intention of the Act was that the intermediaries
who were allotted lands should cultivate them personally and
the object of s. 38 was to discourage them from letting the land
and becoming a new kind of intermediaries, and, consequently,
the section being an ancillary provision necessary for the purposes of carrying out the objects of the Act, was protected under
Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution; and
(4) that in view of the origin of the title of the holders of
these estates who were called jagirdars, a distinction could not
be made between jagirdars as assignees of land revenue and the
same persons as land owners, and therefore, the State could take
over the entire interest in the estate under s. 4 of the Act.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 230-239,
241, 249-251, 256, 257, 290, 303, 306-349, 351, 352,
355-357 of 1955 and Nos. 33 & 36 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India.
Thakur Rngllubir
Si,,gli
v.
State of Ajmer
Thakur Raghubir
Sit1gh
v.
State of AL11rer
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal, for the petitioners in
Petitions Nos. 239, 241 & 251 of 1955.
N aunit Lal, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 249
& 250 of 1955.
B. D. Sharma and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners in
Petitions Nos.

## Text

Alan:gir
&· AnoJhcr
v.
The State of
/Jiht1r
Gajendragadluir
N ove111ber I 4.
478
SUPREME COURT REPORTS_ (1959] Supp.
him. The record shows that appelfant No. 2 is the
brother of appellant No. I; and, if knowing that
ltahmatia had married his brother, appellant No. 2
told the complainant to walk away, that cannot legally
justify the inference that he m11st have offered any
inducement, blandishment or allurement to Rahmatia
1 for leaving the protection of her husband and refusing
· ·to return to him.
Indeed the courts below have not
considered the case of this appellant separately on its
own merits at all. In our opinion, the conviction of
appellant No. 2 is not supported by any evidence on
the record. The result is the appeal preferred by
appellant No. 2 is allowed, the order of conviction and
sentence passed against him is set aside and he is
ordered to be acquitted and discharged.
Appeal of appellant No. 1 d·ismissed.
Appeal of appellant No. 2 allowed.
THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF AJ"fER (NOW ltA.JASTHAN)
AND OTHERS
(and connected petitions)
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, ll. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. \VANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Reform-Abolition of Intermediaries-Validity of Enactmrnt-Competcncy of Legislature-Liability to rernmptir"' of jagir
esfates-Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and La11d J«forms Act,
1955 (Ajmer III of z955), ss. 8, 38-Cot1slil11tiot1 of India, Scvrnth
Schedule, List I, entry 33, List JI, miry 36, List III, e11lry 42.
Section 4 of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and
Land Reforms Act, 1955, provided for vesting of all estates held
by intermediaries, as defined in the Act, in the State from a <late
to be notified, and the petitioners who were affected th ere by
filed petition~ under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the Yalidity of the Act and, in particular, ss. 8 and 38 of
the Act on the grounds that (r) entry 36 of List II of the
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution gave power to the State
legislature to acquire property for purposes other than the purposes of the Union, while the property acquired under the Act
vested in the President and therefore the Union after its acquisition, and the Act was really for the acquisition of property for
the purposes of the Union and could not have been passed by
the Ajmer legislature, (2) s. 8 provided for retrospective cancellation of leases granted at a time when the land-owner had a
right to dispose of his property as he liked under Art. 19(1)(f) of
the Constitution and there was no restriction on such right, and
(3) s. 38 which fixed a maximum rent was an unreasonable
restriction on the right of the land-owner to let his holding.
It
was also contended for some of the petitioners who were
assignees of land revenue as also owners of land that, under the
Act, an intermediary included a jagir and that as a jagirdar
was merely an assignee of land revenue, only that assignment
could be said to have been acquired under the Act.
Held, (1) that the purposes for which the estates were
acquired were purposes of the State of Ajmer and, consequently,
the Act was within the competency of the Ajmer legislature as it
fell within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution,· and it was not necessary .to consider where the
property should vest after acquisition in deciding the ambit of
the competence of the legislature under the entry ;
(2) that the provisions in s. 8 of the Act which gave power
to the Collector to cancel leases which were found to have been
made in anticipation of legislation for abolition of intermediaries
and which were, consequently, a fraud upon the Act, subserve
the purposes of the Act and would, therefore, be an integral part
of the Act, though ancillary to its main object, and wer~ protected under Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution ;
(3) that the intention of the Act was that the intermediaries
who were allotted lands should cultivate them personally and
the object of s. 38 was to discourage them from letting the land
and becoming a new kind of intermediaries, and, consequently,
the section being an ancillary provision necessary for the purposes of carrying out the objects of the Act, was protected under
Art. 31-A(x)(a) of the Constitution; and
(4) that in view of the origin of the title of the holders of
these estates who were called jagirdars, a distinction could not
be made between jagirdars as assignees of land revenue and the
same persons as land owners, and therefore, the State could take
over the entire interest in the estate under s. 4 of the Act.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 230-239,
241, 249-251, 256, 257, 290, 303, 306-349, 351, 352,
355-357 of 1955 and Nos. 33 & 36 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India.
Thakur Rngllubir
Si,,gli
v.
State of Ajmer
Thakur Raghubir
Sit1gh
v.
State of AL11rer
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal, for the petitioners in
Petitions Nos. 239, 241 & 251 of 1955.
N aunit Lal, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 249
& 250 of 1955.
B. D. Sharma and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners in
Petitions Nos. 290, 303, 306-349, 351, 355-357 of 1955
and 36 of 1956.
B. D. Sharma, for the petitioner in Petition No. 33
of 1956.
K. L. Mehta, for the pot.itionor in Petition No. 352
of 1955.
I. N. Shroff, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos.
230-238, 256-257 of 1955.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
M. N. K£iul and 7'. M. Sen, for the respondents.
1958.
November 14.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Wanclloo J.
WANCHOO, .J.-These sixty-nine petitions under Art.
32 of the Constitution by various land-owners in the
former State of Ajmer attack the validity of the Ajmer
Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act,
1955 (Ajmer III of 1955) (hereinafter called the Act).
The petitions disclose a large num her of grounds on
which the validity of the Act is impugned; but learned
counsel, Mr. Achhru Ram and Mr. B. D. Sharma, ap·
pearing for various petitioners, have confined their
arguments only to certain grounds raised in the petitions.
We propose, therefor<i, to consider only the
grounds urged before us.
The Act was passed by the Ajmer Legislative Assembly and received the assent of the President on
May 29, 1955. Section 4 of the Act provided for vest'
ing of all estates held by intermediaries, as defined in
the Act, in the State Government from a date to be
notified.
The Act came into force on June 23, 1955,
and August 1, 1955, was notified as the date on which
the estates held by intermediaries would vest in the
State Government. The present petitions followed
on the fixing of this date.
It is not disputed that; the Act is protected under
Art. 31-A(l)(a) of the Constitut.ion inasmuch as it is a
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
piece of legislation for acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein. The argument is that
in spite of this protection, either the whole Act or
certain provisions of it are invalid, for reasons urged
by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners. Mr.
Achhru Ram attacks only ss. 8 and 38 of the Act.
Mr. Sharma attacks the competency of the Ajmer
legislature to pass the Act and also urges that in any
case it does not apply to the case of jagirdars, one of
whom is a petitioner before us in Petition No. 33 of
1956. These four are the only grounds that have
been urged before us, and we shall deal with them
seriatim.
Re. s. 8.
Section 8 is in these terms-
" Where an intermediary has on or after the 1st
day of June, 1950, (a.) granted a lease of a.uy land in
the estate or any part thereof for any non.agricultural
purposes other than mining for a period of three years
or more; or
(b) granted a lease or entered into a contract
relating to n,ny forest, fishery or quarry in his estate
for a period of three years or more ; or
(c) graMeJ a lease for the cultivation of any area
of bir or pasture or waste land ;
and the Collector is satisfied that such lease~ or contra.ct was not ma.de or entered into in l;he normal
course of management but in anticipation of legislation for the Abolition of Intermediaries, the Collector
may, subject to any rules ma.de under this Act, by
order in writing, cancel the lease or the contract as
the case may be."
It provides for cancellation of certa.in leases granted
on or after June 1, 1950, where the lease is for a
period of three years or more with respect to matters
-
dealt with in els. (a) and (b) and where the lease is for
any period in respect of matters dealt with in cl. (c).
The Collector has been given the power to cancel such
leases if they are not made in the normal course of
managem~nt but in anticipation of legislation for
abolition of intermediaries. The argument is that
61
Viakur lla1Aubir
Singli
v.
Stal• of Aj111u
I9$H
Thakur RaghHbir
Si-,1gh
v.
Staid 11/ Afme,
w;.nchvo J.
482
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
there ca.n he no retrospective cancellation of leases
granted at a time when the land-owner ha.cl a right to
dispose of his property t•s he liked under Art. 19(l)(f)
a.nd there wa.s no restriction on such right. It is sa.id
that in certain contingencies the cancellation of tt
lease might expose the land-owner to the risk of paying compensation to the lessee, part.icula rly in cast's
where the la.ml-owner might have realised the entire
lease-money in one lump sum for a lease of more than
three years' duratfon.
We a.re of opinion that there is
no force in this contention. The legislature was certa.i11ly competent, under entry 18 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution relating to Land,
to make this provision. It cannot be disputed that
the legislature has power in appropriate cases to pass
even retrospective legiijlation.
Provisions for ca.ncella.tion of instruments already executed are not unknown to law; for example, the Insolvency Acts pwvide for setting aside transfers made by insolvents
under certain circumstances.
Therefore, the Ajmor
Legislature certainly had the power to enact such 1•
provision, and in the circumstances in which this provision has been made in the Act, it cannot be said
that it is not protected under Art. 31-A.
The provi-
><ion is not an independent provi8ion ; it is merely
ancillary in character enacted for carrying out the
oi.>jects of the Act more effectively. The intention
of the legislature was to give power to the Collector
aiter the estates Yested in the State Uovemment to
scrutinise lea~es of this kind made after June l, 1950,
which wa.s apparently the da.te from which such legislation was under contemplation and to see whether the
leases were such iis a pru.dent land-owner would enter
into in the normal course of management.. Such
leases woulrl be immune from cancellation ; but. if the
Uollector found that the leases.· were entered into, not
in the normal course of management but designedly to
ma.ke whatever the land-owners could before the
estate came to be transferred to the State Government.,
he was given the power to cancel the same, as they
would obviously be a fraud upon the Act. Such can ..
cellation would su bserve t.he p11rpose8 of the A ct, a.nd
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
the provision for it would therefore be an integral
r9_~11
part of the Act, though ancillary to its main object,
h ,
,
and would thus be protected under Art. 31.A (l)(a) of T '"":,Rahgliuhrr
,"'llf't!
the Constitution.
Re. s. 38.
Section 38 reads as follows :-·
" Notwithstanding any itgremnent, usage, decree
or order of a court or 1rny la.w for the time being in
force, the maximum rent payable by a tenant in respect of the land leased 10 him shall not exc<.>ed onH
and ha.If t.imes the revenue payable in respect of 1rnch
land."
This section providt•s for tixing the maximuru rent
at fifty per cent. above the lam! re,·enne, and it is
urged that this is an unreasonable restriction on the
right of the land-owner to Jet his holding.
The object
of this legislation is to do away with intermediari~'s,
and for that reason the rstates held bv internlerliaries
have been made to vest in the Statt1 Government
under s. 4.
Chapter VI of the Act, howe\·er, provides
for 11llotmeut of lands for personal cultivation to intermediaries whose estates h1we been taken over upto
a certain limit and the intern1ediaries who havt'
been allotted l11.nds under s. 29 of the Act are called
Bhuswamis or K1tsht.kars a.ecording ti) the nature
of the iands allotted to them ; (see s. aO).
Hhuswamis and Kashtkars holrl l:rnd direetlv from thP
Government and pay rPvenne to the 6overnment;
(see s. 32).
The intention of the _-\et, therefore, is
that intermPdiaries who have hf'en allotted lands
should cultirn.te them pel'sonally.
But s. 37 permits
Bhnswamis to !f~t the whole or any part of the land
11.Ilottecl to tlwm, while Kasht.ka.rs are forbidden from
letting any part of their land exeept in cPrtaiu circum-
~ta.nces when they are. suffering from some disability.
In order, however, that the main object of the Act
(namely, that the land should be cultivated by the
person to whom it is allotted and that the1·e should
bP no rackrenting) is attained, S. a8 has been provided
fixing the maximum rent at. 50 per cent. ab1>ve the
hmd revenll<»
Thns the profit which n. Bhuswami
v.
11'trHCAoo f,
1'hnkur Raghubir
Singh
v.
Stata nf Aj,,wr
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
<;an make by letting his land is so reduced compared
to what he would cam if he cultivated it himself as
to discourage him from letting the land and becoming
a. new kind of iutermediat·y. Section 38, therefore, is
another ancillary section, like B. 8, and is meant to
subRerve the purposes of the Act, namely, the abolition
of all intermediaries and encouragement of ~elf.culti
vation of the land. We are, therefore, of opinion I.hat,
s. 38 is also protected under Art. 3l·A(l)(a) of the
Constitution as an ancillary provision necessa.ry . for
the purposes of carrying out the objects of the Act.
Re. 'J.'he competency of the Ajmer Legislation.
The argument in this behalf is put. in this way.
The Act is a piece of legislation for the acquisition of
estates. Before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, came into force on November 1,
1956, there were two entries relating to acquisition ef
property in the Seventh Schedule, namely, entry 33
of List I (acquisition or requisitioning of property for
the purposes of the Union) and entry 36 of List II
(acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for
t,he purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of
entry 42 of List III). The argument continues that
the Act was passed by the Ajmer legislature under the
power it was supposed to have under entry 36 of List
II rca.rl with s. 21 of the Government of Part C States
Act, 1951 (XLIX of 1951). But entry 36 of I...i~t II
only gives power t.o the State legisla t urc to acquire
property for purposes other than the purposes of the
Union. As, however, the property acquired under
the Act vested in the President and therefore the
Union after its acquisition, the Act was really for the
acquisition of property for the purposes of the Union
and could uot have been passed by the Ajmer legisla.
ture.
In support of this argument .Mr. Sharma refened
us to various Articles of the Constitution in Part XII
thereof relating to Finance, J>roperty, Contracts and
Suits, and also Arts. 73 and 239.
He contends that
these provisions show that before the Governme11t of
Part C States Act was passed, the legislative power
with respect to the areas comprised in Part C States
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
485
wa.s in the Union which also through the President
had executive power over the subjects over which the
Parliament could legislate with respect to what were
Part C States. After the passing of the Government
of Pa.rt C States Act, by virtue of the power conferred
on Parliament by Art. 240, there was no change so
far as the executive power in Part C States was con.
cerned a.nd it is st.ill vested in the President. Any property acquired for the purposes of Part C States vests
in the President or the Union. Therefore, according
to him, the Ajmer legislature would have no power to
enact a law for acquiring estates under entry 36 of
List II ; for the property so acquired would really be
for the purposes of the Union and 110 law under that
entry could be made for acquiring property for the
purposes of the Union.
We are of opinion that the argument, though
plausible, must be rejected. Assuming, without deciding, tha.t even after the passing of the Government of
Part C States Act, any propertJ acquired for a Pa.rt C:
State vested in the Union Government by virtue of
the provisions of Pa.rt XII of the Constitution, the
·question still remains whether the Ajmer legislature
could make a law under entry 36 of J.,ist II acquiring
estates even though the estates when acquired may
legally vest in the Union Government. Xow, entry
33 of List I refers to acquiring of property for the
purposes of the Union. It doei> not lay down in wl1om
the property should vest after it has been acquired.
Similarly, entry 36 of List II speaks of acquisition of
property, except for the purposes of the Union, and
makes no mention in whom the property should vest
after it has been acquired. Entry 42 of List III which
deals with compensation for such acquisition as well
as for acquisition for any other public purpose, also
does not speak where the property should vest after
acquisition. It is not necessary, therefore, to consider
where the property should vest after acquisition in
deciding the ambit of the competence of the legislature
under those two entries. The key to the interpretation
of these two entries is not in whom the property would
vest after it has been acquired but whether the
T haku' Raghubir
Si11gh
Y,
Stat• of Ajm•'
Wa11cAoo ].
Thokttr RaChuhir
Singh
StaltJ of Ajnur
WancJioo .f.
486
SUPREME C'OUR'l' REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
property is being acquired for the purposes of the Union
in one case or for purposes other than the purposes of
the Union in the other. It is in this context that the
competency of the Ajmer legislature to enact this law
under entry 36 of List II is to be judged.
Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act
created a Legislative Assembly for Ajmer and gav!l
that legislatfre 11ssembly power to make law" for the
whole or any part of the State with respect to any of
the matters enumerated in List IT nr List III of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Ajmer legislature
was thus giveu power to pass laws with respect to
acquisition of property for purposes other than those
of the Uniou. In other words, it had the power to
make law to ac411ire property for the purposes of the
State of Ajmer or for any other public purpose. The
<JUest.ion then is whether the Act was passed acquiring
estates in the State of Ajmer for the purposes of th<'
State of Ajmer, irrespective of where the title may vest.
The answer to this question to our miud can only be
one; the Act w11s passed by the State legislature for
acquiring estates within the State and it could
onl~·
have been for the purposes of the State. There is no
reason to limit the meaning of these genernl words,
namely, 'the purposes of the Stale', by importiug in
them the idea of where the property would vest after
its acquisition. That the purposeR for which the e•tates
were acquired wen· purpose; of the State of Ajmer
would be quite clear from the fact tlu1t now that the
State of Ajmer is part of the State of R.ajasthiin, the
estates acquired under the Act have gone to Rajasthan
and have not been kept by the Union on the ground
that the title .ve"ted in the Uniou. Therefore, aR the
estates were acquired in thi• case for the purpose" of
the State of Ajmer the Act would be within the competency of the Ajmer legislat.ure as it falls wit.bin the
pla.in words of entry 36 of List II.
Re .. Jagirdars.
The contention on behalf of the petitionn in petition
"'1 o. 33 of 1956 is that. under the Act the word 'inter.
mediary ' includes it jagirdar. The Act also provides
that the definitions in t.he Ajmer Tenancy and Land
r
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
Record!! Act, 1950 (Ajmer
XLII of 1950), will be
import.ed where the words used in it are not defined.
The word ' jagirdar ' is defiued in the Ajmer Tenancy
and Land Records Act as a person to whom the
revenue of any land has been assigned under a sanad
issued by the Chief Commissioner before the commencement of the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation,
1877; (see
1:1. 2 (15) ). It is not in dispute that a
sanad was issued to a predecessor of the petitiont1·
before 1877 ; but it is urged that a jagirdar is merely
the assignee ofland revenue and so far as that assignment is concerned it may be said t.o have been acquired under the Act.
But the petitioner besides being an
assignee of land revenue is also owner of land and that
interest of his has not been acquired under the Act.
We are of opinion that them is no force in this argument. The word' estate' is defined in s. 2(v) of the
Act as having the same meaning as assigned to it i11
the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation, 1877. The
Ajmer Regulation does not define the word 'estate' as
such, but it has defined the wo1·d ' Malguzar ' as a
person liable under s. 64 for payment of the revenue
assessed upon an estate, under s. 2(d).
Further, s. 64
provides that all persons who are bound by the agreement prescribed by s. 61 and their successors-il1interest shall, while they continue to be owners of land
in the Estate to which such agreement relates, be
jointly and severally liable for the payment of the
whole amount of revenue assessed upon such estate.
The Ajmer Regulation also defines particular types of
estates like 'Istimrari Estate' and 'Bhum '; but the
general meaning of thfl word ' estate ' under the Ajmer
H.egulatio11 is an area of land separately assessed to
revenue, which is payable by the holder of the estate.
Thakur Raghubir
Singh
v.
State of Ajm<r
' Intermediary ' as defined in s. 2 (viii) of the Act is a
holder of an estate and includes a jagirdar. Under s. 4
all the estates held by intermediaries vest in the State
Government on the issue of a notification.
Therefore,
if the jagirdars are intermediaries, that is holders of
estates, their estates will vest in the State Government
under s. 4 of the Act.
The distinction which the
learned counsel for this petitioner draws between the (
Wantlv>o).
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
•958
interest of the ja.girdar as jagirdar and as land-owner
Tltah
R
h bi is in our opinion wholly unfounded.
A perusal of
u;;.;f u ' annexures B, C and D, filed by the petitioner himself,
v.
would make this clear. Anuexures B and C are sanads
Stale of Ai""' with respect to the jagir_s held by the pet it imlPr. Entry
in the remarks column of annexure B begins with the
Wonchoo J.
words "Grant of this estate lasts ... ". Similarly, in
annexure C the opening words in the remarks column are
"The Grant is to the Dudha.dha.ri for t.he time being.
No part of the estate is transferable by sale or mortgage ... ". Therefore, the grants themselves designated
these jagirs as estates. They were assessed to revenue,
which was, however, remitted and the estates thus
came to be known as revenue-free jagirs and the estate
holder was designated as jagirdar. It was because of
this remission of the land revenue that the word
' jagirdar ' was defined in the Ajmer Tenancy and
Land Records Act, 1950, as assignee of land revenue.
Annexures B and C also show that when the grants
were ma.de before 1877 a large part of the area covered
by the grant was uncultivated. Annexure D shows
that disputes arose between the jagirdars and the
Biswedars in the~e jagirs about the;;e uncultivated
lands, and oue such dispute was decided as late as
1954. ln that judgment (annexure D) history of jagir
tenure was traced and it was held that the jagirdar
was the owner of uncultivated land in-his ja.gir and not
the Biswedar. Therefore, the distinction which has
been drawn by the learned counsel between the
jagirdar as an assignee of land revenue based on the
definition in the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records
Act, 1950, and the same person as the land-owner is
unfounded. It appears that though the jagirda.r may
have been defined as assignee of land revenue because
of the peculiar fact that in the case of a jagirdar there
had been remission of land revenue by sanads granted
before 1877, he was the proprietor of his jagir and the
grantee of the estate given to him as jagir. There is
no question, therefore, of separating the interest of
jagirdar as the assignee of land revenue from his
interest as the holder of jagir-estate by virtue of a
grant before 1877. The petitioner therefore in petition
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
489
No. 33 of 1956 is the holder of the jagir-estate and
therefore his entire interest in the estate is liable to
resumption under the Act. In the Ajmer Regulations,
(Vol. H to I,) at pp. 564-6, these two estates have been
considered and their history is given, and they are
called jagirs. The history of jagirs in Rajasthan was
considered by this Court in Thakur Amarsinghji v.
State of Rajasthan (1), at p. 330 onwards, and the word
'jagir' was held to connote all grants which conferred
on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. In
the case of these two jagirs also, as annexures B and
C show, land revenue was remitted and they were
granted as estates for particular purposes. They arc,
therefore, clearly estates in view of the origin of the
title of 'the holder of these estates who is called a
jagirdar and therefore the State could take them over
under s. 4 of the Act.
There is no force in any of the points raised on behalf
of the petitioners, and the petitions fail and are hereby
dismissed with one set of costs to the contesting
rer:!pondcnt.
Petitions dismisser!.
SRI RAM RAM NARAIN MEDHI
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(and connected petition)
(S. R. DAS, c. J., N. H. BHAGWATI, 'B. P. SINHA,
K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Ref arm-Distribution of ownership and control of agricultural land--Purchase by tenants-Validity of enactmcnt-Dombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (llom.
XIII of 1956), ss. 32 to 32R-C?nstitution of India, Arts. r4, r9,
:JI, 3rA, Entry r8, List II, Seventh Schedule.
The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of the
Bomhay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Amendment) Act, 1956
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 3•>J.
62
Thakur Raghubir
Singh
v.
State of A }mer
Wanc/wo j.
November rB.