# ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [2019] 1 S.C.R. 100
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-01-08
- **Bench:** Ranjan Gogoi, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, K. M. Joseph
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/alok-kumar-verma-v-union-of-india-anr-33728
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 - ss.8(1)(a), (d)
and 11 - Competence of the CVC and the Government of India to
divest the Director, CBI of all his powers, functions, duties,
supervisory role etc. without obtaining the prior consent of the
Committee constituted under s.4A(1) of DSPE Act to make
recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI - Held: The
long history of evolution has shown that the Institution of the CBI
has been perceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds of
extraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premier
investigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favour
and in the best public interest - The head of the Institution, namely,
the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model of
independence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedom
from all kinds of control and interference except to the extent that
Parliament may have intended - Such intendment would require all
Authorities to keep away from intermingling or interfering in the
functioning of the Director - In a situation where such interference
may at all be called for, public interest must be writ large against
the backdrop of the necessity - The relevance and adequacy of the
reasons giving rise to such a compelling necessity can only be tested
by the opinion of the Committee constituted under s.4A(1) of the
DSPE Act in whom the power to make recommendations for
appointment of the Director has been vested by Parliament - This
alone can provide an adequate safeguard to ensure the
independence of the office keeping in view the legislative intent -
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - ss.4(1), 4A, 4B -
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
CBI - Brief history of CBI - Origin of CBI - Police force in
the country was initially governed by the Police Act, 1861 - DSPE
Act was enacted in 1946 to carve out an exception to the Police
[2019] 1 S.C.R. 100
100
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Act, 1861 - It is the DSPE brought into existence by DSPE Act,
1946 which today is known as the CBI.
CBI - Role of CBI - Investigation of anti-corruption cases;
economic offences and ordinary crimes of special importance have
come to be vested in the CBI which exercises its jurisdiction in the
territory of all States and Union Territory with consent of State
Governments.
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - s.4A and
s.4B - Legislative intent of - Held: The clear legislative intent in
bringing s.4A and s.4B to the statute book is for the purpose of
ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI from
all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for
upholding the integrity and independence of the institution of the
CBI as a whole - If the legislative intent would have been to confer
in any authority of the State a power to take interim measures against
the Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the
legislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effect
and consequently would have been differently worded and drafted -
Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
Disposing of the Writ petitions and IAs, the Court
HELD: 1. There is no manner of doubt that the enactment
of the CVC Act, 2003 and the amendments made by the said
enactment, inter alia, in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVC
Act, 2003) are a sequel to the operative directions of this Court
in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain. The mode and manner of
appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance
Commissioners as well as that of the Director, CBI as spelt out
by this Court in Vineet Narain has been scrupulously followed by
Parliament. Parliament has also on its own in amending Section
4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
(Act No. 1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to the
directions of this Court made in Vineet Narain inasmuch as the
object for change of the Committee for making recommendations
for appointment of the Director, CBI has been state

## Text

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ALOK KUMAR VERMA
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1309 of 2018)
JANUARY 08, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND
K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 - ss.8(1)(a), (d)
and 11 - Competence of the CVC and the Government of India to
divest the Director, CBI of all his powers, functions, duties,
supervisory role etc. without obtaining the prior consent of the
Committee constituted under s.4A(1) of DSPE Act to make
recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI - Held: The
long history of evolution has shown that the Institution of the CBI
has been perceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds of
extraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premier
investigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favour
and in the best public interest - The head of the Institution, namely,
the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model of
independence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedom
from all kinds of control and interference except to the extent that
Parliament may have intended - Such intendment would require all
Authorities to keep away from intermingling or interfering in the
functioning of the Director - In a situation where such interference
may at all be called for, public interest must be writ large against
the backdrop of the necessity - The relevance and adequacy of the
reasons giving rise to such a compelling necessity can only be tested
by the opinion of the Committee constituted under s.4A(1) of the
DSPE Act in whom the power to make recommendations for
appointment of the Director has been vested by Parliament - This
alone can provide an adequate safeguard to ensure the
independence of the office keeping in view the legislative intent -
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - ss.4(1), 4A, 4B -
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
CBI - Brief history of CBI - Origin of CBI - Police force in
the country was initially governed by the Police Act, 1861 - DSPE
Act was enacted in 1946 to carve out an exception to the Police
[2019] 1 S.C.R. 100
100
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Act, 1861 - It is the DSPE brought into existence by DSPE Act,
1946 which today is known as the CBI.
CBI - Role of CBI - Investigation of anti-corruption cases;
economic offences and ordinary crimes of special importance have
come to be vested in the CBI which exercises its jurisdiction in the
territory of all States and Union Territory with consent of State
Governments.
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - s.4A and
s.4B - Legislative intent of - Held: The clear legislative intent in
bringing s.4A and s.4B to the statute book is for the purpose of
ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI from
all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for
upholding the integrity and independence of the institution of the
CBI as a whole - If the legislative intent would have been to confer
in any authority of the State a power to take interim measures against
the Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the
legislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effect
and consequently would have been differently worded and drafted -
Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
Disposing of the Writ petitions and IAs, the Court
HELD: 1. There is no manner of doubt that the enactment
of the CVC Act, 2003 and the amendments made by the said
enactment, inter alia, in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVC
Act, 2003) are a sequel to the operative directions of this Court
in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain. The mode and manner of
appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance
Commissioners as well as that of the Director, CBI as spelt out
by this Court in Vineet Narain has been scrupulously followed by
Parliament. Parliament has also on its own in amending Section
4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
(Act No. 1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to the
directions of this Court made in Vineet Narain inasmuch as the
object for change of the Committee for making recommendations
for appointment of the Director, CBI has been stated to be the
necessity "to provide a High Power Selection Committee for
selection of Director of the Delhi Special Police Establishment".
[Para 32][123-F-H; 124-A-B]
ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA
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Vineet Narain and others v. Union of India and another
(1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 - relied
on.
2. The clear legislative intent in bringing Section 4A and
Section 4B of the DSPE Act to the statute book are for the purpose
of ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI
from all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for
upholding the integrity and independence of the institution of
the CBI as a whole. If the legislative intent would have been to
confer in any authority of the State a power to take interim
measures against the Director, CBI thereby affecting his
functioning, surely, the legislation would have contained enabling
provisions to that effect and consequently would have been
differently worded and drafted. It is against this backdrop that
the words "transferred except with the previous consent of the
Committee" mentioned in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act has to
be understood. If the word "transferred" has to be understood
in its ordinary parlance and limited to a change from one post to
another, as the word would normally convey and on that basis the
requirement of "previous consent of the Committee" is
understood to be only in such cases, i.e. purely of transfer, such
an interpretation would be self-defeating and would clearly negate
the legislative intent. In such an event it will be free for the State
Authority to effectively disengage the Director, CBI from
functioning by adopting various modes, known and unknown,
which may not amount to transfer but would still have the same
effect as a transfer from one post to another, namely, cessation of
exercise of powers and functions of the earlier post. This is clearly
not what the legislature could have intended. The long history of
evolution has shown that the institution of the CBI has been
perceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds of
extraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premier
investigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favour
and in the best public interest. The head of the institution, namely,
the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model of
independence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedom
from all kinds of control and interference except to the extent
that Parliament may have intended. Such intendment would
require all Authorities to keep away from intermingling or
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interfering in the functioning of the Director. In a situation where
such interference may at all be called for, public interest must be
writ large against the backdrop of the necessity. The relevance
and adequacy of the reasons giving rise to such a compelling
necessity can only be tested by the opinion of the Committee
constituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act in whom the
power to make recommendations for appointment of the Director
has been vested by Parliament. This alone can provide an
adequate safeguard to ensure the independence of the office
keeping in view the legislative intent. The status of the
Committee having undergone an upward movement by the
amendment brought in by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
(Act No.1 of 2014) it cannot but be said that the legislative intent
in shielding and insulating the office of the Director from any
kind of extraneous influence has been foremost in the mind of
Parliament which intent found manifestation in the changes in
law brought about. [Paras 34, 36][125-C-D; 126-B-H; 127-A-B]
3. Orders dated 23rd October, 2018 of the CVC divesting
the powers, functions, duties, supervisory role, etc. of 'AKS' as
Director, CBI; of the Government of India divesting 'AKS',
Director, CBI of his functions, powers, duties and supervisory
role with immediate effect and until further orders; of the
Government of India by which one MNR, IPS, Joint Director,
CBI has been asked to look after the duties and functions of
Director, CBI with immediate effect is set aside. The matter will
now be considered by the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the
DSPE Act, 1946 which may be so done at the earliest. A meeting
of the Committee may be accordingly convened by the competent
authority. As the issue of divestment of power and authority of
the Director, CBI is still open for consideration by the Committee,
it is deemed proper to direct that the petitioner, Director, CBI,
upon reinstatement, will cease and desist from taking any major
policy decisions till the decision of the Committee permitting
such actions and decisions becomes available within the time
frame indicated. The role of the Petitioner as the Director, CBI
during the interregnum and in terms of this order will be confined
only to the exercise of the ongoing routine functions without any
fresh initiative, having no major policy or institutional implications.
[Paras 39-41][127-G-H; 128-A-F]
ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA
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Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 :
[1991] 2 SCR 567; Jai Singh Dalal and others v. State
of Haryana & another (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 600 : [1992]
3 Suppl. SCR 816; Prakash Singh and Others v. Union
of India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 1 : [2006] 6 Suppl.
SCR 473 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595
relied on
Para 16
[1991] 2 SCR 567
referred to
Para 27
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 816
referred to
Para 27
[2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 473
referred to
Para 35
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
1309 of 2018.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
WITH
Writ Petition (C) No. 1315 of 2018.
K. K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, P. S. Narasimha, ASG,
Fali S. Nariman, Sanjay R. Hegde, Mukul Rohatgi, A. Sharan, Kapil
Sibal, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Advs.,
Subhash C. Sharma, Vishwajit Singh, Pankaj Singh, Ms. Ridhima Singh,
Prashant Bhushan R. Balasubramanian, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh,
Ms. L. Charanya, B. K. Prasad, Ms. Tatini Basu, Rajat Nair, Kanu
Agrawal, Manan Popli, Ranvijay Singh, Sachin Sharma, V. C. Shukla,
Rahul Tanwani, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Amit Anand Tiwari, Ms. Shakun
Sharma, Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms. Harshal Gupta, Shashwat Singh, Devadatt
Kamat, Nizam Pasha, Varun Chopra, Rajesh Inamdar, Javedur Rahman,
Aditya Bhat, Ms. Aisha Singh, Ashwin G. Raj, Gautam Talukdar, Sunil
Fernandes, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Priyansha Indra Sharma, Darpan
Sachdeva, Paras Nath Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANJAN GOGOI, CJI 1. That the Rule of law is the bedrock
of democracy would hardly require any reiteration. However firmly
entrenched the principle may be, it gets tested in a myriad of situations
that confronts the courts from time to time. The present is one such
occasion.
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2. On 23rd October, 2018, the Central Vigilance Commission
(hereinafter referred to as "CVC") passed an order divesting Shri Alok
Kumar Verma, Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
referred to as "CBI") of the powers, functions, duties, supervisory role,
etc. vested in him as the Director of the CBI. The exercise of said
power by the aforesaid order dated 23rd October, 2018, signed by the
Central Vigilance Commissioner and two other Vigilance Commissioners
holding office, is stated to be under Section 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) of the
Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "the
CVC Act") read with Section 4(1) of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "DSPE Act"). The
divestment of Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director, CBI of his functions,
powers, duties and supervisory role, specifically, is in respect of all
cases already registered and/or required to be registered and/or being
inquired/enquired/investigated under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as "PC Act").
3. The aforesaid order is stated to be in the nature of an interim
measure till completion of an inquiry into the allegations contained in a
complaint dated 24th August, 2018 submitted/forwarded by the Cabinet
Secretary by letter dated 31st August, 2018 to the CVC.
4. The said order dated 23rd October, 2018 of the CVC was
followed by an order of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel,
Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training
of the same date i.e. 23rd October, 2018 divesting Shri Alok Kumar Verma,
Director, CBI of his functions, powers, duties and supervisory role in
any manner as the Director, CBI with immediate effect and until further
orders.
5. There is yet another order of the same date i.e. 23rd October,
2018 of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training by which
one Shri M. Nageshwar Rao, IPS, Joint Director, CBI has been asked
to look after the duties and functions of Director, CBI with immediate
effect.
6. The legality and validity of the aforesaid three orders is the
subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1309 of 2018 filed
by Shri Alok Kumar Verma as well as in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1315 of
2018 filed by Common Cause which claims to be a registered society
ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]
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established/founded in the year 1980 by one late Shri H.D. Shourie for
the purposes of "ventilating the common problems of the people and
securing their resolution".
7. In addition to interference with the aforesaid three orders, in
the writ petition filed by Common Cause, further prayers have been
made, inter alia, seeking removal of one Mr. Rakesh Asthana, Special
Director, CBI (respondent no.4 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1315 of 2018)
from the CBI and for constituting a Special Investigating Team ("SIT"
for short) to go into the charges of corruption against the officials of the
CBI and also the FIR lodged against Mr. Rakesh Asthana, Special
Director, CBI, details of which are mentioned in the writ petition filed by
Common Cause.
8. The order of the CVC dated 23rd October, 2018 is fairly long
and elaborate. What is essentially stated therein is that a complaint
dated 24th August, 2018 was forwarded to the CVC by the Cabinet
Secretary by letter dated 31st August, 2018 which, prima facie, revealed
charges of corruption against the Director, CBI, Shri Alok Kumar Verma.
The CVC considered it worthwhile to take note of the contents thereof
and had sought the explanation/comments of the Director, CBI along
with the relevant record(s). According to the CVC, instead of cooperating
in the matter, the Director, CBI had sought information as to the identity
of the person who had complained to the Cabinet Secretary in that regard
and had gone to the extent of bringing specific allegations against the
Special Director, CBI Shri Rakesh Asthana. Details of several cases of
corruption wherein the Special Director, CBI was alleged to be involved
were also brought to the notice of the CVC by Shri Alok Kumar Verma.
9. In the order of the CVC dated 23rd October, 2018 it is further
recorded that Shri Rakesh Asthana, Special Director, CBI had also made
serious allegations against Shri Alok Kumar Verma, Director, CBI and
that, in fact, on 15th October, 2018, the CBI had registered RC 13A of
2018 of AC III, New Delhi under Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d)
and Section 7A of the PC Act as amended in 2018 against Shri Asthana.
The said RC case was stated to have been registered on the complaint
of one Satish Babu Sana who is an accused in a case investigated by
Special Director, CBI. At the same time, the CVC also took note of the
fact that Mr. Rakesh Asthana, Special Director, CBI had recorded
information received from various sources that huge amounts of bribe
were given to the Director, CBI to avoid taking any action against Satish
Babu Sana.
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10. It is in these circumstances, which may be in the least be
termed as unfortunate, that the CVC had thought it proper to invoke its
powers under Sections 8(1)(a), 8(1)(d) and 11 of the CVC Act to pass
the impugned order dated 23rd October, 2018 divesting the Director, CBI
of his powers, functions, duties, etc., details of which have already been
noted.
11. The two further orders of the Government of India, Ministry
of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel
& Training of the same date i.e. 23rd October, 2018 were consequential
to the order passed by the CVC, as stated above.
12. As already seen, it is the legality, validity and correctness of
the aforesaid orders and the action spelt out therein that has been
challenged before us in the two writ petitions as well as in the Interlocutory
Applications filed by various applicants, details of which will be noted in
due course.
13. It is at the very threshold of the present discourse that a brief
history of the organization called the CBI may be recalled.
The police force in the country was initially governed by the Police
Act, 1861. Section 3 of the said Act had made the following provision :
"3. Superintendence in the State Government.-
The superintendence of the police throughout a general policedistrict shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government
to which such district is subordinate; and except as authorized
under the provisions of this Act, no person, officer, or Court shall
be empowered by the State Government to supersede, or control
any police functionary."
14. The DSPE Act was enacted in the year 1946 to carve out an
exception to the Police Act, 1861. The same is evident from Section
2(1) which is in the following terms:
"2. Constitution and powers of police establishment.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861)
the Central Government may constitute a special police force to
be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the
investigation in any Union Territory of offences notified under
Section 3.
ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]
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15. Initially the administration of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment was governed by the provisions of Section 4 of the DSPE
Act which contemplated the following:
"4. Superintendence and administration of SPE-
(1) The superintendence of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
shall vest in the Central Government.
(2) The administration of the said police establishment shall vest
in an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government
who shall exercise in respect of that police establishment such of
the powers exercisable by an Inspector General of Police in respect
of the police force in a State, as the Central Government may
specify in this behalf."
16. It is the Delhi Special Police Establishment brought into
existence by DSPE Act, 1946 which today is known as the CBI. The
origin of the organization has been succinctly traced by this Court in
Vineet Narain and others vs. Union of India and another1 and the
relevant details are available in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the report of
this Court in Vineet Narain (supra). Shortly put and as already observed,
investigation of anti-corruption cases; economic offences and ordinary
crimes of special importance have come to be vested in the CBI which
exercises its jurisdiction in the territory of all States and Union Territories
(with consent of the State Governments).
17. The organization i.e. CBI has grown over the years in its role,
power and importance and today has become the premier investigative
and prosecution agency of the country. The high stature and the preeminent position that the institution has acquired is largely on account of
a strong perception of the necessity of having such a premier agency.
Such a perception finds reflection in the conscious attempts of the
Government of the day to introduce reforms, from time to time, so as to
enable the institution to reach greater heights in terms of integrity,
independence and confidence. A close look at such attempts will now
be in order.
 1 (1998) 1 SCC 226
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18. In Vineet Narain (supra) such developments have already
been taken note of in detail. The recommendations of the Committee
headed by Shri N.N. Vohra constituted by Government Order No. S/
7937/SS(ISP)/93 dated 9th July, 1993 and those of the Independent Review
Committee (IRC) constituted by Government Order No. 226/2/97-AVDII dated 8th September, 1997 has had a major role to play in giving the
CBI and the CVC their present shape and form and the pivotal role and
position that these two bodies have come to occupy in the system of law
enforcement in the country. Incidentally, the CVC had been in existence
as an administrative body on being established by Resolution No.24/7/
64-AVD dated 11th February, 1964 issued by the Central Government
until conferment of statutory status by the CVC Act, 2003 on the basis
of recommendations of the IRC, summary of which with regard to the
CBI and CVC may now be taken note of.
"SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
I. CBI and CVC
1. CVC to be conferred statutory status; appointment of Central
Vigilance Commissioner to be made under the hand and seal of
the President (para 4.2)
2. Constitution of a Committee for selection of CVC (para 4.3)
3. CVC to overview CBI's functioning (para 5)
4. CBI's reporting to Government to be streamlined without
diluting its functional autonomy (para 3.3)
5. CVC to have a separate section in its Annual Report on the
CBI's functioning after the supervisory function is transferred to
it (para 6)
6. Constitution of a Selection Committee for identifying a panel of
names for selection of Director CBI; final selection to be made
by ACC from such panel (para 8.2)
7. Central Government to pursue with the State Governments to
set up credible mechanism for selection of Police Chief (para
8.3)
8. Director CBI to have a minimum tenure of 2 years (para 8.4)
9. Transfer of incumbent Director CBI would need endorsement
of the Selection Committee (para 8.5)
ALOK KUMAR VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]
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10. Director CBI to ensure full freedom for allocation of work
within the Agency, including constitution of investigation teams
(para 8.6)
11. Selection/extension of tenure of officers up to the level of
Joint Director (JD) to be decided by a Board under Central
Vigilance Commissioner; JD and above would need the approval
of ACC (para 8.7)
12. Change in the existing Tenure Rules not recommended (para
8.8)
13. Proposals for improvement of infrastructure, methods of
investigation, etc., to be decided urgently (para 8.9.2)
14. No need for creation of a permanent core group in the CBI
(para 8.9.3)
15. Severe disciplinary action against officers who deviate from
prescribed investigation procedures (para 9.1)
16. Director CBI to be responsible for ensuring time-limits for
filing charge-sheets in courts (para 9.2)
17. Document on CBI's functioning to be published within three
months (para 9.4)
18. Essential to protect officers at the decision-making levels from
vexatious enquiries/prosecutions (para 10.6)
19. Secretaries to adhere strictly to prescribed time-frames for
grant of permission for registration of PE/RC. CBI to be free to
proceed if decision not conveyed within the specified time (para
10.9)
20. Secretary of Administrative Ministry to convey a decision
regarding registration of PE/RC within 2 months of receipt of
request. If not satisfied with decision, Director CBI free to make
fresh reference to the Committee headed by Cabinet Secretary
within a period of four weeks and the latter to decide thereon
within a period of four weeks (para 10.10)
21. Protection under the Single Directive not to cover offences
like bribery, when prima facie established in a successful trap
(para 10.12)
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22. Cases of disproportionate assets of Central Government and
All India Services Officers to be brought within the ambit of the
Single Directive (para 10.13)
23. Time-limit of 3 months for sanction for prosecution. Where
consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor
General, additional time of one month could be allowed (paras
10.14 and 10.15)
24. Government to undertake a review of the various types of
offences notified for investigation by the CBI to retain focus on
anti-corruption activities which is its primary objective (para 11.1)
25. Cases falling within the jurisdiction of the State Police which
do not have inter-State or international ramifications should not
be handed over to CBI by States/courts (para 11.2)
26. Government to establish Special Courts for the trial of CBI
cases (11.3)
27. Severe action against officials found guilty of high-handedness;
prompt action against those officials chastised by the courts (para
11.4)
28. Director CBI to conduct regular appraisal of personnel to
weed out the corrupt and inefficient, and maintain strict discipline
within the organization (para 11.5)"
19. In paragraph 58 of the report of this Court in Vineet Narain
(supra) directions under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which
were to hold the field till such time that the necessary statutory
enactments are brought into force, came to be issued by this Court.
Paragraph 58 of the report of this Court in Vineet Narain (supra) insofar
as CVC and CBI are concerned is in the following terms:
"58. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we hereby direct as
under:
I. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (CBI) AND
CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (CVC)
1. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) shall be given
statutory status.
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2. Selection for the post of Central Vigilance Commissioner shall
be made by a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition from a panel of
outstanding civil servants and others with impeccable integrity, to
be furnished by the Cabinet Secretary. The appointment shall be
made by the President on the basis of the recommendations made
by the Committee. This shall be done immediately.
3. The CVC shall be responsible for the efficient functioning of
the CBI. While Government shall remain answerable for the CBI's
functioning, to introduce visible objectivity in the mechanism to be
established for overviewing the CBI's working, the CVC shall be
entrusted with the responsibility of superintendence over the CBI's
functioning. The CBI shall report to the CVC about cases taken
up by it for investigation; progress of investigations; cases in which
charge-sheets are filed and their progress. The CVC shall review
the progress of all cases moved by the CBI for sanction of
prosecution of public servants which are pending with the
competent authorities, specially those in which sanction has been
delayed or refused.
4. The Central Government shall take all measures necessary to
ensure that the CBI functions effectively and efficiently and is
viewed as a non-partisan agency.
5. The CVC shall have a separate section in its Annual Report on
the CBI's functioning after the supervisory function is transferred
to it.
6. Recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI shall
be made by a Committee headed by the Central Vigilance
Commissioner with the Home Secretary and Secretary
(Personnel) as members. The views of the incumbent Director
shall be considered by the Committee for making the best choice.
The Committee shall draw up a panel of IPS officers on the basis
of their seniority, integrity, experience in investigation and anticorruption work. The final selection shall be made by the
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) from the panel
recommended by the Selection Committee. If none among the
panel is found suitable, the reasons thereof shall be recorded and
the Committee asked to draw up a fresh panel.
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7. The Director, CBI shall have a minimum tenure of two years,
regardless of the date of his superannuation. This would ensure
that an officer suitable in all respects is not ignored merely because
he has less than two years to superannuate from the date of his
appointment.
8. The transfer of an incumbent Director, CBI in an extraordinary
situation, including the need for him to take up a more important
assignment, should have the approval of the Selection Committee.
9. The Director, CBI shall have full freedom for allocation of
work within the agency as also for constituting teams for
investigations. Any change made by the Director, CBI in the Head
of an investigative team should be for cogent reasons and for
improvement in investigation, the reasons being recorded.
10. Selection/extension of tenure of officers up to the level of
Joint Director (JD) shall be decided by a Board comprising the
Central Vigilance Commissioner, Home Secretary and Secretary
(Personnel) with the Director, CBI providing the necessary inputs.
The extension of tenure or premature repatriation of officers up
to the level of Joint Director shall be with final approval of this
Board. Only cases pertaining to the appointment or extension of
tenure of officers of the rank of Joint Director or above shall be
referred to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC)
for decision.
11. Proposals for improvement of infrastructure, methods of
investigation, etc. should be decided urgently. In order to strengthen
CBI's in-house expertise, professionals from the Revenue, Banking
and Security sectors should be inducted into the CBI.
12. The CBI Manual based on statutory provisions of the CrPC
provides essential guidelines for the CBI's functioning. It is
imperative that the CBI adheres scrupulously to the provisions in
the Manual in relation to its investigative functions, like raids, seizure
and arrests. Any deviation from the established procedure should
be viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken against
the officials concerned.
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13. The Director, CBI shall be responsible for ensuring the filing
of charge-sheets in courts within the stipulated time-limits, and
the matter should be kept under constant review by the Director,
CBI.
14. A document on CBI's functioning should be published within
three months to provide the general public with a feedback on
investigations and information for redress of genuine grievances
in a manner which does not compromise with the operational
requirements of the CBI.
15. Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution
must be strictly adhered to. However, additional time of one month
may be allowed where consultation is required with the Attorney
General (AG) or any other law officer in the AG's office.
16. The Director, CBI should conduct regular appraisal of
personnel to prevent corruption and/or inefficiency in the agency."
20. What followed thereafter is the enactment of the CVC Act,
2003. The salient features of the CVC Act, so far as the present exercise
is concerned, are to be found in Section 4 of the CVC Act which mandates
that the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the
Vigilance Commissioners shall be made by the President on the
recommendation of a Committee consisting of : (a) the Prime Minister;
(b) the Minister of Home Affairs and (c)the Leader of the Opposition in
the House of the People.
Section 6 of the CVC Act contemplates the removal of Central
Vigilance Commissioner and a Vigilance Commissioner only by order of
the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity as
may be found by the Supreme Court of India on a reference being made
by the President to the Court. However, under sub-section (2) of Section
6 of the CVC Act there is a power in the President of suspension from
office pending inquiry on the reference made to the Supreme Court.
Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the CVC Act also empowers the President
to remove from office the Central Vigilance Commissioner or any
Vigilance Commissioner in the following cases:
"(a). is adjudged an insolvent; or
(b). has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the
Central Government, involves moral turpitude; or
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(c). engages during his term of office in any paid employment
outside the duties of his office; or
(d). is, in the opinion of the President, unfit to continue in office by
reason of infirmity of mind or body; or
(e). has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to
affect prejudicially his functions as a Central Vigilance
Commissioner or a Vigilance Commissioner."
21. Though the Director, CBI is to be appointed by the Central
Government on the recommendation of a similar High Power Committee,
no provision with regard to interim suspension or removal is to be found
in the DSPE Act, 1946, notwithstanding the fact that the said Act i.e.
DSPE Act was amended by the CVC Act, 2003. The CVC Act, 2003
and the amendments made in the DSPE Act, 1946 were clearly made to
bring the provisions thereof in proximity to the directions issued by this
Court in Vineet Narain (supra) so far as the CVC and the CBI is
concerned.
22. Section 8 of the CVC Act deals with functions and powers of
the CVC whereas Section 11 deals with the power of the CVC with
regard to inquiries. Both the powers vested by the aforesaid two
provisions of the CVC Act i.e. Section 8 and Section 11 having been
invoked in the present case to support and justify the impugned actions it
will be necessary to extract and notice the said provisions in extenso:
"8. Functions and powers of Central Vigilance Commission.-
(1). The functions and powers of the Commission shall be to-
(a) exercise superintendence over the functioning of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment in so far as it relates to the
investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), or an offence
with which a public servant specified in sub-section (2) may, under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at
the same trial;
(b). give directions to the Delhi Special Police Establishment for
the purpose of discharging the responsibility entrusted to it under
sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946):
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Provided that while exercising the powers of superintendence under
clause (a) or giving directions under this clause, the Commission
shall not exercise powers in such a manner so as to require the
Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate or dispose of
any case in a particular manner;
(c). inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation to be made on a
reference made by the Central Government wherein it is alleged
that a public servant being an employee of the Central Government
or a corporation established by or under any Central Act,
Government company, society and any local authority owned or
controlled by that Government, has committed an offence under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) or an offence
with which a public servant may, under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial;
(d). inquire or cause an inquiry or investigation to be made into
any complaint against any official belonging to such category of
officials specified in sub-section (2) wherein it is alleged that he
has committed an offence under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) and an offence with which a public servant
specified in subsection (2) may, under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial;
(e). review the progress of investigations conducted by the Delhi
Special Police Establishment into offences alleged to have been
committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of
1988) or the public servant may, under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial;
(f). review the progress of applications pending with the competent
authorities for sanction of prosecution under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988);
(g). tender advice to the Central Government, corporations
established by or under any Central Act, Government companies,
societies and local authorities owned or controlled by the Central
Government on such matters as may be referred to it by that
Government, said Government companies, societies and local
authorities owned or controlled by the Central Government or
otherwise;
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(h). exercise superintendence over the vigilance administration
of the various Ministries of the Central Government or corporations
established by or under any Central Act, Government companies,
societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that
Government:
Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall be deemed to
authorize the Commission to exercise superintendence over the
Vigilance administration in a manner not consistent with the
directions relating to vigilance matters issued by the Government
and to confer power upon the Commission to issue directions
relating to any policy matters;
2. The persons referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) are as
follows:-
(a). members of All-India Services serving in connection with the
affairs of the Union and Group 'A' officers of the Central
Government;
(b). such level of officers of the corporations established by or
under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and other
local authorities, owned or controlled by the Central Government,
as that Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf:
Provided that till such time a notification is issued under this clause,
all officers of the said corporations, companies, societies and local
authorities shall be deemed to be the persons referred to in clause
(d) of sub-section (1).
(c) on a reference made by the Lokpal under proviso to subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
(1 of 2014), the persons referred to in clause (d) of sub-section
(1) shall also include-
(i) members of Group B, Group C and Group D services of the
Central Government;
(ii) such level of officials or staff of the corporations established
by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies
and other local authorities, owned or controlled by the Central
Government, as that Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf:
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Provided that till such time a notification is issued under this clause,
all officials or staff of the said corporations, companies, societies
and local authorities shall be deemed to be the persons referred in
clause (d) of sub-section (1).
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"11. Power relating to inquiries.-
The Commission shall, while conducting any inquiry referred to in
clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 8, have all the
powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and in particular, in respect of the
following matters, namely:-
a. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from
any part of India and examining him on oath;
b. requiring the discovery and production of any document;
c. receiving evidence on affidavits;
d.