# Allahabad University Etc v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc

- **Citation:** 2024 INSC 1003
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2024-12-18
- **Case number:** WRIT-A No. 580 of 2023
- **Bench:** Dipankar Datta, Prashant Kumar Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/allahabad-university-etc-v-geetanjali-tiwari-pandey-ors-etc-etc-37231
- **Pages:** 43

## Headnote

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reading
down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018.
Headnotes†
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 - University Grants
Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of
Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in
Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 - Reg.10(f)(iii) - Exception
was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted
by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in
shortlisting candidates for interview for appointment on the
post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10
of the 2018 Regulations - The Division Bench of the High
Court proceeded to read down Reg.10 and held that the same
would apply only where past services are required to be
counted for direct recruitment and promotion under the Career
Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the posts of Associate
Professor and Professor:
Held: First and foremost, the Division Bench of the High Court
has not found Reg.10(f)(iii) to be ultra vires on any of the available
grounds, i.e., either on the ground of legislative incompetence or
that it offends any of the Constitutional rights and/or any provision
of the UGC Act or that there is excessive delegation; rather, the
Division Bench has read down Reg.10(f)(iii) on the specious
* Author
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[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ground that the construction it has placed "would obviate the
need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and
the general instructions appended to the advertisement in that
regard" - This course of action was impermissible - 'Reading down'
can be resorted to whenever a provision, which is questioned,
is found to be ultra vires by the court but there is scope for the
court to read the same down in a manner so as to save it from
being declared constitutionally invalid - The line of reasoning
weighing with the Division Bench that the need to examine the
challenge would stand obviated if Reg.10(f)(iii) were construed
in the manner it did is, thus, plainly erroneous - Once Reg.10
specifically refers to counting of previous regular service, whether
national or international, inter alia as Assistant Professor, the
Division Bench in the exercise of its judicial review powers could
not have held that Reg.10 has no application to one aspiring for
appointment as an Assistant Professor - Law is well settled that
courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which
are not there; at the same time, it cannot also read a statute in
a manner that results in deletion of words which are there - This
is for the simple reason that the court has no power to legislate;
hence, it cannot rewrite the legislation - Bearing this principle in
mind, the Division Bench was wholly unjustified in its approach.
[Paras 42, 43]
Interpretation of Statutes - Intention of the Legislature:
Held: A situation could arise where plain and literal reading of
a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose for which the enactment was introduced and, the situation,
necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction which
would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature - The court
would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while it
irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material
of which the legislation is woven. [Para 18]
Interpretation of Statutes - On the Principle of reading down:
Held: Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary
legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts
would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being
declared

## Text

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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1795 : 2024 INSC 1003
Allahabad University Etc.
v.
Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 12411-12414 of 2024)
18 December 2024
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reading
down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018.
Headnotes†
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 - University Grants
Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of
Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in
Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 - Reg.10(f)(iii) - Exception
was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted
by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in
shortlisting candidates for interview for appointment on the
post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10
of the 2018 Regulations - The Division Bench of the High
Court proceeded to read down Reg.10 and held that the same
would apply only where past services are required to be
counted for direct recruitment and promotion under the Career
Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the posts of Associate
Professor and Professor:
Held: First and foremost, the Division Bench of the High Court
has not found Reg.10(f)(iii) to be ultra vires on any of the available
grounds, i.e., either on the ground of legislative incompetence or
that it offends any of the Constitutional rights and/or any provision
of the UGC Act or that there is excessive delegation; rather, the
Division Bench has read down Reg.10(f)(iii) on the specious
* Author
1796
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ground that the construction it has placed "would obviate the
need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and
the general instructions appended to the advertisement in that
regard" - This course of action was impermissible - 'Reading down'
can be resorted to whenever a provision, which is questioned,
is found to be ultra vires by the court but there is scope for the
court to read the same down in a manner so as to save it from
being declared constitutionally invalid - The line of reasoning
weighing with the Division Bench that the need to examine the
challenge would stand obviated if Reg.10(f)(iii) were construed
in the manner it did is, thus, plainly erroneous - Once Reg.10
specifically refers to counting of previous regular service, whether
national or international, inter alia as Assistant Professor, the
Division Bench in the exercise of its judicial review powers could
not have held that Reg.10 has no application to one aspiring for
appointment as an Assistant Professor - Law is well settled that
courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which
are not there; at the same time, it cannot also read a statute in
a manner that results in deletion of words which are there - This
is for the simple reason that the court has no power to legislate;
hence, it cannot rewrite the legislation - Bearing this principle in
mind, the Division Bench was wholly unjustified in its approach.
[Paras 42, 43]
Interpretation of Statutes - Intention of the Legislature:
Held: A situation could arise where plain and literal reading of
a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose for which the enactment was introduced and, the situation,
necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction which
would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature - The court
would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while it
irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material
of which the legislation is woven. [Para 18]
Interpretation of Statutes - On the Principle of reading down:
Held: Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary
legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts
would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being
declared ultra vires; however, there could be situations where the
subordinate legislation (like a rule or a regulation) is challenged
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
on the ground of excessive delegation or is itself violative of the
enabling/primary legislation under which it is framed or even
breaches constitutional guarantees - 'Reading down' of a provision
is a subsidiary rule of interpretation of statutes, which the courts
tend to employ in situations to save the subordinate legislation like
a rule or a regulation, wherever possible and practical, by reading
it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather than declaring it as
unconstitutional or invalid - However, it has been clarified that it is
to be used sparingly, and in limited circumstances - Additionally, it is
clear that the act of reading down a provision, must be undertaken
only if doing so can keep the operation of the statute "within the
purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid". [Para 27]
Service Law - Selection - Criterion - Whether a selection
Board can fix a higher criterion for shortlisting candidates:
Held: The principle discernible from the various decisions of
this Court is that whenever selection is based solely on the
performance of the aspirants in the interview, it is not open to
the recruiting authorities to dilute in any manner the norms and
standards prescribed by the statutory provisions or executive
orders governing recruitment for screening aspirants to be called
for interview; however, it is always open to them to prescribe
enhanced norms to have the zone of consideration for interview
restricted to those aspirants satisfying the enhanced norms or
higher criteria - In such cases, however, care has to be taken such
that the enhanced norms or higher criteria are not susceptible to
a challenge on the ground of arbitrariness or being contrary to the
statutory provisions or executive orders governing recruitment.
[Para 30]
Pleadings - Grant of relief - Whether, relief can be granted
in the absence of requisite pleadings:
Held: While deciding a writ petition on the basis of affidavits, the
writ court's enquiry ought to be restricted to the case pleaded by
the parties and the evidence that they have placed on record as
part of the writ petition or the counter/reply affidavit, as the case
may be - Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings
and the evidence produced before it by the parties - It is well-nigh
impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make
out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments
advanced in course of hearing. [Para 37]
1798
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur [1986] 1 SCR 383 :
(1986) 2 SCC 237; Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed
Mohideen [2010] 1 SCR 1127 : (2010) 2 SCC 513; Union of
India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp. 1
SCC 323; CST v. Radhakrishan [1979] 2 SCR 33 : (1979) 2 SCC
249; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1990]
Supp. 1 SCR 142 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600; B.R. Enterprises v.
State of U.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1111 : (1999) 9 SCC 700; State of
Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha [2011] 10 SCR 662: (2011) 13 SCC
262; Subramanian Swamy v. Raju [2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8
SCC 390; Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu
[2024] 2 SCR 12 : (2024) 6 SCC 641 - relied on.
A.P.J. Abdul kalam Technological University v. Jai Bharath College
of Mngt. & Engg. Technology [2020] 13 SCR 732 : (2021) 2 SCC
564; Visveswaraiah Technological University v. Krishnendu Halder
[2011] 2 SCR 1007 : (2011) 4 SCC 606; Tej Prakash Pathak v.
Rajasthan High Court [2024] 12 SCR 28 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3184; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 1
SCR 841 : (2004) 6 SCC 54; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v.
Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1078 : (1999) 4
SCC 458; M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar
[1994] Supp. 3 SCR 665 : (1994) 6 SCC 293; Pt. Shamboo Nath
Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh [1995] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1995) Supp. 2
SCC 266; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [2008] 14 SCR 621:
(2008) 17 SCC 491; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v.
Chand Behari Kapoor [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 524 : (1998) 7 SCC
469; Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 1050 :
(1988) 4 SCC 534 - referred to.
List of Acts
University Grants Commission Act, 1956; University Grants
Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers
and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other
Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education)
Regulations, 2018; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Interpretation of Statutes; Principle of reading down; Assistant
Professor; Interpretation of statutes; Ultra-vires; Shortlisting of
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
candidates; Service Law; Selection; Pleadings; Subordinate
legislation; Statutory provisions; Executive orders; Benevolent
interpretation; Power of Court; Rewriting legislation.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 1241112414 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WRIT-A No. 580 of 2023, SPLAD
Nos. 187 and 257 of 2022 and CMRA Nos. 398 of 2023
With
Civil Appeal No. 12415 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Nikhil Goel, P.K.S. Baghel, Sr. Advs., Manu Yadav, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Tanmaya Agarwal, Shwetank Silakwal, Wrick
Chatterjee, Mrs. Aditi Agarwal, Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi
Pandey, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Vishal Agrawal, Mrigank Prabhakar,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
The Challenge
1.
Assail in these civil appeals is to the common judgment and order
dated 18th January, 20241passed by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad,2 whereby the High Court disposed
of a writ petition, two special appeals and one review petition.3 All but
one of the proceedings were at the instance of Gitanjali Pandey.4 The
1
impugned order
2
High Court, hereafter
3
Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, Special Appeal Defective No. 187 of 2022, Special Appeal Defective No. 257 of
2022 and Civil Misc. Review Application No. 398 of 2023
4
 Respondent 1
1800
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
remaining one was at the instance of one Brahma Deo (Respondent 1
in Civil Appeal No. 12413/2024).
Resume of Facts
2.
Relevant facts, pertinent for disposal of the present appeal, are
summed up as under:
a.
Respondent 1was an aspirant for the post of 'Assistant
Professor' in Allahabad University and its affiliated colleges.
As per her pleadings, between October 2004 and March 2010
(approximately 5 1⁄2 years), she worked as a contractual faculty in
Jawad Ali Shah Imambara Girls PG College (affiliated to Pandit
Deen Dayal Upadhyay University, Gorakhpur) at a monthly
cash honorarium of Rs. 5000/-. Thereafter, between 2016 and
2021, she claims to have worked as a guest faculty in different
constituent colleges of Allahabad University at different honoraria
ranging from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-.
b.
Advertisements:
i.
On 28th September 2021, Allahabad University published
an advertisement for appointment on the posts of Assistant
Professors in various disciplines. A total of 4 (four) posts
were advertised for Sanskrit. Respondent 1 applied for
appointment on the single advertised post in the unreserved
category.
ii.
On 30th August 2022, a constituent college of Allahabad
University, viz. Iswar Saran Degree College (ISDC), issued
an advertisement which, inter alia, invited applications
from eligible candidates for appointment on the post of
Assistant Professor in Sanskrit.
iii.
On 28th November 2022, another constituent college of
Allahabad University, viz. Allahabad Degree College (ADC),
issued a similar advertisement.
c.
Pursuant to all the above advertisements, Respondent 1 duly
applied for appointment on the posts.
d.
The requisite qualifications for appointment on the posts of
Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor are
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
prescribed by the University Grants Commission (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations,
2018.5 Clause 4 thereof provides for the minimum qualifications
required for the post of Assistant and Associate Professor. It is
not in dispute that Respondent 1 does possess the requisite
educational qualifications for appointment as Assistant Professor
in Sanskrit.
e.
The procedure for shortlisting candidates for interview is given
in the note to Reg.4.1, which provides for shortlisting on the
basis of an academic score prepared in accordance with Table
3A (for universities) and 3B (for colleges). Hence, for shortlisting
candidates for the purposes of interview, Allahabad University
would score candidates as per the criteria laid down in Table
3A and the affiliated colleges in Table 3B.
f.
As per clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, 2 (two) marks are to
be granted to a candidate for every year of his/her teaching
experience or Post Doctoral experience. Since the contents of
both the tables are similar, we propose to reproduce Table 3A
later in this judgment.
g.
Despite Respondent 1 fulfilling the eligibility criteria, she was
not shortlisted for the interview as her score did not reach the
cutoff marks. This happened because she was not awarded any
marks under clause 7 in Table 3A for "Teaching/Post Doctoral
experience". Her past teaching experiences on contractual
basis and as a guest faculty were not counted as 'teaching
experience' by Allahabad University.
h.
According to Allahabad University, past teaching experience
as a guest lecturer and on contractual basis do not fulfill the
conditions provided under Reg.10(e) and (f)(iii), respectively;
hence, it could not be counted as 'Teaching/Post Doctoral
experience'.
i.
As per clause 10(e), previous service as a 'guest lecturer' would
not count as 'teaching experience'. Furthermore, as per clause
5
 2018 Regulations, hereafter
1802
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10(f)(iii), previous service of a lecturer on contractual basis
would count as 'teaching experience' only if the incumbent was
drawing total gross emoluments not less than the monthly gross
salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor, Associate
Professor and Professor, as the case may be. Reg.10, in its
entirety, would also be reproduced at a latter part of this judgment
for the sake of completeness of understanding.
j.
As mentioned above, Respondent 1 had served as a guest
lecturer and on contractual basis before. Furthermore, as per
the records, she was also not drawing a salary/honorarium
equivalent to the monthly gross salary of a regularly appointed
Assistant Professor, which at the relevant time was Rs. 35,654/-.
Therefore, Respondent 1 was not granted any marks for her past
services as guest lecturer and on contractual basis. Falling short
of marks, she was not shortlisted for interview.
k.
Thereafter, litigation commenced with the following cases being
presented by the Respondent 1:
i.
Upon the advertisement dated 28th September 2021 being
issued and her experience not being marked, Respondent
1 invoked the writ jurisdiction by filing a petition6 praying
that Allahabad University be directed to grant her marks
for her teaching experience as 'contractual faculty' while
shortlisting candidates for interview. Her petition was
rejected by the Single Judge on 20th May 2022. Challenging
the same, she filed the Special Appeal (Defective).7
ii.
In respect of advertisement dated 30th August 2022,
Respondent 1 filed another petition8 wherein, inter alia,
she prayed for a declaration that Reg.10(f)(iii) of the
2018 Regulations be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, 1950. This petition was dismissed
on 2nd August 2023 in light of the pendency of the Special
Appeal (Defective) filed earlier. Against the order dated 2nd
6
Writ-A no. 7114 of 2022
7
Special Appeal (D) No. 187 of 2022
8
 W.P. 16585 of 2022
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
August 2023, Respondent 1 preferred Civil Misc Review
Application.9
iii.
Insofar as the advertisement dated 28th November 2022
is concerned, Respondent 1 filed another petition10
challenging the vires of Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018
Regulations.
iv.
Relying upon the judgment dated 20th May 2022 (rendered
in Writ-A No.7114 of 2022), the Single Judge dismissed
the petition11 of the said Brahma Deo. Aggrieved by
such dismissal, Brahma Deo also filed a Special Appeal
(Defective).12
v.
As noted above, vide the impugned order, all the
abovementioned four proceedings were disposed of.
Impugned Order
3.
The High Court noted the question arising for decision in paragraph
17 of its decision and commenced its discussion from paragraph 23.
We consider it appropriate to reproduce verbatim the same hereunder:
"17. The short question raised in this bunch of petitions
is as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) would be applicable
while awarding marks for the teaching/post-doctoral
experience, in terms of clause 7 of table 3A for shortlisting
of candidates, to be called for interview for the post of
Assistant Professors in universities? As a sequel, it has
to be seen as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) is ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
***
23. The counting of past services under regulation 10,
however, would be relevant and directly co-related to
the post on which direct appointment orpromotion under
CAS itself is sought. Since, past services are required
9
Civil Misc. Application No. 398 of 2023
10
W.P. No. 580 of 2023
11
Writ-A No. 6927 of 2022
12
Special Appeal (D) no.257 of 2022
1804
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for appointment to the post of Associate Professor
and Professor only in the regulations, the relevance of
regulation 10 would be restricted to these posts alone.
24. No previous teaching experience (including Assistant
Professor) since is required as eligibility condition for
appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, as such
regulation 10 would have no direct applicability/relevance
for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor.
***
29. Regulation 10 specifically deals with a defined exigency
i.e. counting of past services for direct recruitment and
promotion under CAS. This exigency is not attracted in the
present set of cases. Regulation 10 has a direct nexus with
the object sought to be achieved i.e. direct recruitment and
promotion under CAS. Since past services are mandatorily
required for appointment to the post of Associate Professor
and Professor only, therefore, regulation 10 would have
relevance only for appointment and promotion to such posts.
30. Reference of past services on the post of Assistant
Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant
Professor appears to be a surplusage since the eligibility
for the post of Assistant Professor does not require
any teaching experience. Counting of past services as
Assistant Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant
Professor serves no purpose in the scheme contained in
the regulations. Regulation 10 of the regulations, therefore,
has no applicability in the case of direct appointment to
the post of Assistant Professor.
31. We are persuaded to take such a view as reference
to teaching experience in table 3A has to be read in
conjunction with post-doctoral experience as they constitute
a composite class in itself. In the event regulation 10
conditions teaching experience, as is suggested by the
respondents, the term post-doctoral experience would also
have to be necessarily conditioned by regulation 10. This,
however, does not appear to be the intent of the scheme
contained in the regulations.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
32. Limiting teaching experience to the experience of
teaching as an Assistant Professor, by drawing emoluments
not less than the monthly gross salary of a regularly
appointed Assistant Professor would clearly be reading
something more than what is specified in the regulations
itself. Counting of past services for direct recruitment or
promotion under CAS to the post of Assistant Professor
otherwise is not contemplated. Such a construction would
also be unworkable once a condition of the kind is attached
to the post-doctoral experiences also.
33. Post-doctoral experiences can be of different kinds,
including research activity, teaching activity etc. If the
provisions of regulation 10 are applied while awarding
marks in clause 7 of table 3A then an anomalous situation
may arise, inasmuch as teaching experience gathered by
a post-doctoral candidate would entitle him to two marks if
teaching by him is considered as post-doctoral experience
but such marks would be denied if it is treated as teaching
experience only. It is for this reason that table 3A of the
regulations does not refer to or rely upon regulation 10. The
interpretation drawn by the respondents to read regulation
10 in table 3A, which specifically lays down the criteria
for short-listing of candidates for interview for the post of
Assistant Professors, therefore, cannot be approved.
34. In our opinion, regulation 10 of the regulations would
be attracted only where past services are required to be
counted for direct recruitment and promotion under CAS.
It cannot be transposed to be made applicable in criteria
for short-listing of candidates to be called for interview, to
the post of Assistant Professor, by any recognized process
of interpretation. Such construction otherwise is not culled
out from the scheme contained in the regulations nor it
helps in short-listing of candidates to be called for interview.
35. Table 3A specifies the marks to be awarded to a
candidate on different parameters specified therein. Apart
from awarding marks for graduation; post-graduation;
M.Phil.; NET with JRF or NET; SLET/SET the table provides
for teaching/post-doctoral experience of two marks for each
1806
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
year. Since the term teaching/post-doctoral experience is
not defined in the regulations the ordinary/commonsensical
meaning would have to be assigned to it.
36. Teaching experience as a full time teacher in a
recognized university or its affiliated or constituent
colleges with requisite qualification as per regulations for
the post of Assistant Professor would sufficiently entitle a
candidate to award of two marks for each year of teaching
experience in clause 7 of table 3A. Nature of appointment
i.e. substantive/adhoc/guest lecturer etc. or the amount of
salary paid having not been specified in clause 7 of the
table 3A are not relevant for the purposes of award of
marks in clause 7 of table 3A for short-listing of candidates.
Regulation 10 would otherwise not be applicable for the
reasons recorded above. This construction would obviate
the need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation
10(f)(iii) and the general instructions appended to the
advertisement in that regard. It would also effectuate the
cause of calling best candidates for interview, inasmuch
as teaching experience of a candidate would be counted
towards his merit for short-listing.
37. The interpretation assigned in this judgment to clause 7
of table 3A would subserve the object of short-listing the
best candidates to be called for interview to the post
of Assistant Professors. The selections already made,
however, would not be reopened or challenged on the
ground that short-listing of candidates was not done in
the manner indicated in this judgment. This is so as the
selected candidates are not a party to this bunch of petitions
nor their selections otherwise have been assailed. The
respondents would, henceforth, short-list the candidates to
be called for interview for the post of Assistant Professor
in the manner indicated in this judgment. On these terms
the writ petition, special appeal and the review application
are disposed of. No order is passed as to costs."
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
4.
Learned senior counsel and counsel for Allahabad University and
Allahabad Degree College, respectively, submitted that the High
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
Court erred in substituting its opinion to the mandatory methodology
followed by them. To persuade us to reverse the impugned order,
they argued that:
a.
For award of marks under clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, Reg.10
would apply, even for appointment on the post of Assistant
Professor, as the post 'Assistant Professor' is expressly
mentioned therein;
b.
The process of shortlisting as adopted by the appellants is
extremely important for them, considering that thousands of
candidates apply for a few posts;
c.
Even if Reg.10 is assumed to be not applicable, the appellants
are entitled to adopt the methodology given therein as there
is no specific bar in the 2018 Regulations. Hence, it is open
for them to supplement such regulations so long as they are
not illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to the 2018
Regulations;
d.
The Division Bench while being seized of the writ petition ought
to have noticed that respondent 1 had not averred anomaly in
respect of clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B and in the absence
thereof, and particularly when 'post-doctoral experience' had
not been defined, could have sought clarification from the
University Grants Commission13 or the appellants as to what
is meant by such expression but instead thereof, allowed itself
to be guided by a perceived anomaly which was not even the
pleaded case of respondent 1;
e.
In practice, 'post-doctoral experience' refers to post-doctoral
fellowship programmes awarded by various Government
organizations like UGC, Indian Council of Social Science
Research, Department of Science and Technology, etc.,
not including teaching activity, yet, it would appear from the
impugned order that the Division Bench has proceeded to return
findings which are based on mere assumptions;
f.
There are decisions of this Court, viz. A.P.J. Abdul kalam
Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of Mngt.
13
 UGC
1808
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
& Engg. Technology14 and Visveswaraiah Technological
University v. Krishnendu Halder15 where it has been laid
down that while dilution of published norms is not permissible,
prescribing enhanced norms is permissible without defeating
any right of an aspirant for a post;
g.
The decision of recent origin of the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court16 also
puts beyond any shadow of doubt that any procedure that
is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and having a
rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved can be
devised for taking a recruitment process towards its logical end
by the recruiting bodies.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent 1
5.
Learned senior counsel for respondent 1 submitted that the Division
Bench of the High Court has rightly read down Reg. 10(f)(iii) of the
2018 Regulations to save it from being struck down as arbitrary and
hence there is no need for interference. He argued that:
a.
Emoluments-based distinction under Reg.10(f)(iii) violates Article
14 of the Indian Constitution as the distinction between Assistant
Professors, who are serving on contractual basis, and those
who are appointed on regular basis, has no direct nexus with
the objective of ensuring quality education;
b.
Exclusion of candidates, who otherwise are qualified and have
ample teaching experience (even though on contractual basis),
undermines the objective of ensuring quality education;
c.
The Division Bench has rightly held that since 'Assistant
Professor' is an entry level post, there is no need for any
previous experience;
d.
Although respondent 1 has since lost the right to participate in
the process initiated by Allahabad University due to passage
of time, the impugned order still holds good for the colleges
where the process is yet to be concluded and it was urged that
14
 (2021) 2 SCC 564
15
 (2011) 4 SCC 606
16
 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
a well-qualified candidate like respondent 1 should not lose the
opportunity to compete with the whole lot of candidates aspiring
for appointment in the manner directed by the Division Bench.
Pleading of respondent 1 in support of her claim that Reg. 10(f)(iii)
is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution
6.
In Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, respondent 1 prayed that Reg.10(f)(iii) be
declared ultra vires since the same was in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. She submitted that the said regulation is discriminatory
as it creates a hierarchy among teachers (in other words, creates
class amongst class) on the basis of salary drawn by them. This
adversely impacts other equally qualified and experienced candidates,
as they do not get any marks for their past teaching experience just
because they were not drawing salary equivalent to gross monthly
salary of a regular Assistant Professor. She further submitted that the
salary a teacher receives does not have any visible correlation with
the teaching experience. Reg.10(f)(iii) is, thus, liable to be declared
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
7.
Significantly, apart from the emoluments aspect, neither have we
been able to trace any other point that respondent 1 sought to
urge to invalidate Reg.10(f)(iii), nor was any other part of the 2018
Regulations subjected to challenge.
The Issue
8.
Exception was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted
by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in shortlisting
candidates for interview for appointment on the post of Assistant
Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations.
Since the High Court did not declare Reg.10(f)(iii) as ultra vires the
Constitution or the parent enactment, i.e., the University Grants
Commission Act, 195617 (in terms whereof the 2018 Regulations
were framed) but read Reg.10 down, we are primarily tasked to
decide whether the High Court was correct in reading it down in the
manner it did. Should the answer be in the negative, allowing the
appeal of Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College is the
logical conclusion; and since the appeals would thus succeed, as
17
 UGC Act, hereafter
1810
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a corollary, there would be no impediment for the appellants to be
guided, inter alia, by Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations for the purpose
of shortlisting. On the contrary, if these appeals fail, all the universities
and colleges across the country would be precluded from shortlisting
candidates seeking appointment on the posts of Assistant Professor
for interview in terms of Regs.4 and 10 read with Tables 3A and 3B
of the 2018 Regulations. This is a conclusion that would logically
follow from the view expressed in paragraph 22 of the decision of
this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India18 and
the ramifications, to say the least, could be significant.
Observations/Findings of the High Court while reading down Reg.
10(f)(iii)
9.
To recapitulate, the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to
read down Reg.10 and held that the same would apply only where
past services are required to be counted for direct recruitment and
promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the
posts of Associate Professor and Professor. The Division Bench took
the view that marking candidates for their past teaching experiences
in order to shortlist them for interview for appointment on the post
of Assistant Professor was a surplusage, since the eligibility for the
post of Assistant Professor does not require any teaching experience.
Therefore, counting of past services on such posts serves no tangible
purpose. In the absence of such a requirement, the applicability of
Reg.10 to direct recruitment on the posts of Assistant Professor would
not arise, thus, restricting the operation of Reg.10 only to posts which
demanded prior experience i.e. Associate Professor and Professor.
10. The Division Bench further opined that 'Teaching experience' as
provided under clause 7 of table 3A has to be read in conjunction with
'Post-doctoral experience'. They form a composite class. Resultantly,
if 'teaching experience' is allowed to be conditioned by Reg.10, then
'post-doctoral experience' mentioned in the same clause will also
necessarily have to be conditioned by the said regulation. This will
result into an anomalous situation. According to the Division Bench,
'post-doctoral experiences' can be of many kinds including research
activity, teaching activity, etcetera and that if teaching experience of a
post-doctoral candidate (who is not drawing gross monthly equivalent
18
(2004) 6 SCC 54
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
to that of a regular Assistant Professor) is counted as 'post-doctoral
experience', then such candidate would be entitled to two marks
per year of his/her experience; however, if it is counted as 'teaching
experience', then the candidate would not be entitled to the marks
as he/she as a teacher was not drawing salary as aforesaid. Hence,
for the same candidate, two different markings are possible based
on the interpretation chosen. This perceived anomaly guided the
High Court to ultimately read down Reg.10.
Judicial Precedents and the Principles flowing therefrom
11. It would be of profit to read precedents and to deduce the principles
of law laid down therein, having a bearing on the issue which we
are tasked to decide.
On Interpretation of Statutes
12. Hon'ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) in
Girdhari Lal & sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur,19 in His Lordship's
inimitable style, had the occasion to emphasize:
"6. It may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this stage
certain well-known principles of interpretation of statutes:
Words are but mere vehicles of thought. They are meant
to express or convey one's thoughts. Generally, a person's
words and thoughts are coincidental. No problem arises
then, but, not infrequently, they are not. It is common
experience with most men, that occasionally there are no
adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words
which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but
not words which will express precisely. There is then a
great fumbling for words. Long-winded explanations and,
in conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous
words and words which unwittingly convey more that one
meaning are used. Where different interpretations are
likely to be put on words and a question arises what an
individual meant when he used certain words, he may
be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say
that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the
legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws
19
 (1986) 2 SCC 237
1812
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has
said, a legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve those
difficulties. The legislatures, unlike individuals, cannot
come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties
of interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws
by finding out what the legislature meant is allotted to the
courts. Now, if one person puts into words the thoughts
of another (as the draftsman puts into words the thoughts
of the legislature) and a third person (the court) is to find
out what they meant, more difficulties are bound to crop
up. The draftsman may not have caught the spirit of the
legislation at all; the words used by him may not adequately
convey what is meant to be conveyed; the words may be
ambiguous: they may be words capable of being differently
understood by different persons. How are the courts to set
about the task of resolving difficulties of interpretation of
the laws? The foremost task of a court, as we conceive it,
in the interpretation of statutes, is to find out the intention
of the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and
unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such
words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words
must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges,
it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended
what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of the
so-called golden rule of construction that where the words
of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be
given to them. A court should give effect to plain words,
not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness
of such words but because plain words may be expected
to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others
as well as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the
words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes
appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may
sometimes be possible that the plain meaning of the words
does not convey and may even defeat the intention of the
legislature; in such cases there, is no reason why the true
intention of the legislature, if it can be determined, clearly
by other means, should not be given effect. Words are
meant to serve and not to govern and we are not to add
the tyranny of words to the other tyrannies of the world."
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
13. Another crisp and enlightening passage is found in Reserve Bank
of India (supra), where His Lordship observed as follows:
"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context.
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the
text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither
can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best
which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual.
A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was
enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first
as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause,
phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked
at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at without
the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that
every word has a place and everything is in its place. ... "
14. Reiteration of the principles of interpretation of statutes and elucidation
of the approach to be adopted, as suggested by the Hon'ble Judge,
are so lucid that we feel hesitant to say anything more.